OF  THE 

UN  IVE.R.S  I TY 
Of  ILLINOIS 


879 
C81 
v . 4 


classics 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 

University  of  Illinois  Urbana-Champaign  Alternates 


https://archive.org/details/developmentofathOObots 


Cornell  Xdntverstt^ 

lltbaca,  IFlew  Jiiorh 


CORNELL  STUDIES 

IN 

CLASSICAL  PHILOLOGY 


EDITED  BY 

BENJAMIN  IDE  WHEELER,  CHARLES  EDWIN  BENNETT, 
GEORGE  PRENTICE  BRISTOL,  AND 
ALFRED  EMERSON 


No.  IV 

THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION 

By  GEORGE  WILLIS  BOTSFORD,  Ph.D. 


PUBLISHED  FOR  THE  UNIVERSITY 

BY 

GINN  & COMPANY 
1893 


THE  DEVELOPMENT 


OF  THF 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION 


BY 

GEORGE  WILLIS  BOTSFORD,  Ph.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  GREEK  IN  BETHANY  COLLEGE 


Cornell  Studies  in  Classical  Philology,  No.  IV 


Copyright,  1893, 

By  CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 


ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED. 


(€bc  ?ltbenaeum  pros? 

GINN  & COMPANY,  BOSTON,  U.S.A. 


2>7  9 
C 8 | 

V* 


PREFACE. 


I wish  to  thank  Professor  George  E.  Howard,  of  the  Leland 
Stanford  Junior  University,  for  the  interest  in  the  study  of 
political  and  social  institutions,  which  came  to  me  from  his 
instruction,  and  for  the  encouragement  and  help  which  I have 
constantly  received  from  him.  I also  owe  a great  debt  of 
gratitude  to  Professor  Benj.  I.  Wheeler,  of  Cornell  University, 
joint-editor  of  the  Cornell  Studies,  for  his  valuable  assistance 
in  the  preparation  of  the  present  number.  He  has  suggested 
literature,  has  given  his  judgment  on  critical  points,  has  read 
manuscript  and  proof  with  patient  care,  and  has  aided  and 
encouraged  me  in  many  other  ways.  I cherish  for  him  as  a 
scholar,  teacher,  and  friend  feelings  of  sincerest  respect  and 
love.  Dr.  A.  G.  Laird,  of  Cornell  University,  has  rendered 
valuable  service  in  the  tedious  work  of  verifying  citations. 
Mr.  G.  W.  Harris,  librarian  of  the  Cornell  University  Library, 
and  Mr.  W.  H.  Tillinghast,  of  the  Harvard  University  Library, 
are  remembered  for  their  kind  favors. 


GEO.  W.  BOTSFORD. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I.  PAGE 

The  Patriarchal  Theory i 

CHAPTER  II. 

The  Aryan  Gens 27 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Grecian  Gens 68 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Phratry  and  Phyle  90 

CHAPTER  Vo 

The  Four  Ionic  Phylae 102 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Basileia m 

CHAPTER  VII. 

The  Oligarchy  Before  Draco 129 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

The  Draconian  Timocracy 138 

CHAPTER  IX. 

The  Solonian  Revolution 157 


Vlll 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  X. 

PAGE 

The  Tyranny 184 

CHAPTER  XI. 

The  Cleisthenean  Constitution,  and  its  Development  to  the 

Battle  of  Salamis 193 

CHAPTER  XII. 

From  the  Battle  of  Salamis  to  the  Beginning  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesian War 212 

Bibliography  235 

/ 


Index 


243 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ATHENIAN 
CONSTITUTION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 

It  was  the  belief  of  the  ancients  that  the  family  was  the 
primitive  society  out  of  which  the  state  developed.1  They 
were  led  to  this  view  partly  by  observing  that  the  institutions 
of  their  state  and  family  were  throughout  of  a similar  charac- 
ter,2— as  were  also  the  relations  sustained  by  the  individual  to 
family  and  state,  — but  more  directly  by  the  fact  that  each 
ascending  group  in  the  gentile  organization  of  the  ancient  city 
had,  as  its  protecting  deity  and  centre  of  its  common  religious 
life,  an  eponymous  (name-giving)  hero,  from  whom  the  mem- 
bers of  the  respective  groups  were  supposed  to  have  derived 
their  lineage.3  Thus  Aristotle4  says:  “That  society  which 

1 Not  only  did  the  philosophic  thinker  hold  this  view,  but  the  ordinary  man 
constantly  acted  on  the  belief  that  the  state  was  but  a large  family,  and  that  ties  of 
a like  nature  bound  him  to  these  two  societies.  For  illustration  of  this,  read  any  of 
the  Attic  orators  touching  the  public  obligations  and  services  of  the  individual. 

2 That  the  institutions  of  the  state  are  largely  those  of  the  family,  the  former 
being  developed  from  the  latter,  will  be  fully  established,  it  is  hoped,  in  the 
following  pages. 

3 When  a new  organization  of  the  state  took  the  place  of  the  old,  eponymous 
heroes  were  selected  for  the  tribes,  in  case  of  the  Cleisthenean  organization,  by 
the  oracle  at  Delphi;  Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  21.  This  seems  to  indicate  that 
no  other  theory  of  the  state  than  the  one  above  proposed  was  conceivable  or,  at 
least,  acceptable.  Furthermore,  the  Athenians  clung  thus  closely  to  the  primitive 
theory  of  the  state,  even  after  the  opportunity  for  an  improved  conception  had 
been  given  in  the  fictitious  nature  of  the  Cleisthenean  tribe ; cf.  Pseud.  Dem. 
Epitaph.  §§  30-1  ; Rohde,  Psyche,  pp.  158-9,  164. 

4 Politics,  I.  2,  p.  1252  b,  12  ff. 


2 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


nature  has  established  for  daily  support  is  a household  (o ?*os). 

. . . But  the  society  of  many  households  for  lasting  and 
mutual  advantage  is  called  a village  (kw^),  naturally  composed 
of  members  of  one  family,  whom  some  call  o/zoyuAaKre?.  . . . 
When  many  villages  join  themselves  perfectly  together  into 
one  society,  that  society  is  a state  (ttoAis).”  Plato1  and  Cicero2 
present  the  same  view.  Arguments  based  on  the  character 
and  institutions  of  the  state  are  equally  cogent  to  the  mod- 
erns.3 That  proof,  on  the  contrary,  which  depends  upon  the 
religious  belief  as  to  the  genesis  of  the  city  from  a single 
ancestor  through  the  family,  clan,  and  phratry  has  for  us  but 
little  value.  We  must  replace  it,  therefore,  by  an  inquiry  into 
the  development  of  the  city,  in  accordance  with  the  recognized 
methods  of  historical  investigation. 

The  Aryan4  household  (or  family),  as  it  appears  at  the  dawn 
of  history,  possessed  a political,  social,  and  religious  organiza- 
tion which  rendered  it  capable  of  an  isolated,  independent 
existence,  and  was  held  in  partial  subjection  only  by  the 
superior  power  of  the  city.  The  tendencies  were  centrifugal, 
the  family  possessed  large  individuality  and  freedom  of  action, 
and  the  ties  of  kindred  and  home  were  stronger  than  love  of 
country  {city)  or  loyalty  to  the  king.  Thus  the  Greek  house 
was  monarchical  in  government,5  — its  pater  was  priest  and 

1 Laws,  book  III.  pp.  680-1  ; Jowett’s  Trans.,  3 Vol.  V.  pp.  60-1. 

2 De  Officiis,  I.  17. 

3 Maine,  Ancient  Law,  pp.  118  ff . ; Early  Law  and  Custom,  ch.  III.  Spencer, 
Principles  of  Sociology,  I.  p.  730.  Bluntschli,  Theory  of  the  State,  pp.  182-9  > 
he  says,  “ But  even  in  the  Aryan  nations  the  beginnings  of  the  state  are  con- 
nected with  the  bond  of  the  family  and  the  tribe.”  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient 
City,  p.  hi  ff.  Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  pp.  28  ff.  Grote,  ch.  X. 
of  his  History  of  Greece  (small  edition),  I.  p.  561.  Buchholz,  Die  homerischen 
Realien,  II.  1,  p.  6.  Curtius,  Alterthum  und  Gegenwart,  I.  p.  360.  Petersen,  Ueber 
die  Geburtstagsfeier  bei  den  Griechen,  p.  343.  Philippi,  Beitrage  zu  einer 
Geschichte  des  att.  Blirgerrechts,  p.  5.  Muller’s  Handbuch,  2 IV.  pp.  18-20. 
Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  p.  113.  Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Sudslaven, 
pp.  1-2,  21,  32-3,  and  n.  1.  Rohde,  Psyche,  pp.  13,  231. 

4 The  term  “Aryan”  is  used  throughout  this  treatise  in  the  sense  in  which  it 

is  employed  by  anthropologists,  — to  correspond  with  “Indo-European”  (not 

“ Indo-Iranian  ”)  of  the  linguists.  6 Aristotle,  Politics,  I.  7.  1,  p.  1255  b,  19. 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


3 


king, — while  a considerable  judicial  authority,  afterwards  ex- 
ercised by  the  central  government,  was,  in  the  Homeric  age, 
vested  in  the  near  kin.1  Thus  the  kinsmen  of  a murdered  man 
wreaked  vengeance  in  person,  accepted  a compensation  in 
money,  or  voluntarily  offered  their  case  to  the  arbitration  of 
the  state.  The  initiative  was  taken  by  the  anchisteis ; the 
clansmen,  phrateres , and  king  were  helpers.  The  Roman  house- 
hold is  a more  striking  example  of  a society  organized  on  the 
monarchical  principle  and  tending  to  isolation  and  independ- 
ence. The  Roman  pater  was,  in  a stricter  sense,  priest,  judge, 
and  king.  He  had  power  of  life,  death,  and  sale  over  his 
children,  lasting  while  he  lived.  His  authority  was  antagonistic 
to  that  of  the  state.  The  latter  could  not,  therefore,  have  created 
the  patria  potestas , but  finding  it  already  existing,  a sovereignty 
within  its  borders,  tolerated  this  institution  because  unable  to 
suppress  it,  and  succeeded  in  modifying  it  only  in  the  course  of 
centuries.2  Th e patria  potestas,  then,  seems  to  point  to  a time 
when  the  family  was  an  independent  community  under  the 
absolute  rule  of  its  pater ; while  agnation,  cutting  off  the  wife 
from  her  kin,  gave  to  woman  an  inferior  place  and  promoted 
isolation.  The  Patriarchal  Theory,  resting  on  this  strong  basis, 
would  be  further  strengthened,  if  an  example  could  be  found 
of  a family  actually  existing  in  remote  antiquity  as  a separate 
and  autonomous  community,  and  if  the  genesis  of  higher  units 
could  be  traced  from  it  as  a beginning.  The  advocates  of  this 
view  have  thought  that  this  first  point  of  growth  existed  in  the 
patriarchal  family  as  we  see  it,  e.g.,  among  the  Hebrews.3  From 
the  family  of  Abraham  developed  the  tribes  and  finally  the  city 
and  kingdom.  Another  example  of  the  isolated  family  is  found 
in  the  Homeric  picture  of  life  among  the  Cyclopes.  These  are 
a pastoral  people  with  “neither  gatherings  for  council  nor 


1 Anchisteis,  or  descendants  of  the  same  great-grandfather. 

2 Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  p.  in. 

3 Maine,  Ancient  Law,  p.  n8,  “There  is  no  doubt,  of  course,  that  this  theory 
was  originally  based  on  the  scriptural  history  of  the  Hebrew  patriarchs  in  lower 
Asia.” 


4 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


oracles  of  law,  but  they  dwell  in  hollow  caves  on  the  crests  of 
high  hills,  and  each  one  utters  the  law  to  his  children  and  his 
wives,  and  they  reck  not  one  of  another.” 1 While  these 
examples  of  the  patriarchal  family  are,  indeed,  non-Aryan, 
there  are  reasons  for  believing  that  it  existed  also  among  the 
Aryans  in  a period  preceding  that  of  the  clan.  It  is  natural 
to  assume  an  epoch  in  history  marked  by  a tendency  to  sep- 
arate into  families,  even  though  men  were  formerly  grouped  in 
tribes.  This  epoch  begins  when  grazing  becomes  the  chief 
occupation  of  man.2  It  is  easy  to  see  how  such  a tendency 
would  arise  in  a country  where  pasturage  was  scarce3  and  at  a 
time  when  the  notion  of  property  began  to  gain  distinctness.4 
The  instinct  of  self-preservation,  overcoming  the  tendency  to 
independence  and  to  the  individual  acquisition  of  wealth,  led 
finally  to  an  undivided  property  and  a combination  of  the  sons 
on  the  death  of  the  father  instead  of  the  formerly  prevalent 
separation.  Thus  the  gens  arose.  Certain  writers,  as  McLen- 
nan 5 and  Morgan,  attempt  to  displace  this  theory  by  the  view 
that  the  gens  is  older  than  the  family.  They  call  attention  to 
the  statement  that  the  gens  is  heterogeneous  as  to  kinship,6 
and  endeavor  to  account  for  this  quality  by  assuming  a period 


1 Od.  IX.  1 1 2-5.  This  picture  is  probably,  in  part  at  least,  from  actual  life; 
yet  the  elements  of  reality  contained  in  it  seem  to  have  been  gathered  from  non- 
Aryan  sources,  for  the  Cyclopes  have  not  the  Aryan  religion  ; — “ they  pay  no 
heed  to  Zeus,  lord  of  the  Aegis  nor  to  the  blessed  gods  ” and  they  honor  not  the 
guest  and  suppliant ; Od.  IX.  275  ff. 

2 Spencer,  Principles  of  Sociology,  I.  p.  724. 

3 Genesis,  xiii.  5 ff. 

4 Spencer,  Principles  of  Sociology,  I.  p.  717.  McLennan,  Studies  in  Ancient 

History,  ch.  VIII.  Morgan,  Ancient  Society,  part  I.  ch.  I.;  part  II.  ch.  XIV.; 
part  III.  pp.  383-508.  (Development  of  the  several  typical  families  of  history.) 
These  writers  have  attempted  the  reconstruction  of  primitive  Aryan  history  from 
data  supplied  by  non- Aryan  sources.  Their  method  is  open  to  question  and  its 
results  are  wholly  unsatisfactory.  I mention  these  authors  as  representative 
“anthropologists  ” well  known  to  the  English  reader.  Bachofen  (Das  Mutterrecht) 
and  Lubbock  (The  Origin  of  Civilization  and  the  Primitive  Condition  of  Man), 
were  among  the  earliest  to  win  fame  in  this  field  of  investigation. 

6 Studies  in  Ancient  History,  pp.  127  ff. 

0 Pollux,  VIII.  hi. 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


5 


antecedent  to  that  of  the  monogamic  family  when  kinship  was 
reckoned  through  females  only,  assuming  at  the  same  time  a 
general  prevalence  of  exogamy  during  the  same  period.  Under 
such  conditions  the  gens  would  not  be  composed  of  a number 
of  distinct  and  entire  households,  but  of  fractions  of  house- 
holds ; clansmen  would  not  be  kinsmen,  but  the  utmost  heter- 
ogeneity of  relationship  would  characterize  this  group.  There 
is  no  ground  whatever  for  such  an  hypothesis.  Some  gentes 
are  indeed  spoken  of  as  heterogeneous.1  This  quality,  how- 
ever, did  not  belong  to  all  the  gentes,  and  was  not  in  any 
instance  prominent  enough  to  influence  the  conception  of  the 
ancients  as  to  their  origin.  Besides,  the  heterogeneity,  real  or 
apparent,  may  be  explained  satisfactorily  in  the  following 
manner.  In  the  first  place,  entire  families  were  adopted  into 
the  gens.  A proof  that  such  a custom  may  of  itself  account 
for  the  heterogeneity  of  the  gens  will  appear  when  we  come  to 
consider  the  nature  of  the  Cleisthenean  deme.  It  may  be 
stated  here  that  the  deme  exhibited  as  to  kinship  of  its  mem- 
bers the  greatest  possible  heterogeneity  ; yet  such  was  the 
influence  of  pre-existing  conditions  upon  the  minds  of  the 
Athenians  that  they  could  not  regard  the  deme  otherwise  than 
as  a gens,  and  gave  to  it  accordingly  an  essentially  family 
character.  If  this  is  true  of  the  Cleisthenean  period,  how 
much  more  must  it  have  been  true  in  the  earliest  times,  when 
men  still  lived  in  villages,  and  bounded  their  sympathies  by 
their  kinship.  The  people  of  Attica,  for  example,  were  a mix- 
ture of  races.  Noble  families  came  thither  from  many  parts 
of  Greece2  and  were  incorporated  by  adoption  into  the  village 
communities.  The  villagers  were  glad  to  receive  these 
strangers,  since  it  increased  their  wealth  and  military  power.3 


1 Pollux,  VIII.  hi,  referred  to  above. 

2 Curtius,  History  of  Greece,  I.  p.  322  ff.  His  chief  authority  here  is  Thuc. 
I.  2. 

3 Thucydides,  I.  2-6.  But  when  there  was  no  longer  need  of  military  strength, 
the  admission  of  strangers  was  stoutly  resisted.  Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der 
Siidslaven,  p.  29. 


6 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


New  families  of  a community  were  regarded  as  relatives, 
though,  of  course,  no  relationship  could  be  traced  till  a real 
connection  should  perchance  be  formed  by  intermarriage.  I 
suspect,  however,  that  this  is  not  the  cause  of  that  hetero- 
geneity which  is  so  great  a stumbling-block  to  some.  Rather 
it  rises  from  the  idea  of  the  cognate  family,  which  was  a 
closely  related  body  of  kinsmen  within  the  gens  and  with  most 
sharply  defined  limits.  Individuals  outside  of  the  circle,  though 
within  the  same  gens,  were  regarded  as  kinsmen  only  in  a 
relatively  faint  degree.  And  when  the  synoecism  of  Attica 
took  place,  and  the  gennetae  became  widely  dispersed,  so  as  to 
make  intermarriage  impracticable,  there  is  no  wonder  that  men 
forgot  the  more  distant  kinship,  the  cognate  family  practically 
superseding  the  gens.1 

Again,  as  a basis  for  the  theory  of  heterogeneity,  Morgan 
tells  us  further  that  the  gentes  were  as  a rule  exogamous  down 
to  historical  times,  e.g.,  in  Greece.2  I have  not  found  the 
slightest  trace  of  a prohibition  of  intermarriage  of  near  kins- 
men among  the  Greeks,  except  in  a few  cases  of  special  near- 
ness, as  between  parent  and  child.  Such  intermarriage  of  near 
relatives  was  the  rule  among  both  the  East  Dorians 3 and  the 
Ionians.  Among  the  Romans,  marriage  within  the  sixth 
degree  of  relationship  was  considered  sinful.4  Beyond  this, 
we  know  of  no  restriction  at  Rome  ; and  this  of  itself  is  not 
sufficient  evidence  to  prove  exogamy  of  the  gens.  There  was 
in  ancient  India  a considerable  variety  of  restrictions  as  to  the 

1 Philippi,  Geschichte  d.  att.  Biirgerrechts,  p.  191.  Among  the  South-Slavo- 
nians,  where  the  gentile  system  remains  to-day  as  a living  organism,  the  feeling 
of  kinship  extends  even  to  the  phyle,  while  in  the  phratry  it  is  surprisingly  vital. 
The  members  of  the  House-community  are,  in  almost  all  cases,  of  kindred  blood. 
Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  20-1,  33,  40,  75. 

2 Morgan,  Ancient  Society,  p.  224.  He  has  derived  all  his  information,  it 
appears,  from  Grote. 

8 Laws  of  Gortyn.  This  speaks  merely  of  heiresses  ; but  when  the  custom  of 
marrying  an  heiress  to  her  nearest  kinsman  has  arisen,  exogamy,  if  it  once 
prevailed,  cannot  long  survive. 

4 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  p.  385  (first  ed.)  thinks  that 
this  was  not  a primitive  restriction. 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


7 


intermarriage  of  near  kin.  Ordinarily  the  statement  occurs  of 
a prohibition  of  intermarriage  between  Sapindas  (Greek  An- 
chisteis ).1  This  is  usually  accompanied  by  a prohibition  also 
within  the  gotra , or  gens.2  The  first  is  apparently  the  older 
usage,  the  second  being  an  outgrowth  from  it  in  accordance 
with  the  principle  that  “usage  which  is  reasonable  generates 
usage  which  is  unreasonable,” 3 — a principle  which  has  a 
wide  application  in  the  genesis  of  Hindoo  customs.  In  the 
Aryan  period  there  seems  to  have  been  no  restriction  except 
in  cases  of  special  nearness.4  The  Aryan  gens  was  not, 
therefore,  exogamous.  Hence  the  objection  cannot  be  made 
to  the  theory  of  development  from  family  to  gens  that  “the 
family  does  not  enter  whole  into  the  gens.” 5 The  same 
authority  which  declares  that  the  city  is  made  up  of  a cer- 
tain number  of  gentes  declares  also  that  the  gens  is  com- 
posed of  a certain  number  of  families.6  Cases  of  polygamy, 
polyandry,  and  promiscuity  among  the  Aryan  nations,  treated 
by  McLennan  as  survivals  from  pre-monogamian  stages  of 
development,  prove  on  closer  inquiry  to  be  later  growths 
under  the  influence  of  peculiar  conditions.7  Leist  holds  the 


1 Gautama,  IV.  3.  5. 

2 Apastamba,  II.  5.  11.  15;  Vasishtha,  VIII.  1. 

3 Maine,  Ancient  Law,  p.  18. 

4 For  further  data  leading  to  this  conclusion,  see  Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung 
und  Urgeschichte,  p.  2566  n.  Cf.  Weber,  Indische  Studien,  X.  pp.  75  ff.  Zimmer, 
Altindisches  Leben,  p.  323,  regards  the  restriction  enjoined  by  the  Dharma5astra  as 
a development  from  a far  narrower  restriction.  In  the  Rigveda,  marriage 
between  brother  and  sister  is  considered  sinful  (Rv.  X.  10)  ; yet  Hindoo 
mythology  gives  many  examples  of  such  unions  ; Zimmer,  loc.  cit. 

5 Morgan,  Ancient  Society,  p.  469. 

6 Gilbert,  Handbuch,  I.  p.  111,  n.  1. 

7 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  78,  n.  r\  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium, 
p.  419,  n.  8 ; p.  123.  Cf.  Delbriick,  Die  indogermanischen  Verwandtschafts- 
namen,  Band  XI.  der  Abhandl.  d.  phil.-histor.  Classe  d.  kgl.  sachs.  Gesellsch.  d. 
Wiss.,  1889,  p.  545,  who  proves  definitely  that  polyandry  did  not  exist  in  Aryan 
times,  that  peculiar  conditions  brought  it  into  being  in  Sparta.  Zimmer,  Altin- 
disches Leben,  p.  325,  declares  that  it  was  impossible  among  the  ancient  Hindoos. 
Later,  however,  an  occasional  example  occurred,  Delbriick,  op.  cit.,  p.  588. 


8 


TIIK  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


view  that  monogamy  was  the  earliest  form  of  marriage,  Aryan 
and  human,  and  that  promiscuity  was  a degradation  from  it 
among  men  who  passed  their  lives  in  indolence  or  in  hunt- 
ing, fishing,  and  war,  abandoning  the  maintenance  and  su- 
pervision of  children  to  the  women  of  the  tribe.1  This  theory 
is  probable  in  itself,  and  explains  the  known  facts  more  satis- 
factorily than  any  other  proposed.  The  Aryans  were,  for  the 
most  part,  unaffected  by  the  common  degradation  and  main- 
tained, therefore,  as  a rule,  the  monogamic  marriage.  If 
Leist’s  view  is  correct,  as  it  seems  to  be,  all  gentes  which 
have  had  an  organic  growth  must  have  sprung  from  fam- 
ilies.2 

Evidence  in  favor  of  the  Patriarchal  Theory  of  a positive 
nature  and  bearing  greater  conviction  is  yet  to  be  adduced. 
Those  gentes  which  are  mentioned  as  heterogeneous,  whose 
members  were  unable  to  discover  any  relationship  in  blood 
with  each  other  and  whose  ancestors  were  said  to  be  fabulous 
heroes,  arose  before  the  dawn  of  history.  We  are  prevented 
thus  from  tracing  their  origin  and  growth  with  the  certainty 
and  precision  of  eye-witnesses.  Yet  could  these  differ  in 
nature  materially  from  those  which  arose  in  historical  times, 
and  whose  development  we  are  able  to  trace  ? A good  ex- 
ample of  the  latter  class  is  the  gens  of  the  Buselidae  at 
Athens.  It  consisted  of  five  houses  sprung  from  a real  an- 
cestor ; its  members  were  bound  together  by  the  ties  of  a 
common  name,  blood  and  worship  ; it  wanted  only  autonomy 


1 Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  p.  123. 

2 There  were  gentes  of  later  formation,  arising  from  various  causes,  which 
were  largely  or  wholly  fictitious.  Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  pp.  297-8  ; Krauss, 
Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  pp.  57-8.  The  view  above  presented  may  be 
considered  well  established  for  the  Aryan  race  as  far  back  as  the  evidence 
afforded  by  the  comparative  study  of  language  reaches.  Bopp,  Kuhn  and  Fick, 
the  three  eminent  authorities  on  Indo-European  philology,  support  this  theory, 
while  no  student  of  any  prominence  in  this  field  has  ever  believed  in  “ Mutter- 
recht.”  Delbriick,  op.  cit .,  pp.  386-8,  offers  convincing  evidence  in  favor  of  the 
Patriarchal  theory.  Cf.  Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  p.  546. 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


9 


to  make  it  a perfect  gens.* 1 II. III. IV. V. VI. VII.  Again,  among  the  South-Slavo- 
nians  the  members  of  a House-community  are  in  almost  all 
cases  related  in  blood.2  A House-community  is  composed  of 
several  families  and  corresponds  closely  to  a gens.  Its  mem- 
bers can  trace  their  kinship  with  one  another,  especially  since 
the  community  never  grows  large,  — so  as  to  contain  over 
seventy  souls  or  thereabout,  — but  readily  divides  into  several 
new  communities.3  These  new  communities  still  retain  for 
one  another  the  feeling  of  kinship,  still  deliberate  in  common 
concerning  the  welfare  of  the  whole,  still  hold  certain  property 
in  common.  A union  of  such  related  communities  is  called 
a “Brotherhood”  ( bratstvo , </>par/ota).4  Were  these  communities 

1 Buselus  had  five  sons ; these  grew  up  and  became  the  heads  of  families ; 
thus  five  households  grew  out  of  the  one  household  of  Buselus  ; Demosthenes, 
XLIII.  19.  This  group  of  families  retained  for  one  another  a feeling  of  kinship, 
and  was  called  a gens  (ytvos)  ; Dem.  XLIII.  20.  The  families  composing  it  were 
called  households  ( oJkol ).  It  possessed  all  the  characteristics  of  a gens,  its  mem- 
bers being  bound  together  by  the  following  ties  : 

I.  The  possession  of  a common  name,  the  patronymic  Buselidae ; Dem. 
XLIII.  79. 

II.  The  possession  of  a common  burial  place  ; Dem.  XLIII.  79  ; cf.  LVII.  28. 

III.  Mutual  rights  of  inheritance  according  to  propinquity  ; Dem.  XLIII.  3,  51-2. 

IV.  a.  Right  to  marry  an  heiress  ; Dem.  XLIII.  54-5.  b.  Duty  of  endowing 
a destitute  orphan  girl  ; Dem.  XLIII.  54-5. 

V.  Duty  of  performing  (or  assisting  at)  the  nomizomena  and  worship  of  the 
dead  ; Dem.  XLIII.  62-4,  66-7. 

VI.  Duty  of  providing  against  the  extinction  of  the  several  households  ; Dem. 
XLIII.  74-5. 

VII.  Duty  of  vengeance  in  case  of  homicide  ; Dem.  XLIII.  57-8.  It  is  evi- 
dent that  this  gens  differed  in  no  respect  from  those  which  existed  before  the  city. 
If  it  had  been  autonomous  and  depended  on  its  own  strength  for  protection,  it 
might  have  grown  much  larger.  But  disintegration  set  in  early.  While  three  (or 
four)  of  these  families  intermarried  and  thus  maintained  with  each  other  the 
closest  relations  (Dem.  XLIII.  23,  55,  73),  the  household  of  Stratius  did  not 
intermarry,  and  had  a separate  tomb  (Dem.  XLIII.  79-80),  and  became  thus,  in 
time,  cut  off  from  all  those  privileges  and  duties  connected  with  the  gentile  bond. 
See  e.g.,  Dem.  XLIII.  56.  From  this  we  may  understand  how  the  ties  of  blood 
within  the  gens  may  be  weakened  and  finally  forgotton. 

2 Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  p.  75. 

8 Krauss,  loc.  cit.,  and  pp.  111-4. 

4 Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  p.  33  and  n.  1 ; also  p.  40;  cf.  Zimmer, 
Altindisches  Leben,  p.  160. 


IO 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


autonomous  and  self-protecting,  they  would  naturally  hold  to- 
gether longer,  and  with  increase  in  size  would  come  inability 
to  trace  kinship  of  member  with  member.  At  the  same 
time  the  ancestor  would  be  placed  much  farther  back  into 
the  past  than  he  really  belonged  and  the  events  of  his  life 
hidden  beneath  a rich  growth  of  legend.1  When  this  should 
be  accomplished,  we  should  have  the  gens  as  described  by  the 
ancient  writers. 

It  would  be  a fruitless  task  to  attempt  a representation  in 
detail  of  the  family  in  the  period  of  its  isolation.  It  would 
be  useless  in  its  results,  even  granting  such  a thing  to  be 
possible  ; for  in  the  history  of  the  Aryan  races,  in  the  remotest 
times  of  which  we  have  knowledge,  we  are  obliged  to  deal  with 
families  as  component  members  of  the  gens,  and  not  as  isolated 
units.  Long  before  the  dawn  of  history,  the  family  had  de- 
veloped into  the  gens  in  the  manner  to  be  explained  hereafter. 
I shall  endeavor  here  to  give  a brief  consideration  of  the  Aryan 
family  as  it  existed  within  the  tribe  in  the  earliest  times  of 
which  we  have  any  knowledge. 

The  Aryan  family  was  in  the  main  monogamic2  and  under 
the  control  of  the  father.  A man  desiring  a housekeeper  and 

1 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  42. 

2 A strictly  monogamic  family  is  not  to  be  assumed,  in  view  of  all  the  facts.  As 
Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  pp.  2 559-60,  has  observed,  traces 
of  polygamy  occur  among  most  of  the  Aryan  races  at  the  dawn  of  their  history  : 
for  the  Vedic  Hindoos,  Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  pp.  323-5;  for  the  ancient  Per- 
sians, Hdt.  I.  135  ; for  the  Gauls,  Caesar  de  Bel.  Gal.  VI.  19  (the  interpretation 
of  this  passage  is  doubtful);  for  the  ancient  Germans,  Tacit.  Germ.  XVIII. 
(polygamy  is  here  exceptional);  for  the  modern  South-Slavonians,  Krauss,  Sitte 
und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  p.  229.  On  the  other  hand,  if  polygamy  had  been  wide- 
spread it  would  have  impressed  itself  more  distinctly  upon  early  Aryan  society, 
which,  in  point  of  fact,  rests  wholly  on  a basis  of  monogamy.  In  many  cases, 
polygamy  is  seen  clearly  to  be  of  later  growth,  e.  g .,  among  the  South-Slavonians, 
— to  avoid  extinction  of  family  through  childlessness.  There  was  probably  no 
law  or  sentiment  against  polygamy  in  the  beginning;  but  the  method  of  procuring 
wives  — by  robbery  or  purchase  — made  it,  for  the  most  part,  impracticable  for 
any  but  the  powerful  or  the  wealthy  to  procure  more  than  one  wife,  cf.  Delbriick, 
Hie  indogermanischen  Vewandtschaftsnamen,  pp.  386-8;  Starcke,  Die  primitive 
Familie  in  ihrer  Entstehung  und  Entwickelung,  Leipzig,  1888  ; Schrader,  Sprach- 
vergleichung und  Urgeschichte,  pp.  2 534—5- 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


slave,  obtained  a wife  for  that  object  by  robbery  or  purchase. 
In  the  case  of  strong,  warlike  gentes  robbery  was  the  usual 
means,  and  the  wives  under  such  circumstances  were  taken 
from  neighboring  clans.  Weaker  gentes  were  obliged  to  pro- 
cure their  wives  by  purchase  either  from  within  or  from 
without  the  gens.1  It  follows  from  these  conditions  that  the 
father  was  proprietor  of  wife  and  children,  and  had  powers  of 
life,  death,  and  sale  over  all  under  his  authority.  This  power 
he  maintained  only  so  long  as  he  possessed  the  necessary 
physical  strength.  When  old  and  weak  he  was  liable  to  be  put 
to  death  by  his  mature  sons.2  The  mother  enjoyed  hardly 
more  influence  than  the  child.  She  must  work  constantly  to 
support  the  family,  — she  cannot  eat  with  her  husband,  but 
must  wait  till  he  is  satisfied  and  then  eat  what  remains.3  At 
her  husband’s  death,  she  was  killed  on  his  grave.4  The 
children  were  the  father’s  property  and  differed  little  from 
slaves.  They  continued  under  their  father’s  authority  till  his 
death  or  old  age  and  then  the  sons  took  the  property  to  them- 
selves. Sometimes  it  was  divided  equally  among  the  brothers; 
but  more  often  the  eldest  gained  the  upper  hand  and  compelled 
his  brothers  to  serve  him.  If  such  a family  held  together 


1 It  is  wrong  to  suppose  that  all  gentes  were  exogamous,  or  that  near  relatives 
were,  as  a rule,  forbidden  to  intermarry.  This  will  be  discussed  in  the  following 
chapter. 

2 This  holds  for  the  ancient  Germans,  Scandinavians,  and  Vedic  Hindoos;  Zim- 
mer, Altindisches  Leben,  pp.  326-8.  Among  the  South-Slavonians,  old  people 
were  treated  with  great  disrespect  and  neglect;  Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siid- 
slaven,  pp.  94-5;  cf.  p.  81. 

3 This  was  the  custom  among  the  South-Slavonians,  Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  96,  and 
among  the  ancient  Greeks,  since  Homer  speaks  of  the  women  taking  their  meals 
in  their  own  apartments. 

4 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urges chichte,  p.  565.  This  was  the  custom 
among  the  Thracians  (Hdt.  V.  5),  the  Germans  (Zimmer,  op.  cit.,  p.  330),  the  Slavs 
(Zimmer,  loc.  cit.),  occasionally  occurred  among  the  Greeks  (Paus.  IV.  2),  may  have 
existed  among  the  most  ancient  Hindoos,  and  seems  to  have  been  Aryan  (Zimmer, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  329,  331).  The  object  of  this  cruel  usage  was  probably  to  make  the 
life  of  the  father  dear  to  the  household.  Whatever  form  of  ancestor-worship 
existed  at  this  time  must  have  been  grounded  upon  fear  rather  than  upon  love 
and  piety. 


2 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


long,  it  became  a gens.  Daughters  were  prized  less  highly 
than  sons,  since  they  were  useless  in  war  and  the  chase. 
Warlike  gentes  found  it  more  economical  to  obtain  their  wives 
by  robbery  than  to  rear  them  from  childhood,  — hence  the 
prevalence  of  infanticide  of  females  among  such  gentes.1 
Relationship  was  necessarily  agnatic.2  The  wife  was  cut  off 
from  her  kindred  and  was  to  them  as  one  that  is  dead.  Her 
relatives  were  enemies  of  her  husband’s  gens.  At  this  early 
period  there  was  no  love  of  country,  since  the  gentes  were 
nomadic  or  half-nomadic;  there  was  no  ancestor-worship  of  the 
noble  type  found  among  Greeks  and  Hindoos,  while  men  put 
to  death  their  aged  parents.  Selfishness  was,  in  general,  the 
rule  of  life.  Yet  there  must  have  been  some  affection  be- 
tween parents  and  children,  some  love  of  brother  for  brother, 
else  no  development  of  higher  moral  principles  had  been 
possible. 

Such  in  outline  was  the  primitive  Aryan  family.  The  next 
stage  in  its  growth  will  now  be  considered.  There  are  strong 
reasons  for  believing  that  this  stage  is  represented  in  its  main 
features  by  the  House-community  as  it  exists  to-day  among 
the  South-Slavonians.3  The  organization  and  general  character 
of  this  type  of  family  is  as  follows.  The  South-Slavonian 
House-community  consists  of  not  more  than  65-70  members, 
all  related  within  the  fourth  or  fifth  degree  (agnatic).4  The 
government  is  monarchical,5  the  house-father  wielding  practi- 


1 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  U rgeschichte,  pp.  562-4.  Among  the  ancient 
Hindoos  “to  have  daughters  was  a sorrow”;  Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  320. 
The  house  and  name  depend  upon  sons  not  daughters;  Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch 
der  Siidslaven,  p.  472. 

2 There  was  an  Aryan  name  for  father’s  brother  but  not  for  mother’s  brother; 
Schrader,  op.  cit.,  p.  539.  Cf.  Delbriick,  Die  indogermanischen  Verwandtschafts- 
namen,  pp.  586-8.  Again,  no  common  Aryan  designation  existed  for  son-in-law 
(Schrader,  op.  cit .,  p.  542),  nor  for  any  of  the  wife’s  relatives,  id.,  pp.  543-4.  Thus 
no  kinship  was  acknowledged  between  the  families  of  husband  and  wife.  Cf. 
Delbriick,  op.  cit.,  p.  382. 

8 Schrader,  op.  cit.,  p.  569. 

4 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  75.  Most  families  are  far  smaller  than  this. 

0 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  80. 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


3 


cally  almost  unlimited  authority.  There  is,  indeed,  a family 
council,  made  up  of  the  adult  males,  before  which  the  house- 
father must  lay  all  business  of  importance  ; yet  it  rarely 
happens  that  anyone  here  opposes  his  will.1  He  is  never 
called  proprietor,  — but  manager,  elder,  or  the  like,  — and  has 
no  more  right  to  the  property  than  the  other  grown  up  men.2 
His  duties  are  as  follows:  he  supervises  the  labors  of  the 
members  personally,  admonishes  the  culpable,  keeps  order  in 
the  house,  and  settles  quarrels  among  those  under  his  authority. 
He  represents  the  whole  family  and  each  of  its  members  before 
the  courts,  protecting  them  from  every  injustice.  He  must 
himself  act  impartially  towards  all.  On  the  other  hand,  noth- 
ing of  importance  in  the  family  may  be  undertaken  without  his 
consent,  and  to  him  must  be  accorded  the  highest  honor  and 
respect  by  all  the  members  of  the  Community.  He  is  treas- 
urer also  of  the  common  funds  and  may  expend  money  to  meet 
the  needs  of  the  household.3  He  has  the  right  to  nominate 
his  successor.  In  most  cases  his  oldest  son  or  younger  brother 
is  thus  appointed.  But  if  he  dies  without  making  a nomina- 


1 The  council  generally  meets  after  supper  ; — in  winter,  around  the  kitchen  fire, 
in  summer,  under  a tree  in  the  court;  Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  ioi.  The  business  gener- 
ally has  reference  to  the  giving  out  of  a maid  in  marriage,  construction  of  build- 
ings, or  any  important  financial  matter.  The  house-father  first  states  the  question 
and  advises  as  to  what  ought  to  be  done.  Rarely  does  anyone  speak  unless 
invited  to  do  so;  id.  pp.  101-2.  “When  an  older  man  speaks,  a younger  should 
keep  silent,”  is  a Slavonian  proverb;  id.  p.  102.  No  vote  is  taken,  but  there  must 
be  unanimity;  id.  p.  102.  If  any  man  dissents,  he  is  overwhelmed  by  the  per- 
suasions of  his  relatives  both  male  and  female;  id.  p.  103. 

2 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  79:  “ Er  ist  bloss  der  Erste  unter  mehreren  Him  Gleichbe- 
rechtigten .”  Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  p.  571,  is  of  the 
opinion  that  to  restore  the  Aryan  family,  we  must  substitute  for  this  limited 
authority  the  severe  potestas  of  the  Roman  type.  While  this  seems  true  for  the 
primitive  Aryan  family,  there  was  probably  a considerable  weakening  of  the 
potestas  in  many  tribes  before  the  separation  of  the  races.  A patria  potestas  of 
the  Roman  type  must  not  be  assumed  for  the  early  Greeks,  Slavonians,  Hindoos, 
and  Germans. 

3 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  88-9.  As  special  honors  are  mentioned  his  right  to 
wear  better  clothes  than  the  others  and  to  serve  his  children  before  the  others  at 
table. 


14 


TIIE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


tion,  the  oldest  man  of  the  community  generally  succeeds,  if 
qualified.1  The  house-father  is  liable  to  deposal  under  the 
following  circumstances  :2 

1.  When  he  has  reached  the  age  of  60.  At  this  time  of  life 
he  generally  resigns  voluntarily. 

2.  When  he  by  his  conduct  brings  shame  upon  the  family : 
e.g.,  when  he  is  convicted  of  a crime  or  of  drunkenness,  or 
spends  the  public  money  extravagantly  or  selfishly. 

3.  When  he  shows  partiality. 

4.  When  he  is  afflicted  by  some  chronic  sickness  which 
hinders  him  in  the  performance  of  his  duties. 

There  is  also  a house-mother  who  was  originally  the  wife  of 
the  father  ; yet  she  is  often  passed  by  in  favor  of  the  most 
intelligent  and  prudent  woman  of  the  household.  The  house- 
mother superintends  the  women  in  their  work,  appointing  to 
each  her  task.  No  one  is  allowed  to  sit  idle.  She  sees  that 
the  guests  are  well  entertained  and  that  they  have  sufficient 
food  and  drink.3  No  expenses  may  be  incurred  without  the 
house-father’s  approval.  Her  influence  in  the  family  is  great, 
and  she  also  enjoys  in  return  for  her  labor,  certain  honors  and 
privileges.4 

Each  member  of  the  community  is  obliged  to  render  un- 
conditional obedience  to  the  head  of  the  house,  to  require  the 
same  of  his  wife,  to  care  for  house  property  as  if  it  were  his 
own,  to  live  in  peace  and  concord  with  his  fellows.  He  has 
a right  to  take  part  in  the  consultations  of  the  family,  to  give 
his  opinion  and  vote,  to  have  decent  clothing  for  himself,  wife, 


1 In  the  latter  case,  the  eldest  calls  the  council,  announces  the  death  of  the 
chief,  and  advises  to  consult  as  to  a successor.  Then  the  next  to  the  eldest 
arising  advises  to  hold  to  the  ancient  customs  and  to  consider  the  eldest  as  chief. 
Then  follow  the  ceremonies  of  paying  respects  to  their  new  chief  ; Krauss,  op.  cit., 
pp.  85-6. 

2 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  86.  The  deposal  is  made  in  the  council  under  the  lead  of 
the  eldest  (after  the  chief). 

8 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  89-90. 

4 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  90. 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


15 


and  children,  and  a little  money  for  pet  indulgences,  and  oc- 
casionally to  entertain  guests.  Himself,  wife  and  children 
may  share  in  the  religious  privileges  of  the  community,  and 
may  expect  protection  and  just  treatment.  Expenses  for  the 
marriage  of  son  or  daughter  are  provided  for  by  the  house- 
hold.1 If  he  goes  abroad  to  seek  his  fortune  and  fails,  he  is 
at  liberty  to  return  to  his  community.2 

The  marriage  ceremonies  of  the  South-Slavonians  have,  as 
it  appears,  grown  out  of  the  custom  of  capture,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  institutions  of  hearth-worship  and  ancestor- 
worship  on  the  other.3  The  father,  or  nearest  male  relative, 
gives  the  maiden  in  marriage  into  the  power  of  her  husband.4 
The  custom  of  robbery  has,  for  the  most  part,  ceased  at  this 
stage,  and  the  relations  between  the  two  families  are  peaceful 
and  friendly.5  The  object  of  marriage  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  male  is  to  have  a housekeeper  and  a mother  of  his 
children.6  The  youth  becomes  a man  at  marriage,  and  takes, 
accordingly,  an  independent  standing  in  the  community.7 
There  was  formerly  among  the  South-Slavonians  a prohibition 
of  intermarriage  within  the  phratry  {brats tv 6) ; yet  this  prohi- 
bition did  not  originally  exist,  and  has  now  again  fallen  into 


1 Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Sudslaven,  p.  101. 

2 Id.,  p.  99. 

3 The  bridegroom  and  party,  arriving  at  the  house  of  the  bride’s  father,  find 
the  doors  barred,  and  must  purchase  admission;  Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  394.  In 
Bulgaria  it  is  customary  at  the  bridegroom’s  door  to  throw  a man’s  girdle  about 
the  bride  and  attempt  to  draw  her  into  the  house.  She  at  first  resists,  but  finally, 
receiving  a promise  of  something  which  she  desires,  allows  herself  to  be  drawn  in ; 
id.,  p.  449.  For  ceremonies  connected  with  the  hearth,  id.,  pp.  395,  386  ; cf. 
Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  312;  Rigveda  X.  pp.  85,  38. 

4 In  Croatia,  the  bridegroom  slaps  the  bride’s  ears  to  show  that  he  is  her  master. 

Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  385;  cf.  Rigveda  X.  85,  24-5. 

6 Kinship  through  marriage  is  not  recognized,  — the  South-Slavonians  call  their 
wife’s  kinsmen  11  friends” ; Krauss,*?/.  cit.,  p.  14.  This  holds  for  the  Aryans  in 
common  ; Delbriick,  Die  indogermanischen  Verwandtschaftsnamen,  p.  591.  As 
time  went  on  a kinship  developed;  id.  See  also  Schrader,  op.  cit.,  p.  545. 

6 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  496,  493.  Cf.  Zimmer,  op.  cit.,  pp.  318-9,  for  Vedic  India. 

7 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  490. 


l6  THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

disuse.1  The  wife  is  mistress  within  the  house  (where  this 
exists  apart  from  the  community),  and  even  of  her  aged 
parents-in-law ; 2 yet  remains  distinctly  inferior  to  her  hus- 
band.3 She  drudges  to  support  the  household,  and  is  rewarded 
with  little  affection  and  kindness  from  her  lord.4  Monogamy 
is  the  rule,  but  if  the  wife  is  sterile,  another  may  be  chosen.6 
The  present  Slavonian  custom  permits  the  widow  to  marry 
again  ; yet  here  there  has  taken  place  a great  change  from 
early  Aryan  usage.6 

Children  are  under  the  absolute  power  of  the  father.7  Sons 
are  especially  prized,  since  on  these  alone  depend  the  continu- 
ance of  family  and  name.8  Children  must  respect  and  obey 


1 Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  p.  40.  Intermarriage  within  the 
eighth  and  ninth  degree,  male  line,  and  within  the  fourth  degree,  female  line,  is 
now  considered  a sin  and  shame;  id.,  p.  336.  Other  impediments  to  marriage 
are  bodily  defects  : blindness,  stinking  breath,  impotence,  etc.;  toe.  cit. 

2 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  479,  481,  494-5.  Cf.  Rigveda,  X.  85,  46. 

3 South-Slavonian  proverbs  : “ he  who  whips  not  his  wife  is  no  man  ” ; “ the 
bitch  may  bark,  the  wife  must  hold  her  tongue”;  “a  man  of  straw  is  equal  to  a 
a woman  of  gold”;  Krauss,  op.  cit.,  94,  483.  The  inferiority  of  the  wife  appears 
also  from  the  fact  that  no  Aryan  word  existed  to  designate  husband  and  wife  as 
a pair;  Delbriick,  op.  cit.,  p.  440. 

4 Selfishness  of  husband,  Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  527-8;  often  desires  the  death  of 
his  wife,  and  refuses  to  be  comforted  if  she  recovers  from  sickness;  id.,  p.  528. 
She  has  no  voice  in  the  management  of  the  house;  id.,  p.  94.  She  is  not  adviser 
and  friend  in  any  high  sense;  id.,  p.  499.  “A  prudent  wife  is  a great  blessing,”  — 
a proverb  which  must  have  arisen  in  comparatively  late  times,  and  does  not 
represent  the  opinion  prevalent  to-day.  She  is  regarded  merely  as  a grown-up 
child;  id.,  p.  501. 

5 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  229.  Cf.  pp.  530,  533,  553.  Apastamba,  XI.  5.  11,  13, 
probably  goes  back  to  the  earliest  times.  Polygamy  was  permitted  in  primitive 
times,  but  could  not  have  been  extensive;  Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und 
Urgeschichte,  p.  560;  Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  pp.  324-5. 

0 The  widow  must  not  marry  again;  Delbriick,  op.  cit.,  p.  555.  It  was  the 
Slavic  wife’s  duty  to  kill  herself  on  the  death  of  her  husband;  Zimmer,  op.  cit., 
P-  33°* 

7 “The  father  is  master  of  their  lives  as  God  of  their  souls”;  Krauss,  op.  cit., 
p.  471.  Yet  his  power  is  undoubtedly  less  severe  now  than  in  early  Aryan  times. 

8 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  472,  540-1.  No  wish  is  expressed  in  the  Vedic  songs  for  the 
birth  of  a daughter.  Cf.  Atharva-Veda,  VI.  11.  Infanticide  of  daughters  is  com- 
mon; Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  544;  Zimmer,  op.  cit.,  p.  319. 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


7 


their  parents,*  1 support  them  in  old  age,  perform  for  them  the 
funeral  rites,  and  hold  them  in  remembrance  before  God  and 
the  world.  2 The  eldest  is  most  prominent  among  the  sons, 
and  generally  steps  into  the  place  of  the  deceased  father. 3 
Where  sons  are  wanting,  adoption  is  resorted  to.  The  adopted 
son  must  renounce  family  name,  patron  saint,  and  kinship  with 
his  father  for  corresponding  connections  with  the  family  which 
he  enters.  4 An  heiress  is  allowed  to  choose  her  own  husband, 
if  there  are  no  male  relatives  within  the  household  to  perform 
this  service  for  her. 5 

It  constantly  happens  that  House-communities  of  this  kind 
separate,  for  various  reasons,  into  their  component  families.6 


1 Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Sudslaven,  pp.  84,  94. 

2 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  470-1. 

3 This  applies  only  when  the  father  is  at  the  head  of  the  community.  In  other 
cases,  the  mature  sons  are,  at  the  death  of  the  father,  on  an  equal  footing.  For 
prominence  of  eldest  son,  Delbriick,  op.  cit.,  p.  578.  Eldest  son  took  the  place  of 
the  deceased  father  ; Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  328. 

4 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  470.  The  Slavonian  customs  of  adoption  are  remarkably  sim- 
ilar to  those  of  the  Greeks,  Hindoos,  etc.  The  patron  saint  has  now  taken  the 
place  of  the  family  gods  of  pagan  times. 

5 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  468.  If  she  has  relatives,  she  chooses  one  of  these.  Cf.  Bii- 
cheler  und  Zitelmann,  Das  Recht  von  Gortyn,  p.  150,  for  the  Greeks.  Under  any 
other  circumstances  the  maid  must  wait  at  home  for  a wooer  ; Krauss,  op.  cit., 
p.  201  ; Zimmer,  op.  cit.,  p.  305.  It  is  esteemed  a great  misfortune  not  to  get  a 
husband  ; Krauss,  loc.  cit.  ; Rigveda,  I.  123,  n;  VII.  25  ; Atharva-Veda,  VI.  60  ; 
III.  18.  An  exaggerated  value  is  laid  on  maidenly  purity  ; Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  197. 

6 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  in,  gives  the  following  reasons  for  separation  : 

1.  The  women  do  not  agree.  Their  quarrels  are  probably  not  confined  to  the 
female  sex. 

2.  Private  property  arises  in  the  Community.  This  is  now  a frequent  cause  of 
separation,  but  in  early  Aryan  times  it  must  have  occurred  far  more  rarely. 

3.  Injustice  on  the  part  of  the  ruler  or  his  wife.  It  is  likely  that  sensitiveness 
to  this  wrong  has  increased  with  the  lapse  of  centuries. 

4.  When  a soldier  has  many  children,  whom  the  Community  does  not  wish 
to  support.  This  cause  has  come  in  with  the  changed  environment  of  the 
Community. 

5.  When  one  of  the  members  is  lazy  or  a thief,  he  is  excluded.  When  the 
offense  is  light  he  is  allowed  to  retain  his  property ; and  this  causes  a partial 
division.  A grave  crime  may  exclude  a man,  with  confiscation  of  property. 

6.  When  the  Community  grows  too  large. 


8 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


In  one  sort  of  division,  the  families  move  into  separate  houses, 
at  some  distance  from  one  another,  that  a wider  extent  of  space 
may  be  occupied,  yet  still  retain  their  property  in  common.1 
In  another  sort,  each  family  takes  its  share  of  property  and 
thus  becomes  a new  House-community  exactly  like  the  old. 
The  new  House-communities,  thus  arising,  still  retain  for  one 
another  a feeling  of  kinship,  occupy  a continuous  territory, 
hold  some  property  in  common,  and  deliberate  in  a general 
assembly  concerning  the  welfare  of  the  whole.  The  union  of 
House-communities  is  called  a “ Brotherhood  ” ( bratstvo , Gk. 
(f>paTpLa).  New  Brotherhoods  may  be.  formed  in  this  manner  at 
any  time.2  These  vary  greatly  in  size,  containing  from  30  or 
50  to  700  or  800  fighting  men,  a bratstvo  of  200  warriors  being 
sufficiently  strong  to  secure  respect.3  The  bratstvenici  are 
bound  together  not  only  by  the  sentiment  of  common  origin 
and  blood,  but  also  by  the  common  worship  of  a protecting 
deity  from  whom  all  the  members  of  a bratstvo  claim  descent. 
Since  the  introduction  of  Christianity,  a patron  saint  has  taken 
the  place  of  the  deity  ; but  the  eponymous  hero  is  still  cele- 
brated in  song  though  shorn  of  his  divine  qualities.4  In  every 
bratstvo  there  still  remains  the  periodical  festival  in  honor 
of  the  hero  ancestor  (or  patron  saint),  which  keeps  alive  the 


1 Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  p.  114. 

2 Krauss,  op.  cit .,  p.  33  ; cf.  n.  1.  Common  property  : church,  grave-yard,  mills, 
pastureland,  id.,  p.  40.  Members  of  a bratstvo  regard  each  other  as  kinsmen,  and 
formerly  would  not  intermarry.  Furthermore,  they  help  one  another  on  every 
occasion  of  need.  If  a man’s  house  burns,  his  fellows  ( bratstvenici ) contribute 
to  the  re-building.  If  a man  wishes  to  marry  but  cannot  afford  it,  his  fellows 
help  him.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  wishes  to  sell  real-estate,  he  must  offer  it 
first  to  his  bratstvenici ; if  these  do  not  care  to  purchase,  to  the  members  of 
the  other  bratstva  of  his  tribe,  — he  is  not  allowed  to  sell  it  to  a stranger  ; 
id.,  p.  40. 

8 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  33,  40.  A brave  man  counts  for  nothing  in  a weak  bratstvo  ; 
id.,  pp.  33-4.  Members  of  a bratstvo  try  to  maintain  its  honor  and  will  not  marry 
into  an  inferior  bratstvo  ; id.,  p.  41. 

4 They  celebrate  the  hero  ancestor  of  their  bratstvo  in  an  epic  poem  of  mythical 
contents  ascribing  to  him  all  manner  of  wondrous  deeds  and  placing  him  as  far 
back  as  possible  in  the  past ; Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  42. 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


19 


phratric  idea  even  where,  for  various  reasons,  it  is  growing 
faint.1  The  bratstvenici  are  bound  together  also  by  the  blood- 
feud,  which  prevails  to  a remarkable  extent  even  at  the  present 
day.2  Every  bratstvo  has  an  assembly  in  which  the  heads 
of  the  component  House-communities  enjoy  equal  rights  of 
speech  and  suffrage.3  In  war  the  bratstvenici  stand  together 
in  one  band4  under  their  elective  military  chief.5 

A bratstvo  sometimes  consists  of  a single  village,  but  more 
frequently  of  several  villages.6 7  When  it  grows  large  it 
becomes  a tribe  ( phyle , plane'),  its  component  House-commu- 
nities at  the  same  time  developing  into  bratstva ? The  district 
occupied  by  a pleme  is  called  a zupa ,8  and  its  ruler  zupan. 


1 Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  pp.  51-4. 

2 When  a member  of  a bratstvo  is  killed  by  a member  of  another  bratstvo , the 
fellows  of  the  murdered  man  wreak  vengeance  on  the  murderer,  if  he  can  be 
found  ; if  not,  on  the  father,  brother,  or  son  ; if  none  of  these  can  be  found,  on 
one  of  his  bratstvenici ; Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  139.  When  compensation  is  allowed, 
it  is  paid  by  the  entire  bratstvo  of  the  offender  ; id.,  pp.  39-40.  The  phratric  name 
is  borne  by  every  member  as  a protection  against  murder,  since  no  one  would  be 
likely  to  kill  a man  who  was  known  to  belong  to  a strong  bratstvo ; id.,  p.  47. 

3 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  38-9.  The  other  adult  males  of  the  bratstvo  may  attend  the 
assembly  and  cry  “yea”  and  “nay.”  All  questions  of  importance  come  before 
the  assembly.  For  Germany  and  India,  see  Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  174. 

4 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  39.  For  India,  Rigveda,  X.  84,  3 ; VII.  79,  2;  V.  61,  1. 
For  the  ancient  Germans,  Tacitus,  Germania  7.  For  the  ancient  Greeks,  Iliad, 
II.  362-4.  For  the  ancient  Italians,  Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  pp. 

139  f- 

6  Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  38.  It  is  evident  that  anciently  the  leadership  of  the  bratstvo 
was  hereditary  (id.,  p.  35),  as  is  the  present  office  of  knez  (king)  in  some  phratries. 
But  the  elective  military  official  ( glava , steresina)  has  in  many  bratstva  gained  the 
upper  hand  in  administrative  functions. 

6 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  39.  Sometimes  several  bratstva  are  represented  in  one  village. 
The  village  is  recognized  as  the  seat  of  a family,  — hence  the  name  of  most  vil- 
lages are  patronymic;  id.,  p.  23. 

7 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  20-21,  2.  Partially  fictitious  tribes  — those  made  up  of  sev- 
eral bratstva  which  are  not  branches  of  an  original  bratstvo  — occur  rarely;  id., 
p.  57.  Sometimes  a bratstvo  for  protection  enters  a foreign  pleme  ; id.,  p.  58. 

8 This  word  signified  originally  “household,”  then  “ village-community,”  then 
“district”  and  especially  “district  occupied  by  a tribe.”  The  word  “zupan” 
(tribe-leader)  has  had  a similar  development  from  its  original  meaning  “house- 
holder” or  “house-father”  ; Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  18-19.  Vi^pati  has  gone  through 
a similar  development  among  the  Hindoos  ; Zimmer,  op.  cit.,  p.  17 1. 


20 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


Each  zupa  contains  at  least  one  stronghold  in  some  easily  de- 
fended spot  (as  on  a steep  hill),1  which  formerly  served  also  as 
the  religious  and  political  center  of  the  tribe.2  The  duties  of 
the  zupan  were  originally  administrative,  judicial,  military,  and 
probably  religious;3  but  in  the  course  of  time  the  military 
functions  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  military  chief  ( Pole- 
march , Herzog , Vojvodci).  The  appointment  of  the  latter  was 
made  by  the  zupan  and  ratified  by  the  people.  Sometimes  he 
came  to  be  also  the  chief  civil  magistrate.4  The  zupan’s  income 
was  originally  derived  from  a portion  of  the  public  land  set 
apart  for  his  use,  and  from  free  gifts  of  his  subjects.5  The 
political  institutions  of  the  Slavic  tribe  have  undoubtedly 
developed  from  those  of  the  household,6  and  the  idea  of  com- 


1 Krauss,  op.  cit .,  p.  22.  Cf.  ’AKpoiroXis  of  the  Greeks.  For  India,  Manu,  VII. 
70,  7 1 ; Institutes  of  Vishnu,  III.  6. 

2 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  22.  Here  the  elders  of  the  tribe  met  for  deliberation  and 
from  here  they  were  accustomed  to  set  out  for  war.  Cf.  the  samiti  (tribal-assem- 
bly) of  the  Hindoos;  Zimmer,  op.  cit.,  p.  174.  Assemblies  of  Attic  tribes  continued 
through  historical  times. 

3 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  26,  22.  Cf.  the  r&jan  of  the  Hindoos  ; Zimmer,  op.  cit.,  p. 
158.  The  latter  was  originally  hereditary  (id.,  p.  162),  but  later  some  elective 
monarchies  arose,  in  which  the  king  was  probably  chosen  from  some  noble 
family  or  gens  (id.,  pp.  162-3)  as  among  the  South-Slavonians  ; Krauss,  op.  cit., 
pp.  30-31.  The  king  was  in  ancient  India  protector  of  the  people  (Rigveda, 
III.  43,  5),  must  be  respected  and  obeyed  (Rigveda,  I.  69,  1 ; IX.  7,  5),  held 
chief  command  in  war  (Zimmer,  op.  cit.,  p.  165)  and  offered  sacrifice  for  the  tribe 
at  critical  moments,  as  before  a battle  ; id.,  pp.  165-6. 

4 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  25. 

6 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  27.  These  gifts  were  afterward  fixed  by  law,  and  other 
sources  of  income  added.  The  Germans  did  not  pay  their  chief  fixed  tributes,  but 
free  gifts;  Tacitus,  Germania,  XV.  So  the  Hindoos;  Rigveda,  X.  173.  This  is 
true  also  of  the  Homeric  Greeks,  as  will  appear  hereafter.  As  among  the  Slavs, 
so  among  the  Germans  and  Hindoos,  voluntary  gifts  generally  developed  to  fixed 
tribute;  Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  166. 

6 This  is  indicated  partly  by  their  character,  partly  by  their  names  and  finally  by 
the  fact  of  development,  clearly  demonstrated,  from  family  to  tribe.  As  to 
names,  cf.  e.g.,  zupan,  already  discussed.  In  the  Croatian  Chronicle,  the  entire 
state  is  called  didina  (“grandfather’s  estate”);  Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  24.  The  ancient 
I lindoo  monarchy  developed  from  rule  of  the  father  ; Zimmer,  op.  cit.,  p.  162.  So 
of  the  Romans;  Mommsen,  History  of  Rome,  I.  pp.  96-7. 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


21 


mon  blood,  worship,  and  property,  though  comparatively  faint, 
is  yet  vital.1 

Kindred  tribes  sometimes  united  for  temporary  objects. 
In  this  case  the  king  of  the  most  powerful  tribe  is  regarded 
as  the  king  of  the  confederacy.2  Such  a leader  is  not  to 
be  compared  with  the  king  of  a state  of  the  more  developed 
type,  but  stands  among  his  fellow  tribe-kings  as  primus 
inter  pares .3  This  is  the  highest  political  development  at- 
tained by  the  Aryans  before  the  separation  of  the  races, 
and  by  most  of  the  South-Slavonic  tribes  down  to  the  present 
time.4 

We  have  now  discussed  the  South-Slavonic  family  with 
sufficient  detail  for  our  present  purposes,  and  have  pointed 
out  those  modifications  which  it  has  undergone  from  early 
Aryan  times.  Making  allowance  for  these  remarkably  few 
and  slight  modifications,  we  may  conveniently  term  it  the 
“Early  Aryan  family,”  and  may  regard  it  as  the  second  stage 
in  the  development  of  the  household  on  Aryan  ground.  We 
have  traced  also  the  growth  of  family  to  tribe  as  it  is  now 
actually  taking  place  among  the  South-Slavonians,  and  as  it 


1 Christianity  has  obscured  the  ancient  religion.  At  present  the  common  prop- 
erty of  the  tribe  consists  mostly  of  forest  and  pasture  lands  ; Krauss,  op.  cit., 
pp.  62-3.  The  tribe  formerly  had  the  right  to  decide  (through  its  chief)  whether  a 
stranger  should  be  admitted  to  any  one  of  its  component  bratstva  and  to  bring 
into  the  common  property  the  real  estate  of  an  extinct  Community  ; Krauss,  op. 
cit.,  p.  29. 

2 No  permanent  union  of  tribes  in  Aryan  times  was  effected.  For  ancient  Ger- 
mans and  Vedic  Hindoos,  see  Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  158.  The  Homeric 
kings  were,  in  the  main,  tribe-kings  as  will  appear  from  ch.  III.  of  this  treatise. 
For  the  South-Slavonian  tribes,  see  Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  pp. 
2>  I5-3L  57-63* 

3 Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  21. 

4 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  pp.  583-4,  is  of  the  opinion 
that  the  kingship  (of  the  state,  permanent  union  of  the  tribes)  developed  in  con- 
nection with  the  migration  of  the  races,  and  that  the  South-Slavonians  had  no 
opportunity  to  advance  to  this  conception,  since  they  remained  nearest  to  the 
primitive  home  of  the  Aryan  race. 


22 


T1IE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


undoubtedly  did  take  place  in  early  times  in  all  the  branches 
of  the  Aryan  race.1  The  organization  and  institutions  of  the 
early  Aryan  family  underwent  modifications  in  certain  direc- 
tions before  the  period  of  migration.  Before  the  close  of  the 
early  Aryan  stage  there  had  developed  through  the  House- 
community  a family  with  strictly  defined  limits,  whose  members 
were  bound  together  by  the  tie  of  blood  for  the  fulfilment  of 
mutual  duties  and  obligations.  This  family  consisted  of  all 
the  descendants  — through  the  male  line — -of  the  same  great- 
grandparents.  From  it  were  separated  the  illegitimate  child, 
the  outcast,  the  emancipated  son,  the  daughter  given  out  in 
marriage  ; to  it  were  admitted  the  adopted  son  and  the  wife 
who  came  from  another  family.  Thus,  marriage  dissolved  the 
kinship  of  the  bride  with  the  family  of  her  birth  and  brought 
her  — but  not  her  father’s  relatives  — into  kinship  with  her 
husband’s  household.  In  the  course  of  time,  however,  a 
kinship  was  developed  between  households  connected  by 
marriage,  the  wife  was  no  longer  cut  off  from  her  kinsmen 
in  blood,  her  children  came  to  be  regarded  as  belonging  in 
a certain  sense  to  both  families,  and  the  two  families  — now 
cognate  in  relationship  — began  to  overlap  each  other,  like 
two  intersecting  circles.  This  group  of  cognate  relationship 
began  probably  before  the  separation  of  the  races  but  was  not 
completed  till  long  afterwards.2  Closely  connected  with  the 
widening  of  kinship  is  the  elevation  of  woman  and  of  the  ideal 
of  home  life.  The  noble  sentiment  and  high  moral  tone  of  the 


1 Cf.  Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  pp.  159-60. 

2 Schrader,  op.  cit.,  p.  550,  grants  the  possibility  of  placing  the  beginning  of  this 
development  in  Aryan  times.  His  tendency  is  to  place  the  beginnings  of  human 
improvement  as  late  as  possible.  For  the  organization  of  the  family  in  its  wider 
sense  (the  Anchisteis),  see  Delbriick,  Die  indogermanischen  Verwandtschaftsnamen, 
p.  591.  It  may  be  well  here  to  present  a few  of  the  facts  which  indicate  a widen- 
ing of  the  idea  of  kinship  : 

1.  As  to  the  Slavs  : “The  Polians  showed  much  respect  for  their  parents  and 
their  relations,  and  to  their  daughters-in-law,  fathers-in-law,  and  brothers-in-law.” 
McLennan,  Patriarchal  Theory,  p.  76.  The  right  of  private  revenge  was  limited  by 
the  code  of  Jaroslav,  1017  A.D.,  to  “the  brother,  the  son,  the  father,  the  brother’s 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


23 


latter  as  portrayed  in  Homer* 1  and  the  Vedas2  lead  us  to  sus- 
pect that  a considerable  improvement  along  this  line  had  been 
made  on  Aryan  ground.3  At  the  same  time  there  took  place  a 
weakening  of  the  father’s  potestas 4 and  a development  of  the 
separate  family.5  This  conduced  to  the  growth  of  individuality 
in  the  household  and  to  a close  union  in  helpfulness  and 
affection.6 


son,  and  the  sister’s  son,”  id.,  p.  85.  These  facts  prove  the  absence  of  strict 
agnation  among  the  Slavs. 

2.  As  to  the  Germans  and  Hindoos  : we  have  the  authority  of  Tacitus  (Ger- 
mania, XX.)  for  the  fact  that  a sister’s  sons  were  as  highly  esteemed  by  their  uncle 
as  by  their  father,  and  that  this  tie  was  even  more  sacred  and  binding  than  that 
between  father  and  son.  Delbriick,  op.  cit .,  p.  589,  observes  that  this  bond  is 
merely  one  of  kind  feeling  (“ gemuthlich  ”),  since  the  inheritance  follows  the  male 
line.  The  existence  of  this  kind  feeling,  however,  and  the  fact  that  maternal  uncles 
stand  next  in  succession  after  brothers  and  paternal  uncles  prove  that  strict  agna- 
tion did  not  exist  among  the  Germans  at  this  time.  Yet  it  is  not  a survival  of 
Mutterrecht , but  a development  from  agnation.  In  India,  the  history  of  this 
change  may  be  traced  : in  ancient  India  the  father’s  brother  was  respected  more 
than  the  mother’s  brother  ; but  in  the  middle  period  of  her  history  (“  im  indischen 
Mittelalter  ”)  the  mother’s  brother  had  crowded  the  father’s  brother  from  his  place; 
Delbriick,  op.  cit.,  pp.  589,  586-8. 

1 Cf.  Od.  IV.,  VI.;  also  the  meeting  of  Hector  and  Andromache  in  Iliad  VI. 

2 Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  316. 

3 For  the  Slavonians  : “Instead  of  being  in  perpetual  tutelage,  Olga  (a  widow) 
was  her  son’s  guardian  and  regent  of  the  kingdom  with  all  the  powers  of  a 
sovereign  ”;  McLennan,  Patriarchal  Theory,  p.  79.  Several  similar  cases  occur  in 
Homeric  Greece.  Indeed,  it  appears  that  the  perpetual  tutelage  of  woman 
belongs  to  the  Romans  alone. 

4 The  Hindoos  (Manu,  VIII.  299-300),  Greeks,  Germans  (McLennan,  op.  cit., 
p.  252  ff)  and  South-Slavonians  (Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  p.  79) 
knew  nothing  of  the  patria  potestas  of  the  Roman  type.  It  is  likely  here  that  an 
early  weakening  took  place. 

5 In  Aryan  times,  the  son’s  family  remained  in  close  connection  with  the  father’s 
family  — generally  a local  nearness;  Delbriick,  op.  cit.,  p.  590.  The  father  and 
son  had  property  together,  although  living  in  separate  houses.  Among  the  ancient 
Hindoos,  Greeks,  and  Romans,  the  “joint  family”  had  become  exceptional; 
Schrfader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  pp.  569-70. 

6 The  son  should  obey  his  father  and  be  like-minded  with  his  mother ; the  wife 
should  speak  to  her  husband  in  honey-sweet  words  of  friendship;  Atharva-Veda, 
III.  30,  2.  Brother  should  not  hate  brother,  nor  sister,  sister;  id.  3.  The  father 
is  master,  but  all  should  render  willing  obedience;  Zimmer,  op.  cit.,  p.  316.  The 


24 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


Progress  in  the  directions  above  indicated  was  materially 
aided  by  the  development  in  the  early  Aryan  family  of  the 
idea  of  divine  law.  This  idea  was  a product  of  Aryan  religion, 
— more  particularly,  of  ancestor-worship* 1  and  hearth-worship. 
These  two  forms,  if  not  identical,  are  similar  in  character, 
and  may  be  designated  by  the  one  term,  house-worship.2 
The  general  effect  of  this  worship  was  to  make  of  the 
house  a temple,  to  promote  respect  for  parents,  to  enhance 
the  value  of  women  and  children,  whence  came  greater 
regard  for  their  well-being,  to  add  the  tie  of  religion  to 
that  of  blood,  to  render  sacred  the  duties  and  obligations  of 


house  has  now  become  the  “ protected  place  ” (kuca)  among  the  South-Slavonians  ; 
Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  72-3. 

1 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  pp.  613-5,  is  of  the  opinion 
that  ancestor-worship  arose  after  the  separation  of  the  races  ; yet  there  are  sub- 
stantial reasons  for  placing  it  earlier.  Relics  of  ancestor-worship  are  found  among 
nearly  if  not  quite  all  of  the  Aryan  races  ; Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  pp.  45-6,  59- 
60.  Among  the  Romans  it  was  so  deeply  seated  in  the  earliest  times  as  to  lead  us 
to  believe  that  ages  had  elapsed  since  its  origin.  Among  the  Vedic  Hindoos, 
the  fathers  ( pitaras ) dwell  with  the  gods  and  receive  almost  divine  honors ; 
Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  413.  They  are  often  called  on  for  protection,  and 
are  worshiped  with  offerings  and  libations  ; Rigveda,  X.  15;  Zimmer,  loc.  cit. 
The  life  of  the  Vedic  Hindoos  does  not  appear  to  be  far  removed  from  that  of  the 
common  Aryans.  For  ancestor-worship  in  primitive  Greece,  see  Packard,  Studies 
in  Greek  Thought,  p.  35,  and  J.  H.  Wright,  in  his  review  of  the  same,  Am. 
Journ.  of  Phil.  VIII.  p.  88,  n.  1.  “ On  the  strength  of  evidence  from  the  grave-mon- 
uments of  Peloponnesus  and  of  Attica  lately  made  available,  the  word  ‘ possibly  ’ 
should  be  erased  from  the  statement  that  the  primal  impulse  to  worship  produced 
among  the  ancestors  of  the  Greeks  ‘ possibly  a worship  of  the  dead.’  This  wor- 
ship, of  which  these  monuments  are  the  record,  could  hardly  have  sprung  up  on 
the  soil  of  Greece.”  Rohde  (Psyche),  from  a study  of  these  monuments  and  of 
Homer  and  Hesiod,  has  now  established  the  fact  of  ancestor-worship  for  primitive 
Greece  beyond  a doubt.  Schrader  is  therefore  wrong  in  regarding  it  as  a develop- 
ment later  than  Homer.  For  ancestor-worship  among  the  primitive  Germans,  see 
Rohde,  op.  cit.,  pp.  31-2  ; among  the  South-Slavonians,  Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  51  ff. 
It  is  likely  that  this  worship  existed  in  a crude  form  from  the  most  primitive  Aryan 
times,  but  did  not  till  long  after  become  a power  for  the  moral  education  of 
society. 

2 The  ancestor  was  never  worshiped  on  an  altar  (/Solo's,  such  as  is  used  for 
sacrificing  to  the  gods),  but  on  a hearth  (iox^Pa)  > Pollux,  I.  8;  Rohde,  Psyche, 
p.  33  and  n.  2.  This  shows  the  close  connection  between  ancestor-worship  and 
house-worship. 


THE  PATRIARCHAL  THEORY. 


25 


all  within  the  consecrated  circle  of  the  family.  The  idea 
of  divine  law  did  not  become  sufficiently  prominent  to  influ- 
ence society  before  the  close  of  the  Early  Aryan  stage  of 
history.  Two  periods  may  be  thus  distinguished  : the  first 
is  the  Rta  period  (or  period  of  natural  law) ; the  second,  the 
Dharma  period  (or  period  of  divine  law).1  The  first  period 
includes  the  two  stages  in  the  history  of  the  Aryan  family 
above  set  forth,  viz.,  the  Primitive  Aryan  and  the  Early  Aryan. 
The  Dharma  period  includes  but  one  stage  of  family  history, 
viz.,  the  Later  Aryan,2  to  be  considered  in  the  following 
chapter.  As  to  when  the  later  Aryan  period  begins  there 
is  much  difference  of  opinion.  In  view  of  all  the  facts,  it  is 
well  to  place  its  beginning  not  long  before  the  separation  of 
the  races,  while  its  full  development  was  attained  centuries 
afterwards.  Moreover,  it  is  only  for  certain  of  the  Aryan 
races,  notably  for  the  Hindoos,  Greeks  and  Romans,  that  our 
information  warrants  us  in  asserting  a full  development  of 
the  idea  of  divine  law  — to  the  extent  that  it  colored  and 
moulded  all  the  legal  and  political  institutions  of  these  races.3 

In  the  following  chapter  the  Later  Aryan  family  will  be 
presented  with  reference  especially  to  the  Hindoos,  Greeks, 
Romans  and  Slavonians.  The  object  of  this  is  to  throw  as 
much  light  as  possible  upon  the  early  Grecian  family  and  gens, 


1 Further  explanation  of  these  terms  will  be  given  in  the  following  chapter. 

2 I have  applied  the  terms  “ Primitive ” “Early,”  and  “Later”  with  the  purpose 
merely  of  indicating  as  definitely  as  possible  the  lines  of  progress  which  the  family 
appears  to  have  followed.  Families  of  the  Primitive  type  undoubtedly  existed 
among  the  less  favored  Aryans  even  after  the  separation  of  the  races.  In  like 
manner,  the  Early  type  has  continued  to  the  present  day,  e.g.,  among  the  South- 
Slavonians.  The  development  of  a new  form  of  society  did  not  exclude  the  old, 
but  the  new  and  the  old  continued  thereafter  side  by  side.  At  the  time  of  par- 
tition, there  existed  two  principal  types  of  the  family,  thus  distinguishing  two 
grades  of  society.  The  Early  type  prevailed  among  the  common  classes,  while 
the  Later  family  existed  only  among  the  nobility. 

3 The  idea  of  divine  law  belonged  undoubtedly  to  the  common  Aryan  stock  and 
was  the  parent  of  common  Aryan  institutions,  e.  g.,  that  of  blood-vengeance. 
Among  the  South-Slavonians  it  certainly  moulded,  if  it  did  not  create,  the  customs 
of  marriage,  adoption,  etc. 


26 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


to  bring  to  the  solution  of  problems  arising  in  the  study  of 
these  as  many  known  factors  as  possible. 

House-worship  developed  within  the  family.  The  common 
sacra  of  the  gens  — a mere  enlargement  of  the  family  — need 
for  their  origin  no  special  explanation.  The  same  may,  indeed, 
be  said  of  phratry  and  tribe,  where  these  have  developed  organic- 
ally from  the  family.  But  as  we  ascend  the  gentile  scale, 
we  observe  a growing  tendency  to  create  factitious  groups. 
Neighboring  gentes  belonging  to  the  same  tribe  united  to 
form  a phratry,  whether  on  the  basis  of  a similarity  of 
religious  rites,  readily  assumed  as  indicative  of  a relationship 
in  blood,  or  whether  on  the  basis  of  local  contiguity  and  an 
identity  of  interest.  Members  of  this  larger  group  in  the  latter 
case  as  in  the  former  regarded  one  another  as  kinsmen  (as  the 
term  <f>paTpia,  bratstvo , indicates).  Finally  the  tribe  yielded  to 
the  prevailing  tendency,  and  received  in  its  legal,  social,  and 
political  institutions  the  impression  of  the  divine  law.  Beyond 
this  the  Aryans,  before  the  separation  of  the  races,  did  not 
advance.1  We  shall  trace  on  Greek  soil  the  development  of 
the  city,  and  shall  find  that  to  the  very  end  of  their  classic 
history  the  Greeks  were  in  bondage  to  two  ideas  : first,  that 
the  city  is  the  ultimate  limit  of  political  unity,  and  second, 
that  the  city  is  a family,  into  the  enjoyment  of  whose  privileges 
none  may  enter  except  by  birth  or  adoption. 


1 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  105. 


CHAPTER  II. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 

, (a)  The  Aryan  Household. 

The  Aryan  household,  in  its  wider  signification,  was  com- 
posed of  the  cognate  parents  (father  and  mother),  the  legiti- 
mate sons  (or  adopted  son),  the  grandsons  and  great-grandsons 
with  the  lawful  wives  of  all  these,  the  unmarried  daughters,  sons’ 
daughters  and  grandsons’  daughters,  — a brotherless  daughter 
being,  in  all  cases,  esteemed  equal  to  a son.1  It  included  also 
property2  and  slaves.3  It  was  customary  for  the  son  at 
marriage  to  depart  from  the  paternal  roof  and  from  the  father’s 
authority  and  to  enter  a new  dwelling  built  for  his  use.4  He 
still  belonged  by  agnation  to  the  house  of  his  father  and  was 
liable  to  all  the  obligations  of  its  members.  Although  he  was 
from  the  time  of  marriage  the  possessor  of  a hearth  and  a free 
member  of  the  gens,  his  house  did  not  become  fully  inde- 
pendent in  religious  and  property  matters  till  the  death  of  the 
father5  and  the  final  division  of  the  property.6  When  it  was 


1 That  the  household  included  definitely  these  persons  will  appear  in  the  course 
of  this  chapter.  Cf.  Mommsen,  History  of  Rome,  I.  ch.  V.  p.  88.  For  the  four 
generations,  see  Isaeus,  VIII.  32  ; Law  <jf  Gortyn,  V;  Baudhayana,  II.  5,  10,  1. 

2 “Property  is  a part  of  the  household”;  Aristotle,  Politics,  I.  4,  1 (p.  1253  b, 
23)- 

3 “A  complete  household  consists  of  slaves  and  freemen”;  id.  I.  3,  1. 

4 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  p.  34  ; Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p. 
65  ; cf.  n.  1 of  following  page.  Some  exceptions  occur.  Among  the  South- 
Slavonians,  the  joint  family,  in  the  form  of  the  House-community,  is  the  rule. 
Cf.,  however,  Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  p.  114. 

5 “ He  who  makes  a ^raddha-offering  while  his  father  is  alive,  must  offer  it  to 
those  persons  to  whom  his  father  offers  (his  (^raddha).”  Institutes  of  Vishnu, 
LXXV.  1.  Thus  the  son  has  not  his  own  ancestral  gods  while  the  father  lives, 
but  must  worship  the  gods  of  the  latter. 

6 “ When  he  has  paid,  according  to  the  law,  his  debts  to  the  great  sages,  to  the 
manes,  and  to  the  gods,  let  him  make  over  everything  to  his  son  and  dwell  (in  his 


27 


2 8 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


thought  advantageous  for  the  property  to  continue  undivided, 
the  married  son,  often  living  apart,  must  have  had  some  voice 
in  its  management;* 1  though  he  naturally  listened  with  respect 
to  the  advice  of  his  father.2 

The  Aryan  household  was  a corporation  with  religious,  moral 
and  material  aims,  united  under  the  householder  and  his  wife.3 
As  a corporation,  it  enjoyed  the  ownership,  in  a restricted 
sense,  of  property.  As  to  real  estate,  it  held  in  permanent 
possession  only  the  lot  on  which  the  house  stood.4  This  could 
not  be  alienated,  and  passed  ultimately  to  the  gens  in  failure  of 
heirs  within  the  house  and  cognate  family.5  Besides  this,  it 
held  a share  (lot,  loos,  sors , kA^/dos,  alod)  of  the  common  gentile 
land,6  which  was  re-distributed  periodically,  with  rights  to 
pasturage,  timber,  etc.,  on  the  unoccupied,  or  waste  lands  of 
the  village.  There  was  enough  land  to  supply  all  these  wants 


house),  not  caring  for  any  worldly  concerns”;  Manu,  IV.  257  ; also,  Apastamba, 
II.  6,  13.  13-14.  It  is  likely  that  this  custom  of  settling  the  estate  before  the 
death  of  the  householder  belonged  to  the  early  Greeks,  and  that  Laertes  followed 
it  in  making  over  his  estate  and  kingdom  to  Odysseus  and  in  dwelling  apart  in  the 
country;  cf.  also  Demosthenes,  XLIII.  19;  XLVII.  34-5.  The  Cretan  house- 
holder might  settle  his  estate  during  his  life-time,  but  could  not  be  forced  to  it ; 
Law  of  Gortyn,  IV.  23  ff. 

1 The  father  may  spend  as  he  chooses  only  self-acquired  property,  (Vishnu, 
XVII.  1),  “but  in  regard  to  wealth  inherited  of  the  paternal  grandfather,  the 
ownership  of  the  father  and  son  is  equal”;  Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XVII.  2.  That 
this  holds  also  for  the  Greeks  is  shown  by  the  Law  of  Gortyn.  Such  rights  were 
undoubtedly  insisted  upon  even  during  the  life-time  of  the  father.  The  father 
and  son  held  property  in  common,  though  living  in  separate  houses  ; Delbriick, 
Die  indogermanischen  Verwandtschaftsnamen,  p.  568. 

2 Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Sudslaven,  p.  84,  “ when  an  elder  speaks,  a younger 
man  must  keep  silent  ” — Slavic  proverb. 

8 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  p.  74  ; cf.  Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  pp. 
305,  317-18. 

4 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  219.  Cf.  Tighe,  the  Development  of  the  Roman 

Constitution,  p.  86. 

6 Apastamba,  II.  6,  14,  2 ; with  Manu,  IX.  187  ; Baudhayana,  I.  5,  11,  11-12. 
In  Athens,  before  Solon,  “ the  goods  and  the  house  must  remain  in  the  family 
of  the  deceased  person”;  Plutarch,  Solon,  21.  Inherited  real  estate  was  also 
inalienable  in  Laconia;  Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  113;  and  in 
Crete  ; Law  of  Gortyn. 

6 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  220. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


29 


and  to  afford  new  dwelling  lots  and  arable  KXrjpo  1 to  the  newly 
married.1  Its  members  were  bound  together  by  the  ties  of 
kinship  and  an  exclusive  religious  service  for  the  fulfilment 
of  mutual  duties  of  help,  defense  and  redress  of  injuries,2  and 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  household  and  its  worship.3  The 
householder  was  not  proprietor  ; nor  are  we  to  think  of  him 
as  managing  the  house  in  his  own  interest.4  The  property 
belonged  first  to  the  household,  secondly  (in  failure  of  heirs 
within  the  family)  to  the  near  kin,  and  ultimately  to  the  gens.5 

Two  ideas  lay  at  the  foundation  of  the  Aryan  conception 
of  the  world,  corresponding  to  two  periods  of  Aryan  history.6 
The  first  is  the  idea  of  natural  law  (Skt.  Rta , Lat.  naturalis 
ratio , Gk.  koo-/, to?,  <£uW).  This,  mankind  learned  from  the 
revolutions  of  sun  and  stars,  from  the  succession  of  the 
seasons,  from  the  unchanging  movements  of  nature.  The 
conception  thus  gained  was  transferred  to  human  modes  of 
activity.  The  sexes  in  marriage  were  subject  to  the  naturalis 
ratio , as  well  as  the  continuance  of  the  race  through  successive 


1 Tacitus,  Germania,  ch.  26  ; Leist,  Graec.  Rechtsg.  p.  103. 

2 Od.  III.  307  ; XXIV.  432. 

3 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  27. 

4 “ The  government  of  a wife  and  children  and  of  a household,  ...  is  exercised 
in  the  firs?  instance  for  the  good  of  the  governed”;  Arist.  Politics,  III.  6,  4 (p. 
1278  b,  38  ft.).  It  appears  also  from  n.  1,  p.  28.  Compare  Gautama,  V.  25,  where 
the  householder  is  regarded  as  the  one  who  feeds  the  family.  He  must  eat 
nothing  till  the  rest  have  enough  ; Institutes  of  Vishnu,  LX VII.  41-3.  Cf.  also 
Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Sudslaven,  p.  79. 

5 See  n.  5,  p.  28.  The  householder  could  not  give  away  the  hereditary  estate  ; 
Vishnu,  XVII.  1-2  ; or  make  a will.  That  the  gens  had  the  ultimate  right  to  the 
property,  appears  from  n.  5,  p.  28,  and  also  from  the  fact  that  the  villager  could 
not  sell  his  land  to  a stranger  ; Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  pp.  228,  229  ; Krauss, 
op.  cit .,  p.  40. 

6 I do  not  assert  that  there  was  no  religion  in  the  earlier  period,  but  that  a far 
higher  form  of  religion  entered  with  the  second  period.  The  latter  begins  with 
the  change  from  nomadic  to  settled  life,  the  founding  of  the  sacred  hearth,  the 
development  of  that  phase  of  ancestor-worship  which  we  find  existing  among 
the  later  Aryans.  We  cannot  doubt  that  the  principles  of  ancestor- worship  were 
at  war  with  many  usages,  such  as  marriage  by  capture,  which  arose  in  an  earlier 
and  less  civilized  age  ; see  Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  pp.  76  ff. 


30 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


generations.  The  relations  of  parents  to  children  with  their 
reciprocal  obligations  and  privileges,  — the  protection  and  sup- 
port which  the  father,  as  the  stronger,  offered,  the  kind  care 
of  the  mother  for  her  infants,  the  reverence  and  affection  with 
which  the  children  requited  these  services,  the  love  of  youth 
and  maiden,  leading  to  marriage,  — all  these  rested,  in  the  Rta 
period,  on  the  one  foundation  of  natural  law.1 2 

While  in  the  second  period  this  basis  continued  as  the  real 
foundation  of  human  institutions,  another  element  entered, 
which  gave  to  these  same  institutions  a firmer  footing,  an  ab- 
solutely new  and  unique  character  and  a marvelous  tenacity 
of  life.  This  was  the  divine  law  (Skt.  D karma ; Lat.  Fas ; 
Gk.  Themis)?  A belief  in  the  existence  of  the  soul  arises 
probably  from  the  notion  of  a second  self  found  among  early 
races,  e.  g .,  the  Homeric  Greeks.3  With  them  the  body  is 
the  principal  self,4  but  along  with  it  is  the  soul,  or  second 
self,  a mere  shadow 5 or  image 6 of  the  body.  It  was  this 
which  was  active  in  dreams,7  — while  the  real  self  was  un- 
conscious, it  communed  with  the  gods  and  with  other  souls, 
and  learned  of  the  future.8  Thus  the  Homeric  Greeks  regarded 
whatever  appears  or  happens  in  dreams  as  real  objects  and 
occurrences  and  not  as  products  of  the  imagination.9  Further- 


1 Isaeus,  II.  18  ; Dem.  XLIV.  32. 

2 The  rta  and  dharma  ideas  are  thoroughly  discussed  in  Leist,  Graeco-italische 
Rechtsgeschichte,  pp.  187  ff.  I regard  the  “ divine  law  ” as  entering  at  the  time 
when  religion  becomes  a factor  in  the  moral  improvement  of  the  race.  Division 
into  periods  here,  as  elsewhere,  is  merely  a convenience  of  thought.  On  the  per- 
sistency of  ancestor-worship  and  of  everything  which  it  colors,  see  Hearn,  Aryan 
Household,  p.  56. 

3 Rohde,  Psyche,  p.  7 ; J.  Lippert,  Die  Religionen  der  europaischen  Cultur- 
volker  in  ihrem  geschichtlichen  Ursprunge,  pp.  309  ff.  (on  the  Greek  religion); 
pp.  1 ff.  (on  the  primitive  conception  of  the  soul). 

4 Iliad,  I.  3-4. 

6 Od.  X.  495  ; XI.  207. 

« II.  XXIII.  100. 

7 Rohde,  Psyche,  pp.  7,  42. 

8 Pindar,  Frag.  131. 

v Rohde,  Psyche,  p.  7. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


31 


more,  they  regarded  death  as  closely  akin  to  sleep.1  In  the 
earliest  times  it  was  supposed  that  even  after  death  the  soul 
retained  a certain  connection  with  the  body,  and  remaining  in 
general  near  it,2  exercised  a potent  influence  upon  the  living. 
As  the  soul  had  the  same  size  and  form  as  the  body,3  so  its 
nature  was  patterned  after  that  of  the  living  man,  — possessing 
the  same  passions  and  appetites,  yet  endowed  with  greater 
power  for  good  or  evil.4  To  avert  the  easily  excited  anger5 
of  disembodied  souls,  to  keep  them  gracious  and  beneficent 
to  the  living,  it  was  necessary  to  propitiate  them  with  gifts 
and  ceremonies.6 

Care  for  the  souls  of  deceased  ancestors  was  the  chief  im- 
pulse to  family  religion,  which  affected  all  existing  modes  of 
thought  and  action,  and  out  of  which  the  social,  legal  and  po- 
litical ideas  and  institutions  of  the  Aryans  (especially  of  the 
Hindoos,  Greeks  and  Romans)  developed.7 


1 “ A deep  sleep  fell  upon  his  eyelids,  a sound  sleep,  very  sweet,  and  next  akin 
to  death.”  Od.  XIII.  79-80.  The  primitive  folk-psychology,  unable  to  conceive 
of  discontinuance  of  being , inasmuch  as  it  had  never  isolated  and  thrown  into 
objectivity  the  conception  being , saw  in  the  phenomena  of  sleep  and  dreams, 
swoons  and  death  only  the  temporary  or  permanent  separation  of  the  shadowy, 
second  self,  or  soul,  from  the  body. 

2 The  soul  remains  with  the  body  when  the  latter  is  buried  in  due  form  with  all 
its  choicest  treasures  ; Rohde,  Psyche,  p.  32.  Its  influence  upon  the  living  is  in- 
dicated by  the  worship  paid  to  it.  The  object  of  burning  the  body,  wherever  this 
custom  existed,  was  to  set  the  spirit  of  the  deceased  free  that  it  might  depart  from 
earth  ; for  the  Greeks,  Od.  XI.  219  ff  ; for  the  Romans,  Servius  ad  Verg.  Aen. 
III.  68  ; for  the  Hindoos,  Rigveda,  X.  16.  2,  9 ; X.  14,  8 ; Zimmer,  Altindisches 
Leben,  pp.  402  f.,  409  ; Rohde,  op.  cit .,  pp.  26-30. 

3 Rohde,  op.  cit .,  p.  3. 

4 This  is  the  case  where  the  primitive  idea  has  not  become  weakened,  as  in 
Homeric  Greece. 

5 Schol.  ad  Aristoph.  Aves,  1490  ; Athenaeus,  XI.  461  c ; IV.  149  c ; Rohde,  op. 
cit .,  pp.  225-6;  in  Manu,  III.  192,  “Free  from  anger,”  must  accordingly  be  a 
euphemistic  expression. 

6 Plato,  Rep.  IV.  427  B ; Rohde,  loc.  cit . 

7 Souls  resided  also  in  objects  ( fetiches ) and  animals  (totems)  as  well  as  in 
human  bodies.  Nature- worship  was  not  something  distinct  from  ancestor-wor- 
ship, but  arose  from  one  and  the  same  impulse  with  it,  — the  propitiation  of 
spirits  that  had  taken  up  their  residence  in  natural  objects.  The  latter  were  not 
distinguished  from  human  bodies.  Both  had  life,  — personal  life. 


32 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


The  leading  fact  in  ancestor-worship,  around  which  all 
others  centre,  is  as  follows.  It  was  essential  to  the  repose 
and  happiness  of  the  deceased  that  he  be  buried  in  due 
form  1 and  worshiped  with  becoming  rites  by  his  living  male 
descendants  begotten  in  lawful  wedlock  and  properly  initiated 
into  the  house-worship.2  This  service  consisted  largely  in 
offerings  of  food  and  water  accompanied  with  the  recitation  of 
appropriate  prayers.3  In  case  these  offerings  were  neglected, 
the  deceased  person  was  tormented  with  hunger  and  thirst,  and 
became  a malevolent  spirit  visiting  those  who  had  neglected 
him  with  the  anger  of  the  gods.4  Those,  on  the  other  hand, 
who  performed  their  religious  duties  to  the  dead  in  the  lawful 
manner,  experienced  the  greatest  prosperity  on  earth  in  moral 
and  material  things,  and  after  death  were  rewarded  with  eternal 


1 When  no  relative  was  present,  the  burial  or  burning  might  be  performed  by 
other  persons.  Accordingly  Elpenor  addresses  Odysseus,  “ Leave  me  not  unwept 
and  unburned  as  thou  goest  hence,  nor  turn  thy  back  upon  me,  lest  haply  I bring 
on  thee  the  anger  of  the  gods.  Nay,  burn  me  there  with  mine  armor,  all  that  is 
mine,  and  pile  me  a barrow  on  the  shore  of  the  gray  sea,  the  grave  of  a luckless 
man  that  even  men  unborn  may  hear  my  story”;  Od.  XI.  72-6. 

2 “ The  legitimate  son  of  the  body  alone  shall  be  the  owner  of  the  paternal 
estate”;  Manu,  IX.  163.  “And  he  who  inherits  the  wealth  presents  the  funeral 
oblations  (to  the  deceased)”;  Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XV.  40.  “One  must  not 
employ  an  (unitiated  child)  to  perform  oblations  in  the  fire”;  Gautama,  II.  4, 
18-19  5 Isaeus,  VI.  51  ; VIII.  22  ; Dem.  LVII.  70  ; XLIII.  51  ; Rohde,  Psyche, 
p.  229. 

3 e.g.,  “Come  near,  O ye  manes  (conduct  them  all  here),  O Agni.  May  my 
ancestors  come  near.  This  is  your  (share),  O ye  manes”;  Institutes  of  Vishnu, 
LXXIII.  12  ; Isaeus,  VI.  51. 

4 “ Till  the  Sapinda-karana  (offering  after  the  days  of  fasting)  has  been  per- 
formed, the  dead  man  remains  a disembodied  spirit  (and  is  afflicted  with  hunger 
and  thirst).  Give  rice  and  a jar  of  water  to  the  man  who  has  passed  into  the 
abode  of  disembodied  spirits”;  Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XX.  33.  Such  a one  finds 
no  rest  ; id.  32  ; Vergil,  Aeneid,  VI.  337  ff .,  374-6  ; Lucian  de  Luctu,  9 ; Od.  XI. 
72-6,  quoted  above.  This  passage  from  the  Odyssey  proves  that  the  Homeric 
Greeks  regarded  the  soul  before  burning  of  body,  as  powerful  in  its  influence 
upon  the  living.  While  it  could  not  personally  work  evil  it  could  bring  upon  the, 
living  the  anger  of  the  gods.  Rohde,  op.  cit.,  has  not  given  this  passage  due  con- 
sideration. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


33 


bliss.1  All  this  the  manes  gave  in  exchange  for  the  equivalent 
benefit  which  they  themselves  received.2  A definite  set  of 
ancestors, — father,  grandfather  and  great-grandfather  of  the 
performer,  — are  recipients  of  this  worship.3  The  ascendants 
beyond  the  great-grandfather  are  satisfied  with  mere  water,4 
and  the  duties  and  obligations  of  these  to  the  living  descend- 
ants are  correspondingly  weak.  The  necessity  of  satisfying 
and  pleasing  the  deceased  led  to  the  development  of  the  rites, 
or  fixed  modes  of  worship,  and  to  that  organization  of  the 
household  which  should  give  it  the  greatest  possible  stability 
and  permanence,  and  the  utmost  efficiency  in  the  fulfilment  of 
its  religious  functions.5 

The  central  idea  in  the  organization  of  the  house  was  that  of 
the  hearth.  In  the  Rta  period  its  use  was  purely  material,  its 
eternal  nature  arising  from  the  difficulty  of  rekindling.6  To 
the  material  element  originally  existing  were  added  moral  and 
spiritual  elements  in  the  Dharma  period.  Henceforth,  it  served 
not  merely  to  cook  the  food  on  which  the  family  subsisted,  but 


1 “ Even  water  offered  to  the  manes  with  faith  . . . produces  endless  (bliss)”; 

Manu,  III.  202.  “ May  we  have  much  to  give  to  the  needy”;  id.  259.  “May 

(our  knowledge  of)  the  Vedas  increase.  May  faith  not  forsake  us”;  id.; 
also,  Apastamba,  II.  7.  16.  12  ; Vasishtha,  XI.  41-2  ; Baudhayana,  II.  8.  14.  1. 

2 “Those  (sons)  who  live  fulfilling  the  rites  taught  (in  the  Veda)  increase  the 
fame  and  heavenly  bliss  of  their  ancestors  ”:  Apastamba,  II.  9.  24.  3 ; also  4.  The 
benefits  are  declared  to  be  reciprocal  in  Vishnu,  XX.  36.  Cf.  Od.  III.  58-9,.  and 
see  especially  Aeschylus,  Choeph.  483  ff . ; Cicero,  de  Natura  Deorum,  I.  116. 

3 “The  father  and  the  grandfather,  likewise  the  great-grandfather,  beset  a 
descendant  who  is  born  to  them,  just  as  birds  (fly  to)  a fig-tree  ; (saying)  he  will 
offer  us  funeral  repasts  with  honey  and  meat,  with  vegetables,  and  with  messes 
made  of  milk,  both  in  the  rainy  season  and  under  the  constellation  Maghah”; 
Vasishtha,  XI.  39-40.  See  also  Manu,  IX.  186  ; Baudhayana,  II.  5.  10.  r. 

4 The  Samanodakas,  as  the  term  indicates,  are  those  allied  through  offerings 
of  water.  They  were  descendants  of  the  ancestors  beyond  the  great-grandfather 
as  far  as  the  family  name  extended  and  a relationship  could  be  traced  ; Manu,  V.  60. 

5 Cf.  Rohde,  Psyche,  p.  231. 

6 “ And  as  when  a man  hath  hidden  away  a brand  in  the  black  embers  at  an 
upland  farm,  one  that  hath  no  neighbors  nigh,  and  so  saveth  the  seed  of  fire,  that 
he  may  not  have  to  seek  a light  otherwhere,  even  so  did  Odysseus  cover  himself 
with  leaves”;  Od.  V.  488-491. 


34 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


became  also  the  connecting  link  between  the  present  generation 
and  the  past,  a medium  of  communication  between  the  family 
and  its  ancestral  gods.1  It  was,  in  short,  the  family  altar  and 
the  visible  expression  of  the  jus  divinum  within  the  household. 
The  hearth  itself  came  to  be  regarded  as  a deity  (. Hestia , Vesta , 
Agni  = Ignis),  whose  function  was  to  receive  the  offerings 
presented  and  transmit  them  to  the  higher  powers.2 

The  fire  must  be  kept  burning  always,  fed  with  pure  fuel  of 
wood  or  oil.3  It  was  a symbol  of  the  immortal  nature  of  the 
family  and  its  continual  dependence  on  the  gods.  By  the  pure 
fuel  was  signified  the  moral  and  spiritual  holiness  of  the  fire4 
and  of  the  gods,  whose  altar  it  was.5  No  unclean  act  could  be 
performed  in  its  presence.6  No  polluted  person  dared  approach 
it,7  except  in  certain  cases  and  with  a view  to  purification.8  An 
oath  sworn  by  the  hearth  was  the  most  inviolable  of  all  pledges.9 
The  suppliant  who  reaches  its  sacred  presence  and  seats  hi’m- 


1 For  performing  sacrifices  and  cooking  food;  Manu,  III.  67  ; Gautama,  V.  7-8. 
Worship  of  sacred  fire  brings  prosperity  ; Manu,  III.  76.  It  is  a crime  not  to 
kindle  ; Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XXXVII.  28.  Carries  offerings  to  the  gods  ; 
Vasishtha,  XIV.  18. 

2 “To  Agtzi,  who  carries  the  offerings  to  the  manes,  who  causes  sacrifices  to  be 
well  performed,  Svaha”;  Baudhayana,  II.  8,  14,  7. 

3 “ He  shall  not  place  fuel  on  the  fire  without  having  sprinkled  it  (with  water) 
Apastamba,  I.  5,  15,  12  ; Baudhayana,  I.  7,  15,  20  ; II.  4,  7,  4 ; Gautama,  II.  8 ; 
XXV.  10  ; Institutes  of  Vishnu,  LXVI. 

4 It  is  everywhere  called  the  “holy  fire”  or  the  “sacred  fire.”  In  Greece,  the 
belief  in  the  purifying  power  of  fire  is  thought  to  be  later  than  Homer ; Rohde, 
Psyche,  p.  29.  We  may  with  reason,  however,  suppose  that  the  belief  existed  in 
Aryan  times  but  in  Homer  fell  into  the  background  along  with  ancestor-worship. 

5 “ For  the  gods  are  desirous  of  purity  and  (themselves)  pure  ”;  Baudhayana, 
I.  6,  13,  2.  “The  gods  enjoy  a pure  sacrifice  only”;  id.  I.  1.  “The  manes  are 
primeval  deities,  free  from  anger,  careful  of  purity,  ever  chaste,  averse  from  strife, 
and  endowed  with  great  virtues”;  Manu,  III.  192. 

6 Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  p.  37;  Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  731. 

7 The  sacrificer  and  his  wife  must  put  on  stainless  garments  before  beginning 
the  rites  ; Baudhayana,  I.  6,  13,  4-5.  Alcestis  bathed,  put  on  fresh  garments  and 
adorned  herself  before  approaching  the  fire  ; Euripides,  Alcestis,  157  ff. 

8 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  p.  86. 

9 “ Zeus  be  my  witness  first,  of  gods  the  highest  and  best,  and  the  hearth  of  noble 
Odysseus  whereunto  I am  come”;  Od.  XIX.  303-4;  XVII.  155-6. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


35 


self  in  its  ashes  is  placed  thereby  under  the  protection  of  the 
household  gods,1  and  its  members  are  under  religious  obligations 
to  entertain  him  as  a guest  and  to  shield  him  from  pursuers.2 
If  his  hands  are  stained  with  blood  from  involuntary  or  justifi- 
able homicide,  he  becomes  clean  through  contact  with  the  fire 
and  the  priestly  service  of  the  householder,  though  not  in  the 
eyes  of  his  pursuers.3 

The  kindling  of  the  fire  symbolized  the  founding  of  a new 
household.  This  always  occurred  at  marriage  ;4  and  when  the 
son  remained  at  home,  taking  the  place  of  the  deceased  father, 
he  re-kindled  his  father’s  domestic  fire,  which  had  been  allowed 
to  die  with  its  possessor.5  On  the  death  of  the  mother,  also, 
it  was  extinguished,  and  re-kindled  by  the  householder  at  his 
second  marriage.6  Thus  the  extinction  of  the  fire  was  regarded 
as  a great  calamity.  It  signified  nothing  less  than  the  tempo- 
rary or  permanent  dissolution  of  the  family.  The  mother  who 
allowed  it  to  die  out  through  neglect  was  in  India  punished  by 
fasting,  while  the  father  who  extinguished  it  must  perform  a 
heavy  penance7  and  might  even  suffer  loss  of  caste.8 

The  hearth,  in  its  character  as  an  altar,  made  of  the  house 


1 Represented  by  Zeus  l-vvdffTios  “Hearth-sharing  Zeus”;  Aeschylus,  Agamem- 
non, 703  : 

“ Exacting  vengeance  for  the  scorn 
Done  to  the  table  and  to  Zeus  hearth-sharing.”  (Kennedy.) 

2 Od.  VII.  1 53  £f. ; Thucydides,  I.  136;  Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  pp. 
404-6,  with  references  to  Aeschylus. 

3 Leist,  op.  cit.,  p.  84.  The  slayer  sits  silent  on  the  hearth,  sticks  his  sword 
in  the  ground,  covers  his  face  with  his  hands.  Then  the  house-holder  sacrifices 
a sucking  pig,  pours  blood  on  the  suppliant’s  hands,  and  prays  to  Zeus  Kaddpaios. 
Then  the  Xu/xara  (beast  and  blood)  are  removed,  and  the  slain  is  appeased 
with  an  offering;  Hdt.  I.  35;  Apollonius  Rhodius,  IV.  693  ff.;  Aeschylus, 
Choeph,  36  ff. 

4 “ The  (sacred)  fire  (must  be  kindled)  on  his  marriage  or  on  the  division  of  the 
family  estate.  The  domestic  (ceremonies  must  be  performed)  with  the  aid  of  the  fire  ” ; 
Gautama,  V.  7-8  ; Manu,  III.  67;  Vasishtha,  VIII.  3 ; Baudhayana,  II.  2,  4,  22. 

5 Leist,  op.  cit.,  pp.  70-1. 

6 Manu,  V.  167-8. 

7 Vasishtha,  XXL  27.  Cf.  I.  18. 

8 Id.  I.  23. 


36 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


a temple.  In  the  house,  archaic  man  found  security  and  peace. 
None  of  his  fellow-citizens  dared  to  enter  it  in  the  absence  of 
the  master,1  while  the  officers  of  the  government  must  lay  aside 
their  arms  on  entering  to  search  for  stolen  goods.2  No  dearer 
or  more  sacred  spot  could  anywhere  be  found.3  As  the  re- 
ligious center  of  the  family,  the  hearth  is  the  source  of  the 
householder’s  power.4  Nature  placed  the  father  at  the  head 
of  the  family  for  its  support  and  protection  ; the  divine  law 
made  him  subordinate  to  the  household  gods  represented  by 
the  hearth5  — as  their  priest  and  prophet.  As  priest  he  made 
offerings  daily  to  the  hearth,6  and  as  prophet  he  expounded 
the  divine  will  to  the  family.  The  hearth,  moreover,  gave 
to  its  possessor  a place  in  the  assembly  of  villagers,  and  was 
the  source  of  his  dignity  and  influence  in  the  state.7  The 


1 It  was  an  insult  to  an  Athenian  gentleman  that  a man  should  enter  his  house 
during  his  absence;  [Dem.]  XLVII.  53,60,  81.  Among  the  South-Slavonians 
it  was  called  Kuca , “ the  protected  place  ” ; Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siid- 
slaven,  pp.  72-3. 

2 This  custom  belonged  to  the  ancient  Germans,  Slavs,  Greeks  and  Italians  ; 
Leist,  Graeco -italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  246  ft. 

3 “ What  is  more  sacred  than  the  house  of  every  citizen  ? What  is  more  guarded 
by  every  sentiment  of  religion  ? Here  are  his  altars,  here  his  hearth,  here  the 
gods  of  his  household  ; here  are  contained  his  sacred  things,  his  worship,  his 
ritual ; this  is  so  holy  a refuge  to  all  that  no  person  may  thence  be  dragged 
away”  ; Cicero,  pro  Domo , ch.  41,  quoted  by  Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  357. 

4 Thus  his  feeding  the  fire  is  a symbol  of  his  holding  authority ; Aeschylus, 
Agamemnon,  1434-5  : 

“ I ne’er  expect  to  tread  the  hall  of  fear 

So  long  as  on  my  hearth  Aegisthus  burneth  fire.” 

The  gods  of  the  hearth  give  the  power,  — 

“And  now  into  the  domes  and  homes  by  altar 
Going,  I to  the  gods  first  raise  the  right  hand  — 

They  who  far  sending,  back  again  have  brought  me.” 

Aeschylus,  Agamemnon,  Browning’s  translation,  p.  25.  This  should  be  con- 
nected with  the  statements  of  Aristotle  (Politics,  p.  1322b,  28)  that  “rulers 
derive  their  honor  from  the  common  hearth.” 

6 *E<rrfa  Uair oiva,  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  p.  112. 
e Gautama,  V.  7-8. 

7 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  pp.  88-9. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


37 


duty  of  replenishing  the  fire,  preparing  the  meal,  and  assisting 
in  the  religious  services  devolved  upon  the  house-mother.1 
Thus  was  she  priestess  and  mistress  of  the  household  co- 
ordinate with  her  husband.2  As  the  daughters  assisted  in 
keeping  the  fire,  so  they  shared  in  the  honor.  The  vestals 
at  Rome  represented  the  daughters  of  the  king,  their  duty 
being  to  watch  over  the  hearth  of  the  nation,  while  at  Athens 
it  was  kept  in  the  Prytaneum  by  aged  widows,  the  venerable 
house-mothers  of  the  state.3 

The  first  step  in  the  founding  of  a new  household  is  marriage. 
During  the  Rta  period  marriage  by  capture  prevailed  among 
warlike  gentes.4  The  captive  wives  were,  of  course,  taken  from 
another  village.  Following  this  form  of  marriage,  and  growing 
out  of  it,  was  the  form  of  marriage  by  purchase.  In  this  case, 
both  parties  consented  to  the  marriage,  and  their  relations  were 
those  of  peace  and  friendship.5  This  naturally  brought  about 
a change  in  the  condition  of  the  wife.  In  the  former  case,  she 
was  in  unconditioned  subjection  to  her  husband  ; in  the  latter, 
there  must  have  come  in  early  an  understanding  as  to  her  treat- 
ment after  marriage.6  Thus  the  change  from  capture  to 

1 “ A wife  who  assists  at  the  kindling  of  the  fires  becomes  connected  with  those 
religious  rites  of  which  that  (fire-kindling)  forms  a part”;  Apastamba,  II.  5,  n, 
14,  and  note  id.  12  ; II.  6,  14,  16-17  ; Baudhayana,  I.  6,  13,  4-5  ; Manu,  III.  18; 
Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XXVI.  1-2. 

2 “Both  wife  and  husband  have  power  over  (their)  common  property”  ; Apas- 
tamba, II.  11,  29,  3.  “The  father  and  the  mother  have  power  to  give,  to  sell, 
and  to  abandon  their  son”;  Vasishtha,  XV.  2;  Baudhayana,  Parisishta,  VII.  5,3. 

3 Cf.  this  with  Frazer’s  view  in  his  interesting  article  on  the  Prytaneum,  etc.  ; 
Journal  of  Philology,  No.  XXVIII.  (vol.  XIV.)  p.  145  ff.  Fustel  de  Coulanges’ 
treatment  of  the  hearth  (Ancient  City,  pp.  29-41)  is  excellent,  but  he  is  wrong  in 
supposing  that  the  wife  has  no  power.  That  the  daughter  assists  appears  from 
A5valayana,  I.  9,  1,  2. 

4 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,2  pp.  553-4  ; Dionysius  of 
Halicarnassus,  II.  30;  Herodotus,  I.  146.  In  this  epoch  the  wife  was  a slave, 
and  relationship  through  males  only  was  the  rule. 

5 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,2  pp.  553-4,  550;  Aristotle, 
Politics,  II.  8,  19  (p.  1268  b,  41). 

6 The  relations  of  the  wife  began  at  this  point  of  time  to  be  recognized  as  the 
husband’s  relations,  and  cognate  relationship  thus  came  in.  As  marriage  by 
purchase  is  Aryan,  so  is  the  cognate  relationship  Aryan  at  least  in  its  beginnings. 


38 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


purchase  brought,  in  time,  great  improvement  in  the  condition 
of  women.  The  development  from  exogamy  (where  this  was 
customary 4)  to  endogamy  was  another  advance  in  their  favor  : 
for  now,  in  case  of  ill-treatment,  they  could  appeal  for  protection 
to  their  kinsmen  in  blood,  and  this  possibility  exerted  a restrain- 
ing influence  upon  their  husbands.* 1 2  Marriage  by  purchase  must 
also  have  originated  in  the  Rta  period.3 4  The  older  custom, 
however,  continued  to  exist  by  the  side  of  the  newer.  We  are 
now  to  consider  the  influence  of  Themis  upon  these  two  forms. 
It  acted  more  strongly  against  the  earlier  and  more  barbarous 
custom,  displacing  the  reality  by  a mere  ceremony.4  To  one 
who  understands  the  nature  of  marriage  as  a ceremony  of 


In  Homeric  Greece,  the  wife  was  not  in  unconditioned  subjection  to  the  house- 
holder of  her  husband’s  family,  but  in  case  of  mistreatment  was  avenged  by  her 
own  father.  “ Moreover  it  is  hard  for  me  to  make  heavy  restitution  to  Icarius,  as 
needs  I must,  if  of  mine  own  will  I send  my  mother  away.  For  I shall  have  evil 
at  his  hand,  at  the  hand  of  her  father”  ; Od.  II.  132-4. 

1 i.  e.  among  warlike  gentes.  When  marriage  by  purchase  and  the  still  higher 
forms  came  in,  endogamy  was  fostered  by  prudential  considerations. 

“ And  choose  thy  wife  from  those  that  round  thee  dwell, 

Weighing,  lest  neighbors  jeer,  thy  choice  full  well.” 

Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  700  f. 

2 Plutarch,  Quaestiones  Romanae,  108. 

8 A sufficient  proof  that  these  two  forms  of  marriage  originated  before  the 
Dharvia  period  is  the  fact,  to  be  set  forth  hereafter,  that  the  dharma  idea  was 
antagonistic  to  both  forms.  For  the  beautiful  family  life  in  early  India,  see 
Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  316. 

4 Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus,  II.  30  (quoted  by  Schrader,  Sprachvergleich.,  etc., 
p.  553)  tells  us  that  marriage  di’  dp-irayrjs  once  prevailed  through  all  Greece.  The 
Dorians  retained  survivals  of  this  in  their  marriage  ceremonies;  Plutarch,  Lycurg., 
15;  Muller’s  Dorians,  II.  p.  298  ff.;  Bliimner,  Griech.  Privatalterthiimer,  p.  272 
and  n.  8.  In  India,  also,  marriage  by  capture  was  not  unknown  in  the  Dharma 
period.  “ If  they  forcibly  abduct  (a  damsel)  destroying  (her  relatives)  by  strength 
(of  arms),  that  (is  called)  Ksatra-rite  Vasishtha,  I.  34  (or  Raksatra-rite ; Baud- 
hayana,  I.  11,  20,  8);  but  this  form  of  marriage  was  denounced  as  sinful  (Baudh. 
I.  11,  20,  11)  and  the  bride  was  released  when  practicable;  Vasishtha,  XVII.  73. 
The  custom  of  carrying  the  bride  across  the  threshold  of  her  new  home  may  go 
back  to  this  practice,  though  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  p.  56  ff.,  treats  it 
differently.  The  rape  of  the  Sabine  women  is  a reminiscence  of  the  same  practice 
among  the  Romans.  For  survivals  among  the  South-Slavonians,  see  Krauss, 
Sitte  und  Brauch  d.  SUdslaven,  pp.  394,  449. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


39 


house-worship  it  seems  perfectly  intelligible  that  the  capture  of 
wives  should  be  suppressed  in  the  interests  of  that  religion.1 
Themis  was  opposed  to  marriage  by  purchase  also,  since  it  made 
the  wife  a slave,  whereas  under  the  divine  law  she  should  be 
free  and  on  a level  with  her  husband.2  Accordingly  the  fee 
was  reduced  to  a merely  nominal  sum  ; — a pair  of  kine  being 
prescribed  by  Hindoo  usage  ;3  and  this  was  not  regarded  as  a 
fee,  but  only  a token  of  kindness  and  respect  for  the  maiden.4 
Any  gift,  great  or  small,  should  be  returned  to  the  giver  or  to 
the  bride  as  dowry.5  But  it  was  impossible  to  do  away  entirely 
with  the  custom  ; hence  the  attempt  to  varnish  it  over  with 
sentiment. 

Besides  the  formal  betrothal,  there  were  three  acts  in  the 
ceremony  of  marriage.  In  the  first  act,  the  father  delivers  his 
daughter  into  the  hand  of  the  bridegroom.6  The  Greek  word 


1 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  155  ff. 

2 Marriage  by  purchase  was  severely  denounced  by  Hindoo  law.  “Those 
wicked  men  who,  seduced  by  greed,  give  away  their  daughters  for  a fee,  who  thus 
sell  themselves  and  commit  a great  crime,  fall  (after  death)  into  a dreadful  place 
of  punishment.  ...  all  this  is  declared  to  happen,  if  a fee  is  taken  ” ; Baudha- 
yana,  I.  1 1,  21.  And  again  : “ It  is  declared  that  a female  who  has  been  purchased 
for  money  is  not  a wife.  She  cannot  (assist)  at  sacrifices,  offered  to  gods  and 
manes.  . . . She  is  a slave”;  id.  2.  Cf.  Vasishtha,  I.  36-8;  Manu,  III.  27-28, 
24-25,  31.  The  father  should  not  take  the  smallest  gratuity;  Manu,  III.  51,  53. 

3 Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XXIV.  21.  This  gift  characterized  the  Arsha  marriage. 

4 Manu,  III.  54. 

5 “It  is  declared  in  the  Veda  that  at  the  time  of  marriage  a gift,  for  (the  fulfil- 
ment of)  his  wishes,  should  be  made  by  the  bridegroom  to  the  father  of  the  bride 
in  order  to  fulfil  the  law.  ‘ Therefore  he  should  give  a hundred  (cows)  besides  a 
chariot ; that  gift  he  should  make  bootless  (by  returning  it  to  the  giver).’  In 
reference  to  those  (marriage-rites)  the  word  sale  (which  occurs  in  some  Smrtis)  is 
only  used  as  a metaphorical  expression  ; for  the  union  of  husband  and  wife  takes 
place  through  the  law”  ; Apastamba,  II.  6,  13,  12.  Cf.  Vasishtha,  I.  36.  This  is 
the  hundred  kine  paid  for  heiresses  in  Homeric  Greece;  Leist,  Altarisches  Jus 
Gentium,  pp.  130-1;  Iliad,  XI.  244;  IX.  146;  Od.  XI.  282;  cf.  £ank.  I.  14,  16. 
That  the  bride-price  ( eedna ) went  in  Homeric  Greece  to  the  daughter  as  dowry, 
just  as  the  Veda  ordains,  is  proved  by  Od.  I.  276-8:  “Let  her  go  back  to  the 
hall  of  that  mighty  man,  her  father,  and  her  kinsfolk  will  furnish  a wedding  feast 
and  array  the  gifts  of  wooing  exceeding  many,  all  that  should  go  back  with  a 
daughter  dearly  beloved.”  Cf.  Od.  II.  196. 

6 Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  p.  56. 


40 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


cyyuryo-ts  probably  applied  originally  to  this  ceremony,  and  signi- 
fied an  actual  delivery  into  the  hand,  just  as  it  afterwards 
signified  a legal  delivery  (ckSovvcu) . Then  came  the  pompe , or 
journey  of  the  bride,  seated  on  an  ox-cart,  to  the  house  of  her 
husband.1  Finally  occurred  the  telos,  or  initiation  of  the  bride 
into  the  sacra  of  her  new  home.2  The  signification  of  these 
ceremonies  is,  in  brief,  the  release  of  the  maiden  from  the 
power  of  her  father  and  connection  with  the  sacra  of  his 
house,3  and  her  delivery  into  the  power  of  her  husband 4 * and 
initiation  into  the  worship  of  his  house.6  Restriction  as  to 
the  intermarriage  of  near  kin  has  already  been  partially  con- 
sidered.6 In  Greece  the  intermarriage  of  near  kin  was  per- 


1 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,2  p.  554;  Leist,  Graeco- 
italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  65. 

2 “ In  regard  to  women,  the  marriage  ceremony  is  (regarded,  &c.,  as  their)  initia- 
tion” ; Vishnu,  XXII.  32.  In  Greece  the  bride  was  “led  in  marriage  from  the 
paternal  hearth  ” ; Bliimner,  Die  griech.  Privatalterthiimer,  pp.  273  n.  1 and  275  n.  1, 
with  references.  The  bride’s  mother  carried  the  sacred  fire  to  the  new  home  ; id. 
Among  the  South-Slavonians,  the  marriage  ceremonies  were  closely  connected 
with  the  hearth  ; Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  pp.  386,  395,  399  f.  For 
the  meaning  of  iyyvrjois  above  given,  see  E.  Hruza,  Beitrage  zur  Geschichte  des 
griechischen  und  romischen  Familienrechts,  Bd.  I.,  reviewed  by  Otto  Muller  in 
Neue  Philologische  Rundschau,  1892,  pp.  327-31.  According  to  Hruza,  the  Attic 
marriage  consisted  of  three  acts:  (1)  ^771)770-45;  (2)  ttout'/]  ; (3)  completion,  con- 
summation ( Vollziehung ),  — he  denies  admission  to  the  phratry.  But  his  reviewer, 
op.  cit.y  p.  331,  is  unwilling  to  accept  his  conclusions.  In  my  opinion  they  are  half- 
correct  : the  bride  retained  kinship  with  the  family  (oJkos)  of  her  father  and  his 
phrateres  and  8t]/a6tcu  and  entered  the  family,  phratry  and  deme  of  husband.  The 
introduction  into  the  phratry  in  Attica  may  be  regarded  as  the  initiation  of  the 
bride,  although  ceremonies  in  the  house  of  her  husband  were  not  wanting.  Cf. 
Bliimner,  Griech.  Privatalterthiimer,  p.  274  ff. 

8 e.  g.,  “ For  married  women  there  is  no  impurity  (in  case  of  death)  for  relatives 
on  the  father’s  side”;  Vishnu,  XXII.  33. 

4 “ The  betrothal  (by  the  father  or  guardian)  is  the  cause  of  (the  husband’s) 

dominion  over  his  wife”;  Manu,  V.  152. 

6 Vishnu,  XXII.  32  ; McLennan,  Patriarchal  Theory,  p.  221.  The  most  thorough 
discussion  of  these  ceremonies  is  that  given  by  Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium, 
p.  1 33  ff-  Also,  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  pp.  53-60  ; Schrader,  Sprach- 
vergleichung und  Urgeschichte,2  pp.  554-5;  for  Greece,  see  Muller’s  Hdb.,  1 IV. 
p.  445  d. 

« p.  6 ff . 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


41 


mitted  and  even  encouraged,1  and  I am  inclined  to  believe  that 
this  was  true  for  the  Aryan  period,2  although  the  data  do  not 
warrant  a positive  assertion.  The  primary  object  of  marriage 
was  the  begetting  of  legitimate  children  that  the  house  might 
be  continued  and  the  sacra  performed  without  interruption.3 4 
Sons  were  especially  desired,  since  daughters  could  not  perform 
the  sacra}  In  begetting  a son,  man  discharges  his  debt  to 
the  manes  and  gains  immortality.5  Again,  it  is  said,  “ He 
is  perfect  who  consists  of  three  persons  united,  his  wife,  him- 
self and  offspring.” 6 This  object  of  marriage  attained  an 
exaggerated  value  among  the  Hindoos,  while  for  the  under- 
standing of  Greek  modes  of  thought,  it  is  difficult  to  over- 
estimate its  importance.  Accessory  to  this  were  the  faithful 
service  rendered  by  the  wife,  her  aid  in  performing  the  religious 
rites,  and  the  increased  strength,  honor,  and  happiness  of  the 
house  resulting  from  the  harmonious  action  of  husband  and 
wife.7 


1 Od.  VII.  58  f,  for  marriage  of  uncle  and  niece.  In  Crete  (Law  of  Gortyn)  and 
at  Athens  the  heiress  belonged  to  the  anchisteis. 

2 The  original  prohibition  of  intermarriage  between  parent  and  child  may  linger 
in  the  Hindoo  law  against  incest  ; Vishnu,  XXXIV.  1-3.  If  marriage  between 
these  closest  relatives  is  highly  criminal,  then  — the  Hindoos  may  have  thought  — 
it  was  still  criminal,  though  in  a less  degree,  when  contracted  between  the  most 
distant  kin.  Hence,  probably,  the  sweeping  prohibition  of  intermarriage  within 
the  gens;  Apastamba,  II.  5,  11,  15  ; Vasishtha,  VIII.  1.  Cf.  Manu,  III.  5.  It 
was  in  accordance  with  this  pseudo-reasoning  that  the  Hindoos  developed  their 
foolishly  intricate  rituals  ; Maine,  Ancient  Law,  pp.  17-19. 

3 Isaeus,  VI.  25;  Demosthenes,  LIX.  122  : Plutarch,  Solon,  20;  Leist,  Alt- 
arisches  Jus  Gentium,  p.  114  ft.  Cf.  Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  496. 

4 “A  female  shall  not  offer  any  burnt  oblation”;  Apastamba,  II.  7,  15,  18. 
Cf.  Leist,  Alt.  Jus  Gent.,  p.  124. 

5 “ Through  a son  he  conquers  the  world,  through  a son’s  son  he  gains  immor- 
tality, but  through  his  son’s  grandson,  he  gains  the  world  of  the  sun”;  Manu, 
IX.  106,  137.  Also  among  the  South-Slavonians  the  son  supports  the  father 
in  old  age,  performs  his  funeral  rites,  remembers  him  before  God  and  the  world, 
continues  the  family  and  name  ; Krauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  469,  470-2. 

6 Manu,  IX.  45. 

7 “ Offspring,  (the  due  performance  of  religious  rites),  faithful  service,  highest 
conjugal  happiness  and  heavenly  bliss  for  the  ancestors  and  oneself,  depend  on 
one’s  wife  alone”;  Manu,  IX.  28.  “There  is  nothing  mightier  and  nobler  than 


42 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


On  failure  of  issue  by  her  husband,  a woman  who  has  been 
authorized  may  obtain,  in  the  manner  prescribed,  the  desired 
offspring  by  cohabiting  with  her  brother-in-law  or  with  some 
other  Sapinda  of  the  husband.* 1  The  child  thus  begotten 
belongs  to  the  husband.2  If  the  husband  has  died  without 
children,  a brother-in-law,3  a Sapinda  or  a Sagotra  4 (clansman) 
married  5 the  widow  to  raise  up  a child  to  the  deceased.  This 
usage  arose  from  the  interest  of  the  Sapindas  in  the  perpetuity 
of  the  house,  and  their  secondary  claim  to  its  property  and 
persons.6 

We  come  now  to  consider  the  common  meal  of  the  Aryan 
family.  This  is  the  oft-recurring  religious  observance  of  the 
family  and,  considered  in  its  natural  aspect,  is  the  material  end 
of  the  Hestia  institution.7  It  is  the  duty  of  the  father  to  labor 
for  the  support  of  the  family,  the  entertainment  of  guests  and 
of  the  divine  guardians  of  the  house.  To  this  object,  his  own 
interest,  his  own  appetite  must  be  postponed.  “ Before  a 
householder  eats,  he  shall  feed  his  guests,  the  infants,  the  sick 
people,  the  women  under  his  protection,  the  various  aged  men, 
and  those  of  low  condition  (who  may  be  in  his  house).”8  Thus 
Themis  has  transformed  the  rude  violence  of  the  stronger  into 
a beneficent,  self-denying  power  exerted  for  the  preservation 


when  man  and  wife  are  of  one  mind  and  heart  in  a house,  a grief  to  their  foes, 
and  to  their  friends  great  joy,  but  their  own  hearts  know  it  best  Od.  VI.  182  ff. 
Cf.  Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  703.  “A  prudent  wife  is  a great  blessing”  — South- 
Slavonic  proverb  ; Krauss,  op.  cit.,  p.  499. 

1 Manu,  IX.  59,  167  ; Plutarch,  Solon,  20.  If  the  husband  is  living,  he  is  the 
proper  person  to  authorize  ; Gautama,  XVII.  11. 

2 Gautama,  XVIII.  11. 

8 Manu,  IX.  69  ; Gautama,  XVIII.  4. 

4 Gautama,  XVIII.  6.  There  was  a difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  limit  per- 

mitted. 

6 The  Hindoos  called  this  the  Niyoga  marriage;  see  above-given  references. 
For  Sparta  and  the  Germans,  Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  pp.  47-8. 

0 “ A bride  is  given  to  the  family  (of  the  husband  and  not  to  the  husband 
alone)”  ; Apastamba,  II.  10,  27,  3. 

7 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  p.  75. 

8 Gautama,  V.  25,  also  3 ; Vasishtha,  XI.  6-1 1. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


43 


and  protection  of  the  weak.  In  its  spiritual  character,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  a community  of  worship,  and  hence  a symbol 
of  kinship.1  This  community  extended  not  to  the  living  alone; 
but  the  dead  also  partook  of  the  meal  ; for  before  the  rest  could 
eat,  an  offering  was  made  in  the  domestic  fire  to  the  guardian 
deities  of  the  house.2  This  sacrifice  consisted  of  a portion  of 
the  food,3  and  was  made  by  the  house-father4  or,  in  his  absence, 
by  his  sons.5  In  the  meal  of  the  family  the  living  and  the 
dead  were  united.  Thus  must  we  supplement  our  statement 
as  to  the  composition  of  the  house.  In  the  belief  of  the 
ancients,  it  included  the  ancestors  as  well  as  their  living  de- 
scendants,6 and  belonged  not  to  a limited  portion  of  time,  but 
to  eternity. 

The  ceremonies  of  birth  were  also  of  a religious  character. 
Before  these  were  performed,  the  child  was  not  considered  a 
member  of  the  household,  but  was  looked  upon  as  a mere 
animal  without  rights  in  the  family  or  state.7  Hence  arose 
the  right  of  the  father  to  expose  the  child.8  Those  were  liable 
to  exposure  (i)  who  were  of  doubtful  birth,  (2)  who  were  weak 
or  deformed,  and  thus  had  little  chance  of  success  in  the  hard 
battle  for  existence  in  those  early  days  of  strife  and  blood. 
If  the  father  concluded  to  acknowledge  the  child,  the  birth 
ceremonies  were  performed.  ’ These  consisted  of  two  parts  : 
(1)  the  Amphidromia ; (2)  the  Feast  of  the  Tenth  Day.  In 
the  Amphidromia  a female  servant,  taking  the  child  in  her 
arms,  ran  around  the  hearth  from  left  to  right,  — whence  the 
name.  In  the  second  act  the  father  took  the  child  up,  gave 


1 Cf.  Plato’s  Laws,  V.  p.  729  C. 

2 Vasishtha,  XI.  3,  4 ; Od.  XIV.  429. 

3 “ That  food  must  not  be  eaten  of  which  (no  portion)  is  offered  in  the  fire,  and 
of  which  no  portion  is  first  given  (to  guests)”  ; Apastamba,  II.  6,  15,  14. 

4 £ankhayana,  II.  17. 

5 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  p.  68. 

6 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  21  ff.  ; Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City, 
pp.  41  ff.,  71  ff. 

7 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  344. 

8 Herodotus,  I.  59. 


44 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


it  a name  and  presented  it  to  his  kinsmen,  who  had  gathered 
on  invitation  to  a feast  in  honor  of  their  new  relative.1  The 
taking  up  of  the  child  by  the  father  is  the  formal  acknowl- 
edgement of  it  as  a member  of  the  family,  while  the  carrying 
around  the  hearth  is  its  presentation  to  the  household  gods.2 
It  is  to  be  observed  that  these  sacra  make  the  child  a member 
of  the  household.  Without  these  he  has  no  family  rights 
and  hence  no  connection  with  the  gens  or,  in  later  times, 
with  the  state.  And  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that 
relatives  be  present  to  witness  the  sacra;  for  only  by  their 
testimony  is  the  initiated  person  enabled  in  later  years  to 
maintain  his  rights.  We  are  met  at  every  point  in  the  way 
by  the  fact  that  the  natural  basis  of  kinship,  alone  existing 
in  the  Rta  period,  viz.,  birth,  was  superseded  in  the  following 
period,  in  obedience  to  Themis , by  religious  ceremonies. 
Hence,  among  the  Aryans,  religion,  not  birth,  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  the  basis  of  kinship.  Daughters  were  received  into 
the  family  in  the  same  manner  as  sons,3  and  it  was  equally 
important  that  their  acceptance  should  be  registered  in  the 
memory  of  kinsmen.  The  accepted  son  or  daughter  was  from 
that  day  forth  a member  of  the  household  and  a sharer  in  its 
spiritual  blessings.  Adoption  also  was  accompanied  by  sacred 
rites  and  offerings  to  the  fire.4  Slaves,  too,  were  initiated,5 
and  participated  to  a certain  extent  in  the  religion  of  the 
house.6  After  the  son  had  been  fully  instructed  by  the  father 


1 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  25  ; Fustel  de  Coulanges,  p.  67; 
Blumner,  Die  griechischen  Privatalterthiimer  in  K.  F.  Hermann’s  Lehrbuch  d. 
griech.  Antiquitaten,  p.  281;  Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XXVII.  5.  The  two  acts 
are  here  designated  by  their  Greek  names.  It  is  not  thought  necessary  to 
describe  these  ceremonies  in  detail. 

2 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  25. 

3 Macrobius,  I.  16,  36. 

4 Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Anc.  City,  p.  70.  The  householder  (in  India)  received  the 

child  with  these  words:  “I  take  thee  for  the  fulfilment  of  my  religious  duties:  I 
take  thee  to  continue  the  line  of  (my  ancestors)  Baudhayana,  Parisishta,  VII.  11. 

6 Demosthenes,  XLV.  74;  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  p.  150. 

6 “They  declare  the  fragments  which  have  fallen  on  the  ground  at  a ((^raddha) 
to  the  manes  to  be  the  share  of  honest,  dutiful  servants”;  Manu,  III.  246. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


45 


in  the  sacred  formulae  required  for  the  domestic  ceremonies, 
he  was,  at  least  in  India,  initiated  into  the  worship  of  the  house 
with  still  further  rites.* 1  From  that  time  forward  he  could  per- 
form the  worship  of  the  house  in  the  absence  of  the  father. 

It  was  for  the  performance  especially  of  the  sacra  of 
death  (Gk.  nomizomena , cmy %eiv,2  Lat.  parentare , i.e.t  worship 
of  parents)  that  the  house  was  organized  and  maintained.  The 
most  dreadful  fate  befell  the  deceased  ancestor,  if  his  worship 
was  discontinued.  He  was  doomed  to  perpetual  hunger,  and 
his  soul  could  find  no  rest  in  the  grave.3  His  living  descend- 
ants experienced  in  consequence  an  equally  terrible  calamity. 
The  curses  of  the  neglected  spirits  visited  their  lands  with 
sterility,  and  their  people  and  flocks  with  pestilence.  On  the 
other  hand,  a proper  fulfilment  of  the  duties  to  the  dead 
brought  length  of  days  with  physical  and  moral  health  and 
material  prosperity  to  the  members  of  the  household.4  The 
duty  of  performing  this  worship  devolved  mainly  upon  the 
living  male  descendants.  Accordingly,  it  was  the  chief  care  of 
the  householder  to  leave  a son,  begotten  or  adopted,  to  con- 
tinue the  worship  after  him.5  The  son  must  not  merely  be 


On  the  sacra  of  birth,  Christian  Petersen,  Ueber  die  Geburtstagsfeier  bei  den 
Griechen,  is  especially  good.  Also,  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  pp.  66-8  ; 
Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  pp.  244  ff.,  716-7;  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium 
(see  index)  ; Bliimner,  Die  griech.  Privatalterthlimer,  p.  281  ff.;  Muller’s  Hdb.,  1 IV. 
p.  450  a-b;  Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  p.  538  ff. 

1 Apastamba,  I.  1,  2,  7-9.  Before  this  he  could  not  offer  sacrifices  in  the  fire  ; 
Gautama,  II.  4.  The  initiation  of  Brahmana,  Ksatriya  and  Vaisya  took  place 
in  the  eighth,  eleventh  and  twelfth  years  respectively  ; Gautama,  I.  5,  11. 

2 Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  p.  42  ; Isaeus,  VI.  51. 

3 Iliad,  XXIII.  7 iff.  It  goes  hard  with  those  who  hinder  burial;  Isocrates, 
XIV.  55;  Rohde,  Psyche,  p.  200 f. 

4 The  South-Slavonians,  in  their  clan  feasts  — now  in  honor  of  their  patron 
saint,  but  formerly  of  their  clan-ancestor  — prayed  for  offspring  ; Krauss,  Sitte 
und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  p.  53.  The  Athenians  before  marriage  prayed  to  the 
TpiToir&Topes  (for  explanation  of  term,  see  Pollux,  III.  17)  for  birth  of  children  ; 
Phot.  Suid.  sub  voc.  Prayers  were  offered  to  Gaia  and  to  the  dead  with  her 
(Aesch.  Pers.  220)  for  good  crops  ; Rohde,  Psyche,  p.  194. 

5 The  necessity  of  marrying  and  begetting  children  is  emphasized  in  Baud- 
hayana,  IV.  1,  17;  Vasishtha,  VIII.  11;  Manu,  IX.  14  and  8.  The  object  of 
adoption  is  stated  in  Baudhayana,  Parisishta,  VII.  5,  n.  The  father’s  most 


46 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


begotten  in  lawful  wedlock,* 1  but  must  be  accepted  and  initiated 
as  above  described.2  In  case  there  was  no  son,  a daughter’s 
son  undertook  the  duty.3  Failing  this,  adoption  was  enjoined.4 
The  person  adopted  was  the  nearest  available  member  of  the 
cognate  family,5  e.g.y  a nephew,  cousin  or  second  cousin.  If 
the  deceased  left  neither  a begotten  nor  adopted  son,  the  cog- 
nate family  must  see  to  the  performance  of  the  nomizomena  \ 6 
and  appoint  the  nearest  available  person  of  their  own  number 
as  a son  to  the  deceased.7  While  the  members  of  the  house 
took  a leading  part  in  the  burial  service,8  they  were  assisted  by 
the  cognate  family.9  The  chief  features  of  the  nomizomena 
were,  in  ancient  Greece,  the  washing  and  clothing  of  the  body 
by  the  women  of  the  house,  the  laying  out  of  the  body,  the 
procession  and  burial,  the  return  and  funeral  meal  in  the  house 
of  the  deceased,  the  days  of  mourning  and  the  periodical  sacri- 


earnest  prayer  was  that  a son  be  born  to  him  to  continue  the  race  and  inherit  the 
property;  Demosthenes,  XLIII.  12.  Cf.  Dem.  XLIV.  32,  which  shows  that  the 
sacra  and  inheritance  are  inseparable. 

1 Isaeus,  VII.  30,  and  especially  VI.  51.  Cf.  VII.  19. 

2 A child  may  perform  religious  rites  after  initiation;  Apastamba,  II.  7,  15, 
24-25,  quoted  from  the  Veda.  Even  a legitimate  child  if  not  presented  to  the 
phrateres  (in  Athens)  was  considered  a vbdos ; Isaeus,  III.  75-6. 

3 “ He  who  has  no  son  may  make  his  daughter  an  appointed  daughter  in  the 
following  manner,  saying  to  her  husband  : ‘ The  male  child  born  of  her  shall  per- 
form my  funeral  rites’”;  Manu,  IX.  127;  Gautama,  XXVIII.  18;  Vasishtha, 
XVII.  17  ; Demosthenes,  XLIII.  12  ; Isaeus,  VIII.  31. 

4 “ Those  who  expect  to  die  make  provision  for  themselves  in  order  that  they 

may  not  have  their  houses  desolate,  but  that  there  may  be  some  one  to  offer 
sacrifice  to  them  — and  perform  for  them  all  the  nomizomena.  Wherefore,  if  they 
die  childless,  they  yet  leave  a son  by  adoption.  And  this  is  not  merely  their 
private  judgment  of  the  matter,  but  the  common  law  of  the  state  has  publicly  set 
forth  this  principle.  For  it  enjoins  upon  the  Archon  by  law  the  care  of  the 
households  that  they  be  not  left  destitute  of  heirs  ” ; Isaeus,  VII.  30. 

6  This  must  have  been  true  of  Athens  before  Solon  (Plutarch,  Solon,  21),  and 
of  India,  Vasishtha,  XV.  6. 

6 Demosthenes,  XLVIII.  5 ; Gautama,  XIV.  34. 

7 Isaeus,  VII.  44. 

8 “ A father  and  a mother  shall  be  carried  out  by  their  sons  who  are  equal  in 
caste  to  their  parents”  ; Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XIX.  3 ; Isaeus,  VIII.  22. 

8 Demosthenes,  XLVIII.  5. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


47 


fice.1  Some  of  the  features  appear  in  the  Hindoo  ceremonials 
together  with  others,  as  the  procession  about  the  grave  from 
left  to  right  and  the  bath  in  the  brook  outside  the  village.2 
Common  features  of  the  nomizomena  are  the  religious  character 
of  the  rites,  the  prominent  part  in  the  ceremonies  taken  by 
the  anchisteis  and  by  the  female  relatives  of  the  deceased,  and 
the  nine  (or  ten)  days  of  mourning.3  We  have  observed  above, 
the  value  of  the  birth-ceremonies  as  establishing  the  son’s 
rights  of  inheritance.  Of  equal  importance  are  the  nomizomena. 
If  he  fails  to  perform  these,  he  is  considered  an  alien,  and  can 
have  no  claim  on  the  estate  of  the  deceased.  This  became  a 
matter  of  great  consequence  to  the  Athenians.4 

We  have  now  considered  all  the  more  important  ceremonies 
connected  with  house-worship.  There  remains  the  discussion 
of  the  several  members  of  the  household  in  the  order  of  their 
importance. 

The  power  of  the  father  was  not  the  arbitrary  force  of  the 
stronger  exercised  for  self-gratification  to  the  injury  of  the 


1 Demosthenes,  XLIII.  62-6;  XLVIII.  5;  Isaeus,  VIII.  39;  VI.  65  ; VII. 
30  ; IX.  4,  7. 

2 Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XIX.  6 ; Apastamba,  II.  6,  15,  10,  and  2-4;  Vasishtha, 
IV.  1 1 —1 7 ; Baudhayana,  I.  5,  11,  24-25.  Further  authorities  for  the  nomizomena 
are  Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  pp.  24  ff.,  716  fT. ; Altarisches  Jus 
Gentium,  pp.  91,  188  ff.,  193,  606;  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  pp.  15-29, 
49 ff.;  Bliimner,  Die  griech.  Privatalterthiimer,  p.  361  ff.;  Rohde,  Psyche,  pp. 
200 ff.,  213  ff.;  Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  401  ff.  That  the  South- 
Slavonians  made  offerings  to  the  dead  is  affirmed  by  Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch 
der  Sudslaven,  pp.  630-1. 

3 Gautama,  XIV.  34;  Apastamba,  II.  6,  15,  10;  Demosthenes,  XLIII.  62-5. 
The  Greeks  and  Romans  mourned  nine  days  (r a evara,  novendialia)  ; the  Hindoos, 
ten.  The  former  may  have  counted  from  the  day  of  death  ; that  the  latter 
counted  from  the  day  of  burial  is  now  established  beyond  a doubt  by  Rohde, 
Psyche,  p.  213  and  n.  5. 

4 “ These  men,  therefore,  are  seeking  to  bring  about  a most  outrageous  result  — 
namely,  that  we  and  the  women  of  our  family  were  obliged  to  inherit  the  corpse  of 
Hagnias  when  he  died  and  to  perform  all  the  last  offices,  as  relatives  and  next  in 
kin  ; but  that  Macartatus  is  to  be  held  entitled  to  the  estate  of  the  deceased 
Hagnias,  although  he  is  descended  from  the  house  of  Stratius  and  his  mother  was 
daughter  of  Apolexis  the  Prospaltian,  and  sister  of  Macartatus.  But  this  is 
neither  just  nor  righteous,  men  of  the  jury”  ; Demosthenes,  XLIII.  65. 


48 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


weak.  Rather,  it  was  a beneficent,  protecting,  and  supporting 
power  founded  upon  the  order  of  nature1  and  sanctified  by 
religion.2  It  was  exercised,  therefore,  toward  all  who  were  in 
need  of  this  support  and  protection,  viz.,  women  and  children,  3 
guests,4  beggars  5 and  slaves.6  “ The  rule  of  the  father  over  his 
children  is  royal,  for  he  receives  both  love  and  respect  due  to 
age,  exercising  a kind  of  royal  power.”7  “ The  rule  over  his 
wife  is  a constitutional  rule,”8  since  he  takes  her  into  his 
counsel  in  all  matters  pertaining  to  the  good  of  the  family. 
“The  rule  of  the  master  over  his  slave  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
master  primarily,”9  although  a good  master  naturally  cares  for 
the  well  being  of  his  slave.  The  latter  kind  of  rule  is  a 
tyranny.  Thus  “the  rule  of  the  household  is  a monarchy,  for 
every  house  is  under  one  head.”  10  It  is  in  the  interest  of  unity 
that  the  wife  renders  her  voluntary  submission  to  the  law  of 
her  husband. 


1 Aristotle,  Politics,  I.  12,  i (p.  1259b,  1):  “The  male  is  by  nature  fitter  for 
command  than  the  female,  just  as  the  elder  and  full-grown  is  superior  to  the 
younger  and  more  immature.” 

2 Aristotle,  Politics,  I.  2 ; Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  57  ff. 

3 “Women  are  considered  to  be  destitute  of  strength”;  Baudhayana,  II.  2,  3, 

46,  quoted  from  Veda.  “Her  father  protects  her  in  childhood,  her  husband 
protects  her  in  youth,  and  her  sons  protect  her  in  old  age.  A woman  is  never 
fit  for  independence”;  Manu,  IX.  3 ; Gautama,  XVIII.  1;  Vasishtha,  V.  1-2; 
Baudhayana,  II.  2,  3,  44-45.  “ The  slave  has  no  deliberative  faculty  at  all ; the 

woman  has,  but  it  is  without  authority;  and  the  child  has,  but  it  is  immature”; 
Aristotle,  Politics,  I.  13,  7 (p.  1260  a,  12). 

4 “ Endless  worlds  are  the  portion  of  those  who  honor  their  guests  (Apastamba, 
II.  2,  4,  15,)  and  earthly  happiness”  ; id.  16  and  14.  Cf.  Od.  I.  119  ff.;  III.  34 ff.; 
XIX.  194;  VIII.  206  ff.;  XVIII.  326  ff.;  XXI.  26  ff.;  Plutarch,  Theseus,  6. 

5 Manu,  V.  226-235  ; Od.  VI.  207. 

0 He  must  stint  himself  rather  than  a slave  who  does  his  work  ; Apastamba, 
II.  4,  9,  10-1 1.  “ One’s  wife  and  one’s  son  must  be  considered  as  one’s  own  body, 

one’s  slave  as  one’s  shadow  ; one’s  daughter  as  the  highest  object  of  tenderness  ; 
hence,  if  one  is  offended  by  (any  one  of)  these,  one  must  bear  it  without  resent- 
ment”; Manu,  IV.  184-5.  Cf.  Aeschylus,  Agamemnon,  950.  At  Athens  a slave 
was  avenged  by  the  owner  ; Demosthenes,  XLVII.  68-73. 

7 Aristotle,  Politics,  I.  12,  3 (p.  1259  b,  10). 

8 Id.  I.  12,  1 (p.  1259  b,  1). 

* Id.  HI.  6,  3 (p.  1278  b,  35). 

10  Id.  I.  7,  1 (p.  1255  b,  19);  Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  d.  Siidslaven,  p.  80. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


49 


“ The  householder  should  take  a wife  of  equal  rank,  who  has 
not  belonged  to  another  man  and  is  younger  (than  himself).”1 
With  her  he  is  to  live  for  the  fulfilment  of  his  religious  duties.2 
They  two  are  to  dwell  together  till  death  in  harmony  and  in 
exercise  of  mutual  fidelity  and  love.3  He  should  support  a sick 
wife  who  is  virtuous  and  kind  to  him.4  Even  a wife  who  has 
left  his  house  or  committed  sin  should  not  be  abandoned,  but 
received  back  after  purification.5  With  all  the  members  of  his 
house  he  should  be  at  peace,  suffering  rather  than  inflicting 
injury.6  Especially  the  weak  and  disabled  should  not  be  neg- 
lected,7 nor  should  the  children  eating  with  him  be  abused.8 


1 Gautama,  IV.  i ; Krauss,  op.  cit .,  p.  333.  She  must  be  of  equal  rank  that  the 
gods  and  manes  may  eat  the  offering  presented  with  her  assistance  ; Manu,  III. 
18 ; Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XXVI.  1-2.  The  Athenian  usage  was  remarkably 
similar.  “ Anciently,  men  of  Athens,  there  was  a regal  dynasty  in  Attica,  and  the 
sovereignty  belonged  to  those  who  from  time  to  time  were  most  distinguished  by 
reason  of  their  being  indigenous,  and  the  king  offered  all  the  sacrifices,  and  at  the 
most  holy  and  mysterious  his  wife  officiated,  as  it  was  reasonable  she  should, 

_ being  queen.  . . . The  people  continued  to  elect  the  king  as  before,  . . . and 
they  passed  a law  that  his  wife  should  be  of  Athenian  parentage,  and  that  he 
should  marry  a virgin  who  had  never  known  another  man,  so  that  the  mystic 
sacrifices  might  be  offered  on  behalf  of  the  state  according  to  ancient  usage,  and 
that  religious  worship  should  be  duly  paid  to  the  gods  without  any  retrenchment 
or  innovation  (Demosthenes)  LIX.  74-5. 

2 “ If  he  has  a wife  who  is  willing  and  able  to  perform  her  share  of  the  religious 
duties,  and  who  bears  sons,  he  shall  not  take  a second  Apastamba,  II,  5,  11,  12. 
Otherwise  a second  may  be  taken  ; id.  13  ; Isaeus,  II.  8. 

3 “ Let  mutual  fidelity  continue  till  death”;  Manu,  IX.  101.  “In  that  family 
where  the  husband  is  pleased  with  his  wife,  and  the  wife  with  her  husband,  happi- 
ness will  be  assuredly  lasting  Manu,  III.  60. 

4 Manu,  IX.  82. 

5 Vasishtha,  XXVIII.  2-3  ; Apastamba,  II.  10,  27,  1.  “ If  (adulteresses)  have 

performed  (the  prescribed  penances)  they  are  to  be  treated  as  before  (their  guilt). 
For  the  connection  of  husband  and  wife  takes  place  through  the  law.”  Compare 
the  case  of  Helen. 

6 “ With  his  father  and  his  mother,  with  his  son  and  his  wife,  with  his  daughter 
and  with  his  slaves  he  should  not  have  quarrels”;  Manu,  IV.  180.  Cf.  184-5. 

7 Manu,  IX.  201-2. 

8 Institutes  of  Vishnu,  LX VI II.  25. 


50 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


Having  once  accepted  a child,  the  father  was  under  obligation 
to  provide  for  his  maintenance,  to  instruct  him  in  the  religion 
of  the  house,  and  to  prepare  him  for  the  duties  of  life.1  The 
extent  of  the  father’s  power  over  his  children  must  have  varied 
with  the  position  of  the  mother  and  the  terms  of  the  marriage 
contract.  The  father  was  bound  also  by  the  usages  of  his 
gens,  and  could  in  no  case  put  a child  to  death  without  the 
consent  of  the  collective  anchisteis.  Judgment  lay  not  in  the 
hands  of  any  individual,  but  came  from  the  gods  in  the  author- 
ized manner.  Thus  the  householder  in  all  criminal  cases 
summoned  the  anchisteis  to  a court,  over  which  he  himself  pre- 
sided.2 The  gods  spoke  through  the  mouths  of  the  kinsmen, 
and  the  decision  had  the  force  of  divine  law.  Even  the  privi- 
lege of  rejection  was  restricted  in  early  Greece  and  Rome. 
We  may  be  assured  that  the  father*  never  arbitrarily  sentenced 
his  son  to  death.  This  would  imperil  the  continuance  of  the 
house,  excite  the  wrath  of  the  domestic  gods,  deprive  the  gens 
of  a portion  of  its  strength,  and  expose  himself  to  prosecution 
for  homicide  on  the  part  of  the  mother’s  kinsmen.  On  attain- 
ing his  majority,  the  son  received  the  wife  whom  the  father 
had  chosen  for  him,3  and  was  henceforth  free  from  the  patria 
potestas , but  not  from  agnation  with  the  father  nor  from  the 
obsequium  which  children  owed  to  their  cognate  parents.  These 
continued  through  life.  The  latter  included  the  gerotrophy , or 
duty  of  supporting  the  parents  during  old  age,  and  the  per- 
formance of  the  nomizomena .4 


1 If  the  parent  neglected  the  education  of  the  child,  the  latter  became  thereby 
free  from  the  duties  of  the  gerotrophy ; Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte, 
pp.  13-14;  Plutarch,  Solon,  p.  22. 

2 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  pp.  291-2.  This  court  of  the  kin,  pre- 
sided over  by  the  householder,  is  the  pattern  for  the  later  Boule  presided  over  by  the 
king.  The  Themis  of  the  state  must  have  had  its  origin,  therefore,  in  the  Themis 
of  the  household,  e.g.,  the  Cyclops  gives  his  Themistes  to  his  family,  yet  without 
the  co-operation  of  the  kin,  — his  house  is  completely  isolated  ; Od.  IX.  112-115. 

8 Od.  IV.  10. 

4 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  27;  Isaeus,  II.  18,45-6;  VIII.  22, 

32- 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


51 


The  father  could  sell  his  minor  sons  and  unmarried  daugh- 
ters.1 It  appears  that  even  here,  merely  the  labor  of  the 
youth  and  not  the  person  itself  was  disposed  of  by  sale.2  This, 
too,  was  probably  controlled  by  usage.  The  father  could  also 
emancipate  a son,  allowing  him  to  enter  by  adoption  into 
another  house.3  The  son  was  thus  freed  from  relationship 
with  his  father,  but  not  with  his  mother.4  It  was  the  duty  of 
the  father  also  to  give  his  daughter  in  marriage,5  bestowing  a 
dowry  from  the  eedna  of  the  wooer.6  An  agreement  was  no 
doubt  made,  in  early  times,  with  the  bridegroom  as  to  the 
disposition  of  the  dowry  and  the  treatment  of  wife  and  children.7 
Women  of  high  rank  both  in  Homeric  Greece  and  in  India 
were  allowed  to  choose  their  husbands.8  The  daughter  at 
marriage  passed  not  only  from  under  the  authority  of  the 
father,  but  also  out  of  the  house,  retaining  her  cognate 
relationship  with  him.9  The  father  could  also  appoint  a guard- 
ian for  his  children  and  wife.10  In  Athens  his  authority  even 
extended  to  the  appointment  of  another  husband  for  the  wife.11 
This,  however,  appears  to  be  a growth  from  the  peculiar  views 
of  the  Athenians  as  to  marriage  and  property. 

The  wife,  though  under  her  husband’s  protection,  and  though 
legally  represented  by  him,  possessed  a name  ( patni , TroVvia, 


1 This  was  true  of  Athens  before  Solon  (Plutarch,  Solon,  13),  but  probably 
affected  only  the  non-Eupatrids.  In  India  the  mother  must  be  consulted  in  the 
transaction.  “ The  father  and  mother  have  power  to  give,  to  sell,  and  to  abandon 
their  son”;  Vasishtha,  XV.  2. 

2 Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  p.  120,  with  references. 

3 Id.  p.  1 18.  Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Sudslaven,  pp.  471-2,  477. 

4 Isaeus,  VII.  25.  Thus  he  inherits  any  property  which  may  fall  to  her.  Nor 
is  he  ever  free  from  the  duty  of  supporting  her;  Baudhayana,  II.  2,  3,  42. 

5 Iliad,  XIX.  291. 

6 Bliimner,  Die  griech.  Privatalterthiimer,  p.  262,  with  references. 

7 Od.  II.  132. 

8 In  the  case  of  Penelope,  Od.  II.  114,  the  command  of  the  father  is  seen  to  be 
only  a legal  sanction  to  her  own  choice.  Cf.  Law  of  Gortyn,  VII.  For  the  case 
of  Damayanti,  see  Nalopakhyanam,  bk.  II.  5loka  8 ff. 

9 Manu,  V.  152. 

10  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  p.  119. 

11  Demosthenes,  LVII.  41,  and  especially  XXXVI.  28-32. 


52 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


SeWoim),  which  designated  her  as  a sharer  in  the  rule  over  the 
family.1  She  was  equally  with  the  father  the  cause  of  the  son’s 
existence,2  and  exercised  in  consequence  the  power  of  life, 
death,  and  sale  over  the  latter  conjointly  with  her  husband.3 
It  was  her  duty  even  more  than  that  of  the  husband  to  “ bring 
up”  the  children,4  and  she  in  turn  was  held  in  even  greater 
reverence  by  them.5  She  shared  in  the  privileges  of  the 
gerotrophy  and  the  nomizomena .6  Even  in  Athens,  where  the 
position  of  woman  was  comparatively  low,  the  mother’s  tomb 
was  visited  with  devotion  by  her  children.7 

The  duties  of  the  wife  have  been  enumerated  by  ancient 
writers  as  follows  : she  should  live  in  harmony  with  her  hus- 
band, should  show  reverence  for  her  mother-in-law,  father-in- 
law,  divinities,  and  guests,  keep  the  household  utensils  in  good 
order,  maintain  saving  habits,  observe  auspicious  customs, 
refrain  from  the  practice  of  incantations,  from  decorating  her- 
self with  ornaments  or  resorting  to  the  houses  of  strangers 
during  the  absence  of  her  husband,  from  standing  near  the 


1 Rigveda,  X.  85,  46 ; Atharva-Veda,  XIV.  I.  439 ; Leist,  Graeco-italische 
Rechtsgeschichte,  pp.  57-8. 

2 “ Man  formed  of  uterine  blood  and  virile  seed  proceeds  from  his  mother  and 
his  father  (as  an  effect)  from  its  cause.”  Vasishtha,  XV.  1 ; Isaeus,  XI.  17. 
About  this  there  was  some  difference  of  opinion  ; Aeschylus,  Eumenides  ; Manu, 
IX.  35.  Cf.  Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  11. 

3 Vasishtha,  XV.  2 ; Law  of  Gortyn,  III. 

4 “ A mother  does  very  many  acts  for  her  son  ; therefore  he  must  constantly 
support  her  (even)  though  she  be  fallen”;  Apastamba,  I.  10,  28,  9.  “A  father 

who  has  committed  a crime  causing  loss  of  caste  must  be  cast  off.  But  a mother 
does  not  become  an  outcast  for  her  son”;  Vasishtha,  XIII.  47. 

6 “The  mother  is  a thousand  times  more  venerable  than  the  father”;  Manu, 
II.  145  ; cf.  Xenophon,  Mem.  II.  2.  Cf.  Delbriick,  op.  cit .,  p.  576. 

6 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  p.  124;  Isaeus,  VI.  65. 

7 Isaeus,  VI.  65.  Theseus  (according  to  Plutarch)  provided  a sum  of  money  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  worship  of  his  wife,  Ariadne.  Hearn,  Aryan  Household, 
has  made  a great  mistake  in  supposing  that  the  mother  was  not  worshiped  after 
death.  “ Om,  I satiate  the  father,  Svadha,  adoration  ! the  grandfathers ; the 
great-grandfathers  ; the  mothers  ; the  grandmothers  ; the  great-grandmothers  ; 
the  maternal  grandmothers ; the  mothers’  grandmother ; the  mothers’  great- 
grandmother ”;  Baudhayana,  II.  5,  10,  1. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


53 


door-way  and  windows  of  her  house,  from  acting  by  herself 
in  any  manner.1 

While  children  were  held  to  be  “the  cause  of  happiness 
in  this  world  and  after  death,"  the  eldest  son  occupied  an 
exceptional  position  in  the  family.  With  his  birth  the  house 
was  secure  against  desolation.  The  father  had  discharged 
his  debt  to  the  manes,  and  might  now  die  in  peace.  Probably 
the  importance  attached  to  the  eldest  son  originated,  in  the 
Rta  period,  in  the  fact  that  he  was  the  first  to  lend  assistance 
to  the  father  in  sustaining  the  family,  and  especially  in  de- 
fending it  against  enemies.  With  the  peculiar  belief  of  the 
ancients  that  in  the  commission  of  offences  like  must  be  re- 
paid by  like,  the  son  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  father’s 
natural  avenger.2  And  then,  when  the  jus  divinum  became 
effective  it  enhanced  the  importance  of  the  eldest  son,  since 
the  duty  of  continuing  the  worship  devolved  chiefly  upon  him.3 
Accordingly  it  was  natural  that  he  should  step  into  the  place 
of  the  deceased  parent,  should  be  a father  to  his  unmarried 
sisters  and  minor  brothers.4  He  must  give  his  sisters  in 
marriage,5  providing  a dowry  for  each,  and  must  help  the 
younger  brothers  to  settle  in  their  new  homes.  He  was  like- 
wise the  protector  of  his  mother  and  her  legal  representative.6 
In  the  division  of  the  property  he  was  favored  somewhat, 


1 Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XXV;  Manu,  V.  165;  Gautama,  XVIII.  2-3.  This 
accords  almost  verbally  with  (Aristotle),  Economics,  III.  1 (Susemihl)  ; Krauss, 
Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Sudslaven,  pp.  483-4,  491-3. 

2 “ So  good  a thing  it  is  that  a son  of  the  dead  should  still  be  left,  even  as  that 
son  also  took  vengeance  on  the  slayer  of  his  father,  guileful  Aegisthus,  who  slew 
his  famous  sire”;  Od.  III.  196  ff.  For  the  superior  importance  of  the  eldest  son 
see  Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  328  ; Delbriick,  Die  indogermanischen  Ver- 
wandtschaftsnamen,  p.  578. 

3 Manu,  IX.  204,  213. 

4 Manu,  IX.  108.  This  position  he  holds  by  his  own  merit;  id.  no.  “The 
elder  and  full-grown  is  (by  nature)  superior  to  the  younger  and  more  immature  ”; 
Aristotle,  Politics,  I.  12,  1 (p.  1259  b,  3). 

5 Provided  the  paternal  grandfather  is  not  living;  Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XXIV. 
38  ; also,  Isaeus,  II.  5. 

6 Manu,  IX.  3 ; Thalheim,  Griech.  Rechtsalterthiimer,  p.  10. 


54 


TIIE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


since  he  had  more  onerous  duties  to  perform.1  But  the 
Aryans  knew  nothing  of  an  exclusive  primogeniture.  When 
such  a thing  existed  in  later  times,  it  was  apparently  a devel- 
opment from  the  idea  of  precedence.  Reserving  a special 
share  for  the  eldest,  the  legitimate  sons  shared  equally.2  The 
position  of  the  younger  sons  will  be  clear  from  what  has  al- 
ready been  said.  It  remains  to  speak  briefly  of  the  daughters. 
During  the  Rta  period  it  was  the  custom  especially  of  warlike 
races  to  expose  their  infant  daughters3  and  to  procure  their 
wives  by  robbery  and  pillage.  At  this  time,  of  course,  those 
gentes  which  practised  the  custom  were  mainly  or  exclusively 
exogamous.  The  very  dearth  of  women,  caused  by  infanti- 
cide, enhanced  their  value.4  Then  follows  the  epoch  of  mar- 
riage by  purchase,  with  their  resulting  elevation,  as  above 
set  forth.  Nothing,  however,  contributed  so  much  to  the 
improvement  of  woman’s  condition  as  the  rise  of  the  jus 
divinum.  Yet  owing  to  the  idea  that  the  family  was  an 
indivisible  unit  under  a monarchical  government,  women  could 
not  originally  own  separate  property  or  hold  a position  of  legal 
independence.  The  beginning  of  her  separate  property  is 
found  in  the  ornaments  given  her  at  marriage.  To  these, 
other  gifts  were  afterwards  added.5  As  religion  restricted 
the  eedna , it  enjoined  that  a portion  or  all  of  this  fund  should 
be  given  to  the  bride  by  way  of  dowry.  Further,  the  father 
of  the  maiden  often  endowed  his  daughter  that  she  might 
the  more  readily  obtain  a worthy  husband.6  Occasionally  also 


1 Gautama,  XXVIII.  5,  9-10;  Apastamba,  II.  6,  13,  13;  Demosthenes, 
XXXVI.  34-5- 

2 Manu,  IX.  104;  Gautama,  XXVIII.  1 ; Apastamba,  II.  6,  14,  11.  To  avoid 
harshness  a maintenance  was  given  to  the  illegitimate  son;  Manu,  IX.  163,  4. 
In  Athens,  also,  legitimate  sons  shared  equally;  Isaeus,  VI.  25. 

8 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  p.  564;  Zimmer,  Altindisches 
Eeben,  pp.  319-20. 

4 McLennan,  Studies  in  Ancient  History,  p.  91  f. 

6 Manu,  IX.  194-5  ; Apastamba,  II.  6,  14,  9 ; Vishnu,  XVII.  18. 

6 Leist,  Graec.  Rechtsgesch.,  p.  76.  This  is  true  for  India  in  the  Vedic  period 
and  for  Rome. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


55 


the  dowry  was  increased  in  repayment  of  some  special  service 
of  the  son-in-law.  Thus  in  the  course  of  time,  a considerable 
property  went  with  the  maiden  in  marriage.  This  was  in 
India  held  to  be  separate  property  of  the  wife,1  and  descended 
regularly  to  her  daughters.2  Among  the  East  Dorians,  there 
were  added  to  this  property  the  separate  earnings  of  the  wife, 

— over  all  of  which  the  husband  had  in  his  own  right  no  con- 
trol.3 In  Athens  the  dowry  belonged  to  the  wife,  and  some 
property  of  the  husband  was  mortgaged  to  secure  it.4  When 
the  furniture  was  thus  mortgaged,  the  wife  regarded  herself 
as  the  real  owner  of  the  furniture.5  In  case  of  divorce  in 
Athens,  the  dowry,  returning  to  her  father’s  house,  was  still 
held  de  facto  as  her  separate  property  that  it  might  be  be- 
stowed in  case  she  should  marry  again.6 

(p)  The  Cognate  Family.  ( Anchisteis , Sapindas , Sobrini-circle. ) 

While  the  household  consisted  of  a married  pair  with  their 
descendants  through  males  only,  theoretically  limited  to  three 
generations,  — children,  grandchildren  and  great-grandchildren, 

— the  cognate  family  to  which  a householder  belonged  con- 
sisted of  the  descendants  through  both  males  and  females  of 
his  great-grandparents.  The  household,  therefore,  formed  the 


1 Manu,  IX.  194-5. 

2 Gautama,  XXVIII.  24. 

3 Law  of  Gortyn,  III. 

4 Demosthenes,  XXX.  4. 

5 Demosthenes,  XLVII.  57. 

6 Kennedy’s  Private  Orations  of  Demosthenes  (translation),  p.  319. 

Our  chief  original  authorities  on  house-worship  are  for  India  the  Grhya-Sutras, 
translated  by  Oldenberg  in  the  Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  vol.  XXIX.  the  Dharma- 
Sutras  — Apastamba  and  Gautama,  Vasishtha  and  Baudhayana, — translated  by 
Buhler  in  vols.  II.  and  XIV.  of  the  same  series,  although  much  valuable  matter  is 
to  be  gained  from  Hindoo  literature  in  general.  Lyall,  Asiatic  Studies,  ch.  II., 
and  Mayne,  Hindu  Law  and  Usage,  p.  55.  The  orations  of  Isaeus  and  private 
orations  of  Demosthenes  are  indispensable  to  the  student  of  Greek  private  sacra 
and  dependent  legal  institutions.  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  pp.  9-52  ; 
Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  15  ff.;  Spencer,  Principles  of  Sociology,  I.  pp.  304- 
324;  ancestor- worship  of  the  Aryans,  p.  314;  survivals  of  — p.  320  ff.;  once 


56 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


center  of  this  larger  group.  As  stated  above,  the  son  in  mar- 
riage laid  the  foundation  of  a new  household  ; yet  we  are  not 
to  consider  it  as  fully  established  till  the  death  of  the  father 
and  the  final  settlement  of  the  estate.  Up  to  that  point  of 
time,  the  son,  though  independent,  was  regarded  as  belonging 
to  the  household  of  his  father  ; thereafter  he  is  himself  the 
head  of  a new  household,  including  theoretically  three  genera- 
tions of  descendants. 

The  children,  as  already  stated,  have  a right  to  maintenance, 
protection  and  education  from  their  parents  ; the  daughters 
also  to  dotation  and  the  sons  ultimately  to  inheritance.  On 
the  other  hand  they  are  under  obligations  to  perform  the 
gerotrophy  and  nomizomena  of  father  and  mother.  To  these 
rights  and  duties  which  concern  the  members  of  the  household 
as  parents  or  children,  may  be  added  those  which  affect  all 
members  alike,  general  obligations  of  mutual  help,  defense  and 
redress  of  injuries.  To  the  latter  group  may  be  assigned  the 
obligation  of  vengeance  in  case  of  homicide.  All  these  are  to 
be  fulfilled  when  possible,  within  the  household.* 1  The  cognate 
family,  on  the  other  hand,  is  under  obligations  to  perform  any 
or  all  of  those  duties,  if  the  ability  should  be  lacking  within 
the  household,  or  to  assist  in  their  performance  so  far  as  re- 
quired.2 Thus  they  are  always  present  at  the  sacra  of  birth 
and  death,  and  frequently  required  to  aid  in  wreaking  blood- 
vengeance.  When  an  orphan  daughter  is  left  without  property, 
the  cognate  family  is  under  obligations  to  provide  her  with  a 

universal,  p.  440.  Maine,  Early  Law  and  Custom,  chs.  III.,  IV.  ; Howard, 
Development  of  the  King’s  Peace,  3-4.  Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte 
and  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium  are  of  the  highest  value,  treating  of  the  develop- 
ment of  legal  institutions  from  the  principles  of  ancestor-worship.  Schomann, 
De  Dis  Manibus,  Laribus  et  Geniis  ; Frazer,  Prytaneum,  Temple  of  Vesta,  etc. 
Journal  of  Philology,  No.  XXVIII.  p.  145  ff.  For  evidence  of  ancestor-worship 
in  ancient  Greece,  especially  in  Homer  and  Hesiod,  and  for  the  history  and  signifi- 
cance of  this  worship  in  Greece,  see  Rohde,  Psyche,  who  has  done  an  invaluable 
service  in  placing  this  subject,  for  the  first  time,  in  its  true  historical  relation. 

1 Od.  III.  307  ; XXIV.  433-5. 

2 Od.  XXIV.  433-5;  XV.  223  ff;  Iliad,  XV.  554;  Od.  VIII.  582;  Gautama, 
XV.  13. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


57 


husband  from  their  own  number,  or  give  her  in  marriage  with 
a dowry.1  If,  however,  she  is  an  heiress,  one  of  their  number 
may  claim  her  in  marriage.2  In  case  no  heirs  are  left  within 
the  household,  a son  is  adopted  into  it  from  the  anchisteis , who 
thus  becomes  heir  to  the  estate  and  the  obligations  connected 
with  it.3  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  here,  as  well  as  in  the  house- 
hold, rights  spring  out  of,  and  are  essentially  dependent  upon, 
duties.4  For  example,  if  a kinsman  has  failed  to  assist  in  the 
nomizomena  of  the  deceased,  he  has  no  right  of  inheritance.5 
We  may  observe  further  that  the  order  of  precedence  in  rights 
is  identical  with  the  order  of  precedence  in  duties.6  This 
order  is  one  of  nearness  to  the  household,  relationship  being 
reckoned  through  females  as  well  as  males,  but  the  latter  taking 
precedence.7  We  have,  therefore,  a different  system  of  kinship 
in  the  cognate  family  from  that  which  prevails  within  the 
household.  In  the  latter  case,  it  is  agnatic,  a daughter  and 
her  children  belong  to  another  household,  but  they  cannot 
pass  out  of  the  cognate  family.8  An  only  daughter,  however, 
is  an  exception  to  the  rule,  being  regarded  as  an  agnate.9 
The  houses  of  a gens  exclude  each  other,  the  cognate  families 
overlap.10  With  respect  to  the  cognate  family,  the  gens  may  be 


1 Demosthenes,  XLIII.  54  (Law  as  to  heiresses)  ; Law  of  Gortyn  VII.-VIII. ; 
Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  pp.  468,  334. 

2 Demosth.  XLIII.  55. 

3 Isaeus,  VII.  31,  44. 

4 “And,  men  of  the  jury,  while  the  legislator  has  given  those  rights  to  the 
relatives,  he  has  not  omitted  to  impose  by  the  law  a great  number  of  duties,  the 
performance  of  which  by  the  relatives  is  made  compulsory”;  Demosthenes, 
XLIII.  53.  Cf.  61. 

8  Demosthenes,  XLIII.  62-5.  If  the  adopted  son  refuses  to  perform  the  sacra 
and  the  civil  duties  of  his  adoptive  father’s  house,  he  has  no  right  to  the  estate,  — 
it  reverts  to  the  kinsmen  in  blood;  Law  of  Gortyn,  X. 

6 Demosth.  XLIII.  54. 

7 Manu,  IX.  35  ; Demosthenes,  XLIII.  78. 

8 Institutes  of  Vishnu,  LXXXIV.  17-18. 

9 Isaeus,  III.  41-2,  50  ; Demosthenes,  LVII.  41  ; Manu,  IX.  130,  136  : Gautama, 
XXVIII.  19  ; Vasishtha,  XVII.  16. 

10  Demosthenes,  XLIII.  26:  “To  Macartatus  . . . who  is  both  in  the  (cognate) 
family  of  Hagnias  and  that  of  Stratius.” 


58 


TIIE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


regarded  as  a series  of  intersecting  circles,  and  when  there  is 
connubium  between  two  gentes,  some  of  the  circles  (cognate 
families)  of  the  two  gentes  also  intersect.  Within  the  gens 
this  intersection  is  not  always  complete,  — there  are  groups  of 
intersecting  circles  which  are  independent  of  each  other,  or  at 
least  in  which  no  connection  can  be  traced.  In  such  a case, 
the  gens  is  said  to  be  heterogeneous  as  to  relationship.  This 
can  come  about  in  two  ways.  First,  a connection  which  actually 
existed  may  be  forgotten,  and  secondly,  alien  families  may  be 
introduced  into  a gens  by  adoption.1 

(c)  The  Ge?is  as  a Whole. 

It  is  merely  the  extended  family.  The  instinct  of  self- 
preservation  led  the  sons  to  combine  at  the  death  of  their 


1 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  pp.  138-9,  distinguishes  the  pure  genealogic  from  the 
non-genealogic,  or  fictitious  clan.  The  first  class  is  composed  of  clans  into  which 
no  families  have  been  adopted  ; the  second,  of  those  which  are  formed  in  part  by 
adoption,  or  are  wholly  fictitious,  being  organized  according  to  agreement  of  the 
component  families.  The  manner  in  which  kinship  within  the  more  ancient  gentes 
was  forgotten  and  revived  is  clearly  set  forth  by  Busolt,  Griech.  Gesch.,  I.  p.  395. 

General  Note.  — That  good-will  and  kindness  to  relatives  rest  upon  a basis 
of  nature  appears  from  the  following  : “ If,  as  you  pretend  to  be  a brother,  you 
do  the  acts  of  a brother,  people  will  believe  that  you  are  my  kinsman.  But  if 
you  plot  against  me,  go  to  law  with  me,  envy  me,  slander  me,  it  will  be  thought 
that  you  have  intruded  into  a strange  family  and  treat  the  members  as  if  they 
were  alien  to  you”;  Demosthenes,  XXXIX.  34.  One  relies  upon  his  kin  in 
battle  arising  from  a feud;  Od.  XVI.  115-6.  A person  without  kin  or  phratric  rela- 
tion is  absolutely  defenceless  in  case  of  homicide;  (Dem.)  XLVII.  70,  72.  Cf. 
Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  p.  47.  For  mutual  helpfulness  among  kins- 
men see  id.  p.  40.  It  is  not  well  to  defend  oneself  against  relatives;  Is.  I.  6.  It  is  a 
most  pitiable  thing  to  be  so  abused  by  relatives  as  to  be  compelled  to  go  to  law 
with  them;  Dem.  XL.  1.  A man  does  an  act  of  justice  in  favoring  a kinsman 
with  evidence  in  court ; Dem.  LVII.  53.  Theomnestus,  a certain  Athenian, 
prosecutes  Neaera  to  avenge  a sister  and  a father-in-law  and  a sister’s  children  and 
a wife;  (Dem.)  LIX.  12.  That  the  cognate  family  is  also  a religious  society  for 
the  worship  of  family  gods  appears  from  the  term  6eol  dfioyvioi,  deities  whom  the 
< rvyyevecs  worship  — ipyidfava iv  — in  common.  The  chief  part  of  their  worship 
was  the  performance  of  the  nomizomena , Apastamba,  II,  6,  15,  2-4,  10  and  n ; 
Demosthenes,  XLIII.  62.  The  three  great  legal  ideas  growing  out  of  the  idea  of 
the  cognate  family  are  those  suggested  by  the  terms  nomizomena , blood-vengeance , 
and  inheritance ; Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  22. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


59 


father,  rather  than  to  separate  as  formerly.  When  such  com- 
bination takes  place  the  gens  comes  into  existence.1 

It  is  most  natural  in  such  a case  that  the  property  remain 
undivided.  At  first  the  clan  chief  alloted  to  each  gennete  his 
daily  task.2  But,  as  the  clan  increased  in  size,  it  became  im- 
possible for  one  man  to  supervise  personally  the  details  of 
labor.  Then  the  lands  were  divided  into  lots  and  distributed 
among  the  gennetae  to  hold  and  cultivate  for  one  or  more  years. 
This  lasted  among  the  Germans  down  into  historic  times.3  It 
continues  to  some  extent  in  India  to-day.4  Yet  in  earliest 
times,  the  houses,  with  the  small  lots  on  which  they  stood, 
must  have  been  assigned  to  the  permanent  use  of  individual 
proprietors.5  This  was  favored  by  religion  ; and  where  house- 
worship  was  in  the  ascendency,  there  we  find  the  gentile 
lands  divided  earliest  among  the  gennetae.  Thus  in  Rome, 
Greece,  and  generally  in  India,  private  ownership  came  in 
early.  We  are  not  to  think  of  the  house  as  enjoying  absolute 
ownership  of  the  soil.  This  still  rested  with  the  gens  as  a 
whole  ;6  and  in  late  Athenian  history  the  notion  prevailed  that 
the  estate  belonged  to  the  cognate  family,7  which  after  Solon 
was  the  representative  of  the  gens.8  No  man  was  allowed 
to  alienate  his  land  in  favor  of  one  outside  the  gens,9  and  in 
case  of  failure  of  heirs  within  the  house  or  cognate  family, 


1 Maine,  Early  Law  and  Custom,  p.  219  ff . ; Mommsen,  History  of  Rome,  I.  pp. 
93-4,  ch.  V.  Reference  is  made  here  to  the  development  of  the  earliest  gentes 
from  the  isolated  patriarchal  family.  New  gentes  were  continually  formed  there- 
after by  the  breaking  up  of  an  older  gens  into  its  component  families. 

2 Maine,  Early  Law  and  Custom,  p.  245  ff.  It  is  this  phase  of  development  which 
is  represented  by  the  South-Slavonic  House-Community  of  to-day.  In  the  ab- 
sence of  clan  autonomy  there  is  nothing  to  foster  the  growth  of  large  communi- 
ties, i.  e .,  small  households  find  sufficient  protection  in  the  bratstvo  and  pleme. 

3 Caesar,  Bel.  Gal .,  VI.  22. 

4 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  216. 

5 Id.  pp.  226-7,  219. 

6 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  212. 

7 Isaeus,  III.  64,  61-2. 

8 Philippi,  Geschichte  des  att.  Burgerrechts,  pp.  190-2. 

9 Plutarch,  Solon,  21. 


6o 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


his  property  reverted  to  the  gennetae}  The  actual  reason  for 
retaining  this  property  within  the  gens  was  undoubtedly  the 
fact  that  it  belonged  originally  to  the  entire  body.  Themis 
set  its  sanction  upon  the  fact  by  declaring  that  it  was  essen- 
tial to  the  perpetuity  of  the  gentile  worship.1 2  There  are 
certain  instances  when  property  must  be  alienated.  One  is 
in  case  of  composition  for  the  blood-feud.  Here  the  collective 
gennetae  are  concerned,  and  the  blood-money  belongs  to  the 
gens  as  a whole.  Also,  when  a daughter  is  given  in  marriage 
to  one  of  another  clan,  the  gennetae  must  be  consulted.  After 
the  custom  of  dotation  had  arisen,  the  inalienable  nature  of 
property  must  have  in  general  restricted  marriage  to  the  gens.3 

Each  gens  dwelt  apart  in  a village  in  the  midst  of  its  arable 
fields  and  pasture  lands.4  Within  it  was  the  village  hall  (Gk. 
M<rxn),  which  contained  the  sacred  hearth  of  the  common- 
wealth, and  in  which  the  gennetae  assembled  under  their  leader 
for  deliberation.5  It  was  also  a place  of  amusement,  and  in 
Homer  is  mentioned  along  with  the  smithy  as  a gathering 
place  for  idlers.6  The  village  had  also  its  sacred  tree,  in  which 
the  gods  dwelt  and  enjoyed  the  rustling  of  the  leaves.7  Under 


1 Institutes  of  Vishnu,  XVII.  4—1 1 ; Manu,  IX.  187;  Baudhayana,  I.  5,  11, 
1 1— 1 2 ; Gautama,  XXVIII.  21. 

2 It  is  everywhere  the  understanding  that  the  householder  must  acquire  property 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  members  of  the  household,  including  guests  and  gods. 
That  this  idea  is  extended  to  the  clan  and  city  is  inferred  from  the  general  prin- 
ciple, “ do  ut  des ,”  which  controls  archaic  man  in  all  his  relations  to  the  gods. 

3 Just  as  it  afterwards  tended  to  restrict  marriage  to  the  cognate  family.  “In 
addition  to  this,  I did  not  give  my  daughter  in  marriage  to  a stranger,  but  to  my 
own  brother’s  son,  so  that,  if  they  lived  and  had  their  health,  their  children  might 
also  be  of  the  kindred  of  Hagnias.  Such  were  the  measures  I adopted,  in  order 
that  the  families  descended  from  Buselus  might  in  the  fullest  possible  way  be 
preserved”;  Demosthenes,  XLIII.  74. 

4 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  1 03  ff. ; Altarisches  Jus  Gentium, 

p.  24  ff. 

6 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  104. 

6 Od.  XVIII.  328-9;  Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  491-9. 

7 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  pp.  29-30.  In  the  court  of  every  South- 
Slavonian  house  stood  a tree  under  which  the  family  council  was  accustomed  to 
meet  in  summer. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


6l 


this  tree  the  villagers  met  in  their  judicial  capacity,  and  the 
gods  were  thus  made  witnesses  of  the  oaths.1  A parent,  a 
beggar  and  an  oath  had  each  a curse  as  an  instrument  of 
defense.2  The  man  who  committed  perjury  could  never  rest, 
being  goaded  continually  by  this  curse.  Hence  we  may  under- 
stand the  wonderful  efficiency  of  the  oath  under  the  gentile 
organization. 

The  village  was  located,  when  possible,  on  a hill  for  the  sake 
both  of  health  and  defence.3  It  was  fortified  by  walls,  especi- 
ally where  exposed  to  attack.4  Unwalled  villages  also  occurred.5 
The  possessors  of  hearths  (e^eo-noi)  were  the  only  members  of 
the  community,6  and  originally  composed  the  army.7  There 
were  clients  most  certainly  even  before  the  separation  of  the 
races.  These  were  probably  Aryans  who  had  lost  their  own 
gentile  connection,  through  war  or  other  means.  They  were 
allowed  to  occupy  portions  of  the  village  domain,  paying  to  its 
owners  one  sixth  of  the  produce,  whence  they  were  called 
tKTrjfjLopoL  (Sk.  shannivartani ).8  The  eKrrjfxopo s received  from  his 
patron  a pair  of  steers  to  plow  with.  These  he  must  not  work 
in  the  heat  of  the  sun,  nor  bore  their  noses,  nor  drive  them 
with  a goad  but  with  gentle  words.9  The  client  must  also  per- 
form military  service  when  required.10 11  As  in  the  family,  the 
eldest  son  represents  his  father  in  authority,  so  in  the  gens  was 
the  leadership  originally  hereditary.  The  ruler  was  called 
pater}1  and  represented  the  ancestor  of  the  gens  by  direct  de- 


1 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  pp.  29-30. 

2 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  pp.  226-7. 

3 Manu,  VII.  71. 

4 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  221. 

5 Thucydides,  I.  5-6. 

6 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  pp.  88-9. 

7 Iliad,  II.  125.  The  army  both  in  Greece  and  Rome  was  based  on  the  gentile 
organization  of  the  state.  This  did  not  exclude  the  military  service  of  clients. 

8 Baudhayana,  III.  2,  1-2. 

9 Id.  2,  3. 

10  Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  pp.  448-9 ; Ihne,  Early  Rome,  p.  112. 

11  Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  pp.  578-9. 


62 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


scent  according  to  the  law  of  primogeniture.1  However,  as  in 
the  family,  the  elder  held  authority  by  his  merit  only,2  so  in  the 
gens  hereditary  right  was  of  itself  insufficient.  The  consent 
of  the  gennetae  alone  could  make  the  leadership  lawful.  This 
amounted  virtually  to  election.  Yet  Themis  favored  the  con- 
servation of  hereditary  rights  for  the  family  if  not  for  the  indi- 
vidual3. In  an  age  when  personal  merit  counted  for  everything 
it  was  essential  that  the  office  should  be  filled  by  a man  of 
strength,  bravery  and  natural  ability.  Thus  it  often  happened 
that  the  son  was  set  aside  in  favor  of  the  deceased  father’s 
brother.4  The  same  principle  finally  threw  the  office  open  to 
all  the  gennetae.  The  natural  basis  of  the  clan-chief’s  authority 
was  the  assent  of  the  gennetae  to  his  hereditary  claim,  or  in 
later  times  their  free  choice  and  election.  But  this  alone 
counted  for  little  in  those  early  times.  The  all  important 
source  of  his  power  is  to  be  found  in  the  religious  view  of  his 
position  as  priest  at  the  gentile  hearth.5  This  gave  him  the 
patria  potestas  over  the  larger  gentile  family.  Accordingly, 
he  was  leader  of  the  gentile  army,  chief  executive  officer,  judge 
and  priest.  It  was  his  duty  to  protect  all  under  his  authority, 
and  to  preserve  peace  within  the  gens.6  In  return,  the  gennetae 
never  failed  to  render  to  their  chief  the  strictest  obedience,  and 
to  manifest  toward  him  the  sincerest  love  and  devotion,  willing 
to  sacrifice  their  lives  even  for  his  sake.7 

Notwithstanding  this,  the  clan-chief  was  by  no  means  an 
absolute  ruler.  The  spirit  of  the  gens  was  intensely  demo- 
cratic, the  gennetae  being  consulted  on  all  matters  of  impor- 


1 Maine,  Early  Law  and  Custom,  p.  247  f.;  Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  145. 

2 Manu,  IX.  no. 

8 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  pp.  145-6. 

4 Maine,  Early  Law  and  Custom,  p.  248. 

6 “ Rulers  derive  their  honor  from  the  common  hearth,  whether  their  title  be 
archon  or  king  or  prytanis.”  Aristotle,  Politics,  p.  1322  b,  28. 

0 Howard,  Development  of  the  King’s  Peace  and  English  Peace-Magistracy, 
pp.  5-6. 

7 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  201. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


63 


tance.1  Frequent  meetings  were  held  in  the  lesche , public 
affairs  were  discussed  and  the  will  of  the  assembly,  not  that  of 
the  chief,  was  sovereign.  There  could  have  been  in  Aryan 
times  little  formality  in  these  proceedings,  — no  vote  was  taken 
and  the  idea  that  the  majority  was  right  had  not  yet  come  into 
existence.2  No  doubt  the  chief  and  leading  gennetae  expressed 
their  opinions,  and  the  decision  reached  by  acclamation  was 
accepted  as  god-given,  just  as  later  in  the  tribal  agora.  The 
ties  of  religion  and  blood  fostered  unity  in  the  gens,  while  the 
instinct  of  self-preservation  and  the  intense  hatred  of  every- 
thing and  every  person  outside  of  their  own  gens  bound  the 
members  much  more  closely  together. 

From  the  standpoint  of  nature,  the  gens  existed  for  the 
lasting  and  mutual  advantage  of  its  members,3  especially  for 
preservation  of  peace  and  happiness  within  its  borders,  and  for 
defense  and  aggression  against  external  foes.  The  gentile 
organization  and  institutions  were  admirably  adapted  to  the 
furtherance  of  these  ends.  But  in  addition  to  the  necessities 
imposed  by  natural  circumstances,  the  gennetae  acted  from 
the  deepest  religious  convictions.  They  were  descended,  as 
they  at  least  believed,  from  a common  ancestor,4  who  was  now 
a god,  and  whom  they  must  worship  according  to  certain  secret 
formulae.  This  deity,  if  properly  supplicated,  was  their  friend 
and  preserver  and  an  enemy  to  all  outsiders.  Besides  the 
divine  ancestor  (eponymous  hero),  they  came  to  have  many 
other  gods ; some  of  them  deified  men,  others  personified 
forces  of  nature.  Yet  all  these  belonged  exclusively  to  the 
gens  and  formed  one  corporate  body  with  it.5  Thus  the 


1 This  has  been  sufficiently  shown  by  Morgan,  Ancient  Society. 

2 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  133. 

3 Aristotle,  Politics,  I.  2;  cf.  above,  pp.  1-2. 

4 McLennan,  Patriarchal  Theory,  p.  206. 

5 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  pp.  5-6.  “ Nature- worship  developed  under  the 

influence  of  entirely  analogous  conceptions  to  those  of  ancestor-worship.  When 
powers  of  nature,  in  the  higher  development  of  nature-worship,  were  made  patron 
gods,  were  addressed  with  titles  of  relationship,  (e.g.  “ father  ’’),  were  viewed  as 
ancestors  of  royal  families,  and  otherwise  as  relatives  of  the  citizen  class  (in  the 


64 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


common  tie  of  blood  and  religion  was  nearly  as  close  as  that 
which  bound  together  the  members  of  the  family.  Within  the 
village  was  harmony  ; in  the  world  without,  man  found  none 
but  his  natural  enemies.  The  village  was  the  only  fatherland 
known  to  archaic  man.  In  it  he  lived  and  mov^d  and  had  his 
being.  Its  boundaries  marked  the  limits  of  his  obligations  and 
sympathies,  — enclosed  the  sphere  of  his  moral  activity.* 1 
Within  the  gens  he  was  law-abiding,  honoring  the  gods,  his 
parents  and  rulers,  refraining  from  bloodshed,  from  another’s 
property,  from  breaking  his  oath  ; beyond  this  narrow  sphere 
he  was,  from  our  point  of  view,  a thief,  a robber,  a murderer, 
a perjurer.2  Thus  the  gentile  institutions  developed  the  noblest 
sentiment  and  strictest  morality,  yet  confined  them  to  these 
exceedingly  narrow  limits.  Long  after  the  separation  of  the 
races  the  gens  maintained  these  institutions  and  remained 
virtually  autonomous.  Even  when  phratries  were  formed, 
when  tribe-kings  were  elected,  when  the  polis  ( civitas ) arose 
from  the  union  of  tribes,  the  gens  clung  doggedly  to  its  time- 
honored  prerogatives. 

The  earliest  idea  of  law  was  the  command  of  the-  house- 
father, resting  for  its  authority  during  the  Rta  period  on  the 
order  of  nature,  and  afterward  receiving  its  sanction  from 
religion.  There  was  no  connection  between  penalties  applied 
to  similar  cases  except  that  supplied  by  the  memory.3  Thus, 
similar  cases  came  to  be  tried  in  a similar  manner,  whence 
arose  the  customs  of  the  house,  by  which  even  the  pater  was 
bound.  The  starting  point  of  gentile  customs  was,  in  like 
manner,  the  command  of  a clan-chief,  on  consultation  with  the 


strictest  aristocratic  sense),  and  members  of  the  blood-community  even  when  this 
was  becoming  merely  a legal  fiction,  we  see  the  continuance  of  these  analogies  and 
limitations,  though  only  in  the  shadow”;  Professor  B.  I.  Wheeler.  Cf.  above, 
pp.  30-7. 

1 Id. 

2 All  this  appears  from  Leist’s  discussion  of  the  nine  commandments;  Altarisches 
Jus  Gentium,  p.  174  ff.  The  ordinary  relation  of  gens  to  gens  is  a relation  of  hos- 
tility; McLennan,  Studies  in  Ancient  History,  p.  72  f. 

a Maine,  Ancient  Law,  pp.  4-5. 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


65 


gennetae , clothed  also  with  the  sanctity  of  religion.  But  the 
usages  of  the  gens  ran  parallel  with  those  of  the  house.  The 
same  principle  applies  to  each  higher  group.  The  customs  of 
the  gens  regulated  religious  duties,  ownership  and  disposition 
of  property,  private  and  public  rights  of  the  gennetae , punish- 
ment of  crimes  and  minor  offenses,  and  everything,  in  brief, 
which  pertained  to  the  welfare  of  the  gens  and  its  members. 

A consideration  of  all  these  customs  belongs  to  the  history 
of  law  rather  than  to  the  subject  now  before  us.  I desire 
merely  to  speak  of  the  nine  commandments,  (as  formulated  by 
Leist)1  which  served  as  the  foundation  of  religion  and  morals, 
and  which  were  respected  and  conscientiously  obeyed  by  the 
Aryans.  There  are  two  groups  of  these  : (1)  the  four  religious, 
(2)  the  five  moral  commandments. 

first  group: 

1.  Thou  shalt  honor  the  gods. 

2.  Thou  shalt  honor  thy  parents. 

3.  Thou  shalt  honor  thy  country. 

4.  Thou  shalt  honor  the  guest  and  the  man  needing  pro- 
tection. 

Leist  has  observed  that  the  questions  asked  the  candidates 
for  office  at  Athens  in  their  docimasy , or  trial  of  probation, 
concerned  the  keeping  of  the  first  three,  viz: 

1.  d lepa  Trarpwa  eVriv  (if  he  performs  his  ancestral  worship). 

2.  d yovea?  ev  ttolzl  (if  he  treats  his  parents  well). 

3.  d ras  o-rpareta?  inrkp  tyjs  7roAca)s  ecrparetmu,  d ra  TtXr]  reAei  (if 

he  performs  his  military  duties  in  defense  of  the  state  and  pays 
his  taxes). 

The  fourth  commandment  is  not  here  included  because  there 
was  little  occasion  in  the  developed  state  for  the  exercise  of 
the  virtue  enjoined.  The  day  of  the  suppliant  had  passed 


1 Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  p.  172  ff.  These  commandments  were  not  peculiar  to 
the  Aryans,  but  belonged  to  the  Egyptians  and  Hebrews  as  well.  I have  followed 
Leist’s  formulation  for  the  sake  of  clearness. 


66 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


away,  and  the  customs  of  private  revenge  and  inter-gentile 
warfare  had  given  away  to  the  reign  of  peace  and  law  within  the 
large  territory  governed  by  the  city.  In  Aryan  times  this 
commandment  was  as  sacred  as  the  others  and  of  nearly  as  fre- 
quent application.  The  feeling  of  humanity  and  pity  for  the 
distressed  and  helpless  is  as  old  as  the  human  race,  subsisting 
therefore  even  in  the  Rta  period  of  history.  Here,  also,  Themis 
works  a transformation,  and  the  instinct  of  sympathy  inherent 
in  man’s  nature  is,  in  the  Dharma  period,  clad  in  the  holiness 
of  religion.  Accordingly,  it  was  the  sacred  duty  of  the  house- 
holder to  entertain  the  guest  with  the  best  food  and  comfort  of 
the  house,  to  be  liberal  toward  the  beggar,  and  to  shelter  the 
suppliant  at  his  hearth  against  pursuers,  greedy  for  his  blood. 
Much  has  already  been  said  about  the  honor  due  to  parents. 
We  observe  now  that  it  is  on  a level  with  the  honor  due  to  the 
gods.  The  most  horrible  crime  known  to  archaic  man  was 
parricide,  which  was  absolutely  unpardonable  either  in  this 
world  or  in  the  next.  One  guilty  of  this  offense,  even  if  he 
should  escape  punishment  at  the  hands  of  relatives,  became  an 
outcast  from  society  and  religion,  goaded  to  frenzy  and  even  to 
self-destruction  by  the  avenging  curse  of  the  murdered  parent. 
In  later  times,  after  much  agitation  of  the  minds  of  men,  it  was 
settled  that  even  such  crimes,  if  unintentional  or  justifiable, 
were  capable  of  atonement  ; yet  this  was  far  from  the  primitive 
view. 

second  group: 

5.  Thou  shalt  keep  thyself  pure. 

6.  Thou  shalt  not  give  way  to  thy  sensual  nature. 

7.  Thou  shalt  not  kill. 

8.  Thou  shalt  not  steal. 

9.  Thou  shalt  not  lie. 

The  fifth  commandment  refers  alike  to  physical  and  moral 
purity.  Violation  of  the  seventh  is  justifiable  in  defense  of 
self,  kinsman  or  property.  Yet  even  here  it  brings  guilt  and 
requires  expiation.  Perhaps  of  even  greater  interest  to  us  is 


THE  ARYAN  GENS. 


67 


the  institution  of  vengeance  in  case  of  bloodshed.  It  is  sup- 
posed that  within  the  gens  men  are  restrained  from  homicide 
through  fear  of  the  gods  and  the  curse  of  the  murdered  party. 
When  any  such  crime  occurred,  it  naturally  led  to  another 
homicide  in  retaliation.  Yet  this,  too,  was  a crime  requiring 
atonement  in  blood  ; for  it  was  committed  against  a kinsman. 
Thus  one  crime  within  the  family  was  the  beginning  of  a long 
series  of  horrible  acts,  which  ended  naturally  only  in  the  ruin 
of  the  house  itself.  For  the  prevention  of  this,  as  well  as 
of  minor  offenses,  a court  was  established  within  the  gens, 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  which  the  blood-feud  was  restricted  so 
far  as  practicable.  But  between  the  gentes,  the  blood-feud 
raged  without  this  interruption.  If  the  bloodshed  was  committed 
by  a member  of  another  gens,  the  wrong  was,  in  the  natural 
order  of  things,  wiped  out  in  war.  After  a time,  such  cases 
might  be  settled  by  arbitration,  the  gens  of  the  injured  or  slain 
accepting  a sum  of  money  judged  as  an  equivalent  of  the 
wrong,  in  place  of  the  original  blood-revenge.  When  it  came 
about  that  several  gentes  were  united  in  the  phratry,  the 
obligations  of  the  blood-feud  extended  to  the  phrateres,  and 
arbitration  between  the  gentes  of  a phratry  became  the  rule. 
It  was  not  till  late  in  history,  however,  that  arbitrators  acquired 
the  authority  to  enforce  their  decisions.1 


1 Howard,  Development  of  the  King’s  Peace,  p.  5 fT. ; Leist,  Altarisches  Jus 
Gentium,  p.  421  ff. 


CHAPTER  III. 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 

(a)  The  Family  before  Solon. 

A casual  reading  of  Homer  does  not  yield  convincing  evi- 
dence of  ancestor-worship  in  the  society  represented  by  his 
poems,  and  some,  accordingly,  as  Schrader,  have  concluded  that 
the  development  of  this  form  of  religion  belongs  to  a later 
period  of  Grecian  history,  — that  represented  in  Attic  literature 
by  the  dramatic  poets  and  the  orators.1  The  testimony,  how- 
ever, of  prehistoric  monuments  in  the  Peloponnesus,  Attica,  and 
elsewhere  in  Greece  establishes  conclusively  the  fact  of  ances- 
tor-worship for  the  primitive  Greeks.2  Rohde  3 has  collected 
and  systematized  the  facts  bearing  on  the  question  at  issue; 
and  it  is  now  possible  to  trace  the  history  of  this  form  of  wor- 
ship on  Greek  ground  with  considerable  certainty  and  precision. 

i.  In  primitive  Greece  the  custom  of  burial  prevailed.4  A 
burnt  offering  was  first  made  in  the  tomb,  and  the  body  was 
then  laid  to  rest  above  the  ashes.5  The  dearest  treasures  of 
the  deceased,  — his  gold,  ornaments,  and  implements, — were 
buried  with  him.6  The  poor  were  treated  in  death  as  the  rich,7 
so  far  as  the  means  of  their  living  kinsmen  allowed.  Women 
as  well  as  men  received  after  death  the  honors  of  burial  and 
worship.8  An  offering  of  a sheep  or  goat  was  made  to  the  dead 


1 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  pp.  613-5. 

2 See  p.  24,  n.  1. 

8 In  his  lately  published  " Psyche.” 

4 Rohde,  Psyche,  p.  31. 

6  Id.  pp.  31-2. 

6 Id.  p.  32. 

7 Tombs  of  common  people  have  been  discovered  at  Nauplia  in  Attica;  id.  p.  31. 

8 Id.  p.  31 ; e.  g.}  princesses  of  Mycenae. 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 


69 


within  the  tomb  before  closing  it.1  Then  an  altar,  in  the  form 
of  a hearth,  was  erected  above  the  tomb  for  further  sacrifices.2 
People  who  maintained  these  customs  must  have  believed  that 
the  soul  of  the  deceased  remained  near  the  body,  enjoyed  the 
sacrifices  and  the  possession  of  treasures,  and  was  capable  of 
greatly  benefitting  or  injuring  its  living  friends  and  kinsmen.3 
The  living  were  prompted  in  their  relations  with  the  dead  by  the 
desire  to  avert  the  anger  of  the  latter  and  to  win  their  favor. 
Treasures  were  buried  with  the  dead  probably  to  render  the 
tomb  an  attractive  dwelling  place  for  the  disembodied  soul,  — 
that  it  might  have  the  less  occasion  for  vexing  the  living  with 
its  presence.4 

2.  In  the  course  of  time,  ancestor- worship  declined  in  Greece. 
While  the  fact  of  such  a decline  is  beyond  question,5  the  forces 
which  brought  it  about  have  not  been  satisfactorily  determined.6 
The  stage  of  decline  now  to  be  considered  is  that  represented 
in  literature  by  the  poems  of  Hesiod.7  We  find  in  Hesiod  the 
belief  that  men  of  the  first,  or  golden  age,  dying  as  if  overcome 
by  sleep,  were  changed  into  daemons 8 by  the  will  of  Zeus. 
These,  30,000  in  number,  wander  over  the  earth,  veiled  in 


1 Remains  of  sheep  and  goats  have  been  found  in  the  tombs  at  Nauplia  in  At- 
tica; id.  p.  32. 

2 Such  an  altar  h^s  been  found  above  one  of  the  tombs  in  Mycenae;  Schliemann, 
Mycenae,  pp.  213-14;  Rohde,  op.  cit.,  p.  33. 

3 Otherwise,  the  living  would  have  had  no  motive  for  burying  with  the  deceased 
so  much  wealth  and  offering  such  costly  sacrifices;  cf.  above  given  references. 

4 Hdt.  V.  92  f.;  Rohde,  op.  cit.,  p.  32. 

5 Rohde,  op.  cit.,  pp.  147-8. 

6 The  most  prominent  force  to  which  Rohde  has  called  attention  is  the  general 
unsettlement  of  Greece  connected  with  the  Dorian  migration.  A tribe  in  leaving 
the  tombs  of  its  ancestors  must  leave  also  in  great  part  its  ancestral  worship 
behind  it.  Nomadic  people  and,  we  may  add,  people  who,  even  though  settled, 
are  uncertain  of  the  future,  are  accustomed  to  burn  rather  than  to  bury  the  body 
that  it  may  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  enemies.  Moreover,  the  custom  of  burning 
tends  to  destroy  belief  in  the  continued  influence  of  disembodied  spirits  upon  the 
living,  as  will  appear  from  the  following  discussion. 

7 That  Hesiod  represents  a less  advanced  stage  of  decline  than  Homer  is  made 
evident  by  Rohde,  op.  cit.,  pp.  147-8,  92. 

8 Deified  men,  — used  only  in  this  sense  in  Hesiod  ; Rohde,  op.  cit.,  p.  91. 


7 o 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


clouds,1  observing  the  just  and  unjust  deeds  of  men.2  Men  of 
the  golden  age  were  endowed  with  great  virtue.3  Those  of  the 
second,  or  silver  age  were  gifted  with  less  merit,  yet  they  too 
were  honored  after  death.4  But  in  Hesiod’s  day,  deification  of 
the  dead  had  ceased,  and  remembrances  only  of  the  custom  had 
come  down  to  him  from  ages  past.  The  souls  of  those  who 
died  in  his  time  all  went,  as  was  believed,  to  Hades.5  Thus  in 
the  Boeotia  of  Hesiod  ancestor-worship  survived,  and  exercised 
a moral  influence  upon  society.6 

3.  In  the  society  represented  by  the  Homeric  poems  an- 
cestor-worship reached  its  final  stage  of  decline.7  Burning  now 
became  prevalent.  The  object  of  burning  was  to  set  the  spirit 
free  that  it  might  depart  as  quickly  as  possible  to  Hades.8 
Until  this  ceremony  was  performed  the  soul  could  not  rest9 
and  was  an  object  of  terror  to  the  living  lest  it  should  bring 
upon  them  the  anger  of  the  gods.10  Offerings  of  honey,  oil,  and 
wine  were  made  to  the  dead  at  the  funeral  pyre.11  Sheep,  oxen, 
horses,  the  dogs  of  the  deceased,  and  even  human  beings  were 
slain  and  placed  upon  the  pile.12  The  mourners  also  offered 
their  hair.13  Then  followed  athletic  contests  in  honor  of  the 


1 i.  e.,  invisible. 

2 Works  and  Days,  252  ff. ; Rohde,  op.  cit .,  p.  91. 

3 Works  and  Days,  122  f. 

4 Id.  142  ; Rohde,  op.  cit.,  p.  93. 

5 Rohde,  op.  cit.,  pp.  101-2. 

6 The  daemons  discerned  right  from  wrong,  probably  rewarding  the  good  and 
punishing  the  bad. 

7 For  causes  of  further  decline,  see  Rohde,  op.  cit.,  p.  36  ff.  Among  the  causes 
were  (1)  migrations  to  Asia  Minor,  (2)  Pan-Hellenic  spirit  of  Homer  — avoidance 
of  the  local  and  the  exceptional,  (3)  idea  of  a well  regulated  universe  — k6<t /ws  — 
to  which  the  idea  of  local  deities  is  antagonistic,  (4)  tendency  to  regard  mental 
attributes  as  abstract  entities,  (5)  aesthetic  and  poetical  reasons,  — Homer  did  not 
introduce  into  his  poems  all  the  beliefs  and  customs  of  the  people,  since  his  taste 
or  his  poetical  motives  would  not  allow  it. 

8 Od.  XI.  218  ff.;  Rohde,  op.  cit.,  p.  29. 

9 See  p.  45  and  n.  3. 

10  Od  XI.  72-76. 

11  Iliad,  XXIII.  218-222  ; Od.  XXIV.  67-8  ; Rohde,  op.  cit.,  pp.  15-16. 

12  Iliad,  XXIII.  166  ff. 

18  Rohde,  op.  cit.,  p.  16. 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 


7 1 


deceased.1  The  soul  after  separation  from  the  body  dwelt  in 
Hades  as  a mere  shadow  without  the  power  of  will,  thought,  or 
feeling,2  — without  influence  therefore  upon  the  world  of  life. 
Apart  from  the  ceremonies  of  burning  and  the  fear  of  a soul 
still  lingering  on  earth,  Homer  knows  nothing  of  an  ancestor- 
worship,3  while  furnishing  abundant  evidence  of  its  existence 
in  earlier  times. 

4.  It  is  likely  that  Attica,  being  less  disturbed  than  Boeotia 
by  the  general  unsettlement  of  Greece  attendant  upon  the 
Dorian  migration,  maintained  her  custom  of  ancestor-worship 
with  more  stability  than  Boeotia  or  the  Ionic  world  of  Homer. 
While  there  may  have  taken  place  in  Attica  a certain  decline 
and  subsequent  revival,  we  are  unable  through  lack  of  data  to 
trace  the  history  of  the  movement.  As  early  as  Draco  provi- 
sion was  made  by  law  for  the  maintenance  of  this  form  of  wor- 
ship.4 While  nothing  is  known  of  it  before  Draco,  we  are 
warranted  by  the  evidence  which  the  monuments  above  con- 
sidered afford,  in  affirming  its  existence  from  the  remotest 
period  of  Attic  history.  The  object  of  Draco’s  ordinance 
therefore  was  not  to  regulate  a new  institution,  but  rather  to 
give  legal  sanction  to  a religion  far  older  than  the  Grecian  race 
itself. 

What  is  the  practical  bearing  of  this  discussion,  — has  it  any 
reference  to  the  development  of  the  Athenian  constitution  ? For 
a sufficient  answer  to  this  question  it  is  only  necessary  to  bear 
in  mind  that  each  group  in  the  gentile  organization  of  the  Greek 
state,  from  gens  upwards,  is  patterned,  in  its  religious,  legal, 
and  political  institutions,  after  the  group  below  it,  that  finally 
the  Greek  state  is,  in  its  institutions,  an  enlarged  family.  If, 
then,  the  Athenian  family  was  from  the  remotest  ages  domi- 
nated by  principles  based  upon  ancestor-worship,  certainly  this 
fact  is  of  the  utmost  value  for  the  correct  appreciation  of  the 
Athenian  government. 


1 Iliad,  XXIII.  274,  646. 

2 Rohde,  Psyche,  p.  4. 


3 Id.  p.  9. 

4 Cf.  id.  p.  137. 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


It  is  unnecessary  to  consider  the  Homeric  family  in  detail, 
since  it  is  but  the  Aryan  family  transplanted  to  Greek  soil  with 
the  changes  which  a few  centuries  bring.1  I desire  merely  to 
call  attention  to  the  more  important  institutions  of  the  early 
Greek  family  and  gens. 

The  father  gave  his  daughter  in  marriage,2  generally  with  a 
dowry,3  receiving  the  eedna  of  the  wooer.4  The  son  was  also  said 
to  be  given  by  the  father.5  Among  the  marriage  ceremonies 
were  the  bridal  procession  and  marriage  feast  as  of  old.6  The 
poet  had  no  occasion  to  mention  all  the  ceremonies  which  may 
then  have  existed.  The  greatest  blessings  which  the  gods 
could  bestow  upon  man  were  offspring,  especially  sons.7 
Parents  cared  most  tenderly  for  their  children,  and  in  return 
enjoyed  the  gerotrophy , which  was  then  called  threptra ,8 9  with 
which  the  7iomizomena  were  connected  as  a matter  of  course. 
The  sacredness  of  these  obligations  is  shown  by  the  fact  that 
a child  who  neglected  his  duty  to  his  parent  was  subject  to  the 
vengeance  of  the  erinys 9 of  that  parent.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  father’s  authority  did  not  continue  through  life.  It  was 
even  the  custom  of  aged  kings  to  resign  their  throne  in  favor 
of  their  sons  who  were  in  the  prime  of  life,  and  thus  more 
capable  of  rule.10  Brothers  divided  the  patrimony  equally,  al- 
lowing to  the  illegitimate  brother  a smaller  share,11  as  in  India. 
There  is  no  trace  of  an  exclusive  primogeniture,  such  as  Fustel 
de  Coulanges  assumes  for  Attica  in  the  pre-Solonian  times. 


1 It  must  be  remembered  that  social  institutions  develop  incomparably  more 
slowly  than  political  institutions. 

2 Iliad,  XIX.  291. 

» Id.  IX.  147. 

4 Id.  XVI.  178. 

6  Od.  IV.  10. 

6 Iliad,  XVIII.  490  ff. 

7 Id.  XXIV.  538  f. 

8 Id.  IV.  478. 

9 Od.  II.  130  ff.;  O.  Muller,  Aeschylus,  Eumenides,  p.  165. 

10  e.g.y  Peleus  and  Laertes. 

11  Od.  XIV.  209  f ; Grote  (small  edition),  I.  p.  334,  (large  edition)  II.  p.  25. 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 


73 


Roman  agnation  did  not  exist.  Outside  of  the  house,  rela- 
tionship was  reckoned  through  females  as  well  as  males,  the 
latter  merely  taking  precedence.  In  some  cases,  connection 
through  the  mother  seems  the  stronger  and  more  sacred  tie.1 
Relationship  through  marriage  was  regarded  as  second  only  to 
that  through  blood.2  Obligations  of  the  blood-feud  rested  also 
upon  kinsmen  through  females.3 

The  character  of  the  family  is  indicated  most  accurately 
by  the  position  which  woman  occupied.4  Her  condition  was 
materially  improved  by  the  rise  of  monarchies,  in  which  woman 
naturally  plays  an  important  part.  We  find  them  in  Homeric 
Greece  enjoying  de  facto  complete  liberty.  Arete  goes  on  foot 
through  the  street  and  is  greeted  kindly  and  respectfully  by 
whomsoever  she  meets.5  Her  daughter,  Nausicaa,  goes  about 
at  pleasure,  sometimes  accompanied  by  female  servants,6  some- 
times alone.7 

While  the  government  of  the  family  remained  monarchical 
with  the  father  as  king,  the  mother  was  joined  with  him  in  the 
rule  of  the  household.  Her  intellectual  equality  is  proved  by 
the  fact  that  her  advice  was  sought  in  everything  of  interest  to 


1 Iliad,  III.  236  ff.;  XIX.  293  ff.;  and,  especially,  XXIV.  45  ff. 

2 Od.  VIII.  581  ff. : “ Hadst  thou  even  a kinsman  by  marriage  that  fell  before 
Ilium,  a true  man,  a daughter’s  husband  or  wife’s  father,  such  as  are  nearest  to  us 
after  our  own  stock  and  blood  ?”  See  also  the  list  of  relations  by  affinity  collected 
by  Gladstone,  Homer  and  the  Homeric  Age,  II.  p.  492. 

3 Iliad,  II.  653  ff.  Tlepolemus,  son  of  Hercules,  slays  the  maternal  uncle  of  his 
father,  and  flees  the  country,  threatened  by  the  sons  and  grand-sons  of  Hercules. 
Hearn  refuses  to  accept  this  testimony,  since  it  conflicts  with  his  theory.  Yet  it 
accords  with  Od.  VIII.  582  and  whatever  else  we  know  of  Homeric  kinship.  On 
the  other  hand,  McLennan  is  wrong  in  testing  Greek  kinship  by  reference  to 
the  Lycians  (Iliad,  VI.  i5off.)  and  to  the  Trojans;  Studies  in  Ancient  History, 
pp.  232,  202-3. 

4 “ Der  beste  Masstab  fur  die  Sittlichkeit  einer  jeden  Nation  ist  das  Weib  und  das 
Verhalten  des  Mannes  zu  ihr  Zimmer,  Altindisches  Leben,  p.  331. 

5 Od.  VII.  66  ff. 

6 Od.  VI. 

7 Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece,  p.  53.  That  this  freedom  was  enjoyed  also  by 
women  of  inferior  rank  is  seen  from  II.  XX.  251  ff.;  Od.  XVIII.  27. 


74 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


the  family.1  The  wife,  indeed,  possessed  more  actual  influence 
than  her  husband,  the  latter  ordinarily  being  content  with  a 
merely  nominal  supremacy.  Thus,  Arete  decides  to  give  aid 
to  the  suppliant  Odysseus.  The  nobles  approve  the  decision, 
but  ask  for  the  assent  of  Alcinoiis,  their  chief,  who  says:  “ Yea, 
the  word  which  she  hath  spoken  shall  hold,  if,  indeed,  I am  yet 
to  live  and  bear  rule  among  the  Phaeacians,  masters  of  the 
oar.”2  So  in  the  Olympian  Council  the  goddesses  Athena, 
Here,  etc.,  virtually  control  affairs;  while  Zeus  is  little  more 
than  a figure-head.  Nor  are  there  wanting  cases  where  a 
woman  was  de  jure  supreme.  The  mother  of  Andromache  was 
queen,  (/WiAeva/)  in  Hypoplacian  Thebes;3  Lemnos  was  ruled 
by  Hypsipyle,4  and  Pylos,  in  former  times,  by  Chloris.5  Cly- 
temnestra  and  Penelope  had  charge  of  their  husbands’  realms 
during  their  absence.  It  would  be  absurd  to  suppose  that 
either  of  these  had  a legal  guardian.  That  this  elevation  of 
woman  belonged  to  Attica,  also,  is  in  itself  probable;  and  is 
confirmed  by  the  legend  cited  by  McLennan,6  according  to 
which  women  in  Athens  possessed  the  right  of  suffrage 
before  Cecrops  and  ruled  the  state,  being  in  the  majority. 
It  is  quite  possible  that  there  may  be  a grain  of  truth  in  this, 
for  the  women  of  Attica  were  certainly  of  far  greater  political 
importance  in  earlier  than  in  later  times. 

The  poet’s  ideal  of  married  life  was  as  high  as  that  of  the 
moderns.7  The  eedna  of  the  wooer  was  now  only  an  indication 
of  esteem;  and  did  not  secure  to  the  giver  the  powers  of  life, 


1 There  is  no  need  of  citing  special  cases,  since  the  fact  is  prominent  in  nearly 
every  dialogue  between  husband  and  wife.  See  Gladstone,  Homer  and  the 
Homeric  Age,  II.  p.  509. 

2 Od.  XI.  335  ff. 

8 Iliad,  VI.  425. 

4 Id.  VII.  468-9. 

6 Od.  XI.  254  ff.,  281  ff. 

6 Studies  in  Ancient  History,  pp.  234-6,  from  Varro  in  August . de  Civ.  Dei , 
XVIII.  9. 

7 Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece,  p.  52. 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 


75 


death,  and  sale.1  In  the  court  of  Menelaus,  Helen  was  the 
central  figure.  It  is  impossible  to  speak  of  equality  here,  — 
the  wife  was  distinctly  superior.  The  respect  of  children  for 
their  mother  is  everywhere  noticeable,  as  is  indicated  by  the 
phrase  ‘ ttotvlo.  /X7jrr;p.’  The  Cretans  and  Messenians  were  ac- 
customed to  call  their  country  “ motherland,  ” 2 out  of  respect 
and  love  for  the  mother,  while  colonists  always  spoke  of  their 
parent  city  as  the  /x^rpoVo Ais. 

The  Spartans,  who  preserved  the  early  institutions  most 
nearly  in  their  integrity,  maintained  the  ancient  respect  for 
women.  Spartan  youths  were  stimulated  to  manly  conduct  by 
the  presence  and  praise  of  their  maiden  friends;  while  mothers 
continued  through  life  to  exercise  a directing  influence  upon 
their  sons.3 

The  Cretan  family,  as  represented  in  the  law-code  of 
Gortyn,4  is  in  all  essential  respects  similar  to  that  described 
above.  There  was  in  Gortyn  the  same  gentile  organization  of 
the  state  which  we  meet  with  every  where  in  Greece.  The  city 
was  divided  into  phylae  and  phratries  (here  termed  eraipetat).5 
Phyle  and  phratry  were  organic  groups  of  kinsmen6  and  the 
latter  at  least  was,  like  the  Attic  phratry,  a religious  associa- 
tion having  charge  also  of  adoption  and  other  matters  affecting 
the  social  and  civil  status  of  the  individual.7  The  Cretan  house- 

1 Muller’s  Handbuch,  IV.  p.  446  b ; E.  Hruza,  Beitrage  zur  Geschichte  des 
griech.  und  romisch.  Familienrechts,  I. 

2 McLennan,  Studies  in  Ancient  History,  p.  236. 

3 Muller’s  Dorians,  II.  p.  290  ff.;  Donaldson,  Contemporary  Review,  XXXII. 
pp.  647-64.  Aristotle  says  that  the  Spartan  women  ruled  the  state,  and  were 
themselves  without  restraint;  Politics,  II.  9.  4-13  (pp.  1269  b — 1270  a).  Donald- 
son’s treatise  together  with  McLennan,  Studies  in  Ancient  History,  Mahaffy, 
Social  Life  in  Greece,  chs.  II  and  III,  Gladstone,  Homer  and  the  Homeric  Age, 
II.  pp.  479-520,  and  Buchholz,  Die  homerischen  Realien,  II.  2.  pp.  1-38,  are  of 
great  value  in  forming  an  estimate  of  the  Homeric  family. 

4 Bucheler  and  Zitelmann,  Das  Recht  von  Gortyn,  has  been  used,  in  which 
Zitelmann’s  “Juristische  Erlauterungen,”  pp.  41-178,  have  been  found  very 
valuable. 

5 Id.  VII,  VIII,  X,  and  p.  55. 

6 Id.  p.  55. 

7 Id.  X.  37-9. 


76 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


* 


hold  included  parents  and  children,  property  and  slaves.  The 
family  lived,  so  far  as  practicable,  in  the  city,  that  those  of  its 
members  who  were  qualified  might  take  part  in  governmental 
affairs.1  While  the  householder  in  Gortyn,  as  elsewhere  among 
the  Aryans,  is  to  be  regarded  as  head  of  the  family,2  the  wife 
enjoyed  a remarkable  degree  of  indulgence.  Although  rep- 
resented in  court  by  her  husband  or  nearest  kinsman  in  blood,3 
she  was  allowed  to  inherit,  possess,  and  manage  property.4  The 
householder  had  no  right  to  sell  or  pawn  the  separate  property 
of  his  wife.5  The  law  of  inheritance  was  as  follows: 

The  property  of  father  or  mother  goes,  at  death,  to 

(i)  children,  (2)  grandchildren,  (3)  great-grandchildren. 

If  these  fail,  to 

(1)  brothers  of  deceased,  (2)  their  children,  (3)  their  grand- 
children. 

If  these  fail,  to 

(1)  sisters  of  the  deceased,  (2)  their  children,  (3)  their 
grandchildren. 

If  these  fail,  to 

relatives  of  whatever  degree. 

If  these  fail,  to 

the  slaves  (clients)  of  the  house.6 * 8 

An  heiress  was  under  obligation  to  marry  her  nearest  kins- 
man. But  if  no  kinsman  was  available,  she  might  choose  a hus- 


1 Bucheler  und  Zitelmann,  Das  Recht  von  Gortyn,  p.  139. 

2 Id.  p.  109. 

8 Id.  p.  61. 

4 On  inheritance,  id.  V (for  same  privileges  in  Delphi  and  Tenos,  see  Thalheim, 

Griech.  Rechtsalterthiimer,  p.  56,  n.  1);  on  possession,  p.  117,  n.  42;  on  manage- 
ment, VI.  9 ff.,  32  ff.,  and  IV.  26  ff. 

6 Id.  p.  1 17.  A husband  or  near  kinsman  was  at  liberty  to  kill  an  adulterer 
taken  in  the  act.  This  points  to  the  Aryan  idea  of  purity  and  of  the  object  of 

marriage;  id.  p.  103.  The  influence  of  the  mother  must  have  been  great,  as  in- 
dicated by  her  legal  privileges.  See,  also,  p.  75  for  the  position  of  the  Cretan 
mother. 

8 Id-  PP-  143-4- 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 


77 


band  from  her  phyle}  Every  daughter  not  an  heiress  received 
as  dowry  or  inheritance  a certain  portion  of  the  estate  fixed  by 
law.1 2  In  case  of  childlessness,  a son  was  adopted  to  inherit  the 
property  and  perform  for  the  adoptive  father  the  sacra  and  all 
other  duties  connected  with  the  house.3  Clients  (slaves  of  the 
higher  class)  tilled  the  fields  of  their  lord  for  rent.  These  fields 
they  inherited  along  with  other  property.  In  law  they  were 
represented  by  their  lord,  but  their  social  condition  was  remark- 
ably high4  and  in  many  respects  they  enjoyed  practical  inde- 
pendence. The  lower  class  of  slaves  were  in  less  favorable 
circumstances  ; yet  there  was  nothing  peculiar  in  their  condi- 
tion demanding  special  mention. 

The  Cretan  household  with  its  residence  in  the  city,  its  slaves 
and  its  tenant  clients  dwelling  apart  in  the  country,  tilling 
the  fields  of  their  lord,  closely  resembles  the  pre-Solonian 
Eupatrid  family  of  Attica.  The  social  and  legal  status  of 
the  client  is  apparently  the  same.5  It  does  not  appear  that 
these  tenants  had  once  been  free  and  had  fallen  into  a species 
of  serfdom  ; but  rather  that  this  had  been  their  original 
condition,  from  which  they  were  liberated,  in  Attica,  by 
Solon.  The  Attic  nobility  was  based  not  only  upon  blood 
but  also  upon  the  possession  of  landed  property.  The 
latter  was  an  indication  of  autochthony,  and  therefore,  of 
Eupatridism. 


1 Biicheler  und  Zitelmann,  Das  Recht  von  Gortyn,  p.  149  £f.  If  she  is  already 
married,  the  kinsman  who  has  a claim  may  cause  a separation  ; id.  p.  1 54. 

2 Law  of  Gortyn,  IV.  42  f. 

3 Id.  X,  XI. 

4 eg.,  intermarriage  with  citizens  was  allowable. 

5 Cretan  and  Attic  clients  were  alike  in  the  following  respects  : they  were  repre- 
sented before  the  courts  by  their  lords  ; (2)  they  enjoyed  no  political  privileges  ; 
(3)  they  tilled  the  lands  of  the  nobility,  paying  a quota  of  the  produce  ; (4)  they 
were  designated  by  practically  identical  terms,  — in  Gortyn,  tt dpoucoi,  AypoiKoi ; in 
Attica,  Attolkoi , dypoiKOL ; (5)  they  were  said  to  be  in  slavery, — in  Gortyn  the  term 
8Q\os  is  constantly  applied  to  them  ; in  Attica,  they  were,  in  accordance  with  the 
oligarchic  constitution,  in  slavery  — idovXevov — to  the  rich  ; Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  2; 
cf.  Keil,  Die  Solonische  Verfassung  in  Aristoteles  Verfassungsgeschichte  Athens, 
p.  15  ; also  Erdmann,  Der  Athenerstaat,  p.  18,  n.  1. 


78 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  family  as  above  set  forth 
is,  in  the  main,  pan-Hellenic.  Nothing,  independent  of  this,  is 
known  of  the  Athenian  family  before  Solon,  except  a few 
particulars  gathered  from  his  legislation.  The  main  facts  are 
as  follows,  i . The  motives  to  marriage  were  pure  love,  kind 
affection,  and  desire  for  children.1  Plutarch  has  not  here 
introduced  the  idea  of  his  own  age,  since  his  view  agrees  with 
that  of  Homer2  and  the  Hindoos.3  2.  The  husband  shall  consort 
with  his  wife  thrice  a month.4 *  Solon  was  not  the  author  of  this 
law  since  it  existed  among  the  Hindoos  in  a similar  form.6  3.  On 
failure  of  heirs  by  the  husband,  an  heiress  may  consort  with 
her  husband’s  nearest  kinsman  that  an  heir  to  the  estate  may 
be  born.  A kinsman  rather  than  a stranger  is  chosen  that  the 
children  may  be  of  the  same  family.6  4.  Large  dowries  were 
bestowed  and  marriages  were  often  contracted  for  gain.7  No 
mention  is  made  of  marriage  by  sale.  This  custom,  therefore, 
must  have  fallen  into  disuse  before  Solon’s  time.  5.  Women 
were  allowed  great  liberties.  They  often  walked  about  clad  in 
costly  garments  and  often  traveled  even  in  the  night.8  Aristotle 
tells  us  that  “ the  wives  of  oligarchs  are  too  fine  to  be  con- 
trolled.” 9 6.  The  father  could  sell  his  unmarried  sisters  and 

daughters  and  minor  sons.  This  point  is  taken  as  a proof  of  a 
patria  potestas  in  its  utmost  severity.10  That  such  an  inference 
is  unwarranted  will  immediately  appear  upon  considering  who 
were  the  men  who  were  allowed  such  powers.  There  is  not 


1 Plutarch,  Solon,  20. 

2 Od.  VI.  173  ff. 

8  Manu,  IX.  28. 

4 Plutarch,  Solon,  20. 

6 Manu,  IX.  4 ; Baudhayana,  IV.  1.  17. 

6 Plutarch,  Solon,  20.  That  this  law  is  older  than  Solon  is  shown  by  Manu, 
XI.  59,  171  ; Gautama,  XVIII.  n.  Solon  was  the  author  of  but  few  of  the  laws 
attributed  to  him.  Thus  the  Niyoga  marriage  was  practised  by  the  Spartans 
(Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  46),  and  by  the  Germans  (id.  p.  47). 

Plutarch,  Solon,  20. 

8 Id.  21. 

9 Politics,  IV.  15.  13  (p.  1300  a,  8). 

10  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  pp.  hi,  1 1 5. 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 


79 


the  slightest  evidence  that  a Eupatrid  ever  sold  any  of  the 
members  of  his  family.  The  persons  mentioned  as  exercising 
this  privilege  were  the  eKrrJ/xo/oot,  or  clients.  The  patron  often 
sold  his  client  into  slavery,  and  many  were  in  Solon’s  time 
serving  in  foreign  lands.  In  such  a state  of  things,  it  was  but 
natural  that  the  client  should  let  his  children  go,  if  only  it 
might  free  himself  from  the  yoke.  The  Eupatrids,  who  were 
organized  in  gentes,  and  practised  ancestor-worship,  had  strong 
motives  for  maintaining  their  houses,  and  rearing  their  children 
in  freedom.  The  latter  did  not  belong  to  the  parents  alone, 
but  to  the  gens  as  well,1 2  and  could  not  have  been  sold  without 
the  consent  of  the  gennetae.  7.  The  father  could  make  no 
will.  In  failure  of  heirs  within  the  family,  the  property  went 
to  the  anchisteis ; failing  these  to  the  gennetae ? This  point 
shows  that  the  father  was  not  in  early  Greece  absolute 
proprietor.  The  property  belonged  first  to  the  household,  of 
which  he  was  legal  representative,  next  to  the  cognate  family, 
and  ultimately  to  the  gens.  The  land  became  alienable,  how- 
ever, before  Solon,  by  sale  but  not  by  bequest.3  8.  Only 
legitimate  children  enjoyed  the  anchisteia  — legal  right  of 
inheritance.  From  this  we  learn  that  family  rights  depended 
upon  birth.  Now,  the  state  did  not  before  Solon  regard 
anyone  as  a genuine  citizen  who  did  not  enjoy  the  anchisteia. 
There  was  not,  therefore,  one  class  of  citizens  enjoying  the 
politeia  and  another,  both  politeia  and  anchisteia , these  two 
terms  having  the  same  denotation.  The  pre-Solonian  state 
was,  accordingly,  an  enlarged  family,  and  an  individual  who 
was  excluded  from  the  smaller  unit,  was  excluded  equally 
from  the  larger.4  9.  The  obligation  to  prosecute  for  personal 

1 The  customs  which  regulate  inheritance,  marriage,  blood-vengeance,  etc.,  all 
point  to  this  view. 

2 Plutarch,  Solon,  21  ; Demosthenes,  XX.  102. 

3 Aristotle,  Politeia  of  the  Athenians,  ch.  6,  shows  that  land  might  be  bought 
and  sold  before  Solon.  See,  also,  Aristotle,  Politics,  II.  7 (p.  1266  b). 

4 H.  Schenkl,  Zur  Geschichte  des  attischen  Burgerrechts,  Wiener  Studien, 
V.  pp.  52-84  ; Philippi,  Beitrage  zu  einer  Geschichte  des  attischen  Burgerrechts, 
pp.  9,  14  ff. 


8o 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


injury  devolved  upon  the  kin.1  This  corresponds  perfectly 
with  the  other  gentile  customs.  io.  Ancestor-worship  was 
practised.2  This  is  undoubtedly  the  basis  upon  which  rest 
all  the  customs  above  enumerated.  These  were  not  brought 
into  being  by  Solon,  but  are  older  than  any  individual 
legislator. 


(b)  The  Gens  as  a Whole. 

The  house,  as  set  forth  in  the  preceding  chapter,  is  a clearly 
defined  body  lying  wholly  within  the  gens.3  This  would  be 
true  even  if  exogamy  were  the  rule  instead  of  the  exception.4 
The  gens,  accordingly,  was  composed  of  a number  of  houses, 
being  itself  no  more  than  an  enlarged  house.  The  gens  is 
taken  as  the  smallest  political  unit  simply  because  the  state 
found  it  so  thoroughly  organized  and  presenting  so  firm  and 
complete  a defense  about  the  whole  circle  of  its  privileges,  that 
it  remained  impossible  for  many  years  to  tear  away  these 
barriers,  or  to  interfere  in  its  internal  affairs.  As  soon  as 
the  gens  was  dismembered,  the  family  became,  for  the  most 
part,  the  political  unit.5 6  The  notion  that  the  individual  was 


1 Plutarch,  Solon,  18  ; Aristotle,  Politeia  of  the  Athenians,  ch.  9 ; Philippi, 
p.  193  f. 

2 Demosthenes,  XLIII.  61,  66  f.  Cf.  Plutarch,  Solon,  21. 

3 It  is  the  mistake  of  Morgan  (Ancient  Society,  pp.  215-225)  and  those  of  his 
view,  to  disregard  the  opinion  of  the  ancients  as  to  the  structure  of  the  gens,  and 
to  introduce  into  Grecian  History  generalizations  from  non-Aryan  phenomena. 
The  chapter  on  the  Grecian  gens  in  his  “ Ancient  Society  ” has  little  value  except 
as  a warning  to  theorists.  The  fundamental  differences  between  the  Aryan  race 
and  other  races  render  all  analogies  and  comparisons  extremly  hazardous.  I can 
hardly  think  that  the  study  of  the  North  American  Indians  or  the  savages  of 
Africa  will  ever  throw  any  light  upon  Grecian  history. 

4 See  examples  of  marriage  between  uncle  and  niece,  aunt  and  nephew,  occurring 
in  the  Homeric  poems,  collected  by  Gladstone,  Homer  and  the  Homeric  Age,  II. 
pp.  490-1.  It  does  not  appear  that  property  considerations  dictated  these  unions. 

Marriage  of  cousins  must  certainly  have  been  far  more  numerous,  and  no  restriction 
is  mentioned  save  that  of  marriage  between  parent  and  child.  Marriage  of  brother 
and  sister  was  not  unknown  among  the  gods,  e.  g.,  Zeus  and  Here. 

6 Philippi,  Beitrage  zu  einer  Geschichte  des  attischen  Burgerrechts,  pp.  190-197. 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 


8l 


free  from  his  kin,  and  might,  therefore,  constitute  an  inde- 
pendent unit  of  the  commonwealth  found  no  practical  working 
on  Greek  soil.  Morgan  has  not  personally  investigated  Grecian 
history,  but  takes  Grote  as  an  authority.  In  reliance,  however, 
upon  the  statement  of  Grote,1  we  must  decide  against  the  preva- 
lence of  exogamy.  It  would,  indeed,  be  absurd  if  the  heiress 
must  be  kept  within  the  gens,  but  all  other  daughters  must  be 
given  to  outsiders.  If  exogamy  once  existed,  the  law  as  to  heir- 
esses must  soon  have  destroyed  it.  It  often  happened  where 
there  was  a son  and  a daughter,  that  the  son  died  without  heirs 
before  the  daughter,  the  latter  thus  becoming  an  heiress.  Now, 
if  the  daughter  had  been  given  into  another  gens  the  property 
must  pass  to  another  gens  or  the  daughter  be  deprived  of  her 
rights.  For  certainly  the  nearest  kinsman  of  the  heiress  could 
not  hope  to  receive  her  back  from  another  gens.  The  former 
was  impossible  owing  to  the  inalienability  of  property.  Pro- 
viding against  the  latter  alternative,  the  father  must  have 
preferred  to  give  her  in  marriage  to  his  gennete  and,  when 
possible,  to  one  of  his  family,  just  as  in  later  times.2 

Grote  states  the  chief  features  of  the  gens  summarily,  and 
it  may  be  well  to  repeat  what  he  has  given  :3  “ The  basis  of  the 
whole  was  the  house,  hearth,  or  family  — a number  of  which, 
greater  or  less,  composed  the  gens  or  genos.  This  gens  was 
therefore  a clan,  sept,  or  enlarged,  and  partly  factitious, 
brotherhood,  bound  together  by  — 

1.  Common  religious  ceremonies,  and  exclusive  privilege  of 
priesthood  in  honor  of  the  same  god,  supposed  to  be  the  prim- 
itive ancestor  and  characterized  by  a special  surname. 

2.  By  a common  burial  place. 

3.  By  mutual  rights  of  succession  to  property. 

4.  By  reciprocal  obligations  of  help,  defense,  and  redress  of 
injuries. 

5.  By  mutual  right  and  obligation  to  intermarry  in  certain 


1 Ch.  X (small  edition),  I.  p.  560,  (large  ed.)  II.  p.  428. 

2 Demosthenes,  XLIII.  74. 


3 Grote,  loc.  cit. 


32 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


determinate  cases,  especially  where  there  was  an  orphan-daugh- 
ter or  heiress. 

6.  By  possession,  in  some  cases  at  least,  of  common  prop- 
erty,1 an  archon,  and  a treasurer  of  their  own.” 

The  deities  which  the  gentes  had  in  common  were  Apollo 
Patroiis  and  Zeus  Herccius ? This  is  an  instance  of  the 
adoption  of  powers  of  nature  as  patron  gods.3  The  original 
title  “pater"  as  a designation  of  the  chief  had  passed  into 
that  of  basilens .4  Aristotle  5 tells  us  that  villagers  are  kins- 
men and  are  ruled  by  kings  because  they  are  of  one  blood  — 
a colony  of  the  family.  This  accords  with  the  new  derivation 
of  basileus  from  the  Aryan  word  for  “household"  or  “gens."6 
When  the  gens  lost  its  autonomy  the  term  basileus  was 
dropped,  and  the  clan-chief  was  known  thereafter  simply  as 
the  “archon  of  the  gens." 

The  members  of  the  gens  were  called  gennetae , the  term 
applying  properly  only  to  those  of  pure  descent  and  full  priv- 
ilege, but  made  inaccurately  to  include  the  dependents  of  the 
gens.7 8  The  term  homogalaktes  8 — “ milk-brethren  " — was  ap- 
plied exclusively  to  those  of  noble  birth.  It  may  signify 
“those  nourished  by  the  same  milk,"  but  more  probably 
“those  who  offer  the  same  milk  in  sacrifice."  This  term  then 
is  nearly  equivalent  to  the  Sanskrit  sapindas — “those  who 
offer  the  same  cake,"  i.  e .,  members  of  the  cognate  group.9 


1 William  Ridgeway,  Journal  of  Hellenic  Studies,  Vol.  VI.  (1885)  pp.  319-339, 
has  shown  that  in  the  Homeric  Age  the  land  occupied  by  the  gens  most  probably 
belonged  to  the  gens  as  a whole.  Landwehr,  Philol.,  Supplb.  V.  p.  135,  n.  49,  has 
also  observed  that  no  sale  of  land  has  been  mentioned  by  Homer. 

2 Muller’s  Handbuch,  2 IV.  p.  206. 

8 See  p.  63,  n.  5. 

4 Gilbert,  Altattische  Komenverfassung,  p.  209. 

6 Politics,  I.  2 (p.  1252  b,  20). 

6 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  p.  584  n.,  from  Bez.  Beitr. 
II.  p.  174. 

7 Muller’s  Handbuch,  2 IV.  p.  206,  n.  6. 

8 Pollux,  VI.  156. 

9 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  17 1. 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 


83 


The  clients  of  the  gens  had  some  share  in  the  worship,  and 
were  called  as  such  orgeones } They  were  likewise  under  the 
protection  of  their  noble  brethren.  This  is  seen  in  the  treat- 
ment of  homicide.  If  a man  is  slain,  and  has  no  near  kinsman, 
a law  of  Draco  provides  that  ten  Eupatrid  phrateres  be  selected 
to  prosecute  the  murderer.1 2  This  law  undoubtedly  refers  to  a 
time  when  clientage  existed,  carrying  with  it  this  duty  of  the 
patron  to  defend  and  avenge  the  client  in  the  same  manner  as 
the  slave.  Before  Draco,  the  clients  had  no  right  to  prosecute 
in  their  own  name;  but  receiving  through  him  an  independent 
standing  before  the  courts,  they  could  now  in  their  own  name 
prosecute  the  slayer  of  a kinsman.  It  was,  henceforth,  only 
when  the  slain  had  no  near  kin  that  the  Eupatrids  of  his 
phratry  were  under  obligations  to  follow  up  the  slayer. 

In  early  Attic  history,  as  in  Aryan  times,  the  gentes  lived  in 
villages,  and  were  virtually  autonomous.  Each  village  had  its 
lesche , or  place  of  assembly,  of  all  the  villagers  for  the  transac- 
tion of  public  business,  as  well  as  for  amusement.  Thucydides 
speaks  of  a prytaneum  (king’s  house),  and  a bouleuterium  (coun- 
cil chamber),3  as  belonging  to  the  several  independent  cities  of 
Attica.  No  difference  probably  existed  between  the  village 
and  city  which  he  mentions  except  that  of  size.  Koine  and 
polis  seem,  indeed,  to  have  been  with  him  convertible  terms. 
A large  community  was  generally  formed  by  the  union  of 
smaller  communities,  just  as  these  latter  had,  no  doubt,  their 
own  division  into  demi,  or  sub-villages.  It  is  highly  probable, 
then,  that  the  prytanea , bouleuteria  and  most  of  the  other  in- 
stitutions of  the  city  — phratric  or  tribal  — existed  previously 
in  the  village.  After  the  synoecism,  the  lesche  was  removed  to 
Athens,  partly  for  convenience,  since  the  gennetae , from  this 
time,  came  to  be  more  and  more  widely  dispersed,  and  could 
gather  more  easily  in  Athens  than  in  their  original  village  ; and 
partly  as  an  aid  to  centralization.  In  the  lesche  at  Athens  the 

1 Philippi,  Geschichte  d.  att.  Biirgerrechts,  p.  204  f.;  Muller’s  Hdb.  2 IV.  p.  207  f. 

2 Demosthenes,  XLIII.  57-8  ; corroborated  by  C.  I.  A.,  I.  61. 

3 Thucydides,  II.  15. 


84 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


gennetae  continued  through  historical  times  to  meet  on  stated 
occasions,  to  transact,  under  the  presidency  of  their  archon,  the 
necessary  business  of  the  gens.1  The  prytanea  and  bouleuteria 
were  transferred  to  Athens,  and  united  in  the  one  prytaneum 
and  bouleuterium  of  the  entire  commonwealth. 

The  gennetae  were,  strictly  speaking,  only  those  of  pure  de- 
scent and  lawful  birth  who  had  been  properly  initiated  into  the 
worship  of  the  house,  and,  at  the  prescribed  time,  into  the 
common  rites  of  the  gens.  On  the  latter  occasion,  the  collected 
gennetae , receiving  the  oath  of  the  father  that  the  candidate 
was  indeed  a genuine  son,  proceeded  to  vote  on  the  acceptance 
of  the  candidate.  If  decided  in  the  affirmative,  the  son  shared 
in  th6  religious  feast,  and  (after  writing  had  come  into  use)  had 
his  name  inscribed  in  the  gentile  register  (< grammateion 2). 
Daughters  also  were  initiated  into  the  phratry,3  and  probably, 
therefore,  into  the  gens.  Before  Solon,  the  presence  of  a name 
in  the  register  was  legal  proof  of  citizenship.  After  Solon,  it 
indicated  merely  evyeveia,  or  noble  birth,  and  all  honors  and 
privileges  which  the  latter  assured  to  the  possessor. 

The  religious,  moral,  and  legal  ideas  and  institutions  of  the 
Greek  gens  were  an  outgrowth  from  the  common  possessions 
of  the  Aryan  stock.  It  is  unnecessary  in  this  treatise  to  con- 
sider these  in  detail.  It  may  be  sufficient  to  state  here  that 
the  Grecian  gens  maintained  in  their  integrity  the  fundamental 
Aryan  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  notwithstanding  the  influences 
of  the  Olympian  worship  and  contact  with  the  Orientals.  In 
its  religious  ceremonies  and  ideals,  in  its  free  and  martial  spirit, 
and  even  in  its  exclusiveness  and  isolation,  we  find  preserved 
without  material  change  the  main  features  of  the  Aryan 
village. 


1 Gilbert,  Handbuch  d.  griech.  Staatsalterthumer,  I.  p.  115. 

2 Muller’s  Handbuch,  ‘IV.  p.  144  ; Andocides,  de  Myst .,  127  : “The  Ceryces 
voted  according  to  a law  which  they  have  which  allows  a father  to  introduce  his 
son  when  he  has  sworn  that  he  is  of  a truth  introducing  his  own  son.”  The 
Ceryces  were  a noble  gens. 

8 Gilbert,  op.  cit .,  I.  p.  185,  n.  2 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 


85 


Each  gens  is  said  to  have  contained  thirty  families,  while 
thirty  gentes  constituted  a phratry.  Both  numbers  are  doubt- 
less hypothetical,  being  assumed  for  the  purposes  of  govern- 
ment, when  Athens  became  the  capital  ; or  possibly  invented 
outright  by  later  theorists.  The  number  of  families  must  have 
varied  greatly  in  the  different  gentes.  Nor  do  we  know  how 
many  gentes  existed  in  Attica  in  this  early  time.  For  even  if 
the  given  number  is  genuine,  it  does  not  necessarily  apply  to 
the  period  of  autonomous  villages.  If  there  were  360  gentes 
in  Attica,  each  gens  occupied  on  an  average  a little  more  than 
two  square  miles  of  territory,  or  about  1 500  acres.  It  seems 
strange  that  Attica  could  contain  so  many  autonomous  units, 
each  occupying  so  small  a space.  Doubtless  the  villages  were 
originally  larger  ; for  the  necessity  of  self-preservation  tended 
to  maintain  large  units.  But  when  phratric,  and  still  larger 
groups  were  formed,  the  communal  bond  was  relaxed  and  the 
main  branches  fell  apart  and  formed  new  gentes.  Even  before 
the  formation  of  higher  units,  there  were  tendencies  in  opera- 
tion which  frequently  dismembered  the  gens  in  the  manner  just 
described.  These  were  strife  between  the  families  within  the 
gens  and  agricultural  and  grazing  conveniences.1  This  process 
was  assisted  by  the  migration  of  leading  Eupatrid  families, 
— attendant  upon  the  synoecism — , to  Athens.  It  will  be 
shown  hereafter  that  each  city  of  the  Attic  Dodecapolis  — which 
we  shall  term  “phratric  city” — was  composed  of  about  four 
villages,  giving  forty-eight  villages,  or  large  clans,  for  all  Attica. 
These  were  in  turn  divided,  doubtless,  into  sub-villages,  — also 
called  Kto/xai  or  demi.2  According  to  this  view,  then,  the  deme 
was  a section  of  the  original  village  domain,  occupied  by  a 


1 “ When  in  a commune  the  pressure  of  population  is  felt,  if  there  be  vacant  ter- 
ritory, the  people  form  new  communes  ad  infinitum  Hearn,  Aryan  Household, 
p.  235.  Cf.  Krauss,  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven,  p.  hi. 

2 Each  larger  community  had  its  sub-divisions;  Hearn,  op.  cit.,  p.  218.  “In 
the  course  of  time  a gens  is  divided  into  a number  of  sub-gentes,  and  the 
latter  gradually  become  independent”;  Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte, 
pp.  1 50-1. 


86 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


family  or  a group  of  closely  related  families.  As  the  influences 
of  centralization  began  to  be  felt,  the  larger  communal  corpora- 
tions were  dissolved,  and  the  demes  took  the  place  of  the 
villages.  Hence,  there  is  no  need  to  suppose  that  every  gens 
of  historic  times  was  once  an  independent  village  ; but  they 
represented  rather  the  main  branches  or  sections  of  the  original 
autonomous  village. 

(c)  Dependent  Classes  in  the  Gens. 

Besides  the  slaves,  who  were  within  the  household,  there 
were  two  dependent  classes,  or  ranks  ( ethne ),  within  the  gens. 
These  were  (i)  the  peasants,  Georgia  Geomori,  Agroeci , Pelatae 1 
and  (2)  the  artisans  and  tradesmen,  Demiurgi.  The  first  class 
was  the  older,  and  arose  as  follows.  While  the  clans  lived  in 
villages  and  maintained  their  independence,2  each  felt  a great 
anxiety  to  increase  its  military  force;  and  as  the  village  pos- 
sessed more  land  than  sufficed  for  its  own  use,  strangers  were 
allowed  to  come  into  the  village,  and  receive  small  parcels  of 
land  near  its  marches,  and  to  hold  these  as  clients  of  the  gens.3 
They  were  liable  to  taxation,  paying  one-sixth  of  the  produce 
of  the  land,  and  to  military  service;  and,  in  turn,  enjoyed  some 
private  rights4  and  some  participation  in  the  gentile-worship. 
Of  political  rights  they  had  none  whatever.  Among  their 
private  rights  must  have  been  security  of  life,  ownership 
of  property,  and  the  privileges  of  trade  and  contract.5  In  these, 
however,  they  sought  the  protection  of  the  law  only  through 
their  patrons.  They  were  not  themselves  supposed  to  know 


1 Aristotle,  Politeia  of  the  Athenians,  chs.  2,  13  ; Apoeci  in  the  Berlin  fragment. 

2 The  fact  that  Shannivartani  and  Pelata  alike  paid  one-sixth  is  sufficient  proof 
that  the  institution  is  Aryan. 

8 Attachment  to  the  gens  might  readily  be  displaced  by  attachment  to  the  indi- 
vidual nobles  of  the  gens  against  the  gens  itself.  At  times  the  nobles  induced 
men  to  enter  the  gens  for  the  sole  purpose  of  strengthening  themselves.  See 
Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  254. 

4 Gilbert,  Altattische  Komenverfassung,  pp.  208-9. 

6 Ihne,  Early  Rome,  p.  114  ; Muller’s  Dorians,  II.  pp.  62,  66. 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 


87 


the  customs  of  the  gens  or  the  forms  of  judicial  procedure.1 
As  participants  in  the  worship  they  were  called  orgeones.  To 
be  sure,  they  could  not  themselves  perform  religious  rites;  nor 
were  they  initiated  into  all  the  service  of  the  gens.  Probably 
this  participation  amounted  to  nothing  more  than  their  presence 
at  the  village  festivals  and  a share  of  the  sacrificial  meat.2 

There  is  no  doubt  that  clients  of  this  sort  existed  before  the 
separation  of  the  races;  and  that  their  relations  to  the  patron 
were  already  defined.  Leist  supposes  them  to  have  been 
Aryan,3  and  this  accords  with  what  we  know  of  them  in  Attic 
history.  No  difference  of  dialect  or  customs  is  mentioned, — 
nowhere  are  they  regarded  as  aliens.  Had  the  Agroeci  and 
Demiurgi  been  of  non-Hellenic  race,  they  would  not  so  easily 
have  had  their  claim  to  citizenship  allowed,  and  Solon  could 
not  have  said  that  he  gave  to  them  merely  what  was  their  due.4 
Probably  after  the  Ionic  settlement  of  Attica,  the  clients  still 
continued  to  come  in.  The  original  inhabitants  were  either 
expelled  or  reduced  to  slavery.  Some  of  these,  to  be  sure,  may 
have  become  clients ; but  not  s q as  to  affect  the  character  of  the 
class. 

The  second  rank  of  inferiors,  the  Demiurgi , came  in  with  the 
recognition  of  the  principle  of  the  division  of  labor.  Men  found 
it  better  and  more  economical  to  purchase  of  a skilled  work- 
man than  themselves  to  produce  what  they  needed.  Ac- 
cordingly the  invitation  was  given  to  professional  workmen  to 
settle  within,  the  village  domain.5  These  also  received  certain 
rights,  yet  fewer  perhaps  than  the  Agroeci , since  in  early  Greece 
the  possession  of  land  fixed  a man’s  position  in  relation  to  the 
state.6  The  old  settlers,  in  contrast  with  these  newcomers, 
styled  themselves  autochthones ; in  contrast  with  their  in- 


1 Maine,  Ancient  Law,  pp.  n-12. 

2 Cf.  Manu,  III.  246  ; Mommsen,  History  of  Rome,  I.  pp.  94-6. 

3 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  pp.  448-9. 

4 Solon’s  Poems,  quoted  by  Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  12. 

5 Gilbert,  Altattische  Komenverfassung,  p.  209. 

6 Id. 


88 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


feriority,  they  were  called  Eupatridae } These  alone  enjoyed 
political  and  religious  offices.1 2  The  growth  of  the  kingship 
bettered  the  condition  of  the  Agroeci  and  of  the  Demiurgi , so 
far  as  the  latter  had  come  into  existence.  For  the  army  was 
composed  of  Plebeians  as  well  as  Eupatrids,  and  all  the  soldiers 
attended  the  agora.  Thus,  in  the  Homeric  army  a distinction 
is  made  between  leaders  and  people,  seldom  between  nobles 
and  Plebeians.  No  vote  was  taken,  and  the  voice  of  the 
peasant  was  as  loud  as  that  of  his  Patrician  neighbor.  At  this 
time  it  appears  that  many  of  the  clients  became  free.  Under 
the  oligarchy,  however,  all  this  was  changed.  The  agora  rarely 
met  in  Athens  during  this  period;  and  when  it  did  meet,  little 
influence  was  exercised  by  it  upon  the  government.3  More- 
over, the  Eupatrids  no  longer  depended  upon  the  Plebeians  for 
defense,  and  as  slavery  was  becoming  fashionable,  there  was  no 
longer  any  need  of  a free  peasantry.  Accordingly,  the 
Eupatrids  united  with  the  capitalists  in  encroaching  upon  the 
privileges  of  these,  and  were  in  the  time  of  Solon  reducing 
them  once  more  to  serfdom.4  There  was  a third  lower  rank, 
the  Thetes , who  did  not  belong  to  any  gens.  As  they  had  no 
land  nor  professional  skill,  there  was  no  object  in  granting  to 
them  special  rights.  They,  therefore,  supported  themselves 
inadequately  and  wretchedly  by  working  at  odd  jobs  and  in 
busy  seasons  for  those  who  could  not  afford  to  keep  a sufficient 
number  of  slaves.5  While  such  Agroeci  as  had  gained  free- 
dom were  fast  returning  to  slavery,  the  Demiurgi  were  rising 
in  importance.  Many  had  enriched  themselves  by  commerce, 


1 Gilbert,  op.  cit .,  p.  208. 

2 Plutarch,  Theseus,  25  : “To  the  nobility  he  committed  the  care  of  religion, 
the  choice  of  magistrates,  the  teaching  and  dispensing  of  the  laws,  interpretation 
and  direction  of  all  sacred  matters.” 

8 The  only  assembly  known  was  that  which  met  during  the  siege  of  Cylon  in  the 
Acropolis.  On  this  occasion  the  lower  ranks  seem  to  have  been  represented; 
Thuc.  I.  126. 

4 Aristotle,  Politeia  of  the  Athenians,  ch.  2. 

r*  Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece,  pp.  65-6,  with  references  to  Homer  and 
1 lcsiod. 


THE  GRECIAN  GENS. 


89 


and  now  formed  a middle  class,  or  rank,  between  nobles  and 
peasants.  These  lived  along  the  coast  and  belonged  to  the 
party  of  Paralians. 


(d)  Weakening  of  the  Gens. 

It  is  intended  here  merely  to  sum  up  the  disintegrating 
forces.  Hearn1  and  Fustel  de  Coulanges2  have  already  treated 
the  subject  carefully. 

1.  The  opposition  of  the  state.  This  may  be  regarded  as 
the  chief  cause  of  disintegration.  The  king,  to  strengthen  his 
own  position,  intruded  within  the  sacred  circle  of  the  gens,  and 
endeavored  to  take  from  it  some  of  its  privileges.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  gens  was  no  longer  compelled  by  dangers  from 
without  to  keep  up  its  organization  with  the  same  strictness. 

2.  Internal  strife.  This  arose  between  powerful  families  of 
the  gens.  Sometimes  the  younger  branches,  which  enjoyed 
fewer  privileges,  rebelled  against  the  older. 

3.  Opposition  of  the  inferior  classes.  These  were  compelled 
to  share  in  the  burdens  of  government.  They  demanded  there- 
fore a share  in  its  privileges.  Their  greatest  obstacle  in  the 
way  of  attaining  this  end  was  the  gens ; and  against  it  they 
directed  their  most  violent  attacks. 

4.  Finally,  the  natural  expansion  of  the  human  mind,  out- 
growing the  narrow  sphere  in  which  it  was  placed.  Yet  the 
Greeks  never  freed  themselves  wholly  from  “ clannishness.” 
A history  of  Greek  politics  is  mainly  a history  of  clan  pre- 
judices in  its  effect  upon  the  political  organism.  Individuals 
lived  who  were  free  from  these  prejudices  ; yet  such  were 
exceptional  and  came  late  in  history. 


1 Aryan  Household,  ch.  XX. 


2 Ancient  City,  pp.  336-341. 


CHAPTER  TV. 


THE  PHRATRY  AND  PHYLE. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  the  phyle  is  older  than  the 
Aryan  household  as  we  find  it  at  the  dawn  of  history.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  are  able  to  trace  the  growth  of  the  phratry  from 
the  gens  and  the  family.  Inside  the  phyle , the  family  developed 
by  a natural  process  into  the  gens,  bequeathing  to  the  latter  its 
own  organization  and  institutions.  After  the  gens  had  once 
been  formed,  new  families  were  sometimes  admitted  into  the 
village  by  adoption,1  thus  giving  to  such  gentes  their  partially 
fictitious  nature.  Village  life  in  this  form  was  the  most  char- 
acteristic feature  of  the  Aryan  period.  Yet  even  before  the 
separation  of  the  races,  it  was  common  for  the  villages  of  a 
neighborhood  to  combine,  for  the  purposes  of  defense  and 
aggression,  into  the  larger  phratric  unit.2  The  central  point  of 
the  phratry  was  an  easily  defended  hill  (a/cpos),  which  was  pro- 
tected by  a ring  of  earth-works  (7roAts).3  The  gentes  composing 
a union  chose  one  of  its  ablest  pateres  as  basileus  (phratriarch, 
or  ^vzzz-king).4  The  process  of  combining  was  aided  in  some 
cases  by  the  discovery  that  neighboring  gentes  practiced  similar 
religious  rites,  thus  indicating  a blood-relationship.5  Other 
clans  of  the  neighborhood  which  could  not  put  forth  this  claim 
to  kinship,  might  be  received  by  adoption  into  the  phratry. 
The  religious  character  of  the  phratric  union  was  that  of  its 
component  members,  consisting  of  those  rites  and  beliefs  which 
the  gentes  were  found  to  hold  in  common,  while  alien  gentes 
must  adopt  this  worship  at  the  time  of  their  admission.6 

1 Od.  IV.  174  ff. 

2 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  p.  582. 

8 Id.  p.  583  ; Manu,  VII.  70  ; Institutes  of  Vishnu,  III.  6. 

4 Schrader,  op,  cit.,  p.  583. 

fi  Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  259. 

0 Id.  pp.  269-270. 


THE  PHRATRY  AND  PHYLE. 


9 


Where  neighboring  gentes  were  actually  connected  in  blood, 
a voluntary  union  under  the  fear  of  a common  danger,  or  desire 
of  some  advantage  attainable  only  by  common  effort,  was  per- 
fectly natural.  Many  instances  of  such  combinations  are  known. 
Yet  when  the  villages  belonged  to  different  tribes  or  races,  a 
voluntary  union  could  hardly  be  expected.  In  this  case,  cen- 
tralization was  brought  about  through  conquest  of  the  weaker 
villages  by  some  powerful  neighboring  town.1  This  mode  of 
combination  was  not  wanting  even  in  cases  of  kinship.  The 
conquered  villages  were  sometimes  removed,  in  whole  or  part, 
to  enlarge  the  city  of  the  conquerors.  In  the  meantime,  the 
phyle  continued  as  a non-political  unit,  occupying  for  the  most 
part  a continuous  territory,  and  distinguished  from  other  phylae 
by  its  dialect  and  local  customs.2  Only  on  the  occasion  of 
some  great  undertaking,  was  the  tribe-king  chosen  ; and  the 
villages  and  phratries  of  the  phyle  for  the  time  acted  in  unison.3 
Thus,  the  migrations  of  the  races  took  place  by  tribes.  It  is 
natural  that  when  the  tribe-king,  chosen  for  such  an  enterprise, 
proved  to  be  a man  of  great  ability,  his  rule  became  hereditary  ; 
and  the  tribe  after  settlement  in  its  new  home  retained  its 
coherence,  and  in  some  cases,  exhibited  a strong,  centralized 
power.4  Thus,  the  petty  kingdoms  of  England  arose  from  the 
invading  tribes  of  Angles  and  Saxons.  Thus,  the  tribes  of 
Epirus  and  Aetolia  were  coherent,  political  units  when  we  first 
meet  them  in  history.5  In  Attica,  so  far  as  we  are  informed  by 
tradition,  the  tribes  did  not  play  an  important  part  in  early 
history,  the  synoecism  taking  place  by  villages  and  cities  rather 
than  by  tribes.6  If,  however,  it  is  possible  to  identify  the  main 
local  districts  of  Attica  with  its  tribal  divisions,  it  will  appear 


1 Thucydides,  I.  8. 

2 Herodotus,  VIII.  144,  for  a description  of  the  tribe  of  Hellenes.  Cf.  Thu- 
cydides, I.  3. 

3 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  pp.  274-5. 

4 Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  pp.  583-4  ; Leist,  Graeco- 
italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  pp.  105-6. 

5 Kuhn,  Rhein.  Mus.,  XV.  p.  9 ff. 

6 Plutarch,  Theseus,  24,  32;  Thuc.  II.  15. 


92 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


that  not  even  the  Attic  phylae  were  so  insignificant  as  has 
generally  been  supposed. 

The  religious  and  political  constitution  of  the  tribe  was 
patterned  after  that  of  the  family.1  In  Aryan  times,  although 
there  may  have  been  confederations  of  tribes  for  temporary 
objects,  no  coalescence  took  place  ; and  hence  no  city,  in  the 
proper  sense  of  the  term,  was  organized.  King,  in  the  Aryan 
sense,  is  phratric  king  or,  at  most,  tribe-king  ; and  city  is 
merely  the  fortified  centre  of  the  gau>  or  phratry.  It  must  not 
be  assumed,  however,  that  every  village  had  part  in  a phratric 
union  ; or  that  villages  thus  taking  part  lost  their  autonomy. 
The  limited  object  of  the  union  and  the  resolute  spirit  of 
independence  among  the  gentes  preclude  the  latter  idea,  while 
even  in  early  Attica,  it  is  supposed  that  some  KWfMu  existed 
outside  of  phratric  unions.2 

In  early  Greece,  people  lived  everywhere  in  villages.3  This 
continued  down  into  historic  times  among  the  Acarnanians, 
Ozolian  Locrians,  Aetolians  and  others,  while  we  have  the  au- 
thority of  Thucydides4  for  the  fact  that  all  the  Hellenes  in  the 
earliest  times  lived  in  the  same  way.  It  may  be  set  down, 
then,  as  a well  established  fact  that  the  gens,  or  village,  was  in 
Greece  itself  a virtually  autonomous  community,  and  that  out 
of  the  gentes  was  developed  the  phratric  city  for  the  purpose 
of  defense  and  aggression.  In  Acarnania,  we  see  an  actual 
breaking  up  of  villages  and  a gathering  into  phratric  cities. 
This  was  brought  about  through  the  persuasion  of  Cassander, 
as  a military  measure  — to  strengthen  the  Acarnanians  against 
the  Aetolians,  their  hereditary  foes.  “ They  gathered,”  says 
Diodorus,  “ mostly  into  Stratus,  but  some  into  Sauria  and 
others  into  Agrinium.”  5 In  Arcadia  the  same  process  went 

1 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  p.  321. 

2 Gilbert,  Altattische  Komenverfassung,  pp.  213-4.  By  “ phratric  union  ” I mean 
the  union  of  villages  or  demes  for  permanent  objects. 

8 Vischer,  Ueber  die  Bildung  von  Staaten  und  Biinden,  Kleine  Schriften, 
I.  p.  308  ff. 

4 Thucydides,  I.  5. 

6 XIX.  67.  See  Rhein.  Mus.,  XV.  p.  4. 


THE  PHRATRY  AND  PHYLE. 


93 


on.  Mantinea,  for  example,  was  formed  of  five  /cto/xat.  But  the 
Lacedaemonians,  in  385  b.c.  broke  up  the  city  and  distributed 
the  inhabitants  among  the  original  villages,1  for  the  purpose  of 
weakening  its  power.  After  the  battle  of  Leuctra,  Epaminon- 
das  brought  about  a re-synoecism  to  strengthen  the  district 
against  the  Spartans.  Tegea  was  formed  of  four  tribes  and 
nine  demes.2  The  facts  to  which  attention  is  called  in  these 
cases  are,  (1)  the  actual  settling  together  of  villages  in  phratric 
or  tribal  cities,  and  (2)  the  purpose  of  such  a synoecism,  viz., 
defense  and  aggression.  When  we  come  to  Attica,  we  find  the 
same  principles  at  work.  The  twelve  phratric  cities  of  Attica, 
mentioned  by  Philochorus,  were  formed  by  the  actual  synoecism 
of  villages.3  Here,  too,  the  object  was  protection, — against 
the  Carian  pirates  and  Boeotian  neighbors.4  The  names  of 
these  twelve  cities,  assumed  by  Philochorus  to  have  existed 
before  Theseus,  are,  Cecropia,  Tetrapolis,  Epacria,  Deceleia, 
Eleusis,  Aphidna,  Thoricus,  Brauron,  Cytherus,  Sphettus,  Ce- 
phisia  and  Phalerus.5  Instances  occurred  in  which  the  icfyuu 
did  not  actually  settle  together,  but  remained  in  their  town- 
ships (demes)  in  which  they  were  originally  located,  selecting 
merely  some  central  point  as  a 7toXl<s.  This  ttoXls  served  not 
merely  as  a fortified  place  for  the  united  kw/xcu,  but  also  for  re- 
ligious assemblies.  Such  groups  of  kw/xui  may  have  been  the 
(TvcrTrjixaTa  StJ/awv.6  The  Philochorean  7ro'A.as  of  Attica  were  not 
themselves  phratries  but,  most  probably,  the  capitals  of  dis- 
tricts which  the  state  afterwards  organized  as  phratries.  We 
know  the  composition  of  some  of  these  Attic  ttoAcis.  (i)  Ce- 


1 Gilbert,  Handbuch  d.  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  II.  p.  125  ff. 

2 Id.  p.  127. 

3 Strabo,  IX.  397;  Etymol.  Mag.  (Suidas),  sub  v.  No  one  supposes  that  in 
the  period  preceding  the  synoecism  there  were  exactly  twelve  cities.  The  actual 
number  we  have  no  means  of  determining,  but  may  reasonably  assume  that  the 
number  twelve  arose  from  a comparison  of  these  early  cities  with  the  later  twelve 
Attic  phratries. 

4 Kuhn,  Rhein.  Mus.,  XV.  p.  1 ff. 

5 Strabo,  IX.  397  ; Rhein.  Mus.,  XV.  p.  1 f. 

6 Muller’s  Handbuch,  2IV.  p.  23  f. 


94 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


cropia  was,  no  doubt,  a single  home  on  the  Acropolis.  But 
Athens  appears  to  have  been  made  up  of  four  kw/xcu,  viz.  Ce- 
cropia,  Helicon,  Museum,  and  Melite.1  Here  is  an  example  of 
synoecism  bfought  about  by  conquest.  (2)  The  Tetrapolis  was 
composed  of  Marathon,  Oenoe,  Probalinthus  and  Tricorynthus. 
This  union  was  indebted  for  its  origin  to  the  character  of  the 
locality,2  and  retained  in  its  name  and  constitution  the  nature 
of  its  composition.  (3)  Phalerus  was  also  a tetrakomia.  It 
was  made  up  of  Peiraeus,  Phalerum,  Zypete  and  Thymoetadae. 
In  the  neighborhood  was  a temple  to  Heracles  Tetrakomos ; 
and  the  whole  was  comprehended  under  the  name  Phalerus.3 
(4)  Aphidna  was  situated  between  Deceleia  and  Marathon,  and 
contained  at  least  three  komae , viz.  Titacidae,  Perrhidae,  and 
Aphidna.4  (5)  Epacria  contained  Plotheia  and  Samachidae, 
both  known  as  names  of  Attic  demes.5  Epacria  is  also  spoken 
of  as  a trittys , which  was  perhaps  identical  with  the  phratry. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  Aphidna  contained  other  komae  or 
demes  ; but  these  are  all  that  tradition  has  given  to  us.  (6) 
Brauron6  contained  the  kome  Philaedae,  which  also  gave  its 
name  to  an  Attic  deme.  We  know  not  how  many  others 
belong  to  this  polls.  These  are  all  among  the  twelve  poleis  of 
whose  composition  anything  has  been  learned.  I will  add  to 
these,  the  remaining  unions  which  are  known,  but  whose  names 
do  not  appear  in  the  list  of  Philochorean  cities.  They  are  as 
follows.  (7)  Pallene  was  composed  of  the  demes,  Gargettus, 
Pitthus,  Sphettus  and  Pallene,  united  in  the  worship  of  Athena 
Pallenis.7  (8)  Hecalesium  was  composed  of  several  demes, 
among  which  were  perhaps  Hecale  and  Trinemeia.8  The  cen- 
tral point  of  this  union  was  the  shrine  of  Zeus  Hecalus , which 


1 Curt  Wachsmuth,  Stadt  Athen,  I.  p.  388  ff. 

2 Gilbert,  Altattische  Komenverfassung,  p.  21 1. 

8 Kuhn,  Rhein.  Mus.,  XV.  p.  2. 

4 Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  p.  21 1. 

6  Id.  p.  212. 

6 Plutarch,  Solon,  10. 

7 Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  pp.  212-3. 

8 Plutarch,  Theseus,  14. 


THE  PHRATRY  AND  PHYLE. 


95 


was  on  the  way  from  Athens  to  Marathon.1 2  (9)  Mesogeia  was 
a trikomia  or  tetrakomiaP'  One  of  its  members  was  Bate,  ap- 
parently in  the  neighborhood  of  Athens.3  It  had  a shrine  to 
Heracles,  and  was  presided  over  by  an  archon  (apxwi/  M«ro- 
ye<W),  who  performed  merely  sacerdotal  functions.  (10)  Tri- 
komia was  composed  of  Eupuridae,  Cropidae  and  Peleces.  Its 
situation  is  unknown.4 

It  may  be  well  here  to  sum  up  the  results  of  this  discussion. 
Attica  was  in  primitive  times  occupied  throughout  its  entire 
extent  by  autonomous  villages  with  their  surrounding  domains. 
The  number  of  these  cannot  be  definitely  ascertained,  but  must 
have  been  far  less  than  360.  Larger  groups  which  we  may 
call  phratric  unions  — were  developed  organically  by  the  natural 
expansion  of  the  village,  — i.e.,  when  a village  became  in- 
conveniently large  or  when  any  other  sufficient  motive  to 
division  existed,  it  separated  into  its  component  families,  or 
groups  of  closely  related  families  — each  component  family  or 
group  of  families  becoming  an  independent  village,  while  all 
the  members  of  the  original  village  retained  feelings  of  kinship 
and  continued  to  deliberate  in  common  concerning  the  welfare 
of  the  whole.  Thus  the  original  village  became  a phratry. 
But  from  this  organic  development  there  were  many  variations. 
Sometimes  neighboring  villages  united  in  a phratry  on  the 
basis  of  a presumed  kinship,  sometimes  kindred  gentes  were 
admitted  into  the  phratry  by  adoption,  sometimes  villages  were 
conquered  and  annexed;  but  in  all  known  cases  the  villages  of 
a phratry  were  on  an  equal  footing.  The  number  of  these 
unions  is  unknown,  but  is  not  likely  to  have  been  exactly 
twelve.  When  all  these  phratric  groups  were  united  in  the 
state  they  were  reorganized  into  twelve  phratries.  In  the 
process  of  reorganization,  the  state  may  sometimes  have 
erected  a phratry  by  the  union  of  two  or  more  groups  of 
villages.  In  other  cases  it  may  have  divided  a large  group. 


1 Gilbert,  op.  cit .,  p.  213. 

2 CIA.  II.  602-3. 


3 Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  p.  212. 

4 Id.  p.  211. 


96 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


As  the  phratric  unions  were  often  fictitious  and  were  formed 
for  purposes  of  convenience,  it  was  not  difficult  to  arrange 
them  in  accordance  with  an  artificial  system.1 

Later  history  shows  that  the  state  could  regulate  phratries 
more  easily  than  gentes.2  The  unions  which  thus  lost  their 
political  character,  maintained  themselves  for  purely  religious 
purposes;  just  as  the  Ionic  tribes  continued  after  Cleisthenes 
as  religious  organizations.  This  seems  to  be  demonstrated  by 
the  fact  that  the  ruler  of  Mesogeia  was  called  archon.  It  is 
difficult  to  understand  how  an  office  purely  sacerdotal  in 
origin  could  bear  that  name.  It  points  rather  to  a time 
when  the  ruler  was  a military  and  administrative  officer, 
and  when  the  union  existed  for  defense  and  aggression. 
When  the  political  synoecism  of  Attica  took  place,  the 
prytanea  and  bouleuteria  were  removed  to  Athens,  as  well 
as  the  leschae  of  the  gentes.  But  a shrine  was  not  so  easily 
disturbed.  The  sanctuaries  of  both  village  and  polis  were 
maintained  on  their  ancient  sites,  though  disconnected  hence- 
forth with  the  political  and  administrative  powers  of  the 
state. 

We  should  naturally  expect  some  diversity  in  the  religious 
rites  and  deities  of  the  phratric  cities.  Certainly  they  did  not 
worship  Zeus  Phratrius  and  Athena  Phratria  before  the  synoe- 
cism. But  Zeus  was  the  patron  deity  of  one  union,  Athena,  of 
another  and  Heracles  of  another.  Curt  Wachsmuth  has  set 
forth  the  principle  that  “ no  site  once  consecrated  by  a shrine 
ever  became  cultless  among  the  Greeks.”  3 It  is  in  accordance 


1 Philochorus  had  probably  little  trustworthy  information  as  to  the  state  of  At- 
tica before  Theseus.  To  fill  out  the  number  twelve  he  probably  selected  the 
names  of  twelve  of  the  most  prominent  Attic  localities  known  to  him.  Among 
these  are  the  names  of  at  least  six  groups  of  demes,  which  continued  after  the 
synoecism  for  religious  purposes.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  development  of  the 
Attic  phratry  was  similar  to  that  of  the  South-Slavonian  bratstvo.  See  p.  17  f. 

2 The  gentes  could  not,  as  the  phratries,  be  made  to  fit  the  Cleisthenean 
organization  of  the  State,  and  were  accordingly  set  aside,  while  the  phratries 
remained. 

8 Stadt  Athen,  I.  p.  387. 


THE  PHRATRY  AND  PHYLE. 


97 


with  this  principle  that  local  cults  are  found  throughout  Attica, 
which  represent  the  ancient  political  centers  of  the  surrounding 
demes. 

Before  proceeding  further  with  the  synoecism  of  Attica  as  a 
whole,  it  is  thought  best  to  show  how  the  synoecism  of  Athens 
itself  from  the  neighboring  villages  took  place.  I have  here 
followed,  in  the  main,  Curt  Wachsmuth,1  who  bases  his  con- 
clusions mainly  on  mythological  and  archaeological  data.  The 
settlement  on  the  Acropolis  was  one  of  the  oldest  cities  in 
Greece,  as  its  situation,  remote  from  the  sea,  indicates.  The 
settlers  were  thus  among  the  original  inhabitants  of  Attica, 
styling  themselves  autochthones , and  belonging,  it  is  said,  to  the 
Pelasgic  race.  They  worshiped,  among  the  great  gods,  the 
Earth  and  Sun.2  Across  the  Ilissus,  on  mount  Helicon,  slightly 
elevated  above  the  surrounding  hills,  was  another,  younger 
settlement,  which  Wachsmuth  thinks  to  have  been  made  by 
Ionians,  or  at  least,  that  the  Ionic  element  was  the  main 
element.3  The  Pelasgians  appear  to  have  formed  the  primitive 
basis  of  the  historical  Attic  race.4  The  settlement  above  men- 
tioned had  its  central  point  and  citadel  on  Mount  Helicon,  but 
extended  over  the  hills  and  both  banks  of  the  Ilissus.  It  was 
the  most  favorable  spot  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Acropolis  for  the 
growth  of  an  independent  community.  These  people  worshiped 
Poseidon,  Apollo,  Aphrodite  and  the  two  goddesses  of  the 
mysteries,  Demeter  and  Persephone.  There  must  have  been 
constant  strife  lasting  through  many  years,  between  the  old  and 


1 Rhein.  Mus.  XXIII.  p.  Stadt  Athen,  I.  p.  387  ff. 

2 Welcker,  Griechische  Gotterlehre,  I.  p.  636. 

3 Stadt  Athen,  I.  p.  393. 

4 The  Pelasgians  had  a considerable  civilization  : they  tilled  the  soil  and  built 
walls,  e.  g.,  that  on  the  Athenian  Acropolis;  Busolt,  Griech.  Gesch.,  I.  p.  31.  The 
primitive  inhabitants  of  Attica  were  Pelasgians  ; Hdt.  VIII.  44.  They  were  bar- 
barous— did  not  speak  the  Hellenic  tongue;  Hdt.  I.  57-8,  60.  Hesselmeyer, 
Studien  zur  alten  Geschichte,  I.  p.  127  ff.,  regards  them  as  related  to  the  Etrus- 
cans, as  neither  Aryan  nor  Semitic.  Cf.  Crusius,  Beitrage  zur  griech.  Mythologie 
und  Religionsgeschichte,  p.  8 ff.  ; also,  review  of  Hesselmeyer  by  C.  Pauli  in 
Neue  Philologische  Rundschau,  1892,  pp.  250-3. 


98 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


the  new  cities.  This  is  typified  in  Attic  Mythology  by  the 
strife  between  Athena  and  Poseidon  for  the  possession  of  the 
city.1  Finally  under  Theseus  the  new  community  was  victo- 
rious. A treaty  was  made  between  the  two  peoples,  whereby 
the  new  community  was  admitted  to  the  Acropolis,  and  its  king 
seated  upon  the  throne.  Their  religions  were  also  blended, 
and  Poseidon  took  up  his  abode  in  the  temple  of  Athena.  There 
was  also  an  independent  settlement  on  the  Museum  south-west 
of  the  Acropolis.2  Wachsmuth  believes  that  this  was  inhabited 
by  the  Thracians,  as  indicated  by  the  cults  of  Dionysus  and  the 
Muses  attached  to  the  locality.3  The  settlement  was  of  far 
less  importance  than  that  of  Helicon,  and  hence  has  not  left  as 
distinct  traditions  of  its  conquest.  The  fourth  community  was 
that  of  Melite,  west  of  the  Acropolis,  which,  for  various 
reasons  not  altogether  satisfactory,  Wachsmuth  assigns  to  the 
Phoenicians.4  The  tradition  of  Theseus’  war  with  the  Amazons, 
he  tells  us,  probably  goes  back  to  the  strife  between  Athens 
and  Melite.5  It  is  further  the  belief  of  Wachsmuth  that  the 
Diasia  was  celebrated  in  remembrance  of  a confederation  which 
was  likely  to  have  existed  before  the  coalescence.  The  Synoecia , 
or  Metoecia , was  instituted  to  commemorate  the  final  synoe- 
cism.6  These  two  terms  were  originally  synonomous,  and 
indicated  an  actual  migration  and  settlement  together.  In  later 
times,  synoecism  meant  no  more  than  a political  union. 

But  even  this  synoecism  did  not  bring  perfect  peace.  Me- 
nestheus,  great-grandson  of  Erechtheus,  headed  the  autochthon- 
ous element  of  the  population  against  the  foreign  conqueror, 
Theseus,  drove  him  into  exile  and  himself  mounted  the  throne. 

1 Hermann,  Griechische  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  267. 

2 Ginn  & Heath’s  Classical  Atlas,  map  13. 

8 Stadt  Athen,  I.  p.  399.  While  it  is  likely  that  this  settlement  existed,  the 
proof  that  it  was  made  by  Thracians  is  insufficient.  Cf.  Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, 
Philol.  Untersuch.,  I.  pp.  97-172. 

4 Stadt  Athen,  I.  p.  404  ff. 

5 Id.  p.  447. 

6 For  Thumser’s  objections  to  this  view,  see  his  Griech.  Staatsalterthiimer, 
p.  306,  n.  3. 


THE  PHRATRY  AND  PHYLE. 


99 


It  was  Menestheus  who  led  the  Athenians  to  Troy.  We  must 
not  infer  from  the  Iliad,1  that  Athens  had  at  this  time  extended 
its  sway  over  Salamis.  The  passage  is,  doubtless,  a late  inter- 
polation, and  its  only  value  is  to  give  a hint  as  to  the  condition 
of  things  when  Salamis  was  independent  of  Athens  ; for  the 
Salaminians  followed  their  own  leader.  The  Theseides  regained 
the  throne  after  the  death  of  Menestheus,  and  ruled  despotically, 
as  the  people  of  later  times  supposed,  embodying  their  belief 
in  the  fictitious  names  of  the  last  three  kings  of  this  line,  — 
Oxyntes,  “the  severe,”  Apheidias,  “the  unsparing,”  and  Thy- 
moetes,  “ the  passionate.”  2 

The  reasons  for  believing  that  the  synoecism  of  Theseus 
affected  Athens  alone  and  not  the  Dodecapolis,  may  be  stated 
as  follows : 

i.  It  was  the  custom  of  later  times  to  refer  any  and  all  of 
the  institutions  of  the  developed  Athenian  state  to  Theseus  as 
their  originator.3  Thus,  he  was  not  merely  the  king  who 
united  Attica  into  one  state,  but  the  founder  of  the  Athenian 
democracy,  voluntarily  abdicating  the  kingship.  To  him  was 
attributed  the  first  coinage  and  the  institution  of  ostracism. 
Sometimes  the  laws  of  Athens  were  referred  to  him  as  their 
maker.  All  this  speculation  belongs  to  a later  age.  In  it  we 
find  only  an  attempt  to  restore  a state  of  things  before  the 
dawn  of  authentic  history.  Even  the  hero,  Theseus,  is  in  great 
part  a late  invention,  and  was  introduced  into  Greek  mythology 
after  the  rise  of  Athens,  as  an  offset  to  the  Lacedaemonian 
hero,  Heracles.  There  is,  indeed,  no  more  reason  for  ascribing 
to  him  the  synoecism  of  Attica  than  any  of  the  institutions 
mentioned.  Any  tradition  connected  with  Theseus  is  to  be 
regarded  with  suspicion,  and  is  to  be  rejected  outright  when  it 
seems  probable  on  other  grounds  that  the  institution  or  event 


1 II.  557-8. 

2 Gilbert,  Handbuch  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  p.  n6  ; Wachsmuth,  Stadt  Athen, 
I.  p.  472.  Cf.  Busolt,  Griechische  Geschichte,  I.  p.  399  ; Hdt.  V.  65  ; Strabo, 
VIII.  359  ; IX.  393  ; XIV.  633  ; Paus.  II.  18,  9. 

3 Grote,  ch.  XI  (small  edition),  I.  p.  158  f.,  (large  edition),  I.  p.  189  ff. 


IOO 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


under  consideration  belongs  to  a later  period.  This  is  pre- 
eminently the  case  with  the  synoecism. 

2.  The  word  synoecism  means  literally  “a  settling  together.” 
At  so  early  a date,  it  could  have  had  no  other  meaning,  — it 
could  not  express  the  mere  political  union  of  the  twelve  cities. 
Thucydides  is  right  in  ascribing  a synoecism  and  its  festival 
to  Theseus,  but  not  right  in  identifying  it  with  the  union  of 
the  Dodecapolis.1 

3.  This  union  is  said  to  have  taken  place  before  the  Tro- 
jan war.  If  so,  it  must  have  made  Athens  one  of  the  most 
powerful  cities  of  Greece.  The  fact  is  that  she  was  one  of 
the  weakest,  and  that  too,  far  down  in  historic  times.  It  is 
well  known  that  Athens  played  an  insignificant  part  in  early 
Grecian  history,  and  that  in  the  times  of  Peisistratus  and  later, 
when  she  began  to  rise  among  the  Greek  states,  her  heroes  had 
to  be  smuggled  into  Greek  mythology.  Thus,  the  portion  of 
the  catalogue  of  ships  relating  to  Athens  is  unquestionably  an 
interpolation.2  This  will  be  considered  further  when  we  come 
to  discuss  the  naucrary.  It  may  be  stated  here  that  even  in 
the  time  of  Solon,  Athens  betrayed  a weakness  which  reminds 
one  of  the  days  before  the  synoecism,  when  each  city  stood 
alone.  It  was  Peisistratus  who  brought  about  the  perfect 
coalescence  of  Attica  and  who  gave  to  Athens  a place  of  dig- 
nity and  power  in  Greece.  In  one  respect  we  may  call  Theseus 
the  author  of  the  political  unity  of  Attica.  As  Solon  gave  to 
the  Athenians  a constitution  that  was  capable  of  expansion 
and  development,  and  a few  salutary  laws,  which  served  as  an 
excellent  nucleus  to  an  Attic  corpus,  so  Theseus  laid  the  foun- 
dation of  a political  unity  by  assuring  to  Athens  her  military 
and  political  supremacy.  And  as  the  later  Athenians  were 
inclined  to  ascribe  the  whole  body  of  their  laws  to  Solon,  they 
likewise  honored  Theseus  for  the  final  results  of  his  achiev- 


1 Thucydides,  II.  15. 

2 Kiessling  und  Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,  Philologische  Untersuchungen,  VII. 
p.  244  ff. 


THE  PHRATRY  AND  PHYLE. 


IOI 


ments,  erring  only  in  ascribing  to  him  as  immediate  author  the 
results  themselves.1 


1 Authorities  for  the  phratry  : Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte, 
pp.  2574~5  ; Muller’s  Handbuch,  IV.  pp.  22  f.,  106-8,  144-6;  Gilbert,  Handbuch 
d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  pp.  103  ff.,  113,  184-6;  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient 
City,  pp.  154-8  ; G.  F.  Schomann,  Assemblies  of  the  Athenians,  p.  340  f.  ; Athenian 
Constitutional  History,  pp.  15-7  ; De  Phratriis  Atticis  ; Philippi,  Beitrage  zu  einer 
Geschichte  des  attischen  Biirgerrechts,  pp.  248  ff.,  xvi  with  references  ; Gilbert, 
Die  altattische  Komenverfassung,  p.  210  ff.  ; Hammarstrand,  Attikas  Verfassung 
zur  Zeit  des  Konigtums,  p.  816  ff.;  Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  ch.  XI  (“Combina- 
tion of  Clans  ”)  ; Landwehr,  Zur  altern  attischen  Geschichte,  Philol.  Supplb.  V. 
p.  166 ff.;  Szanto,  Zur  attischen  Phratrien-  und  Geschlechterverfassung,  Rhein. 
Mus.  XL.  pp.  506-520 ; Busolt,  Griechische  Geschichte,  I.  pp.  370  ff.,  395  ff. ; 
Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer  in  Hermann’s  Lehrbuch  der  griech.  Antiq., 

pp.  317-24- 


CHAPTER  V. 


THE  FOUR  IONIC  PHYLAE. 

The  members  of  each  tribe  were  bound  together  by  the 
double  tie  of  a common  religion  and  kinship,  — the  latter 
being  partly  factitious,  — thus  giving  to  the  tribes  their 
family,  or  gentile  nature,  on  account  of  which  they  were 
designated  as  4>v\al  yevLKat.  In  addition  to  this,  the  latest 
and  most  thorough  investigations  relating  to  this  subject 
have  tended  to  establish  the  fact  that  the  four  Ionic  phylae 
comprised  originally  the  inhabitants  of  continuous  territories, 
and  were  therefore  local  tribes  totukoll)} 


1 i.  There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  nature  of  the  gens.  It  lived  in  a village 
and  occupied  a definite,  coherent  territory.  Aristotle,  Politics,  I.  2 ; Hearn, 
Aryan  Household,  p.  212. 

2.  The  ancients  regarded  the  phratry  as  local.  This  appears  from  the  fact  that 
they  derived  (pparpla  from  (pplap , and  made  it  comprise,  accordingly,  those  who 
had  a common  well;  cf.  Schomann,  Athenian  Constitutional  History,  p.  11. 
Again,  the  phratry  was  a collection  of  gentes  and  was,  therefore,  originally  local. 
It  occupied  also  a continuous  territory.  This  is  shown  by  the  way  in  which  it 
was  developed  from  the  gentes.  None  but  neighboring  gentes  would  unite  for 
defense  and  aggression.  Accordingly,  the  obligation  of  the  blood-feud  was  made 
to  extend  to  Phrateres ; Dem.  XLIII.  57.  The  practical  fulfilment  of  this  obliga- 
tion required  that  the  phratry  should  occupy  a continuous  territory. 

3.  In  the  belief  of  the  ancients,  the  tribes  were  local  as  well  as  gentile,  and 
were  identified  by  them,  to  some  extent,  with  the  natural  divisions  of  Attica. 
Some  of  the  ancients  endeavored  to  reconstruct  the  state  organization  as  they 
imagined  it  to  have  existed  before  the  institution  of  the  Ionic  phylae.  They  still 
assume  the  existence  of  four  tribes,  but  give  them  different  names.  Two  sets  of 
them  have  thus  come  down  to  us  : one  for  the  tribes  under  Cecrops,  the  other 
for  the  tribes  under  Cranaiis.  To  these  may  be  added  the  division  of  Attica 
among  the  sons  of  Pandion,  quoted  by  Strabo  (IX.  392)  from  Sophocles,  in  which 
Acte  takes  the  place  apparently  of  two  former  tribes.  Its  situation  is  explained 
by  schol.  on  Aristoph.  Wasps,  1223  and  Lysist.  58.  There  existed  also  in 
the  time  of  Solon  a fourth  division  of  Attica  into  three  local  districts.  The 
four  divisions  are  compared  by  Philippi  (Beitr'age  zu  einer  Geschichte  des  att. 
Burgerrechts,  p.  243)  in  the  following  table. 


THE  FOUR  IONIC  PHYLAE. 


103 


The  theory  has  been  held  that  the  four  tribes  were  castes  or 
professions,  and  that  the  names  of  the  tribes  corresponded  to 
their  occupations,  or  ranks.  Thus  the  word  Hopletes  signifies 
“ Warriors/’  Aegicoreis,  “ Goat-herds,”  Argadeis , “ Laborers  ” ; 
but  whether  husbandmen  or  artizans  is  uncertain.  As  to  the 
meaning  of  Geleontes , which  is  the  first  on  the  list,  there  is  an 
endless  variety  of  opinion.1  The  derivation  of  the  word  from 
yeXetv,  “ to  shine,”  is  now  generally  accepted2  as  most  probable. 
The  term  thus  signifies  “ The  Illustrious,”  3 and  designates  a 
priestly  or  martial  class.  While  there  can  be  but  little  doubt 
as  to  the  meaning  of  at  least  three  of  these  words,  the  theory 
that  they  represent  castes  demands  an  essential  modification. 
Grote4  seems  to  be  right  in  assuming  that  the  names  were 
applied  from  their  chief  occupations,  the  Aegicoreis  being 
mainly,  but  not  exclusively,  goat-herds,  and  so  of  the  rest. 
Schomann5  supports  his  view  and  illustrates  it  by  the  fact 


Under  Cecrops 
“•  Cranaus 


Actaea 

Atthis 


Cecropis 

Mesogaea 


Pandion  according 
to  Sophocles 

Pandion  according 
to  the  scholium 
on  Aristophanes  _ 


Acte 


T)  Trep'l  TO  &(TTV 


Solon 


Pedion 


Autochthon  Paralia 

Diacris  Cranais 


Diacria  Paralia 


Diacria  Paralia 


The  local  nature  of  the  four  tribes  becomes  still  more  apparent  when  we 
consider  their  relation  to  the  trittyes  and  naucrariae.  These  were  distinctly  local 
districts.  Each  tribe  was  divided  into  three  trittyes , and  each  trittys  into  four 
naucrariae  ; Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch..  8.  If  the  tribes  were  not  local,  they  could  have 
had  no  local  subdivisions. 

1 For  the  various  opinions,  see  Hammarstrand,  Attikas  Verfassung  zur  Zeit  des 
Konigtums,  p.  791  ff. 

2 Id.  pp.  792-3  ; Muller’s  Handbuch,  2IV.  p.  125  ; cf.,  however,  Thumser,  Griech. 
Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  295. 

3 Or  perhaps  the  “ worshippers  of  the  glorious  Zeus.” 

4 Pt.  II.  ch.  X (small  edition)  I.  p.  558,  (large  edition)  II.  p.  425. 

5 Athenian  Constitutional  History,  p.  7 ff. 


o4 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


that  there  was  a deme,  Kerameis , the  “ Potters,”  named  after 
the  chief  industry  of  that  locality.  Accepting  the  view  of 
Grote  and  Schomann  as  satisfactory,  let  us  inquire  as  to  the 
more  precise  denotation  of  the  terms.  It  seems  to  me  that 
with  any  reasonable  etymology,  Geleontes  must  denote  hus- 
bandmen. Hammarstrand  affirms  that  Zeus  Gcleon , the 
Eponym  of  this  tribe,  was  the  Pelasgic  Zeus  and  that  the 
tribe  was  therefore  Pelasgic.  This  would  give  rise  to  the 
reputation  of  the  people  as  a priestly  class,  and  would  demon- 
strate their  occupation  to  be  husbandry;  for  such  was  the 
chief  occupation  of  the  Pelasgians,  so  far  as  we  are  acquainted 
with  them.  Even  without  bringing  in  the  notion  of  their 
Pelasgism,  however,  we  obtain  the  same  result;  for  those  who 
prided  themselves  on  the  observance  of  religious  rites  were 
preeminently  the  landed  nobility.  Again,  supposing  them  to 
be  a martial  class,  they  must  still  have  been  husbandmen;  for 
these  were  the  only  class  in  early  Greece  who  composed  the 
heavy-armed.  This  last  argument  applies  equally  well  to  the 
Hopletes.  My  conclusion  is,  then,  that  these  two  tribes  were 
chiefly  agricultural,  and  that  the  difference  between  the  two 
was  one  of  race  or  religion,  — not  of  occupation.1  This  is  the 
only  conclusion  possible  after  laying  aside  the  caste  theory. 
The  Argadeis,  it  is  admitted,  were  laborers.  If  two  tribes  of 
husbandmen  existed  besides,  it  seems  more  likely  that  these 
were  artizans  and  perhaps  tradesmen.  Yet  the  Argadeis 
were  certainly  Eupatrids,  being  eligible  to  the  office  of  Phylo- 
basileus,  to  which  only  the  nobility  had  access.  Their  occu- 
pation will  be  further  considered  in  connection  with  the 
question  as  to  their  locality. 

It  remains  to  consider  the  situation  of  these  phylae.  Since 
the  Geleontes  and  Hopletes  were  not  only  husbandmen,  but 
also,  apparently,  the  most  powerful  of  the  tribes,  they  must 
have  had  their  choice  of  territory.  Accordingly,  they  took  up 


1 This  conclusion  accords  with  Thumser’s  view,  loc.  cit .,  who  makes  TeXtov res 
signify  “ cultivators.” 


THE  FOUR  IONIC  PHYLAE. 


105 


their  abode  in  the  plain.  The  Hopletes  are  sometimes  assigned 
to  Diacria,  the  mountain  land  in  the  north  of  Attica,  following 
the  tradition  of  an  Ionic  migration  from  Thessaly  to  that 
region.  But  this  tradition  arises  merely  from  the  ambition 
of  the  early  Athenians  to  connect  themselves  with  the  general 
scheme  of  Hellenic  migrations  and  settlements.1  It  has,  there- 
fore, no  value  for  our  investigation.  This  is  especially  true, 
since  we  find  another  tradition  equally  good,  pointing  to  Acte 
as  the  abode  of  the  Hopletes , and  to  the  hypothesis  of  a migra- 
tion of  this  tribe  into  Attica  from  the  Peloponnesus  by  sea.2 
It  seems  impossible  that  the  Hopletes,  a warlike  race,  should 
content  themselves  with  the  barren  mountains  and  the  wretched 
livelihood  of  goat-herds,  when  the  Attic  plain  lay  open  to  them. 
Much  rather,  must  we  suppose  that  they  settled  in  the  plain  in 
accordance  with  the  tradition  last  mentioned.  Now,  the  plain 
may  be  divided  into  two  parts,  the  Acte,  or  coast,  and  the 
Mesogaea,  or  interior.  Tradition,  as  has  been  said,  connects 
the  Hopletes  with  Acte.  We  have  seen  how  Cecropia  was 
conquered  by  the  men  of  Helicon  under  Theseus.  It  may  be 
assumed  with  some  reason  that  these  were  Hopletes , who  had 
crossed  the  sea  from  Argolis.  After  establishing  their  power 
at  Athens,  their  next  step  was  to  extend  their  conquests  and 
alliances.  It  is  certainly  impossible  to  say  in  detail  how  the 
synoecism  of  Attica  took  place.  Probably  Phalerus  was  next 
taken,  and  an  alliance  made  on  equal  terms  with  the  Geleontes , 
who  inhabited  the  Mesogaea,  dwelling  in  the  cities,  Aphidna, 
Deceleia  and  Cephisia.3  The  alliance  was  promoted  by  the 
fact  that  no  natural  boundary  separated  the  two  peoples.  The 
Geleontes  took  precedence,  whether  from  superior  power  or 


1 Hammarstrand,  Attikas  Verfassung  zur  Zeit  des  Konigtums,  pp.  794-806. 
Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  295,  believes  that  they  settled  in  the 
Tetrapolis. 

2 Hammarstrand,  op.  cit.,  pp.  795-6.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  absolute 
certainty  as  to  the  location  of  the  tribes  is  at  present  unattainable.  We  must 
content  ourselves  with  the  probable. 

3 Hammarstrand,  op.  cit.,  p.  815. 


106  THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

whether  from  the  great  reverence  in  which  their  deity,  Zeus 
Geleon , was  held.  The  confederation  soon  resulted  in  a perfect 
coalescence  ; and  the  district  occupied,  in  contrast  with  the  rest 
of  Attica  was  called  simply  “The  Plain,”  and  its  inhabitants, 
Pediaeans.  The  Aegicoreis  lived  in  Diacria,  in  the  cities, 
Tetrapolis,  Epacria  and  Cytherus.1  They  were  for  the  most 
part  a pastoral  race  ; yet  there  were  men  of  different  occupa- 
tions among  them,  as  among  the  other  tribes.  The  Argadeis 
dwelt  along  the  coast  in  Paralia.  The  cities  of  this  district, 
according  to  Schomann,  were  Thoricus,  Brauron  and  Sphettus. 
The  people  were  probably  traders  and  artisans.  The  ancients 
appear  to  have  entertained  this  view,  and  their  situation  tends 
to  confirm  it.  In  the  earliest  times,  while  it  was  yet  no  dis- 
grace to  labor,  we  may  suppose  that  the  tribesmen  of  pure 
descent  engaged  personally  in  trade,  manufacturing,  such  as 
then  existed,  and  even  in  fishing.  Afterwards,  these  occupa- 
tions were  carried  on  among  the  Argadeis  by  the  Demiurgi , 
who  were  mainly  clients. 

The  Pediaeans  must  have  waged  a keen  and  almost  uninter- 
rupted warfare  with  the  other  tribes.  A tradition2  of  this 
strife  lingers  perhaps  in  the  story  of  Theseus’  Battle  with  the 
sons  of  Pallas.  Indeed,  the  two  tribes  were  never  strictly  sub- 
jugated ; else  they  would  not  be  found  on  terms  of  equality 
with  the  two  already  united.  They  were  admitted  to  an  alli- 
ance, their  tribal  and  city  autonomy  finally  disappearing  in  the 
process  of  coalescence.  It  was  not  until  the  time  of  Peisis- 
tratus  that  perfect  coalescence  was  brought  about,  the  three 
local  factions  of  Solon’s  time  still  keeping  up  the  internal  strife. 

Eleusis  was  the  only  great  rival  of  Athens.  Wars  between 
the  two  cities  undoubtedly  began  early  ; and  we  know  that  the 
struggle  was  long  and  bitter.  At  one  time,  the  Ionian  warriors 
almost  lost  their  cause,  and  there  was  great  danger  that  Eleusis 
would  conquer  Athens.  Finally,  after  all  the  rest  of  continental 
Attica  had  been  united,  the  Hopletes  triumphed,  and  Eleusis 


1 Ilammarstrand,  op.  cit.,  p.  815. 


2 Id.  p.  810. 


THE  FOUR  IONIC  PIIYLAE. 


107 


was  deprived  of  its  autonomy.  This  happened  shortly  before 
Solon.  Then  came  the  contest  for  Salamis,  in  which  that  great 
statesman  bore  an  important  part,  and  which  was  finally  termi- 
nated in  favor  of  Athens  by  the  able  generalship  of  Peisistratus. 

As  soon  as  Athens  became  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy, 
a migration  of  the  nobility  set  in  from  all  directions  towards 
Athens.  This  brought  great  confusion  into  the  tribal  organiza- 
tion of  the  state.  The  gentes  were  naturally  affected  first  by 
this  disorganization  ; then,  the  phratries,  and  finally,  the  tribes.1 

Gradually  the  boundary  lines  of  tribe  and  phratry  became 
indistinct,  and  would  have  been  completely  obliterated,  had 
they  not  been  preserved  by  the  institution  of  the  trittyes  and 
naucrariae. 

During  the  monarchy,  there  were  no  direct  taxes  in  money, 
but  the  king  was  supported  by  presents  from  his  subjects.2 
These  were  generally  victims  for  sacrifice,  received  and  disposed 
of  by  the  Colacretae  for  the  king’s  use.  While  the  tribes, 
phratries,  and  gentes  remained  local  in  character,  no  other 
territorial  divisions  were  necessary  for  the  levy  of  these  con- 
tributions. But  when  they  began  to  grow  indistinct,  the  trittyes 
and  naucrariae  were  instituted  to  preserve  the  local  divisions  of 
Attica.  As  the  tribal  boundaries  remained  longer  than  the 
others,  it  was  thought  unnecessary  to  make  a local  division 
corresponding  to  the  tribe.  Accordingly  a trittys  was  made  to 
cover  the  district  occupied  by  a phratry,  and  a naucrary  was 

1 Authorities  on  the  Phyle:  Grote,  ch.  X (small  edition),  I.  p.  558  ff. ; Fustel  de 
Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  p.  158  ; Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,2 
pp.  575,  582-3;  Gilbert,  Handbuch  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  pp.  109-10;  Die 
altattische  Komenverfassung ; Hammarstrand,  Attikas  Yerfassung  zur  Zeit  des 
Konigtums ; Schomann,  Animadversiones  de  lonibus ; The  Assemblies  of  the 
Athenians,  p.  323  ff.  ; Athenian  Constitutional  History,  pp.  3-17  ; MUller’s  Hand- 
buch,2 IV.  pp.  1 24-8  ; Philippi,  Beitrage  zu  einer  Geschichte  des  attischen  Biirger- 
rechts,  pp.  233-296;  Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  pp.  105-6;  Wilam- 
owitz-Moellendorff,  Phil.  Untersuch.,  I.  pp.  97-172  ; E.  Kuhn,  Die  Entstehung  der 
Stadte  der  Alten  ; Vischer,  fiber  die  Bildung  von  Staaten  und  Btinden,  Kleine 
Schriften,  I.  p.  308  ff. ; Busolt,  Griechische  Geschichte,  I.  p.  391  ff.  ; Thumser, 
Die  griechischen  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  290  ff. 

2 Fanta,  Der  Staat  in  der  Ilias  und  der  Odyssee,  p.  53.  See^also  p.  20,  n.  5. 


io8 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


probably  identical  with  the  smaller  territory  occupied  by  a 
town.  At  the  head  of  each  naucrary  stood  the  naucrar,1  who 
probably  held  the  office  for  a year,  and  was  a chief  contributor 
of  his  district  to  the  expenses  of  the  state.  The  naucrars 
collected  the  contributions  from  their  respective  districts,  levied 
according  to  an  existing  property  scale,2  into  the  naucraric-fund. 
It  appears  that  the  Colacretae  had  charge  of  this  fund,3  but  the 
receipts  and  expenditures  were  controlled  by  the  naucrars.4 
The  functions  of  the  naucrar  must  have  been  originally  very 
simple  ; but  as  the  state  grew  in  complexity,  the  naucrar’s 
sphere  of  action  widened.  When  it  was  necessary  for  the  state 
to  raise  a small  fleet,  probably  the  maritime  naucraries  offered 
their  private  vessels  temporarily  to  the  public  service.  In  this 
case  the  naucrar  acted  as  trierarch  5 of  the  vessel  furnished  by 
his  district  and  manned  probably  by  its  inhabitants.  The  fleet 
thus  furnished  was  under  the  command  of  the  Polemarch.6  At 
first,  the  naucrar  was  undoubtedly  a Eupatrid,  for  these  alone 
held  office ; but  I suspect  that  even  before  Draco  wealthy 
Plebeians  were  admitted  to  the  office,  since  the  commercial 
interests  of  the  state  were  mostly  in  their  hands.  They  owned 
the  greater  number  of  the  vessels.  They  were  the  class,  then 
who  were  required  to  perform  the  most  onerous  duties.  But 
duties  generate  rights.  Hence,  it  was  in  the  naucrary  that  the 
battle  was  fought  between  Eupatrids  and  Plebeians.  Not  merely 
on  the  coast,  but  everywhere,  did  the  burden  fall  on  all  ranks 
alike,  according  to  their  means.  It  would  not  be  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  the  Plebeians  were  exempt  from  contributions  to 
the  support  of  the  government  ; and  it  was  only  through  the 
naucrary  that  such  contributions  were  made.  Before  the  mon- 
archy began  to  decline,  the  board  of  naucrars,  if  then  in 


1 Pollux,  VIII.  108,  shows  that  there  was  but  one  naucrar  to  each  naucrary. 

2 Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  pp.  135-6. 

8 Schol.  on  Aristoph.  Birds,  1541. 

4 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  8. 

6 Bekker,  Anec.,  p.  283,  20. 

6 Bekker,  loc.  cit. 


THE  FOUR  IONIC  PHYLAE. 


IO9 


existence,  must  have  been  subordinate  to  the  king.  When  the 
kingship  was  succeeded  by  the  archonship,  the  Polemarch  took 
the  place  of  the  king  and  commanded  the  naucrars  in  their 
capacity  as  military  leaders,1  while  in  all  other  matters  they 
were  probably  subordinate  to  the  Archon  and  the  Areopagus. 

Besides  the  duties  above  mentioned,  the  naucrar  must  have 
acquired  some  judicial  functions  in  his  own  district,  especially 
in  cases  lying  within  the  sphere  of  his  official  activity.  As 
Cleisthenes  made  the  demes  to  take  the  place  of  the  naucraries, 
and  the  demarchs  of  the  naucrars,  their  functions  must  have 
been  similar.  It  is  also  stated  that  each  naucrary  furnished 
two  horsemen  for  the  army,2  and  this  statement  is  now  accepted 
by  most  authorities.3  Homer  represents  the  army  as  organized 
according  to  phylae  and  phratriae.  The  Athenians,  accord- 
ingly, were  arranged  in  four  divisions  corresponding  to  tribes, 
each  under  its  leader.4  The  cavalry  was  doubtless  arranged  in 
the  same  way,  just  as  it  was  after  Cleisthenes.  It  now  appears 
that  the  naucrariae  took  the  place  of  the  phylae  and  phratriae 
as  the  basis  of  the  military  organization.  Contingents  from 
these  were  probably  led  by  the  Prytanes  under  the  command  of 
the  Polemarch.5 


1 Busolt,  Griech.  Geschichte,  I.  p.  502,  n.  1. 

2 Pollux,  VIII.  108. 

3 Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  135,  accepts  the  statement,  but  Landwehr,  Philol.,  Supplb. 
V.  p.  169  ff.  attempts  to  disprove  it. 

4 II.  XIII.  690-1. 

5 The  Prytanes  were  important  officers  at  the  time  of  the  Cylonian  tumult ; 
Hdt.  V.  71.  Authorities  on  the  naucrary  : Grote  ch.  X (small  edition),  I.  p.  559, 
(large  edition),  II.  p.  426  f.  ; Curtius,  History  of  Greece,  I.  p.  330  ; Schomann,  The 
Assemblies  of  the  Athenians,  pp.  n-12;  Athenian  Constitutional  History,  pp. 
12-15;  Gilbert,  Handbuch  d.  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  I.  pp.  134-6,  143,  n.  4; 
Altattische  Komenverfassung,  pp.  245-6;  Muller’s  Handbuch,2  IV.  pp.  134-5; 
Philippi,  Beitrage  zu  einer  Geschichte  des  attischen  Burgerrechts,  p.  xv  (for  refer- 
ences); Landwehr,  Philol.,  Supplb.  V.  pp.  169-192;  Busolt,  Griechische  Geschichte, 
I.  p.  501  ff. ; Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  314  ff.  For  the  various 
conjectures  as  to  the  derivation  of  vavKpapia  see  Grote,  Curtius,  Gilbert,  loc.  cit. 
That  proposed  by  G.  Meyers,  Curt.  Studien,  VII.  p.  175  ff.,  which  connects  the 
naucrary  with  naval  objects,  is  now  generally  accepted.  The  great  objection  to 
this  is  that  Attica  had  no  fleet,  so  far  as  we  know,  before  Solon  and  probably  not 


I IO 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


before  Draco.  See  Landwehr,  loc.  cit.  The  first  syllable  may  be  from  the  root  nau , 
meaning  temple  (m6s,  Meyer,  Griech.  Gram.,  sec.  64).  Professor  B.  I.  Wheeler 
has  suggested  this  to  me  as  a possible  derivation.  We  may  assume,  in  accordance 
with  this  view,  that  the  tributes,  in  the  form  of  gifts,  collected  from  each  of  the 
48  administrative  districts  of  Attica,  were  deposited  for  safe  keeping  in  the  prin- 
cipal shrine  of  the  district,  that  the  collectors  and  keepers  of  these  funds  were 
called,  from  their  connection  with  the  shrine,  vaiJKpapoi,  and  the  districts  whose 
finances  they  administered,  vavicpapLou.  In  like  manner,  the  ra^tfat,  from  their 
position  as  stewards  of  the  temple,  came  in  time  to  be  treasurers  of  the  state 
funds.  The  naucraries  must  have  originated  long  before  640  B.C.,  since  at  this 
time  the  Prytanes  had  acquired  great  influence  in  the  state;  Hdt.  V.  71.  Their 
beginning  may  reasonably  be  placed  within  the  period  of  monarchy.  Cf.  further, 
Keil,  Die  Solonische  Verfassung,  pp.  93-5  and  n.  1 ; Sandys,  Aristotle’s  Constitu- 
tion of  Athens,  p.  32,  n.  on  rpirrijes  . . . vavapaplai. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE  BASILEIA. 

Having  discussed,  in  the  preceding  chapters,  the  genesis  and 
character  of  the  several  members  — religious,  political  and 
local  — of  the  state  as  it  existed  before  Solon,  I now  desire 
to  consider  the  history  of  the  state  as  a whole  from  the  earliest 
times  to  the  fully  developed  Periclean  democracy. 

(a)  Origin  of  the  Basileia. 

There  is  reason  for  believing  that  the  title  Bao-iAeA  was 
applied  even  to  the  village  chief.  Thus,  Cecropia  seems  to 
have  been  a single  kco^  on  the  Acropolis  ; and  yet  its  rulers 
were  called  /WiAeTs.  In  Homer,  any  ruler  or  lord  appears  to 
bear  that  name.  In  the  little  island  of  Ithaca,  for  example, 
there  were  many  /WtAeTs,1  princes,  no  doubt,  of  the  small 
districts  known  as  demes,  or  ko^ku.  Aristotle  tells  us  that  “ in 
the  colonies  of  the  family  (i.  e.  in  villages)  the  kingly  form  of 
government  prevailed  because  they  (the  villagers)  were  of  the 
same  blood.”2  This  accords  with  the  lately  offered  derivation 
of  /WiAeA  which  makes  it  signify  clan-chief.3  That  derivation, 
on  the  contrary,  which  connects  it  with  military  leadership  4 is 
unsatisfactory  in  that  it  disregards  the  fundamental  character  of 
the  basileia.  King  and  warrior  are,  indeed,  contrasted  in  the 


1 Od.  I.  394-395- 

2 Politics,  I.  2.  6 (p.  1252  b,  21). 

3 From  */3acrt-Ao-s,  fiaai - being  cognate  with  Lith.  gimtis  ‘natural  gender’  — 
cf  .gimini  ‘relationship,’  ‘family,’  ‘stock,’  ‘race’ — ; A ves.  jaiti,  ‘family’  ; Wacker- 
nagel  K.  Z.,  XXIV.  p.  297;  Bezzenberger,  Beitrage,  III.  p.  174.  This  brings  us  to 
the  Germ.  Konig ; as  clan-head,  the  evident  meaning  in  the  Homeric  fiaaiXTje s. 
This  derivation  is  adopted  by  Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte, 
p.  584,  note. 

4 From  f]3a  and  \ev  = \ao  ; G.  Curtius,  Rhein.  Mus.,  IV.  p.  258  f. 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


I  12 

Homeric  Poems.1  The  essential  character  of  the  village  chief 
was  that  of  priest  at  the  village  shrine.  From  the  hearth  of  the 
commonwealth  he  derived  his  authority.2  His  command  in  war 
was  a secondary  function,  which,  however,  on  certain  occasions 
came  into  great  prominence.  Besides  the  priesthood  and  mili- 
tary leadership,  the  village  chief  performed  executive  and 
judicial  duties,  the  latter  including  the  hegemony  (presidency) 
of  the  village  court  in  the 

The  voluntary  combination  of  clans  was  for  military  purposes, 
and  the  person  selected  for  ruler  must  be  distinguished  for  his 
military  ability.  The  bond  which  held  the  clans  together  was 
not  material  interest,  however,  but  community  of  worship.  The 
commonwealth  thus  arising,  erected  its  hearth,  kindled  thereon 
a sacred  fire,  and  consecrated  its  chief  to  the  priesthood  of  the 
new  worship.  Not  till  then  did  he  become  a /WiAev's  with  a 
divine  right  to  rule,  receiving  his  Oe/juo-Tes  from  Zeus.  A mere 
leader  in  war  devoid  of  sacerdotal  authority,  could  not  be  called 
fSacnXevs  in  either  the  Homeric  or  the  later  sense  of  the  term. 
Little  can  be  said  of  the  king  of  the  small  city  or  town,  formed 
by  the  union  of  clans.  It  is  known,  however,  that  his  authority 
was  limited  by  a PovXrj,  consisting,  no  doubt,  of  the  powerful 
clan-chiefs.  If  it  is  true,  as  it  seems  to  be,  that  there  were 
four  villages  to  the  phratry,3  we  may  reasonably  conjecture  that 
the  leading  members  of  the  ftovXrj  were  the  phratric  king 
(phratriarch)  and  four  village  chiefs.  When  Theseus  united  the 
Bouleuteria  of  the  twelve  cities  into  the  common  Boiileuteiium , 
the  number  of  members  of  the  state  council  thus  formed  would 
be  sixty.4 

1 Iliad,  III.  179. 

2 Aristotle,  Politics,  1322  b,  28. 

3 See  p.  94  f. 

4 This  is  Lange’s  view,  adopted  by  Gilbert,  Hdb.  I.  p.  120  and  n.  2.  The 
number  51  could  arise  at  the  time  when  the  full  number  of  archons  was  reached, 
i.  e.  in  682  B.  C.  The  only  difficulty  in  accepting  the  view  is  that  the  number  of 
Areopagites  must  have  begun  soon  after  682  B.  C.  to  vary,  while  before  that  date 
the  combination  9 + 51  = 60  did  not  exist.  An  argument  in  favor  of  the  number  60, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  supplied  by  the  fact  that  Sparta  had  two  tribe-kings  and 


THE  BASILEIA. 


113 

The  tribe-kings  seem  to  have  originated  in  the  period  of 
migrations  and  settlements.* 1  The  constitution  of  the  tribes  at 
this  early  period  is  termed  by  Aristotle  the  original  constitution 
of  Athens.  “First  of  all,”  he  says,  “came  the  original  establish- 
ment by  Ion  and  those  who  assisted  him  in  forming  the  settle- 
ment, when  the  people  were  first  divided  into  four  tribes  and 
the  tribe-kings  were  created.”2  This  harmonizes  with  the 
further  statement  of  the  same  writer  that  “the  first  chiefs  were 
benefactors  of  the  people  in  arts  or  arms  ; they  either  gathered 
them  into  a community,  or  procured  land  for  them  ; and  thus 
they  became  kings  of  voluntary  subjects,  and  their  power  was 
inherited  by  their  descendants.” 3 The  king  increased  his 
dignity  and  power  by  attaching  to  himself,  in  the  earliest  times, 
a band  of  companions  — eratpot  — solemnly  pledged  to  support 
him  in  every  way  and  to  fight  for  his  honor.4  The  kingship 
was  at  first  elective,5  the  people  retaining  the  right  to  depose 
their  chief,  if  he  should  prove  incapable  ; 6 but  in  the  course  of 
time  the  office  became  hereditary  in  the  manner  described  by 
Aristotle,  — - yet  not  exclusively  so,  for  the  heir  could  be  set 


thirty  senators.  Athens  should  have,  if  the  ratio  be  the  same,  sixty  senators  since 
it  had  four  tribe-kings.  Philochorus  identifies  the  Areopagus  with  the  Ephetae  ; 
Muller’s  Frag.  Hist.  Gr.,  I.  p.  394,  frag.  58  ; Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  12. 
Busolt  (Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  p.  143)  has  proposed  a new  explanation  of  the  number 
51,  which  appears  to  me  to  be  far-fetched.  If  Lange’s  view  must  be  rejected 
because  of  new  data  supplied  by  Arist.  Ath.  Pol.,  it  is  more  reasonable  to  assume 
that  the  odd  number  was  chosen  to  prevent  a tie,  and  to  regard  the  number  50  as 
arbitrary. 

1 It  was  as  leader  of  a migrating  tribe  that  the  Aryan  king  attained  to  importance  ; 
Schrader,  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte,  p.  583  ; Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech. 
Staatsalter.,  II.  pp.  265-266. 

2 Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  41. 

3 Politics,  III.  14.  12  (p.  1285b,  6 ff.)  ; also  Thuc.  I.  15  ; Schomann,  Antiquities 
of  Greece,  p.  22. 

4 Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  II.  p.  266,  nn.  2-3. 

5 “ The  appointment  of  a king  is  the  resource  of  the  better  classes  against  the 
people,  and  he  is  elected  by  them  out  of  their  own  number,  because  either  he 
himself  or  his  family  excel  in  virtue  and  virtuous  action  ” ; Aristotle,  Politics,  V. 
10.  3 (p.  1310b,  9 ff.). 

6 Plutarch,  Pyrrhus,  ch.  2 ; Diodorus,  XV.  13. 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


I  14 

aside  and  some  one  else  chosen.1  The  royal  authority  was 
kept,  so  far  as  practicable,  within  one  family,  and  certain 
families  are  spoken  of  as  more  kingly  (/Sao-iAevVcpo?)  than  others.2 
Ordinarily  the  king  held  office  for  life  ; yet  even  here  there  were 
exceptions,  the  mature  son  sometimes  taking  the  place  of  the 
aged  father.3  The  tribe-king  had  sacerdotal  and  judicial,  as 
well  as  political  functions.  When  the  phylae  coalesced  into  the 
state,  the  tribe-kings  lost  their  political  functions,  retaining  their 
priestly  character  and  connection  with  the  court  sitting  near 
the  Prytaneum  in  judgment  upon  animals  and  lifeless  objects 
instrumental  in  homicide.  A confederacy  was  early  founded 
of  the  four  Attic  phylae  and  a king  was  chosen,  probably  from 
among  the  lower  chiefs.  He  had  at  first  but  little  authority. 
It  was  only  in  time  of  common  danger,  or  when  the  whole 
people  were  moved  to  the  undertaking  of  some  common  enter- 
prise that  his  services  were  in  demand.  Gradually,  as  the  con- 
federation coalesced  into  the  state,  his  power  increased.  This 
growth  of  the  royal  authority  was  assisted  by  contact  with  the 
Phoenicians.  From  these  the  Greeks  most  probably  learned 
the  use  of  bronze  and  iron  weapons  and  building  in  stone.4 
By  these  means  the  kings* of  coast-lands  were  enabled  to  fortify 
themselves  strongly  and  to  assert  their  supremacy  over  the 
adjacent  tribes  of  the  interior. 

(b)  His  Right  to  Rule. 

Although  the  king  was  sometimes  elected,  the  people  believed 
that  he  was  ordained  of  God.5  He  traced  his  descent  from  one 
of  the  gods,6  and  the  further  idea  entered  that  he  represented 
in  a peculiar  way  the  common  ancestor  of  the  race.7  His 

1 Telemachus  was  threatened  with  this  ; Od.  I.  386-402. 

2 Od.  I.  394-397- 

3 Examples  are  Achilles  and  Odysseus. 

4 Gilbert,  op.  cit .,  II.  pp.  267-268. 

6 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  127. 

0 11.  XX.  215.  Thus,  kings  are  called  Siorpecpte s or  Sioyevtes ; Schomann, 
Antiq.  of  Greece,  p.  22. 

7 Cox,  Greek  Statesmen,  I.  p.  34. 


THE  BASILEIA. 


1 1 5 

commands  (©efjuares,  “dooms”)  rested  for  their  authority  upon 
direct  inspiration.  These,  it  was  said,  came  from  Zeus,  who 
gave  to  the  king  his  right  to  rule.  They  were  not  laws 
containing  a general  principle,  but  judgments  applying  to 
particular  cases.1  From  them,  in  time,  developed  the  customs 
of  the  state,  which  in  Athens  were  reduced  to  writing  by  the 
Thesmothetae  and  Draco.  Even  in  the  beginning,  they  could 
not  have  been  purely  arbitrary,  but  must  have  accorded  with 
the  tribal,  phratric,  and  gentile  customs  already  existing.  His 
authority  was  limited  first,  by  the  customs  and  privileges  of 
the  gentes,  with  which  he  dared  not  to  interfere  ; and  again,  in 
inter-gentile  relations,  by  the  ftovXrj  of  elders.  It  was  his 
interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  gentes  which  aided  in 
bringing  about  the  abolition  of  the  royal  power.2  Even  within 
this  restricted  sphere  of  activity,  his  authority  was  limited  by 
the  religious  usages  and  beliefs  of  the  age.  Everything  in  the 
commonwealth  must  be  done  according  to  the  will  of  the  gods, 
so  far  as  that  could  be  known.3  The  king  was  bound  by  this 
will  as  much  as  any  one  of  his  dependents. 

In  war  the  king  had  more  authority  than  in  peace.  Only  on 
the  battle-field  did  he  have  power  over  life  and  death.4  He  was 
commander-in-chief  of  the  state  forces,5  and  must  show  himself 
superior  in  personal  valor.  He  undertook  no  important  military 
measures,  however,  without  advising  with  the  Boule  and  gaining 
the  consent  of  the  army.  Thus,  he  is  seen  to  have  had  far  less 
power  than  a modern  general,  who  never  thinks  of  asking  the 
consent  of  the  army  to  any  plan  which  he  has  in  mind.  In 


1 Maine,  Ancient  Law,  pp.  3-5. 

2 Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  p.  321. 

3 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  127. 

4 “ The  king  has  not  the  power  of  life  and  death,  except  when  upon  a campaign 
and  in  the  field ; after  the  manner  of  the  ancients  which  is  described  by 
Homer.  For  Agamemnon  is  patient  when  he  is  attacked  in  the  assembly, 
but  when  the  army  goes  out  to  battle  he  has  the  power  even  of  life  and 
death”;  Aristotle,  Politics,  III.  14.  4 (p.  1285  a,  7 ff.).  Cf.  Iliad,  II.  391  ff.; 
XV.  348  ff. 

5 Buchholz,  Die  homerischen  Realien,  II.  1.  p.  13. 


II 6 THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

peace  he  performed  such  executive  and  judicial 1 functions  as  at 
this  time  belonged  to  the  state,  assisted  by  the  Bonle.  It  is 
wrong  to  suppose  that  the  king  was  absolute  in  either  of  these 
departments.  In  the  Homeric  Age,  king  and  senate  held  the 
Kpdros,  or  sovereignty.2  This  they  had  originally  received  from 
the  people,  though,  in  the  popular  belief,  it  came  from  heaven. 
The  people,  accordingly,  asserted  their  generally  latent  power 
only  on  special  occasions.3  Thus  in  all  important  matters,  the 
king  must  win  the  consent  of  the  Agora.  He  protected,  also, 
the  helpless  and  oppressed4  and,  as  pater  of  the  larger  state 
family  and  priest  at  the  hearth  of  the  commonwealth,  superin- 
tended the  state  religion.5  While,  in  point  of  fact,  the  king 
was  often  unjust  and  oppressive  in  his  dealings,6  the  ideal 
sovereign  cared  like  a father  for  his  people,7  paying  regard  to 
the  common  interests  rather  than  his  own,8  maintaining  justice, 
scattering  plenty  and  happiness  over  the  length  and  breadth  of 
his  country.9  The  king  was  supported  in  part  by  the  produce 
of  land,  some  of  which  was  assigned  by  the  state,  and  which 
was  inherited  by  the  succeeding  king  ; another  portion  of  the 


1 11.  II.  204.  He  was  not  considered  as  legislator,  but  merely  as  guardian  of  the 
themistes  from  Zeus.  It  is  in  this  capacity  that  he  carries  the  scepter  ; Gladstone, 
Homer  and  the  Homeric  Age,  III.  p.  56  ; 11.  I.  234  ; IX.  99  ; Buchholz,  Die  horn. 
Real.,  II.  1.  p.  13.  As  guardian  of  the  laws  he  is  called  8u<a(nr6Xos,  Buchholz,  op. 
cit.,  p.  12.  The  Gerontes , also,  hold  the  scepter  and  are  called  SiicacnroXoi  (II.  XVIII. 
505)  showing  that  they  as  well  as  the  king  exercised  this  guardianship. 

2 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  pp.  130,  136-7. 

3 Iliad,  VII.  406  ff. ; IX.  17  ff. ; Fanta,  Der  Staat  in  der  Uias  und  Odyssee,  p.  89  ff. 

4 Od.  VIII.  32-3  ; XX.  222  f. 

5 Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  pp.  322-3  ; Fanta,  op.  cit.,  pp.  56-7. 

6 Fanta,  op.  cit .,  pp.  58-9. 

7 Od.  II.  47  ; cf.  II.  II.  24-5. 

8 “ Of  forms  of  government  in  which  one  rules,  we  call  that  which  regards  the 
common  interests,  kingship”;  Aristotle,  Politics,  III.  7.  3 (p.  1279a,  33).  The 
perversion  of  this  is  tyranny  ; cf.  III.  13.  25  (p.  1284  b). 

9 “ A blameless  king,  one  that  fears  the  gods  and  reigns  among  many  men  and 
mighty,  maintaining  right,  and  the  black  earth  bears  wheat  and  barley,  and  the 
trees  are  laden  with  fruit,  and  the  sheep  bring  forth  and  fail  not,  and  the  sea  gives 
store  of  fish,  and  all  out  of  his  good  guidance,  and  the  people  prosper  under 
him”  ; Od.  XIX.  109  ff. 


THE  BASILEIA. 


II  7 


land  belonged  to  him  as  an  individual,  and  descended  regularly 
to  his  children.1  Moreover,  he  received  presents  from  his 
subjects  for  judicial  or  other  services,2  and  a great  share  of  the 
plunder  in  war.3  The  government  was  largely  personal,4  and 
was  marked  by  an  absence  of  form.  So,  also,  he  retained  his 
authority  only  by  the  display  of  personal  excellencies,  such  as 
superior  bodily  strength,  skill,  and  activity,  personal  bravery, 
wisdom,  and  eloquence,  all  these  being  marks  of  divine  favor.5 
The  necessity  of  this  last  quality  shows  the  democratic  spirit 
of  the  times.  The  Agora  will  not  give  its  consent  unless  it  has 
been  persuaded  thereto.  Homer  admits  into  his  poems  none 
but  the  ideal  king,  i.  e.,  the  one  who  is  always  successful  in 
influencing  the  people.  This  principle  is  to  be  taken  into 
account  in  estimating  the  value,  as  evidence,  of  Homer’s 
poems.  We  must  also  consider  that  he  was  a court  poet,  and 
represented  the  king,  therefore,  with  a power  which  existed 
only  in  the  aspirations  of  his  royal  hearer.  Perhaps  also, 
oriental  influences  were  at  work,  awakening  in  the  king  aspira- 
tions which  out-soared  the  actualities  of  life.  Yet  apart  from 
these  considerations,  the  reader  of  the  Greek  epic,  in  reliance 
upon  a simple,  unconditioned  interpretation  of  the  poems,  must 
find  in  them  a Senate  and  Agora  existing  as  active  and 
powerful  members  of  the  political  organism. 

(c)  The  Boule . 

The  Homeric  Boule  consisted  of  the  inferior  /WAeis,  from 
whom  the  king  of  the  city  had  been  originally  selected.  Its 
object  was  to  advise  the  king  and  assist  him  in  the  government. 
In  its  political  capacity  the  Boule  was  not,  as  Grote  says,  a 

1 Gladstone,  Horn,  and  the  Horn.  Age,  III.  p.  55  ; Schomann,  Antiquities  of 
Greece,  p.  32  ; Buchholz,  Die  hom.  Real.,  II.  1.  p.  7 ; Od.  XI.  183  ff. ; II.  VII. 
194  f. 

2 II.  IX.  73;  XXIII.  296  f.;  XII.  310-21  ; Od.  I.  392  f.;  VII.  10  f.  ; Grote, 
ch.  XX.  (small  edition)  I.  p.  323,  (large  ed.)  II.  p.  5 ; Gladstone,  op.  cit.,  p.  59. 

3 Fanta,  op.  cit.,  p.  53. 

4 Grote,  ch.  XX.  (small  edition)  p.  323  f. 

5 Id.  ch.  XX.  (small  edition)  I.  p.  324. 


I I 8 THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

purely  consultative  body.1  On  the  contrary,  the  Greek  epic 
tells  us  of  a king  not  only  listening  to  the  advice  of  the 
yepovrcs,  but  even  yielding  to  them  against  his  own  judgment.2 
The  authority  belonged  to  the  gcrontes  by  primitive  right  and 
returned  to  them  with  the  decay  of  royalty.3  The  Bottle , 
therefore,  was  strong  or  weak  in  proportion  to  the  weakness 
or  strength  of  the  king.  Members  of  the  Bottle  were  reputed 
also  of  divine  origin.4 *  They  must  show  the  same  wisdom, 
eloquence,  and  general  personal  merits  as  the  king  himself. 

The  probouleutic  character  of  the  Cleisthenean  Senate  of 
500  goes  back  even  to  this  Bottle.  Ordinarily,  measures  to  be 
submitted  to  the  popular  assembly  were  first  considered  here  ; 
and  the  opinions  of  the  leading  gerontes , adopted  by  the  king 
because  of  their  evident  wisdom,6  generally  prevailed.  The 
same  body  aided  the  king  in  his  administrative  duties.  As 
its  powers  and  functions  were  not  yet  assigned  to  it  by  a 
written  constitution,  and  as  the  government  did  not  yet  proceed 
according  to  clearly  defined  forms,  the  notion  has  arisen  that 
the  Bottle  was  of  far  less  importance  in  these  branches  of 
business  than  a closer  study  shows  it  to  be. 

While  the  Bottle  shared  with  the  king  in  all  the  political 
functions  of  the  state,  it  was  no  less  active  in  the  performance 
of  judicial  duties.  The  state  had  apparently  not  yet  acquired 
the  power  of  enforcing  its  judicial  decisions,  at  least  in  cases 
of  blood-guiltiness.  Acting  merely  as  an  arbitrator  between 
the  parties  concerned,  it  instituted  judicial  proceedings  only 
at  their  request.  Often  the  blood-feud  prevailed,  or  a compo- 
sition for  money  was  accepted  by  the  relatives  of  the  slain. 
Gradually  it  became  customary  to  refer  such  matters  to  the 


1 Grote,  op.  cit .,  ch.  XX.  (small  edition)  I.  p.  325. 

2 Gladstone,  Homer  and  the  Homeric  Age,  III.  p.  94  ff ; Buchholz,  Die  homeri- 
schen  Realien,  II.  1.  p.  17  ff. 

8 Buchholz,  op.  cit.,  II.  1.  p.  17.  The  term  ytpuv  points  to  this,  being  connected, 
no  doubt,  with  the  clan-eldership. 

4 Schomann,  Antiquities  of  Greece,  p.  22. 

8 11.  IX.  74-75- 


THE  BASILEIA. 


I 19 

state  for  arbitration  ; and  finally  the  central  power  acquired 
the  authority  to  enforce  its  decisions.1  The  growth  of  this 
authority  was  aided  by  the  right  of  asylum,  which  arose  in  the 
earliest  times.  There  were  certain  sacred  places  in  which  the 
guilty  party  took  refuge,  and  from  which  he  could  not  be  forced 
away  without  a gross  violation  of  religious  feeling  in  the  com- 
munity. These  places  varied  with  the  nature  of  the  offence. 
It  came  about  in  Attica  that  the  criminal  was  tried  in  or  near 
the  asylum,  prosecuted  by  his  enemies  — the  relatives  of  the 
injured  or  slain  — and  defended  by  his  friends.2  The  judges 
in  such  a case  were  members  of  the  Boule , and  here  they 
probably  first  acquired  power  to  execute  the  penalty.  Here, 
too,  arose  distinctions  as  to  procedure  based  upon  the  nature 
of  the  crime. 

Mitigating  circumstances  in  homicide  were  recognized  by  the 
Aryans.3  It  is  perfectly  natural  that  it  should  be  so,  and  is  in 
accordance  with  the  archaic  religious  idea.  Thus,  the  spirit  of 
the  slain  held  the  willing  murderer  as  an  irreconcilable  foe. 
Hence  intentional  homicide  was  unpardonable.  But  where  the 
homicide  was  accidental,  naturally  the  spirit  of  the  slain  could 
be  satisfied  by  some  compensation  rendered  to  his  relatives  by 
the  perpetrator.  The  distinction  between  intentional  and 
accidental  homicide  seems  to  have  been  known  to  all  the 
Greeks  ; yet  everywhere,  except  at  Athens,  without  effect  on 
the  judicial  system’.  Probably  even  in  Athens,  the  Palladium 
and  Delphinium  did  not  originally  exist,  but  were  developed 
rather  from  this  common  idea,  which  among  the  Athenians  was 
conceived  much  more  sharply  and  concretely  than  elsewhere. 
The  Boule  originated  with  the  confederation  of  the  Ionic 
phylae , while  these  discriminations  as  to  degree  of  blood- 
guiltiness  came  later.  Homer  says  nothing  of  the  internal 
affairs  of  Athens,  and  could  not  be  expected  to  mention  the 
courts,  even  though  they  had  existed  in  his  time.  It  is  now 


1 Maine,  Ancient  Law,  ch.  X.;  Hearn,  Aryan  Household,  chs.  XIX.,  XX. 

2 Kohler,  Hermes,  VI.  p.  102  ff. 

3 Leist,  Altarisches  Jus  Gentium,  pp.  294  ff.,  307  ff. 


120 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


well  established  that  the  Homeric  Boule  was  at  Athens  identical 
with  the  Boule  of  the  Areopagus  and  that  the  latter  exercised 
both  judicial  and  general  administrative  functions.1  Nothing  is 
said  in  Aristotle’s  Politeia  of  the  existence  of  the  Ephetac  in 
early  times  ; yet  this  is  not  strange,  if  indeed,  as  has  been 
assumed,  the  court  of  the  Ephetae  was  practically  identical  with 
the  Areopagus.  As  the  term  gerontes  points  backward  to  the 
time  of  the  isolated  family  or  clan  under  the  rule  of  the  eldest, 
so  the  etymology  of  the  word  Ephetae , as  proposed  by  Lange 
and  approved  by  Gilbert,2  calls  to  mind  a period  in  history 
during  which  cases  of  homicide  were  settled  by  the  kinsmen 
under  their  respective  chiefs.  According  to  Lange  the  word 
signifies  “ Those  in  authority  over  their  kinsmen,  oi  eVt  rots  crais 
oj/res.”  A mere  conjecture  as  to  the  meaning  of  a word  is  an 
unsafe  basis  upon  which  to  build  an  historical  theory.  The 
proposed  derivation  of  this  word,  however,  harmonizes  perfectly 
with  all  the  known  facts  in  the  case.  At  first  the  clan  redressed 
its  own  wrongs.  Afterwards  when  the  state  assumed  the 
arbitration  of  such  cases,  it  set  apart  for  the  purpose  those  who, 
as  chiefs  of  their  gentes,  had  long  been  accustomed  to  this  very 
duty,  which  they  now  continued  to  perform  as ‘members  of  the 
king’s  council.  Thus  the  Ephetae , in  a body,  exercised  judicial v 
authority  as  chiefs  of  their  respective  clans.  There  is  little 
doubt  that  the  court  of  the  Ephetae  existed  before  Draco  ; but 
since  its  organization  and  procedure,  as  known  to  us,  was 
ascribed  to  him  by  the  ancients,3  it  is  thought  best  to  consider 
these  topics  in  connection  with  the  Draconian  legislation.4 


1 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  chs.  3,  8,  57. 

2 Handbuch  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  p.  121,  n.  1.  I may  add  that  the  required 
age  of  the  Ephetae  (above  50)  connects  them  closely  with  the  gerontes  of  the  Bottle. 

3 Decree  of  409-8,  C.I.A.  I.  61. 

4 See  p.  148  ff. 

4 On  the  Homeric  Boule,  see  Gladstone,  Homer  and  the  Homeric  Age,  III.  p. 
94  if.;  Buchholz,  Die  homerischen  Realien,  II.  1.  p.  17  ff.;  Schomann,  Antiquities 
of  Greece,  p.  23  ff.;  Fanta,  Der  Staat  in  der  Ilias  und  der  Odyssee,  p.  70  ff.; 
Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece,  ch.  II;  Grote,  ch.  XX.,  (small  edition)  I.  p.  325  ff., 
(large  ed.)  II.  p.  9. 


THE  BASILEIA. 


12 


(d)  The  Agora. 

The  Agora  was  composed  of  all  the  adult  male  members  of 
the  state.  This  included  the  inferior  ranks,  so  far  at  least  as 
these  were  liable  to  military  service.  It  was  the  privilege  of  all 
to  hear  the  plan  of  king  and  nobles  with  reasons  for  its 
adoption,  and  to  applaud  the  wisdom  of  their  rulers.  So  long 
as  there  was  no  voting,  this  worked  very  well  for  the  nobles. 
It  did  not  immediately  appear  that  the  Agora  thus  wielded  the 
supreme  power  of  the  state.  But  when  the  election  of 
magistrates  was  instituted  and  the  government  began  to  move 
in  sharply  defined  grooves,  the  nobles  for  the  security  of  their 
own  leadership,  did  their  utmost  to  suppress  the  Agora, 
convening  it  only  at  the  rarest  intervals. 

The  Agora  was  summoned  regularly  by  the  king,  but  some- 
times by  a member  of  the  Boule}  Order1 2  was  maintained  by 
heralds.  The  business  of  the  Agora  was  usually  to  listen  to  a 
plan  already  adopted  by  the  Boule , members  of  which  alone 
were  regularly  the  speakers.  Sometimes  inferiors  took  part  in 
the  discussion,  either  of  their  own  accord,3  or  invited  by  one  of 
the  Boule .4  After  discussion,  the  assembly  approved  by  shouts 
of  applause  ; or  showed  its  dislike  to  the  proposition  by  its 
silence.5  The  king  might  persist  in  carrying  out  a rejected 
plan  ; yet  there  was  great  danger  that  such  would  fail,  owing  to 
lack  of  support.6  Usually,  no  doubt,  he  yielded  to  the  popular 
will,  whether  the  latter  was  directed  by  some  noble,7  or  took  its 
own  course.8  A remarkable  feature  of  the  assembly  was  the 
absence  of  the  idea  that  the  majority  rules  ; after  the  decision 
each  party  went  its  own  way.9 

Every  important  business  was  brought  before  the  Agora. 
Even  in  war,  when  secrecy  ought  to  have  been  maintained,  the 
king  feared  to  enter  upon  any  new  plan  without  consulting 

1 II.  I.  54.  5 Fanta,  op  cit.,  p.  92. 

2 II.  II.  96  f.,  280.  6 II.  II.  192  ff.;  XVI.  203  ff.;  XIII.  108  ff. 

3 As  in  the  case  of  Thersites.  7 11.  IX.  17  ff. 

4 II.  I.  68.  8 Od.  IX.  44. 

9 Od.  III.  150;  XXIV.  464. 


122 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


the  people.  So,  the  more  important  judicial  proceedings  took 
place  in  the  Agora.  Here  the  members  of  the  Boule  delivered 
their  opinions  in  order,  and  the  judicial  present  went  to  him 
who  gave  the  most  righteous  judgment.1  The  king  probably 
pronounced  the  decision.  In  case  of  doubt,  appeal  was  made 
to  an  oracle  or  resort  was  had  to  other  means  of  learning  the 
divine  will.2  The  king  could  also  make  this  appeal  whenever 
he  believed  the  people  had  rendered  a “ crooked  ” decision;3 
and  in  such  a case  the  response  of  the  oracle  was  final.  The 
will  of  the  gods  was,  therefore,  the  only  power  above  the 
Kparo<;,  or  sovereignty,  of  the  people  on  the  special  occasions 
when  these  chose  to  exercise  it.4 

(e)  Decline  of  the  Basileia. 

With  the  founding  of  the  city  the  Greek  monarchy  entered 
upon  its  last  stage  of  development.  The  powerful  nobles  of 
the  country  united  the  small  groups  — families  or  gentes  — 
over  which  they  ruled,  into  the  larger,  or  city  unit,  and 
delegated  to  one  of  their  number  some  of  the  authority  which 
they  had  formerly  exercised  each  within  his  petty  sovereignty; 
but  reserved  to  themselves,  a great,  yet  somewhat  ill-defined 
and  fluctuating  power  both  as  individuals  within  their  respective 
spheres,  and  as  a council  for  the  entire  city.5  The  overlord 
( Basileus ) thus  established,  was  only  a chief  among  equals.  In 
order  to  strengthen  his  power  and  to  shake  off  the  control  of  the 
Boule , he  endeavored  to  elevate  the  inferior  ranks  and  to  weaken 


1 II.  XVIII.  501  ff.  The  two  talents  must  not  be  compared  with  the  Attic 
talent.  See  Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  132. 

2 Leist,  op.  cit.,  p.  135. 

3 Leist,  op.  cit .,  p.  134. 

4 On  the  Homeric  Agora : Schomann,  Antiquities  of  Greece,  pp.  25-7  ; Grote, 
ch.  XX.,  (small  edition)  I.  p.  325  ff.,  (large  edition)  II.  p.  9 ff . ; Howard,  Develop- 
ment of  the  King’s  Peace,  p.  10  f. ; Buchholz,  Homerische  Realien,  II.  1.  p.  24  ff.; 
Gladstone,  Homer  and  the  Homeric  Age,  III.  p.  115  ft.;  Fanta,  Der  Staat  in  der 
Ilias  und  Odyssee,  pp.  87-96. 

5 This  is  a type  of  the  voluntary  union  of  clans.  Some  modification  must  be 
admitted  for  other  forms  of  clan  combination. 


THE  BASILEIA. 


123 


the  gentile  organization.1  The  early  history  of  Greece  and 
Rome  may  be  characterized  as  a war  between  state  and  gens. 
The  king  represents  the  former,  the  nobles,  to  a great  extent, 
the  latter.  The  partial  triumph  of  the  king,  with  the  help  of  the 
Phoenician  arts,  fostered  centralization  and  a vigorous  national 
life.  But  the  elements  of  oligarchy  existed  in  the  primitive 
constitution  and  were  held  in  check  only  by  the  personal  ability 
of  the  monarch.  When  it  happened  that  the  latter  was  too 
feeble  to  perform  any  of  the  duties  devolving  upon  him  by 
inheritance,  the  Boule , by  undertaking  their  performance,  gained 
thereby  so  much  ground,  which  it  was  unwilling  to  yield  to  his 
successor.  The  first  immediate  step  toward  the  downfall  of 
royalty  was  taken  when,  in  the  reign  of  certain  kings  who  were 
weak  in  war,  a Polemarch,  or  commander-in-chief,  was  appointed 
by  the  Boule  for  the  conduct  of  military  affairs.2  At  first  the 
Polemarch  seems  to  have  been  appointed  on  occasions  of  need, 
but  in  time  the  office  became  permanent,  and  the  department  of 
war  thus  passed  to  the  control  of  the  Eupatrids.  A further 
weakening  of  the  royal  power  took  place  with  the  appointment 
of  the  Archon,  whose  original  duties  have  not  been  stated,  but 
who  was  undoubtedly  an  administrative  magistrate.  Aristotle 
is  in  doubt  as  to  the  time  when  this  office  was  instituted.  Most 
of  his  authorities  placed  it  in  the  reign  of  Medon,  son  of  Codrus  ; 
some,  in  the  reign  of  Acastus,  successor  to  Medon.  An  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  the  latter  view,  he  finds  in  the  oath  of  the 
archons,  viz.,  “to  rule  the  state  as  in  the  time  of  Acastus.” 
At  any  rate,  the  event  occurred  not  long  after  the  death  of 
Codrus,  and  is  closely  related  to  the  limitation  of  the  royal 


1 Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  pp.  314  ff.,  319  ff. 

2 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  3.  He  mentions  Ion  as  having  been  sent  for  by  the 
Athenians  in  a time  of  necessity.  This  was  in  the  war  between  Erechtheus,  king 
of  Athens,  and  Eumolpus  of  Eleusis.  Ion  was  made  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Athenians,  and  has  actually  been  called  Polemarch  ; Schol.  on  Arist.  Aves,  1527. 
For  other  references  to  Ion  see  Hdt.  VIII.  44  and  Paus.  I.  31.  3 ; VII.  5.  1.  The 
Polemarch  is  described  as  uxnrep  Xoxa roO  paviktm  by  the  Schol.  on  Plato, 
Phaedrus,  235  D ; cf.  Wyse,  Class.  Rev.,  V.  p.  224  ; Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Ath., 
p.  7,  notes. 


124 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


power  connected  by  tradition  with  his  heroic  self-sacrifice.  The 
opinion  that  the  basileia  was  abolished  at  the  death  of  Codrus 
was  clearly  shown  by  Lugebil 1 to  be  false,  even  before  the 
discovery  of  Aristotle’s  Politeia. 

One  would  naturally  infer  from  the  mention  of  Codrus  in 
Plato2  and  Aristotle3  that  his  descendants  continued  to  exercise 
the  royal  authority  and  that  these  authors  knew  nothing  of  its 
abolition  at  this  time.  Other  authorities,  much  later  and  more 
untrustworthy,  introduced  the  false  notion  which  has  crept  into 
nearly  every  modern  treatise  on  Grecian  History.  The  title  of 
Basileus  was  never  abolished  ; but  continued  to  be  borne  by 
the  life-kings,  then  by  the  ten-year  kings,  and  finally  by  one  of 
the  nine  archons.4 

The  usual  story  goes  on  to  say  that  the  life-archon  differed 
from  the  king  in  being  responsible,  — virevOvvoq.5  Now,  Lugebil 
has  attempted  here  also  to  find  a misstatement,  but  without 
success.  In  the  ordinary  use  of  the  term  in  the  developed 
Athenian  state,  responsibility  is  inseparably  connected  with  a 
limited  period  of  office,  and  hence  in  this  sense  a life-king  or 
life-archon  could  not  have  been  responsible.  But  before  the 
institution  of  temporary  functionaries,  the  word,  if  it  existed  at 
all,  must  have  had  a different  application.  We  have  noticed  a 
gradual  subordination  of  the  king  to  the  Boule .6  This  began, 
we  may  safely  say,  long  before  the  close  of  the  so-called  Heroic 
Age,  since  it  has  been  observed  that  the  Boule  of  the  Odyssey 


1 Staatsverfassung  von  Athen,  p.  540  ff.  Much  of  his  reasoning  is  now  unneces- 
sary, and  some  of  it  unsound  in  view  of  the  facts  as  lately  ascertained.  Yet  his 
conclusion  is  just,  and  we  may  feel  thankful  to  him  for  demonstrating  the  possi- 
bility of  arriving  at  important  truths  through  a masterly  employment  of  scanty 
material. 

2 Symp.  XXVII.  p.  208. 

8 Politics,  VIII.  (V.)  10  (p.  1310b,  37). 

4 Cf.  Paus.  I.  3.  1. 

6 Paus.  IV.  5.  10. 

6 Before  the  institution  of  temporary  functionaries,  responsibility  signified 
nothing  more  than  subordination  to  the  Boule  ; cf.  Busolt,  Griech.  Gesch.,  I. 
p.  400  f.  ; Lugebil,  Jahrb.  f.  class.  Philol.,  Supplb.  V.  pp.  539-564  ; Sandys,  Arist. 
Const,  of  Ath.,  p.  6. 


THE  BASILEIA. 


25 


enjoys  more  power  in  comparison  with  the  king,  than  the  Boule 
of  the  Iliad.1  The  statement  of  Aristotle  concerning  the 
appointment  of  the  Polemarch  bears  still  more  directly  upon 
the  question  of  responsibility.  With  the  military  force  at  their 
command,  the  Eupatrids  were  supreme,  — the  king  was  virtually 
under  their  control  and  could  be  called  to  account  for  his  acts 
whenever  the  Boule  should  see  fit.  But  while  the  king  became 
in  reality  responsible  to  the  Boule  long  before  Codrus,  it  was 
not  till  the  death  of  the  latter  and  the  appointment  of  another 
magistrate,  the  Archon,  to  share  the  king’s  remaining  functions, 
that  his  responsibility  became  a recognized  fact.  At  the  death 
of  Codrus,  the  basileia  was  made  elective,  yet  the  choice  was 
restricted  to  the  descendants  of  that  king.  Accordingly,  there 
ruled  twelve  kings  of  the  line  of  Codrus,  holding  office  for  life  ; 
the  first  being  Medon,  son  of  Codrus,  the  rest  being  all  Medon- 
tidae.  A thirteenth  basileus , Alcmaeon,  entered  office  as  a life- 
king.  But  in  752  b.c.  in  the  second  year  of  his  reign,  the  term 
of  office  was  restricted  to  ten  years.2  At  this  point,  the  king 
became  responsible  — vi revOwos — in  the  sense  of  the  term  as 
it  is  employed  by  Attic  writers, — he  was  obliged  at  the  close  of 
his  period  of  office  to  give  to  his  constituents  an  account  of  his 
administration,  and  became  in  this  manner  liable  to  punish- 
ment for  abuse  of  his  prerogatives.  The  government  was  now 
a basileia  only  in  name.  The  king  might  no  longer  pursue  a 
course  of  action  in  opposition  to  the  Boule.  Four  ten-year 
kings  were  chosen  from  the  Medontidae  ; but  the  fourth,  Hippo- 
menes,  being  deposed,  it  is  said,  for  cruelty,  the  office  was  in 
712  thrown  open  to  the  entire  body  of  the  Eupatridae.  This 
was  an  important  step  in  the  direction  of  oligarchy,  especially 
as  it  was  essential  to  the  cutting  down  of  the  term  of  office  to 
one  year,  which  occurred  soon  after.  It  also  gave  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  selection  of  magistrates  devoted  to  the  Bottle , and 


1 Fanta,  Der  Staat  in  der  Ilias  und  Odyssee,  pp.  70  ff.,  81. 

2 Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  p.  116;  Grote,  History  of  Greece,  ch. 
X.;  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Anc.  City,  p.  319  ff. 


126 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


thus  enabled  this  body  to  control  the  state  without  obstruction 
or  opposition  on  the  part  of  Codrid  officials.  For  as  long  as 
the  supreme  magistracy  belonged  exclusively  to  the  Codrids, 
the  oligarchy  was  insecure,  and  liable  to  be  overthrown  by  any 
occupant  of  the  royal  office,  if  gifted  with  more  than  ordinary 
ability,  who  might  bend  his  energies  to  the  restoration  of  the 
ancient  basileia.  The  Eupatrids  were  thus  relieved  from  this 
standing  menace  to  their  supremacy  ; and  the  ground  was  pre- 
pared for  the  final  step  to  the  abolition  of  kingship,  and  the 
establishment  of  oligarchy. 

This  entire  period,  beginning  with  the  decline  of  royalty,  is 
marked  by  a gradual  concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of 
the  Boule.  The  Ecclesia , which,  if  the  lower  ranks  were 
admitted  as  in  the  time  of  Homer,  would  have  supported  the 
king  against  the  Boule , was  seldom,  if  ever,  convened.  No 
popular  elections  were  held  ; but  the  Areopagus  acquired  by 
degrees  absolute  control  of  the  state,  filling  all  offices  by 
appointment,  superintending  the  magistrates  in  the  perform- 
ance of  their  duties,  inflicting  fines  and  other  penalties  at  its 
own  discretion,  regulating  and  supervising  even  the  private 
conduct  of  the  citizens.1  The  king  was  a man  of  its  own 
choice,  the  minister  of  its  policy.  He  still  had  charge  of  the 
“ house- worship  ” of  the  state,  and  watched  over  its  religious 
interests.  He  presided  over  those  courts  which  tried  cases  of 
homicide,  settled  disputes  between  the  clans,  and  superintended 
the  mysteries  and  other  sacred  festivals.  The  Archon  had  for 
his  chief  duty  the  protection  of  property  and  of  orphans, 
heiresses,  and  other  persons  in  need  of  special  guardianship.2 


1 “ The  Boule  of  the  Areopagus  had  as  its  constitutionally  assigned  duty  the 
protection  of  the  laws  ; but  in  point  of  fact  it  administered  the  greater  and  most 
important  part  of  the  government  of  the  state,  and  inflicted  personal  punishments 
and  fines  summarily  upon  all  who  misbehaved  themselves”;  Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol., 
ch.  3. 

2 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  chs.  5 6-7.  The  functions  exercised  by  the  Basileus  and 
Archon  in  Aristotle’s  day  must  have  been  inherited  from  the  times  of  which  we 
are  now  speaking. 


THE  BASILEIA. 


127 


The  Archon  was  at  first  an  inferior  magistrate  ; but  before  • 
Solon  he  had  superseded  the  king  in  authority.  The  Pole- 
march  commanded  the  army  and  probably  had  charge,  under 
the  supervision  of  the  Areopagus,  of  military  affairs  in 
general.  The  finances  of  the  state  were  managed  by  the 
board  of  naucrars,  subordinate  no  doubt,  to  the  Boule  of 
the  Areopagus.1  Thus  four  departments  of  administration 
were  evolved,  viz.,  war,  finance,  religion,  and  the  protectorship 
of  property  and  persons.  The  individuality  of  the  govern- 
mental policy  was  thus  weakened  by  the  introduction  of 
specialized  functions.  No  man  any  longer  held  the  reins  of 
government,  commanding  all  its  resources  ; but  each  within 
his  narrow  sphere  of  activity  found  it  difficult  to  use  the 
privileges  of  office  for  self-aggrandizement,  or  in  defiance  of  the 
authority  which  had  appointed  him.  The  Boule , in  effecting 
these  improvements,  while  unconsciously  laying  the  foundation 
of  a definite  constitution  on  which  the  most  popular  govern- 
ment was  to  be  constructed  which  the  world  has  ever  known, 
was  more  immediately  conforming  to  the  general  oligarchic 
principle,  which  represses  individuality  in  the  magistrate, 
distrusts  genius  and  unusual  talent,  and  tends,  while  trampling 
upon  the  rights  of  inferior  classes,  to  reduce  all  within  the 
narrow  governing  circle  to  the  same  dull  mediocrity.2 


1 See  p.  109. 

2 Great  effort  to  secure  equality,  Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  153  ; 
cf.  Aristotle,  Politics,  V.  1.  3.  This  effort  was  the  more  necessary  because  of  the 
strife  among  the  oligarchs  to  gain  the  upper  hand  ; “ for  the  instant  an  oligarchy 
is  established,  the  promoters  of  it  disclaim  equality,  and  every  body  thinks  he 
ought  to  be  far  above  every  body  else”;  Thucydides,  VIII.  89.  It  is  also  a well 
known  fact  that  oligarchs  were  cruel  and  unscrupulous  ; Thuc.  VIII.  48.  Coupled 
with  their  internal  strife  was  the  danger  of  their  falling  out  with  the  people;  Aristotle, 
Politics,  V.  1.  15  (p.  1301b).  This  danger  comes  from  their  haughty,  oppressive 
treatment  of  the  lower  classes.  “ An  oligarchy  while  giving  the  people  their  full 
share  of  danger,  not  merely  takes  too  much  of  the  good  things,  but  absolutely 
monopolizes  them”;  Thuc.  VI.  39.  W.  Wachsmuth,  Historical  Antiquities  of 
the  Greeks,  I.  p.  359,  is  of  the  opinion  that  while  the  archons,  being  organs  of  the 
Eupatridae,  were  narrowly  limited  in  relation  to  them,  they  possessed  almost 
unrestricted  authority  over  the  lower  classes.  Cox,  Greek  Statesmen,  I.  pp.  33-4, 


128 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


has  summed  up  admirably  the  forces  at  work  in  an  oligarchy.  Busolt,  in  Muller’s 
Hdb.,  2 IV.  pp.  31-3,  traces  briefly  the  transition  from  kingship  to  oligarchy  ; cf. 
Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  II.  p.  271  ff.  For  limitation  of  the  royal 
power  after  Codrus,  see  Paus.  III.  5.  10.  The  ten-year  rulers  were  also  called 
kings ; Paus.  I.  3,  and  the  Parian  Chronicle ; also  Lugebil,  Zur  Gesch.  der 
Staatsverf.  von  Athen,  p.  550  and  n.  15.  The  kingship  was  never  abolished  in 
Athens;  Paus.  I.  3.  1 ; Plato,  Menex.  238  D.  The  date  752  is  conjectural;  for 
literature  bearing  on  this  point,  see  Busolt,  Gr.  Gesch.,  I.  p.  406.  The  period  of 
ten-year  rulers  lasted  seventy  years  ; Paterculus,  I.  8.  3. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


THE  OLIGARCHY  BEFORE  DRACO. 

682-621  B.C. 

In  682  the  chief  magistracies  were  made  annual,  and  a board 
of  six  Thesmothetae  was  added  to  the  three  principal  offices 
already  existing.  Aristotle 1 tells  us  that  the  offices  of  Basileus , 
Polemarch,  and  Archon  were  filled  at  first  for  life  and  after- 
wards for  ten  years;  but  that  the  Thesmothete  was  never  more 
than  an  annual  magistrate,  since  this  office  was  instituted  many 
years  after  the  archonship,  when  the  custom  of  annual  appoint- 
ments had  arisen.2  Their  duties  were  to  record  the  laws 
(Oea/ALa)  publicly3  and  to  preserve  them  for  use  in  the  trial 
of  offenders.  The  Thesmothetae  were  probably  judges  as  well, 
though  this  is  not  stated  by  Aristotle;  and  the  thesmia  were 
merely  rudimentary  laws  derived  from  their  knowledge  of 
unwritten  usage  or  suggested  by  their  actual  experience  in 
the  management  of  cases.4  Thus,  the  germ  of  a written  code 
existed  before  Draco,  — a fact  hitherto  unknown. 

The  Basileus  held  office  in  the  Boucolium,  so-called  in 
Aristotle’s  time,  situated  near  the  Prytaneum;  the  Archon  in 
the  Prytaneum;  the  Polemarch  near  the  Lyceum;5  the  Thes- 


1 Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  3. 

2 That  the  Thesmothetae  came  into  existence  immediately  upon  the  institution 
of  annual  offices  is  not  stated  by  Aristotle,  but  is  well  known  from  other  sources. 
See  Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  116,  with  n.  5. 

3 Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  8,  n.  on  avay  papavres. 

4 It  is  wrong,  however,  to  call  them  “judicial  decisions”  as  Kenyon  (Arist.  on 
the  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  6,  n.)  does.  If  the  custom  of  recording  judicial  decisions 
had  arisen  in  these  early  times,  it  would  have  continued  through  Attic  history. 
But  the  Athenians  never  conceived  this  great  idea,  and  their  code  suffered  much 
in  consequence  ; cf.  also  Holm,  Griech.  Gesch.,  I.  pp.  460-1 ; Sandys,  Arist.  Const, 
of  Ath.,  p.  8,  n.  on  Qe<r  podtrai. 

5 Busolt,  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  p.  132,  n.  7. 


30 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


mothetae  in  the  Thesmotheteum.  Not  till  the  time  of  Solon  did 
they  ever  act  as  a board,  all  meeting  in  the  Thesmotheteum. 
This  is  the  reverse  of  the  theory  formerly  held,  i.e.t  that  the 
functions  of  the  nine  archons  were  not  specialized  before 
Solon.  I suppose  that  the  Prytaneum  was  originally  the  office 
of  the  king,  containing  as  it  did  the  sacred  hearth  of  the 
community,  and  serving,  no  doubt,  as  a place  of  assembly  for 
the  king’s  council,  including  the  four  tribe-kings.  But  when 
the  king  was  deprived  of  his  political  functions,  he  was  crowded 
out  of  the  Prytaneum  by  the  Archon,1  but  might  return  to  its 
precinct  with  his  Phylobasileis  for  the  trial  of  animals  and 
inanimate  objects  instrumental  in  homicide.2 

The  archons  enjoyed  absolute  judicial  competence  within 
their  respective  spheres,  and  their  decisions  were  without 
appeal.  This  does  not  signify  that  they  were  free  from  inter- 
ference on  the  part  of  the  Areopagus  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
latter.  Far  from  it.  It  signifies  simply  that  they  were  not 
mere  clerks,  as  in  later  times,  whose  duty  it  was  to  prepare 
cases  for  presentation  to  the  popular  courts;  but  were  judges 
with  full  competence,  whose  authority  could  be  overruled  by 
the  Areopagus  in  its  capacity  as  a supervisory  council  and  not 
as  a court  of  appeal.  The  functions  of  the  archons  as  exercised 
in  later  times  must  have  developed  from  conditions  already  ex- 
isting before  Solon.  Accordingly,  we  may  safely  assume  that 
their  chief  duties  were  as  follows : 

(is>  The  Basileus  had  charge  of  the  state  religion.  He 
administered  all  of  the  ancestral  sacrifices,  superintended  the 
mysteries,  the  Lenaean  Dionysia , and  the  torch-race.  “ Indict- 
ments for  impiety  come  before  him,  or  any  disputes  between 


1 Cf.  Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  118. 

2 Pseud.  Dem.  LIX.  75  f.  The  Basileus  must  be  one  who  had  married  a 
maiden,  that  she  might  fill  the  office  of  priestess  according  to  hereditary  usage, 
and  perform  the  sacred  rites  in  behalf  of  the  state.  Every  year  on  the  twelfth 
of  Anthesterium  she  went  through  the  ceremony  of  marriage  to  Dionysus  in  the 
Boucolium  according  to  an  ancient  ordinance.  As  queen,  or  priestess,  she  was 
called  Basilinna  or  Basilissa. 


THE  OLIGARCHY  BEFORE  DRACO. 


13 


parties  concerning  priestly  rites;  and  he  also  determines  all 
controversies  concerning  the  privileges  of  the  ancient  clans 
and  the  priests.  All  actions  for  homicide  come  before  him, 
and  he  it  is  who  makes  the  proclamation  requiring  polluted 
persons  to  keep  away  from  forbidden  places.  Whenever  the 
king  hears  a case  he  takes  off  his  crown.  The  king  and  the 
tribe-kings  also  hear  cases  in  which  the  guilt  rests  on  inani- 
mate objects  and  the  lower  animals.”1 

2.  The  Polemarch  was  originally  commander-in-chief  of  the 
&rmy.  He  “ performs  the  sacrifices  to  Artemis  and  to  Eny- 
alius,  and  arranges  the  contest  at  the  funeral  of  those  who 
have  fallen  in  war.”  In  his  judicial  capacity  he  had  charge  of 
all  those  cases  in  which  an  alien  was  concerned.  This  included 
“ cases  in  which  an  alien  is  accused  of  deserting  his  patron 
or  neglecting  to  provide  himself  with  one,  and  also  cases  of 
inheritance  and  the  protection  of  heiresses  where  aliens  are 
concerned;  and  in  fact,  generally,  whatever  the  Archon  does 
for  citizens,  the  Polemarch  does  for  aliens.”  2 

3;  The  Archon  superintended  the  processions  and  contests 
of  the  Dionysia  and  Thargelia , after  these  were  introduced, 
had  charge  of  the  processions  in  honor  of  Asclepius  and 
Zeus  the  Savior,  and  performed  other  religious  duties  of  lesser 
importance.  But  his  most  important  function  was  the  guard- 
ianship of  property  and  of  persons  destitute  of  natural  pro- 
tectors. “As  soon  as  the  Archon  enters  office,  he  begins  by 
issuing  a proclamation  that  whatever  anyone  possessed  before 
he  entered  into  office , that  he  shall  possess  and  hold  until  the 
end  of  his  term!'  The  following  judicial  business  came  under 
his  control:  cases  of  injury  to  parents,  orphans,  widows,  and 
heiresses,  or  their  estates;  cases  of  mental  derangement,  where 
a party  charged  another  with  destroying  his  own  property 


1 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  57.  To  these  functions  we  may  probably  add  for  this 
period  presidency  of  the  court  which  sat  in  the  Prytaneum  and  had  cognizance  of 
cases  of  treason. 

2 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  58. 


132 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


through  unsoundness  of  mind;  the  appointment  of  liquidators, 
where  a party  refused  to  divide  property  in  which  others  had 
a share;  the  decision  between  rival  claims  to  an  heiress ; and 
some  other  business  of  a similar  nature.1 

4.  The  remaining  six  archons,  called  Thesmothetae , were 
probably  also  judges,  though  the  only  function  mentioned  at 
this  early  time  is  that  of  recording  the  laws.  Having  in  their 
hands  the  political  and  legal  documents  of  the  state,  it  came 
about  naturally  that  they  appointed  days  for  trial,  for  political 
gatherings,  etc.2 

The  Areopagus  appointed  to  the  office  of  archon  only  men 
of  both  rank  and  wealth.  .Evidently,  no  re-election  was  per- 
m it  ted,  ....  AtThe  -clo'ge'bT  t HHr Te rm  Trfhc^  o n s m u s t 

render  an  account  to  the  Boiile.  If  approved,  they  became 
life-members  of  the  Areopagus.  Formerly  it  was  thought  that 
this  custom  was  introdueed  4jyI2oIonj  but  it  now  appears  to 
have,  arisen,  as  early  as  the  mstituti©n-~a£Hdie^  jaine  archons. 
Thus  the  Boule  of  the  Areopagus  was  composed  at  this 
time  of  the  ablest  and  most  experienced  statesmen  of  Athens, 
all  of  the  highest  rank  and  wealth,  ' aib-of-  conservative  dis- 
position. Its  functions,  as  stated  by  Aristotle,3  were  now  as 
follows: 

1.  It  supervised  the  execution  of  the  laws. 

,.2.  It  performed  the  greater  and  more  important  part  of  the 
administrative  duties  of  the  state. 

3.  It  had  power,  assigned  to  it  by  the  constitution,  to  fine 
and  punish  all  who  misbehaved  themselves.  This  apparently 
gave  the  Areopagus  unlimited  supervision  over  the  citizens, 
enabling  it  to  take  action  against  immoral  as  well  as  lawless 
conduct.  These  are  all  administrative  functions. 

To  these  we  may  add:  4.  Jurisdiction  in  cases  of  blood- 
guiltiness,  exercised  on  the  Areopagus,  or,  through  the 


1 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  56.  It  is  probable  that  the  Archon  stood  third,  or  at 
least  second,  in  the  list  till  about  the  time  of  Solon. 

2 Id.  ch.  59. 

8 Id.  ch.  3;  cf.  Isocrates,  Areop.,  42,  who  agrees  perfectly  with  Aristotle. 


THE  OLIGARCHY  BEFORE  DRACO. 


33 


Ephetae , in  the  other  courts,  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
offense.1 

What  has  been  said  in  the  preceding  chapter  of  the  abso- 
lute rule  of  the  Areopagus  applies  with  still  greater  force  to 
this  period.  Much  had  been  gained  by  the  introduction  of 
annual  magistracies.  No  matter  now  what  the  personal  ability 
of  the  officer  might  be,  or  what  his  desires  and  motives,  he 
was  practically  debarred  from  the  assertion  of  these  and  forced 
into  those  lines  of  policy,  which  the  Boule  had  drawn  for  him, 
by  the  very  shortness  of  his  term  of  office.  Within  so  brief 
a period  he  could  carry  out  no  independent  plan;  nor  could 
he  so  collect  his  resources  and  strengthen  his  position  as  to 
maintain  himself  permanently  in  office  against  the  will  of  his 
constituents.  The  multiplication  of  officials  and  the  institu- 
tion of  annual  magistracies  may  be  explained  superficially  by 
the  greed  of  the  Eupatrids  for  office;  but,  in  my  opinion,  the 
cause  lies  far  deeper  than  this.  The  security  of  an  oligarchy, 
as  has  been  said,  demands  that  all  who  share  in  the  privileges 
of  government  shall  be  peers.  Any  disturbance  of  this  equi- 
librium sets  up  a tendency  in  the  direction  of  monarchy  or 
democracy.  This  is  the  principle  by  which  the  Eupatrids 
were,  more  or  less  consciously,  actuated.2 

This  period  is  especially  barren  of  events.  It  is  not  that 
the  narrative  of  this  epoch  has  been  lost,  but  rather  that  no 
events  occurred  of  such  importance  as  to  call  forth  a singer  of 
epics  or  writer  of  history.  The  government  lost  in  centrali- 
zation by  the  downfall  of  royalty,  and  hence  in  vigor  of  action. 
It  was  unlikely  under  a system  tending  to  mediocrity  and  the 
suppression  of  individual  genius  that  any  important  enterprise 
should  be  undertaken  or  effectually  accomplished  ; and  as  there 


1 Aristotle  does  not  mention  this  function  here,  but  it  certainly  existed  at  this 
time,  as  is  well  known  from  other  sources.  He  discusses  the  Areopagus  here 
only  as  an  administrative  body. 

2 Aristotle,  Politics,  V.  6 (p.  1305  a,  36  ff .),  sets  forth  the  extreme  instability  of 
oligarchies. 


134 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


was  but  little  national  life,  there  could  be  but  little  national 
history.1 

Strife  between  Eupatrids  and  Plebeians  must  have  arisen  in 
the  earliest  times.  The  causes  of  discord  will  be  explained  in 
detail  hereafter.  Nor  was  everything  peaceful  and  harmonious 
within  the  governing  party.  The  Eupatrids  were  split  into 
factions  ; and  in  the  turmoil  and  confusion  which  thus  arose,  it 
was  often  impossible  to  make  out  which  faction  represented 
the  government.  It  was  natural  that  some  ambitious  person 
should  take  advantage  of  this  state  of  things  to  usurp  the  reins 
of  government  and  establish  a despotism.  Unfortunately,  we 
have  no  means  of  determining  Aristotle’s  view  as  to  the 
underlying  causes  of  the  Cylonian  movement.  In  the  absence 
of  Aristotle’s  testimony  which  might  give  us  clearer  light,  I 
cannot  help  believing,  on  a consideration  of  the  attendant 
circumstances,  that  the  movement,  though  necessarily  factional 
to  some  extent,  was,  in  the  main,  of  an  anti-popular  nature. 
Certain  Eupatrids,  seeing  the  gentile  organization  of  the  state 
crumbling  to  pieces  through  internal  decay,  and  assailed  with- 
out by  the  Plebeians,  — rich  and  poor  in  combination,  — and 
hoping  by  temporary  employment  of  the  tyranny,  to  re-establish 
the  oligarchy  on  a firmer  basis,  had  recourse  to  a violent 
reactionary  measure.  This'  they  did  by  favoring  a man  who 
was  known  to  be  an  enemy  of  popular  rights,  and  who  would, 
accordingly,  as  they  supposed,  serve  as  a tool  in  their  hands  for 
putting  down  the  ttA^os  and  re-establishing  the  oligarchy  on  its 
old  foundations.  He  was  Cylon,  an  oligarch  of  the  old  stamp, 
a victor  in  the  Olympic  games,  son-in-law  of  Theagenes,  tyrant 
of  Megara.2  Supported  by  a band  of  companions  and  a force 

1 Authorities  for  this  period  as  heretofore  treated  are  Fustel  de  Coulanges, 
Ancient  City,  pp.  314-335  ; Curtius,  History  of  Greece,  I.  pp.  327-334  ; Thirlwall, 
History  of  Greece,  II.  pp.  2-27  ; Grote,  ch.  X.,  (small  edition)  I.  pp.  556-576  ; 
(large  edition)  II.  pp.  422-459  ; cf.  also  pp.  384-394  ; Schomann,  Antiquities  of 
Greece,  pp.  31 1-327  ; Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  pp.  1 15-123,  and 
II.  pp.  271-280  ; Pauly,  Real-Encyclopaedie  ; and  Smith’s  Dictionary  of  Antiqui- 
ties, s.  v. 

2 Thuc.  I.  126. 


THE  OLIGARCHY  BEFORE  DRACO. 


135 


borrowed  from  Theagenes,  he  seized  the  Acropolis.  But  the 
Alcmaeonidae,  heading  the  people  from  the  country,  besieged 
the  Acropolis  and  starved  the  adherents  of  Cylon  into  sub- 
mission, the  would-be  tyrant  and  his  brother  having  effected 
their  escape.  The  Alcmaeonidae  were  prosecuted  by  Myron, 
probably  an  adherent  of  the  Cylonian  party,  before  a court  of 
300  Composed  wholly  of  oligarchs  ( KptOrjvaL  TpLaKoaCoiv  apuTTtvSrjv 
SlkolIovtujv)  .1  Condemned  for  sacrilege,  the  Alcmaeonidae,  them- 
selves and  their  race,  were  banished  forever,  while  even  the 
bodies  of  their  dead  were  cast  forth  from  the  tomb.  Returning, 
they  were  again  expelled  by  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  continued 
even  after  the  lapse  of  two  centuries  to  persecute  the  family 
chiefly  instrumental  in  suppressing  the  insurrection.  The 
Cylonian  tumult  occurred  in  one  of  the  Olympic  years  between 
640  b.c.  and  the  archonship  of  Aristaechmus,  probably  in  628 
or  624.2  The  trial  of  the  Alcmaeonidae  and  the  purification  of 
the  state  by  Epimenides  of  Crete  probably  occurred  much 
later,  since  Plutarch  connects  these  with  the  reforms  of  Solon. 

That  the  Cylonian  insurrection  was  indeed  an  oligarchic 
reactionary  movement,  is  indicated  by  the  main  circumstances 
of  the  event.  I shall  recapitulate  them  as  follows  : 

1.  Thucydides3  seems  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  Cylon 
belonged  to  a family  distinguished  for  its  nobility  and  wealth. 
He  was  not,  as  Peisistratus,  one  of  the  younger  nobility,  who 
were  in  favor  with  the  people ; but  a thorough-going  representa- 
tive of  the  blue-blooded  Eupatridism,  with  its  caste-like  exclu- 
siveness and  haughty  pride  of  birth. 


1 Plut.,  Solon,  12. 

2 Busolt,  Griechische  Geschichte,  (1885)  I.  p.  498,  n.  8 and  p.  505,  placed  the 
date  before  Draco.  He  was  followed  by  J.  H.  Wright,  Proceedings  of  the 
American  Philological  Association,  1888,  p.  xxvi.;  cf.  F.  D.  Allen,  The  Nation, 
March  5,  1891,  p.  197.  Busolt’s  remarkable  conjecture  is  now  confirmed  by  Arist., 
Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  1 ; cf.  Sandys’  notes  on  this  chapter. 

3 I.  126,  KtfXwi'  . . . tCov  Trd\at  eir/ev^s  re  Kal  5umr6s.  It  must  be  admitted,  how- 
ever, that  7rd\ai  may  refer  to  the  time  of  Kylon’s  life  and  not  to  the  age  of  his 
family.  Busolt,  Griech.  Gesch.,  I.  p.  504,  places  his  family  next  in  importance  after 
the  Philaidae  and  Alcmaeonidae. 


136  THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

2.  His  procedure  was  exactly  opposite  to  that  of  the  champion 
of  popular  rights.  Herodotus 1 says  that  he  attached  to  him- 
self his  club-mates.  These,  of  course,  were  oligarchs,  sharing 
the  sentiments  of  their  leader.  Peisistratus,  on  the  other  hand, 
obtained,  as  the  first  step  toward  the  tyranny,  a body-guard  of 
common  people. 

3.  Thucydides  says  he  received  a force  from  Theagenes. 
As  the  rank  and  file  of  the  Athenian  army  consisted  largely  of 
the  inferior  classes,  he  could  not  rely  upon  the  support  of  the 
military  force  at  home,  but  must  seek  this  aid  from  abroad. 
Had  the  people  favored  him  or  even  shown  indifference,  it 
would  have  been  unnecessary  to  bring  in  foreign  troops.  The 
Athenians  were  at  this  time  apathetic  in  relation  to  their 
political  interests,  — as  the  sedition  law  of  Solon  shows  — and 
unless  he  was  actually  known  to  be  opposed  to  their  interests, 
he  could  have  counted  on  their  neutrality.2 

4.  He  was  opposed  by  the  Alcmaeonidae  who  were  cham- 
pions of  the  people  through  all  Athenian  history. 

5.  The  people  came  from  the  country  to  suppress  the  insur- 
rection. This  fact  alone  seems  to  prove  that  the  movement 
was  anti-popular.  We  can  hardly  think  that  the  8^/xos  so 
oppressed,  would  rally  for  the  protection  of  their  masters,  and 
we  are  dealing  here  with  a strife,  not  so  much  between  the 
government  and  a body  of  insurgents,  as  between  two  political 
factions.  It  is  wrong  to  suppose  that  the  Alcmaeonidae  called 
out  the  Srjfjios  merely  as  representatives  of  the  government. 

6.  The  prosecutors  of  the  Alcmaeonidae  must  have  been 
Eupatrids,  for  these  alone  knew  the  sacred  law ; 3 and  that  the 

1 V.  71.  Busolt,  op.  cit .,  p.  505,  n.  2,  is  far  from  satisfactory. 

2 Thumser,  Griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  345,  assumes  without  a grain  of 
evidence  that  Cylon  was  at  first  supported  by  the  common  people,  who,  however, 
turned  against  him  when  they  discovered  his  real  design.  All  the  evidence  points 
to  the  view  of  Landwehr,  which  I have  followed. 

8 Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  Thesmothetae  were  appointed  to  record  the 
laws  even  before  Draco,  it  is  most  improbable  that  the  sacred  law  was  at  this 
early  time  open  to  the  Plebeians.  Plutarch,  Solon,  12,  states  that  it  was  the 
faction  of  Cylon  which,  growing  strong,  quarreled  continually  with  the  Alcmae- 
onidae, thus  confirming  the  view  that  the  Cylonian  movement  was  oligarchic. 


THE  OLIGARCHY  BEFORE  DRACO. 


37 


court  was  composed  of  men  of  the  highest  rank  has  been 
expressly  stated.  And  further,  the  prosecution  was  supported 
by  Sparta,  who  would  not  lend  aid  to  a mere  factional  chief ; 
but  who  would  gladly  uphold  the  oligarchs  in  any  attempt, 
however  violent,  to  strengthen  their  decaying  authority. 

7.  I am  aware  that  all  these  arguments  together  do  not 
demonstrate  the  view  proposed.  But  they  do  show  it  to  be 
possible  or  even  likely.  Why  should  not  the  oligarchs  place 
their  hopes  in  Cylon,  as  afterwards  they  placed  their  hopes  in 
Solon  ? In  the  latter  case  we  are  not  left  to  reason  from  circum- 
stances ; but  he  tells  us  in  his  own  words  that  his  friends 
advised  him  to  set  up  a tyranny,  and  Aristotle  states  that  the 
Eupatrids  expected  Solon  to  re-establish  them  in  their  ancient 
authority.  This  much,  therefore,  is  undisputed,  that  the  Eupa- 
trids did,  in  the  case  of  Solon,  attempt  to  effect  an  oligarchic 
reaction  through  the  tyranny.  It  may  be  also  that  the  same 
thing  was  attempted  through  Damasias.  Probably,  then,  this 
tendency  began  earlier,  manifesting  itself  in  the  Cylonian  move- 
ment, and  continuing  until  the  democracy  was  firmly  estab- 
lished. Not  every  tyranny  is  a popular  tyranny ; and  in  the 
political  harangues  which  preceded  an  ostracophory,  oligarch 
and  tyrant  were  not  discriminated.  It  is  much  more  reasonable 
to  suppose  that  the  attempt  of  Cylon  belonged  to  a general 
movement  than  to  regard  it  as  a mere  accident  out  of  all 
connection  with  the  tendencies  of  the  age. 

This  is  the  last  recorded  event  in  the  history  of  the  absolute 
oligarchy  at  Athens.  The  causes  of  its  overthrow  will  be  set 
forth  in  the  succeeding  chapter.1 


1 On  the  Cylonian  conspiracy  : Hdt.  V.  71  ; Thuc.  I.  126;  Plut.,  Solon,  12; 
Plass,  Die  Tyrannis,  I.  pp.  177-184;  Grote,  Hist,  of  Greece,  ch.  X.  (latter  part)  ; 
Curtius,  History  of  Greece,  I.  pp.  334-8  ; Cox,  Greek  Statesmen,  I.  p.  13  ; Oman, 
History  of  Greece,  p.  104;  Landwehr,  Philol.,  Supplb.  V.  pp.  157-8;  Busolt, 
Griech.  Geschichte,  I.  p.  504  ff.;  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  pp.  135-6  ; Thumser,  Griech. 

Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  344  ff. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


THE  DRACONIAN  TIMOCRACY. 

Aristotle  now  mentions  the  strife  between  nobles  and  com- 
mons, which  he  says  continued  a long  time.1  His  history 
reveals  to  us  the  condition  of  the  peasantry,  heretofore  but 
imperfectly  known.  “ The  government  was  in  general  an  oli- 
garchy, and  especially  in  this  fact,  that  the  poor  were  slaves 
to  the  rich,  themselves,  their  wives  and  children,  and  were 
called  clients  — 7reAaTai  — and  tKrrjixopoi , since  they  tilled  the 
fields  of  the  wealthy  for  that  amount  of  rent.2  All  the  land 


1 Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  2. 

2 This  reading  is  supported  by  three  strong  arguments,  (i)  Clientage  existed 
also  among  the  Hindoos,  where  the  Shannivartani  paid  one-sixth  of  the  produce 
to  the  owner  of  the  land  thus  worked.  The  number  one-sixth  could  hardly  have 
arisen  by  chance  among  both  Greeks  and  Hindoos.  It  appears  likely,  therefore, 
that  the  number  was  Aryan,  and  that  Shannivartarii  and  Hectemori  were  equivalent 
terms.  This  argument  is  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  the  Shannivartani  worked 
with  a pair  of  steers  borrowed  from  the  master  and  were  thus  distinguished  from 
a higher  class  who  had  a pair  of  steers  of  their  own,  just  as  the  Hectemori  were 
distinguished  from  the  Zeugitae.  Thus  there  is  a close  connection  between  the 
so-called  Solonian  property  classes  and  the  Hindoo  classes  based  on  occupation, 
showing  that  the  two  sets  of  classes  have,  in  part  at  least,  a common  origin.  See 
p.  86  f.  (2)  Plutarch,  Solon,  13,  says  that  the  Hectemori  paid  one-sixth  of  the 
produce.  Some  attempt  to  amend  this  passage  ; yet  these  may  be  answered 
in  the  words  of  Professor  B.  L.  Gildersleeve,  “An  ounce  of  MS.  is  worth  more 
than  a hundred-weight  of  conjectures”:  (3)  The  word  just  below  signifies 
“ rent .”  This  is,  therefore,  the  meaning  of  the  word  in  the  sentence  before  us, 
since  it  is  altogether  improbable  that  the  same  word  should  have  opposite 
meanings  in  the  same  paragraph  without  notice  being  given.  This  chapter  from 
Aristotle  was  probably  Plutarch’s  only  source  of  information,  and  his  interpreta- 
tion is  intelligent  and  accurate.  On  the  other  hand,  Photius,  who  confessedly 
relies  upon  Aristotle,  has  misinterpreted  the  passage,  declaring  that  the  Pelatae 
and  Hectemori  are  “those  who  served  for  hire”  and  again  that  “they  tilled  the 
land  for  a sixth  part  of  the  produce.”  Pollux,  III.  82,  adheres  to  the  same  view. 
Victor  Thumser  has  followed  these  late  authorities  in  his  statement  that  “ the 


THE  DRACONIAN  TIMOCRACY. 


139 


was  in  the  hands  of  a few,  and  if  ever  the  tenants  failed  to  pay 
the  rents  due  they  could  be  sold,  both  themselves' and  children.” 
And  Plutarch  says,  “ The  disparity  of  fortune  between  the  rich 
and  the  poor  had  reached  its  height  at  that  time,* 1  so  that  the 
city  seemed  to  be  in  a truly  dangerous  condition,  and  no  other 
means  for  freeing  it  from  disturbances  and  settling  it,  seemed 
possible  but  a despotic  power.  All  the  people  were  indebted 
to  the  rich;  and  either  they  tilled  the  land  for  their  creditors, 
paying  them  a sixth  part  of  the  increase,  and  were,  therefore, 
called  Hectemori  and  Thetes , or  else  they  engaged  their  body 
for  the  debt,  and  might  be  seized,  and  either  sent  into  slavery 
at  home  or  sold  to  strangers  ; some  (for  no  law  forbade  it) 
were  forced  to  sell  their  children,  or  fly  the  country  to  avoid 
the  cruelty  of  their  creditors.”  2 3 J^rom  a comparison  of  the 
two  passages  it  appears  that  there  were„.iwa  degrees  .of  serf- 
dom before  actual  slavery  was  reached  : firsts  that.  aLthp  tena n t 


.produce  _Y£arJy^^nd~on.iaying^  a certain 


1 iberty^.^4rmhabiy_^  To the estate  of  his 

patroiLiiL-^^^J±^  who  harLmort gaged  their  own 

bodies  or  those_.of tkdr^Ymes  and  children  to  their  creditors 


Hectemori  were  not  renters  but  laborers  for  hire  ” ; Zeitschrift  fiir  die 
osterreichischen  Gymnasien,  1892,  p.  506.  Now  that  we  are  able  to  trace  all 
these  statements  to  their  common  source,  we  may  safely  venture  an  independent 
interpretation  of  our  original  authority,  with  greater  satisfaction,  however,  in 
that  our  interpretation  is  supported  by  Plutarch.  An  argument  in  favor  of  the 
opposite  view  is  that  a man  who  pays  but  a sixth  part  of  the  produce  as  rent 
cannot  be  in  desperate  circumstances.  With  so  many  conditions  unknown,  itj 
is  extremely  hazardous  to  emend  texts  and  introduce  violent  readings  on  the 
basis  of  such  an  argument.  Poste  and  Sandys  (Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  5) 
have  translated  the  passage  correctly.  For  the  opposite  view,  see  translations 
of  ch.  II.  by  Kenyon,  Arist.  on  the  Ath.  Const.;  Kaibel  und  Kiessling,  Arist. 
Staatwesen  d.  Athener  ; Erdmann,  Der  Athenerstaat ; see  also  Busolt,  Muller’s 
Hdb.,  2 IV.  p.  136,  and  Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  pp.  335-6. 
Cf.,  however,  Gomperz,  Die  Schrift  vom  Staatwesen  der  Athener,  pp.  45-8. 

1 Just  before  Solon’s  Archonship. 

2 Plutarch,  Solon,  13. 

3 This  appears  from  Aristotle’s  statement  that  “ themselves  and  children  and 
wives  were  in  slavery  to  the  rich,”  and  Plutarch’s  statement  that  “all  the  people 
were  indebted  to  the  rich.” 


140 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


This  condition  was  reached  when  they  failed  to  pay  the  quota 
due.  Arrears  of  rent  were  charged  as  debt  against  the  delin- 
quent; his  person,  and  the  persons  of  his  family  were  taken  as 
security  and  were  liable  to  seizure  on  failure  of  redemption.1 2 
Many,  however,  must  have  borrowed  money,  for  the  redemp- 
tion of  their  persons,  from  the  capitalists  among  the  Demiurgi ? 
This  did  not  alter  their  condition,  but  merely  exchanged  an 
old  master  for  a new,  and  possibly  deferred  the  day  of  actual 
slavery. 

This  difficult  subject  is  further  complicated  by  the  question 
as  to  the  real  meaning  of  the  opoi  mentioned  in  Solon’s  poems.3 
These  were  found  standing  in  many  places  holding  the  “ black 
earth  ” in  slavery.  Solon  removed  them,  setting  the  land  free. 
Cox  has  maintained  that  the  opoi  were  boundary  stones  sacred 
to  the  gods  of  the  Eupatrids,  and  binding  to  their  authority  and 
ownership  the  lands  thus  marked  out,  together  with  all  moveable 
property  connected  therewith  as  well  as  slaves  and  even  clients. 
By  removing  these  pillars,  Solon  set  both  land  and  people  free. 
This  view  assumes  that  the  clients  became  through  Solon’s 
relief  measures,  proprietors  of  lands  formerly  worked  for  others, 
and  implies  necessarily  a re-distribution  of  property.  But  such 
re-distribution  is  denied  by  Aristotle ; 4 and  the  theory  of  Cox 
becomes  untenable  in  consequence.  The  only  view  remaining 
is  that  they  were  real  mortgage  pillars  and  this,  in  turn,  demon- 
strates the  existence  of  a class  of  peasant  proprietors  distinct 
from  the  clients.  This  class  may  have  contained  the  poorer 
and  less  noble  Eupatrids,  but  was,  in  my  opinion,  composed  for 
the  most  part  of  those  who  had  once  been  clients,  but  had, 
under  the  wise  and  liberal  patronage  of  the  kings,  become  free 
and  acquired  property,  just  as  the  Plebeians  at  Rome.  These 
were  now,  in  a time  of  economic  distress,  relapsing  into  serfdom 


1 The  same  condition  of  things  prevailed  in  early  Rome  ; Ihne,  History  of 
Rome,  I.  p.  109. 

2 This  appears  from  Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  13. 

8 Id.,  ch.  12  ; Bergk,  Anthol.  Lyr.,  Frag.  32  (25).  5. 

4 Aristotle,  op.  cit.}  ch.  11. 


THE  DRACONIAN  TIMOCRACY.  I4I 

similar  to  that  from  which  they  had  emerged.  If  this  view  is 
correct,  the  peasant  proprietors  must  have  formed  a numerous 
class,  since  the  mortgage  pillars  were  found  standing  in  many 
places ; and  the  creditors,  in  this  case,  must  have  been  the 
Demiurgi.  To  sum  up  the  whole  argument,  there  were  two 
classes  of  the  poor  : first,  the  clients  who  had  never  been  free 
owners  of  real  estate  but  who,  as  in  Aryan  times,  worked  the 
lands  of  the  rich,  paying  as  rent  a quota  of  the  produce;  and 
second,  peasant  proprietors,  who  had  once  been  clients  and  were 
now  returning,  through  debt,  to  their  former  condition.  It  need 
not  be  supposed  that  the  capitalists  were  accustomed  to  lend 
money  only  to  the  latter  class.  The  clients  themselves,  to 
escape  immediate  slavery  in  default  of  payment  of  their  quota, 
probably  borrowed  money  of  the  Demiurgi  on  security  of  their 
persons  and  those  of  their  families,  with  which  to  satisfy  the 
claims  of  their  masters.  Such  action  merely  deferred  the  day 
of  actual  servitude,  the  bondage  beginning  legally  at  the  moment 
when  security  was  given.  According  to  Athenian  usage,  the 
holder  of  a mortgage  was  hypothetical  owner  of  the  property 
under  pawn,  and  enjoyed  its  use  till  the  liquidation  of  the  debt.1 
The  free  proprietors,  therefore,  whose  lands  were  now  mort- 
gaged, differed  but  little  from  the  clients,  who  had  never  owned 
land.  They  payed  the  same  quota  of  produce,  and  were  also 
called  Hectemori.  Aristotle  does  not,  therefore,  discriminate 
between  the  two  classes,  it  being  unessential  to  his  purpose. 
It  is  apparent  then  that  the  chief  cause  of  the  trouble  lay  in  the 
nature  of  clientage,  and  that  the  mortgaging  of  free-holds  was 
an  attendant  circumstance.  The  suffering  of  the  peasants  was 
augmented  by  the  rise  of  commerce  and  the  transfer  of  national 
activity  from  husbandry  to  manufacturing  and  mercantile  indus- 
tries. Corn  could  be  imported  more  cheaply  than  it  could  be 
raised.  The  peasant  found  no  market  for  his  produce,  while 
such  necessities  as  he  must  purchase  rose  in  price  to  a height 
altogether  beyond  his  means.  Perhaps  successive  failure  of 


1 Demosthenes,  XXX.  26-29. 


142 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


crops  added  to  his  distress.  The  clients  could  no  longer  pay 
their  quota,  and  the  freeholders  were  tempted  to  mortgage  their 
farms  to  the  capitalists.  The  results  have  been  stated. 

But  economic  distress  was  not  the  only  ground  of  discon- 
tent. Civil  and  political  disability  of  the  inferior  ranks,  insep- 
arably connected  with  the  gentile  system,  provoked  a complaint 
scarcely  less  loud  and  bitter.1 

Aristotle2  says:  “Now  it  was  for  the  multitude  the  hardest 
and  most  bitter  thing  in  the  constitution  that  they  should  be 
in  slavery.  Not  but  that  they  had  other  motives  to  indigna- 
tion, for  they  were  excluded,  so  to  speak,  from  everything.” 
This  “ everything ” signifies  not  merely  political  rights,  but 
social,  religious,  and  civil  privileges  as  well.  The  feeling 
would  not  have  been  so  bitter,  were  they  as  well  governed  as  in 
former  days.  But  the  king,  their  patron,  was  no  more,  and 
the  haughty  Eupatrids,  enthroned  in  office,  and  claiming  an 
exclusive  right  to  legal  and  religious  knowledge,  turned  these 
overwhelming  advantages  to  the  oppression  of  their  inferiors.3 * * * * 8 

1 It  is  a fact  worth  noting  that  although  the  historians  of  Rome  lay  the  whole 
blame  of  internal  strife  upon  debt  and  excessive  military  service,  no  measures  were 
taken  for  the  relief  of  these  evils  ; but  the  entire  work  of  reform  had  for  its  object 
the  social,  civil,  and  political  equalizations  of  the  orders.  We  are  able  now  to 
emphasize  this  fact  in  relation  to  Attic  history,  viz.,  that  debt  was  not  the  only 
burden  of  the  early  Athenian  of  humble  rank. 

2 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  2.  The  Ms.  is  mutilated  here.  Kenyon  supplies 

apX&v  p.er£xeLV  and  renders,  “ that  they  had  no  share  in  the  offices  then  existing 

under  the  constitution.”  This  is  obviously  wrong,  since  the  sentence  in  question 
is  a resumption  of  what  precedes  and  not  an  altogether  new  statement,  and  since 
no  mention  is  made  of  offices  above.  Herwerden  and  Leeuwen  have  supplied 
t6  tt) s 777s  p. 77  Kpareiv,  with  more  reason,  since  it  is  stated  immediately  above  that 
“ all  the  land  was  in  the  hands  of  a few  ” and  the  inference  is  certain  that  the 
oligarchic  constitution  debarred  the  many  from  the  privilege  or  power  of  acquiring 
land.  Yet  it  is  more  probable  that  rb  dov\eve iv,  the  suggestion  of  Kaibel  and 

Wilamowitz-Mollendorff,  is  the  correct  reading,  since  it  is  distinctly  stated  above 
that  the  slavery  of  the  masses  is  one  of  the  conditions  of  an  oligarchic  consti- 

tution. This  reading  is  adopted  by  Keil,  Verfassungsgesch.  Athens,  p.  15,  and 

Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens. 

8 At  Rome  the  condition  of  the  Plebeians  was  improved  by  the  kings,  but 
became  much  worse  under  the  oligarchy ; Mommsen,  History  of  Rome,  I.  pp. 
130-1  ; Ihne,  Early  Rome,  p.  116.  There  is  no  doubt  that  this  is  true  also  for 
Athens. 


THE  DRACONIAN  TIMOCRACY. 


143 


The  Eupatrids  had,  from  the  very  beginning,  considered  it  an 
insult  to  their  gods  that  a stranger  should  know  the  formulae 
of  their  worship.  And  since  in  early  times  no  clear  distinc- 
tion was  made  between  civil  law  and  religious  precepts,  their 
monopoly  naturally  was  made  to  cover  both  fields  of  knowledge. 
The  king  had  based  his  authority  upon  direct  inspiration;  the 
Eupatrids  had  as  safe  a stronghold  in  their  monopoly  of  the 
knowledge  of  law.  It  is  well  known  that  the  rulings  of  the 
courts  were  swayed  by  bribery  and  favoritism.  In  every  way 
the  Eupatrids  were  failing  in  their  duties,  and  in  their  deal- 
ings with  the  7 rXrjOos  were  actuated  by  no  religious  scruples  or 
generous  feelings.  There  was  corruption  in  the  .courts,  grind- 
ing oppression  in  the  executive  offices,  avarice  and  insolence  in 
the  dealings  of  lord  with  client,  dissension  within  the  ranks  of 
the  nobles,  and  the  multitude  threatening  outbreak.  Some- 
thing must  be  done  to  save  the  state. 

In  the  archonship  of  Aristaechmus,1  621  b.  c.,  Draco, 
probably  a Thesmothete,2  drew  up  a code  of  laws.  In  view  of 
the  conflicting  opinions  now  prevalent  as  to  the  nature  of  his 
work,  it  is  deemed  best  to  present  the  testimony  of  Aristotle’s 
Athenian  Politeia , ch.  4,  and  to  use  this  as  the  basis  for  a 
general  consideration  of  the  subject.  “Such  was  in  outline  the 
first  politeia  (7 rpurr]  ttoXctclo)  ; but  not  long  after  this,  in  the 
archonship  of  Aristaechmus,  Draco  drew  up  his  laws  (0eo-/Aou? 
ZOrjKev).  The  arrangement  was  now  (avrrj)  as  follows.  The 
politeia  (fi  Trpurrj)  had  (already)  been  granted  to  those  who 
were  accustomed  to  furnish  their  own  panoply  in  war.  They 
elected  by  vote,  as  provided  by  the  Draconian  Oea-/xo C,  the  nine 
archons  and  treasurers  from  those  possessing  an  estate  worth 
not  less  than  ten  (?)  minae  free  from  encumbrances.  The 
other  inferior  offices  were  filled  from  the  heavy-armed.  The 
generals  and  hipparchs  must  possess  an  estate  free  from  en- 

1 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  4. 

2 Paus.  IX.  36.  8:  ApdKovros  ’Adrjvafois  deo-pboderriaavTos.  Grote,  accordingly,  re- 
garded Draco  as  a Thesmothete.  That  this  is  the  correct  interpretation  seems 
probable,  now  that  the  early  function  of  the  Thesmothete  is  known. 


144 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


cumbrances  worth  not  less  than  a hundred  minae  and  must 
be  fathers  of  children  above  ten  years  of  age,  born  of  a lawful 
marriage.  (All  these  officials  seem  to  have  been  subject  to 
the  euthyna  at  the  expiration  of  their  term  of  service.1)  A 
Boule  of  four  hundred  and  one,  chosen  from  those  enjoying 
the  politeia ,2  was  to  exercise  deliberative  functions.3  These 
and  the  other  (inferior)  offices  were  filled  by  lot  from  the  citi- 
zens above  thirty  years  of  age.  It  was  permitted  to  no  one 
to  hold  office  a second  time  till  all  the  rest  had  served  their 
turn,  — then  the  process  of  casting  lots  from  the  whole  number 
began  anew.4 *  If  a senator  was  absent  from  a session  of  the 
senate  or  assembly,  he  had  to  pay,  if  a Pentacosiomedimnus , a 
fine  of  three  drachmae  ; if  a Hippeus , two,  and  if  a Zeugite,  one 
drachma .6  The  Boule  of  the  Areopagus  was  guardian  of  the 


1 The  text  is  corrupt  here. 

2 It  appears  that  the  members  of  the  Draconian  Boule  were  not  chosen  equally 
from  the  four  tribes,  and  that  Solon,  in  ordaining  that  ioo  senators  should  be 
selected  from  each  tribe  and  thus  bringing  in  the  democratic  loo v,  actually  created 
a new  Boule ; Keil,  Verfassungsgeschichte  Athens,  p.  95.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const, 
of  Athens,  p.  16,  n.  on  (3ov\ei  eiv,  is  wrong  in  supposing  that  the  odd  number 
(401)  is  “mainly  characteristic  of  later  times,”  since  the  9 archons,  the  51  Ephetae 
and  the  Eleven  (oi  'IvSe/ca)  go  back  to  this  time  ; Keil,  op.  cit.,  pp.  96-7. 

3 The  Areopagus  was  at  this  time  a general  administrative  body  without  definite 
functions.  It  could  not,  therefore,  have  exercised  probouleutic  functions.  With 
the  revival  of  the  Ecclesia  came  naturally  the  institution  of  a pre-considering 
Boule , if,  indeed,  this  body  did  not  already  exist,  in  some  form,  before  Draco. 

4 The  idea  that  all  the  qualified  could  in  turn  be  chosen  by  sortition  for  office, 
with  the  possibility  of  a repetition  of  the  process,  must  have  arisen  in  a small  state, 
such  as  Athens  was  in  Draco’s  time  and  earlier.  On  the  other  hand,  it  need  not 
be  assumed  that  any  were  obliged  to  become  candidates.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const, 
of  Athens,  p.  17,  makes,  on  this  point,  a wrong  use  of  Arist.,  Politics,  VI.  (IV.)  14 

(p.  1298  a,  14),  following  Class.  Rev.  V.  p.  168  a.  It  is,  indeed,  characteristic  of 
the  oligarchic  spirit  /j.rj  eav  \lyeiv  iravras  eijijs  n r)d£  j3ov\eveiv  ([Xen.]  Rep.  Ath.,  I.  6), 
where  irdvras  includes  the  whole  population.  In  every  oligarchy,  however,  great 
effort  is  made  to  secure  equality  among  the  oligarchs  themselves  ; cf.  H.  Jackson, 
Class.  Rev.,  V.  p.  107. 

6 The  objection  has  been  made  to  this  statement  that  fines  were  paid  in  cattle, 
not  in  money ; cf.  F.  Cauer,  Aristoteles  als  Historiker,  Deutsche  Zeitschrift  fur 
Geschichtswissenschaft,  (1892),  VIII.  p.  4,  relying  upon  Pollux,  IX.  61.  It  is 
ridiculous  to  suppose,  however,  that  a man  should  be  fined  an  ox  or  even  a sheep 
or  lamb  for  a day’s  absence  from  the  Ecclesia.  Again,  Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  10, 


THE  DRACONIAN  TIMOCRACY. 


145 


laws  and  kept  watch  over  the  magistrates  to  see  that  they  ruled 
according  to  the  laws.  And  it  was  permitted  anyone  who  was 
injured,  to  lay  an  information  before  the  Areopagus,  citing  the 
law  in  violation  of  which  he  felt  that  he  had  been  injured.” 
Such  is  the  Draconian  constitution  as  presented  in  the  fourth 
chapter  of  Aristotle’s  Politeia  of  the  Athenians.  Before  the 
discovery  of  this  treatise  it  was  the  universal  belief  that  Draco 
made  no  change  in  the  existing  constitution.* 1  The  chapter 
before  us  presents  him,  according  to  the  interpretation  of 
Kenyon,2  as  the  author  of  important  political  innovations. 
Others  regard  the  greater  part  of  this  chapter  as  an  interpolation.3 
I desire  to  show  that,  regarding  the  passage  as  genuine, 


speaks  of  the  didrachm  being  in  use  before  Solon.  Fines  due  to  the  public 
treasury,  and,  especially,  small  fines,  were  probably  paid  in  this  currency,  while 
compensation  to  an  individual  for  unintentional  homicide,  and  possibly  heavy 
fines  to  the  treasury,  may  have  been  payable  in  oxen ; cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of 
Athens,  p.  17,  n.  on  e/c\ebroi  ttjv  avvodov ; Busolt,  Philologus,  1891,  p.  399. 

1 “Draco  has  left  laws,  but  he  adapted  them  to  a constitution  which  already 
existed,  and  there  is  no  peculiarity  in  them  which  is  worth  mentioning,  except  the 
greatness  and  severity  of  the  punishments”;  Aristotle,  Politics,  II.  12.  13 
(p.  1274  b,  1 5 ff.).  The  genuineness  of  this  whole  chapter  has  been  called  into 
question  ; yet  we  are  certain  that  Aristotle  considered  Draco’s  laws  very  severe. 
See  Arist.,  Rhet.  II.  23.  29  (p.  1400  b,  21).  On  the  other  hand,  mention  is  made  of 
“ Draco’s  constitution  ” along  with  that  of  Cleisthenes  in  Pseud.  Plato,  Axiochus, 
365  D ; see  Busolt,  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  p.  138  n.  1.  The  author  of  the  Axiochus 
may  have  drawn  his  information  from  Aristotle,  loc.  cit .,  or  from  some  source 
unknown  to  us.  Draco’s  constitution  may  have  been  known  in  outline,  at  least, 
in  41 1,  so  as  to  serve  as  a pattern  for  the  oligarchic  constitution  of  that  year. 
The  latter,  indeed,  resembled  the  constitution  which  is  known  (apart  from  the 
Ath.  Pol.)  to  have  existed  before  Solon  rather  than  that  of  Cleisthenes.  See  Ath. 
Pol.,  ch.  29.  It  is  fair  to  assume  that  the  makers  of  the  constitution  of  41 1 used 
this  outline,  filling  it  in  with  various  details,  and  that  a later  writer  might  be 
betrayed  into  bringing  some  of  these  details  into  his  description  of  the  Draconian 
constitution. 

2 Second  ed.,  Introd.,  pp.  xxiii-xxiv. 

3 E.  g.,  E.  S.  Thompson  in  Classical  Review,  vol.  V.  p.  336.  Headlam  (ibid., 
p.  168)  supposes  that  the  matter  found  here  was  taken  from  the  account  of  the 
Four  Hundred,  ch.  30.  It  may  be  said  with  more  probability  that  the  pre-Solonian 
constitution  served  as  a model  for  the  later  oligarchy.  It  is  absurd  to  call  the 
probouleutic  functions  of  the  senate  of  this  time  “ an  anachronism  ” when  such 
functions  were  exercised  even  by  the  Homeric  Boule  though  in  an  informal 


manner. 


146 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


Draco  did  not  materially  affect  the  existing  constitution.  We 
have  seen  that  in  the  Homeric  Age  the  Agora  was  composed  of 
those  who  were  liable  to  military  service.  The  Athenian 
Ecclesia  was  composed,  accordingly,  not  of  Eupatrids  alone  but 
of  the  Agroeci  and  Demiurgi  also  who  served  in  the  heavy- 
armed. If  this  is  true,  Draco  did  nothing  to  widen  the  range 
of  citizenship.  In  perfect  accord  with  this  view,  it  is  stated 
that  the  “ politeia  had  (already)  been  given  to  those  who 
furnished  a panoply  in  war.”  Again,  the  Boule  of  401, 
mentioned  in  this  chapter,  may  have  existed,  in  some  form, 
before  Draco,  just  as  it  has  been  thought  by  some,  with  good 
reason,  that  a Boule  larger  than  that  of  the  Areopagus  existed 
before  Solon.1  Now,  these  are  the  main  points  affecting  the 
constitution  ; and  if  Draco  made  no  technical  change  in  these 
two  points,  it  may  be  said  with  truth  that  he  “ adapted  his  laws 
to  a constitution  already  existing.”  On  the  other  hand,  no  one 
can  deny  that  he  modified  the  constitution  in  certain  respects. 
Thus,  the  codification  of  the  laws  was  a most  important  step  in 
the  history  of  the  government,  far  more  important,  indeed, 
than  the  institution  of  a new  Boule  like  that  of  the  Four 
Hundred  and  One.  This  is,  accordingly,  mentioned  as  his 
chief  work,  — the  characteristic  feature  of^his  constitution.2 

No  new  light  is  thrown  upon  the  nature  of  his  laws.3  We 
are  left,  in  consequence,  to  rely  upon  the  few  hints  given  by 


1 Philippi  and  Lange  believed  in  the  existence  of  such  a Boule.  This  they 
endeavored  to  identify  with  the  court  of  300,  which  tried  the  Alcmaeonidae. 
This  number  as  well  as  the  number  400  may  have  stood  in  some  approximate 
relation  to  the  number  of  gentes.  Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  p.  123, 
admits  the  possibility  of  this,  but  states  that  we  have  no  evidence. 

2 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  41.  The  writing  of  the  laws  is  here  given  as  the 
distinguishing  feature  of  his  work.  In  ch.  4,  the  phrase  Qeafwv s edrjice v suggests 
an  actual  law-making  activity,  corroborated  by  Aristotle’s  Politics,  II.  12.  13 
(p.  1274  b,  16). 

8 That  Aristotle  was  writing  a history  of  the  constitution  and  did  not  think  it  in 
place  to  discuss  laws  which  had  no  political  import  is  not  an  altogether  satis- 
factory explanation  of  his  silence  here,  since  in  other  parts  of  the  treatise  he 
frequently  introduced  non-constitutional  matter.  We  might  better  take  his  own 
reason,  that  he  saw  nothing  in  them  worthy  of  notice,  except  their  extreme  severity. 


THE  DRACONIAN  TIMOCRACY. 


47 


other  authorities.  The  notion  that  his  laws  were  “ bloody  ” is 
erroneous,  though  they  were  severe  compared  with  the  code  of 
Athens  at  a later  date.  It  is  doubtful  whether  he  introduced 
any  important  changes  in  existing  usages.1  Those  relating  to 
homicide  were  not  contrived  by  an  individual,  but  developed 
gradually  from  the  religious  beliefs  of  the  ancients.  Theft, 
under  his  laws,  was  punishable  by  death,  and  this  is  taken  as 
a proof  of  their  severity;  but  we  know  that  every  offense  was 
not  so  punished.  We  read  of  a number  of  cattle  being  the 
penalty  in  certain  cases,2  and  in  others  it  was  short  exile 
without  confiscation  of  property.  The  influence  of  the  Draco- 
nian code  was  unspeakably  great,  both  for  a clearing  up  of 

1 Many  writers,  as  Grote,  History  of  Greece,  ch.  X (large  edition)  II.  pp.  447-8, 
are  of  the  opinion  that  Draco  had  no  power  of  legislation,  but  merely  reduced  to 
writing  the  existing  customs.  It  is  surprising,  indeed,  that  a view  so  ill-supported 
should  have  met  with  so  great  favor.  In  the  first  place,  there  is  not  the  slightest 
evidence  for  the  theory  in  the  ancient  writers  ; but  all,  on  the  contrary,  who  have 
occasion  to  speak  of  Draco  regard  him  as  responsible  for  the  laws  which  pass 
under  his  name.  Again,  there  is  much  collateral  evidence  against  the  theory. 
First,  the  earliest  Greeks  believed  that  kings  received  their  laws  from  Zeus. 
Accordingly,  in  those  times,  legislative  power  was  not  exercised  by  the  people 
(or  even  consciously  influenced  by  them),  but  was  vested  in  an  individual  enjoying, 
in  his  legislative  capacity,  unlimited  authority.  The  most  noted  legislator  of  this 
class  was  Minos;  Od.  XIX.  178.  Secondly , on  the  borderland  between  myth  and 
history  appear  certain  great  legislators,  each  inspired  and  directed  by  some  deity  ; 
as  Zaleucus,  by  Pallas  Athena,  and  Lycurgus,  by  Apollo.  The  laws  of  these,  being 
divine  declarations,  were  accepted  without  modification  by  the  people.  It  matters 
not  whether  these  cases  are  historical  or  mythical,  they  disclose  the  early  concep- 
tion of  law  and  law-maker,  and  must  have  exercised  a determining  influence  upon 
methods  of  legislation.  Thirdly,  the  gift  of  unlimited  authority  was  bestowed 
upon  Solon  together  with  his  commission  to  draw  up  a new  code  and  constitution. 
Cleisthenes  apparently  enjoyed  the  same  unrestricted  power  of  legislation.  For 
his  most  striking  innovations  he  also  obtained  the  sanction  of  Apollo  ; Arist., 
Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  21.  According  to  the  conception  here  set  forth,  Draco  must  have 
enjoyed  absolute  power  of  legislation,  since  there  is  no  reason  why  he  alone 
should  be  made  an  exception  to  the  rule.  It  seems  far  safer  to  follow  tradition 
in  this  matter.  But  there  is  no  reason  for  believing  that  Draco’s  changes  were 
sweeping  or  even  important.  Religion  must  have  saved  many  of  the  old  customs 
as  it  has  everywhere  done.  Nor  can  deep-seated  institutions  of  a race  be  up- 
rooted by  the  edicts  of  a man,  even  though  he  be  a despot. 

2 Pollux,  IX.  61  ; VIII.  42  ; Pausanias,  IX.  36.  8,  says  that  he  assigned  a severe 
penalty  for  adultery,  though  he  condoned  some  offenses. 


48 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


the  existing  ideas  of  law,  with  a view  to  future  improve- 
ment and  growth,  and  for  preparing  the  people  for  the  task 
of  self-government.  Notwithstanding  its  severity,  it  tended 
in  the  end  to  clemency  by  subjecting  injustice  to  public 
criticism  ; it  deprived  the  Eupatrids  of  one  of  their  most 
sacred  rights  and  strongest  safeguards,  and  kept  the  whole- 
some usages  of  the  early  state  from  degenerating  into  un- 
reasonable and  superstitious  formulism,  such  as  sprang  up 
among  the  Hindoos  from  a perversion  of  the  same  primitive 
institutions.1  On  the  other  hand,  had  the  Eupatrids  yielded 
and  allowed  a mitigation  of  the  laws,  they  might  have  con- 
tinued in  power  much  longer.  The  people  were  far  from 
being  quieted,  as  the  following  chapter  will  show. 

Pollux2  was  of  the  opinion  that  Draco  instituted  the  court 
of  the  Ephetae.  Yet  it  is  more  probable  that  he  merely 
systematized  in  definite  Ota^o i its  organization  and  procedure, 
which  had  been  developing  for  centuries  before  him.  For  a 
long  time  after  the  confederation  of  the  Ionic  tribes,  the  Boule 
sat  in  one  place,  hearing  and  judging  such  cases  as  were 
presented  to  it  for  arbitration.3 * * * * 8  But  when  in  Attica  distinctions 


1 Maine,  Ancient  Law,  p.  n ff. 

2 VIII.  125.  But  this  seems  to  rest  on  a misunderstanding  of  Dem.  XLIII. 

57;  cf.  Philippi,  Areopag  und  Epheten,  p.  203,  and  Busolt,  in  MUller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV. 
p.  142,  n.  9.  Plutarch,  Solon,  19,  says  that  Draco  in  his  laws  speaks  only  of  the 
Ephetae,  never  of  the  Areopagus,  and  this  has  led  some  to  disbelieve  in  the 

existence  of  the  Areopagus  before  Solon.  But  Plutarch,  it  seems,  was  ignorant 
of  Draco’s  legislation  as  a whole.  The  only  Draconian  laws  existing  in  his  time 
were  those  relating  to  homicide,  which  Solon  had  admitted  into  his  code.  Yet 
even  here  it  appears  that  Solon  left  unchanged  only  those  laws  which  relate  to 
involuntary  or  justifiable  homicide,  — those  only  which  fell  within  the  compe- 

tence of  the  Ephetae.  That  Solon  changed  the  law  concerning  premeditated 

homicide  is  maintained  by  Gilbert  (Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  p.  128,  n.  3, 

with  references),  and  Busolt  (Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  p.  143,  n.  6),  and  seems  probable 
for  the  reasons  urged. 

8 That  all  murder  cases  were  tried  in  primitive  times  before  the  Areopagus 
without  regard  to  palliating  circumstances  is  implied  in  the  ancient  myths  con- 
cerning trials  before  that  body.  For  trial  of  Ares  and  Orestes  see  Dem.  XXIII. 
66,  74  ; Aesch.,  Eumenides,  683  ff. ; Paus.  I.  28.  5.  See  also  Paus.  IV.  5.  2,  for  the 
antiquity  of  the  Areopagus  as  a court  with  competence  in  murder  cases.  Com- 


THE  DRACONIAN  TIMOCRACY. 


I49 


as  to  degree  of  guilt  began  to  be  more  definitely  conceived,  a 
separate  court  was  instituted  for  the  consideration  of  cases 
affected  by  palliating  circumstances.  This  court,  consisting  of 
5 1 Ephetae  (who  must  be  above  50  years  of  age  and  must  have 
led  blameless  lives),  selected  from  the  Eupatrids  and  probably 
from  the  Areopagites,  sat  in  judgment  upon  cases  of  homicide 
in  localities  varying  with  the  nature  of  the  offense  : 

1.  At  the  Palladium,  in  cases  of  accidental  homicide,  or 
devising  an  action  which  would  result  in  accidental  homicide. 
Here  also  were  tried  cases  of  killing  a slave  or  a resident  alien 
or  a foreigner.* 1  The  convicted  must  retire  from  the  country, 
without  confiscation  of  property,2  until  he  could  effect  a recon- 
ciliation with  the  kinsmen  or  phrateres  of  the  slain,  originally, 
no  doubt,  by  the  payment  of  a compensation  in  money.  In 
case  the  kinsmen  or  phrateres  refused  reconciliation,  it  is 
thought  that  the  period  of  exile  was  fixed  by  some  law 
unknown  to  us.3 

2.  At  the  Delphinium  were  tried  cases  of  justifiable  homi- 
cide, the  act  itself  being  admitted  but  legal  justification  pleaded, 
“as  when  a man  takes  an  adulterer  in  the  act  or  kills  another 
by  mistake  in  battle,  or  in  an  athletic  contest,”  4 or  in  self- 
defense  against  assault.5  The  convicted  suffered  no  punish- 
ment but  required  purification.6 


pare  this  with  the  Spartan  senate,  which  enjoyed  like  competence ; Arist.,  Poli- 
tics, III.  1 (p.  1275  b,  10);  Philippi,  Areopag  und  Epheten,  p.  208.  The  number 
51  is  well  established ; Decree  of  409/8,  C.  I.  A.  I.  61.  17  ; Dem.  XLIII.  57.  The 
same  passages  show  the  Ephetae  to  be  of  noble  rank  ; also  Poll.  VIII.  125.  For 
the  other  qualifications  see  Philippi,  op.  cit.,  p.  210. 

1 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  57;  Dem.  XXIII.  71-2;  Paus.  I.  28.  8-9.  Cf. 
Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  362-3  ; Busolt  in  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2IV.  p.  273  ; Philippi, 
op.  cit.,  p.  1 18. 

2 Dem.  XXIII.  45  ; Busolt,  loc.  cit.',  Philippi,  op.  cit.,  p.  114. 

3 Philippi,  op.  cit.,  pp.  1 1 5-6 ; Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  362-3. 

4 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  57. 

5 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  309 ; Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  363 ; 
Demosthenes,  XXIII.  50,  confirmed  by  C.  I.  A.  I.  61.  33;  also  Dem.  XXIII.  51 
ff.,  74;  Antiph.  Tetral.  Ill;  Paus.  I.  28.  10;  [Dem.]  XLVII.  7,  40. 

6 Dem.  XX.  1 58  ; Busolt  in  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2IV.  p.  274  ; Leist,  op.  cit.,  p.  340  ; 
O.  Muller,  Eumenides,  pp.  152,  153,  n.  4.  The  statement  of  Demosthenes,  loc.  cit., 


150  THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

3.  In  the  Phreatto  were  tried  cases  of  intentional  homicide, 
or  wounding  committed  while  in  exile  for  unintentional  homicide. 
Being  unclean,  the  accused  dared  not  touch  the  land  but  took 
his  place  in  a boat  hauled  in  against  the  shore,  on  which  latter 
sat  the  judges.  While  no  case  of  the  kind  is  known  to  have 
occurred,* 1  Aristotle  regards  it  as  one  of  the  necessary  courts, 
the  feeling  of  guilt  driving  the  murderer  to  ask  purification  of 
this  character.  If  he  is  found  guilty,  he  suffers  the  punish- 
ment of  wilful  murder  ; if  he  is  acquitted,  he  escapes  that 
penalty,  but  undergoes  the  exile  for  his  former  homicide. 2 
These  were  all  the  courts  in  which  the  5 1 Ephetae  sat.  A fourth 
court  existed  for  the  trial  of  animals  and  lifeless  objects,  held 
near  the  Prytaneum  and  composed  of  the  king  and  four  phylo- 
basileis .3  In  primitive  times,  this  court  was  deemed  as  essen- 
tial and  as  important  as  the  others  ; yet  Aristotle  must  have 
considered  it  useless  since  he  has  made  no  mention  of  it  in 
his  enumeration  of  necessary  courts.4  It  is  quite  probable 
that  in  the  Prytaneum  there  existed  before  Solon  another  court 
for  the  trial,  under  the  presidency  of  the  king,  of  those  accused 
of  designs  against  the  government.  In  the  court  of  the  Are- 
opagus were  still  tried  cases  of  premeditated  homicide,  wound- 
ing with  intent  to  kill,  plotting  against  life,  poisoning  with 
murderous  effect,  and  arson.5  Where  death  was  effected  by 
any  of  these  means,  no  compensation  in  money  was  allowed  to 

that  such  a person  is  pure  ( nadapos ) seems  to  mean  that  no  criminality  attaches  to 
him  on  the  side  of  the  civil  law,  and  that  he  has  a just  claim  to  religious  purifica- 
tion. This  is  the  view  also  of  Thumser,  Griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  363  and 
n.  5. 

1 Alfred  Emerson,  Lectures  (unpublished)  on  Attic  Law.  Aristotle,  Politics, 
IV.  16.  3 (p.  1300b,  29  b)  says  that  “ cases  of  this  sort  rarely  happen  at  all,  even  in 
large  cities.” 

2 Demosthenes,  XXIII.  77  ff . ; Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  57  ; Pollux,  VIII.  120; 
Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  364;  Busolt,  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  p.  274. 

8 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  57;  Demosthenes,  XXIII.  76;  Pollux,  VIII.  120; 
Pausanias,  I.  28.  11;  Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  364;  Busolt,  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV. 
p.  274. 

4 Aristotle,  Politics,  IV.  16.  2-4  (p.  1300b). 

6 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  57;  Dem.  XXIII.  22-4;  Philippi,  Areopag  und 
Epheten,  p.  23  ff.;  Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  p.  31 1. 


THE  DRACONIAN  TIMOCRACY. 


151 

the  convicted,  no  pardon  was  granted.  Death  and  confiscation  of 
property  alone  satisfied  the  spirit  of  the  slain.1  In  case  of  mere 
wounding  with  murderous  intent,  banishment  was  the  penalty.2 

The  Areopagus,  while  performing  the  judicial  duties  above 
enumerated,  remained,  as  before,  a general  administrative  body, 
superintending  the  entire  work  of  government  and  exercising 
guardianship  over  the  newly  written  laws.  Any  person  could 
now  gain  access  to  the  Areopagus  and  claim  its  protection, 
whosoever  felt  himself  injured  in  violation  of  any  law.3  Thus 
were  the  Eupatrids  driven  from  the  stronghold  of  their  power, 
viz.,  a monopoly  of  the  knowledge  of  customs,  and  the  Plebeians 
given  an  independent  standing  in  the  courts  of  law.  The 
judges  were  still  Eupatrids,  however,  and  the  reform,  though 
important,  did  not  de  facto  reach  the  lower  strata  of  society. 

Before  Draco,  the  archons  were  chosen  only  from  those  of 
rank  and  wealth.  Probably  the  property  qualification  was  at 
this  time  indefinite.  The  text  states  that  Draco  fixed  it  at  ten 
minae  (Aeginetan  standard,  which  was  equivalent  to  1380 
drachmae  of  the  Attic-Euboic  standard).  Now,  as  rents  were 
far  higher  in  Draco’s  time  than  even  a generation  later,  and  as 
the  purchasing  value  of  money  was  far  greater,  it  is  safe  to 
assume  that  the  property  requisite  for  filling  the  office  of 
archon  was  about  that  of  a Hippeus .4  Legally  non-Eupatrids 
were  now  eligible,  provided  they  possessed  the  property  quali- 


1 Leist,  op.  cit.,  p.  312  ff. 

2 Authorities  on  the  Areopagus  and  Ephetae : Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  57  ; 
Demosthenes,  XXIII;  Pausanias,  I.  28;  Philippi,  Rhein.  Mus.,  XXIX.  p.  1 ff.; 
Schomann,  Der  Attische  Process,  p.  5 ff.;  Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  120  ff.,  360  ff.; 
Muller’s  Handbuch,  2 IV.  pp.  142-4,  273  ff.;  Hammarstrand,  Attikas  Verfassung 
zur  Zeit  des  Konigtums,  p.  816  ff. 

3 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  4. 

4 The  landed  property  of  the  Zeugite  in  the  time  of  Solon  was  worth,  at  least, 
2,000  drachmas;  Plut.,  Solon,  23;  Headlam,  Class.  Rev.,  V.  p.  167  ; Wyse,  id. 
p.  224.  This  fact  has  been  used  to  prove  the  number  10  to  be  an  error  of  author 
or  copyist,  or  even  to  show  that  the  whole  passage  is  an  interpolation.  Perhaps 
the  amount  should  be  stated  at  100  minae  instead  of  10  ; but  cf.  Busolt,  Muller’s 
Hdb.,  2 IV.  pp.  139-40  and  n.  1.  For  the  generals  under  Draco,  Busolt,  toe.  cit., 
and  Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  351  ff. 


152 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


fication.  But  we  may  be  pretty  certain  that  they  did  not  in 
practice  gain  access  to  the  archonship  till  after  Damasias.  In 
two  things  only  did  the  Draconian  constitution  affect  this  office 
from  the  time ’of  its  adoption:  (i)  in  making  the  property 
qualification  definite,  (2)  in  shifting  the  elective  power  from  the 
Areopagus  to  the  Ecclesia.  His  change  in  the  constitution  did 
not  consist,  as  has  been  said,  in  widening  directly  the  range  of 
citizenship,  for  the  hoplites  had  always  been  citizens  ; but  the 
change  was  far  less  palpable,  and  therefore  escaped  the  notice 
of  the  ancient  historian.  Draco’s  task  was  to  recall  the  Ecclesia 
into  life  and  to  restore  to  it  the  sovereignty  long  wielded  by  the 
Areopagus.  It  is  in  view  of  this  fact  that  we  name  his 
constitution  a timocracy.  The  property  qualification  of  general 
and  hipparch  was  one  hundred  minae , and  these  were 
required  to  have  reached  the  prime  of  life.1  In  ancient  times, 
the  organization  of  the  army  was  based  almost  universally  on 
the  tribes,  and  the  Athenian  military  system  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  no  exception  to  the  rule.  Tribe  leaders  of  the  host  must 
havie  existed  from  Homer,  down.  These  were  originally 
the  Phylobasileis ; but  when  they  had  been  restricted 
to  the  performance  of  sacerdotal  functions,  the  ground  was 
cleared  for  the  institution  of  a new  magistracy,  — that  of 
Strategus , which  now  appears  to  have  existed  as  early  as  the 
time  of  Draco.  If  this  is  true,  the  number  of  Strategi  must 
have  been  four,  as  also  the  number  of  hipparchs.  They  must 
also  have  been  subordinate  to  the  Polemarch,  as  were  the  ten 
generals  from  the  time  of  their  institution  down  to  the  battle 
of  Marathon.  Magistrates  even  at  this  early  date  seem  to  have 
been  subject  to  the  euthyna  at  the  expiration  of  their  term  of 
office.  This  may,  indeed,  have  originated  with  the  institution 


1 The  peculiar  form  which  the  statement  of  the  latter  requisite  assumes  is 
distinctly  antique,  and  tells  strongly,  therefore,  against  the  theory  of  interpola- 
tion; cf.  Deinarch.  Contr.  Dem.  § 71.  The  high  property  qualification  of  the 
generals  seems  to  indicate  that  they  were  chosen  from  the  wealthiest  citizens  to 
act  as  a check  upon  the  Polemarch,  — a measure  deemed  necessary  after  the 
attempt  of  Cylon  to  seize  the  government. 


THE  DRACONIAN  TIMOCRACY. 


153 


of  the  ten-year  magistracies,  since  the  great  objection  to  life- 
tenure  was  the  irresponsibility  of  the  magistrate.  The  terms 
‘in revOwos’  (responsible)  and  ‘ evOw a’  (examination  of  accounts) 
give  us  the  Greek  idea  of  responsibility. 

Before  Draco  there  had  been  a court  of  three  hundred 
nobles,  which  sat  in  judgment  upon  certain  persons  who  had 
incurred  the  charge  of  impiety  in  the  suppression  of  the  Cylo- 
nian  tumult.  No  evidence  exists  that  this  was  a special  court 
instituted  for  the  occasion.  Since  the  Areopagus  could  not 
always  represent  adequately  the  transient  feelings  of  the  whole 
Eupatrid  body,  it  was  natural  that  the  nobles  should  devise 
some  other  mode  of  making  themselves  felt  whenever  occasion 
demanded.  Again,  in  early  Greece,  we  nowhere  find  delibera- 
tive and  judicial  functions  specialized.  Accordingly,  it  is  not 
impossible  that  the  court  of  three  hundred  nobles  possessed 
something  of  the  nature  of  a Boule,  that  it  represented  the 
Eupatrids  more  directly  than  the  Areopagus,  that  it  met  in  cases 
of  special  emergency,  and  contained  within  it  the  germ  of  the 
Draconian  Senate.1  Under  Draco  the  Boule  was  composed  of 
four  hundred  and  one  members,  and  seems  to  have  exercised 
probouleutic  functions,  as  did  the  Boule  of  the  time  of  Homer 
and  of  Pericles.  The  filling  of  this  and  other  offices  by  lot  is 
here  no  sign  of  democracy.  It  merely  determined  the  order  in 
which  the  qualified  were  to  serve,  and  assured  to  all  the  quali- 
fied an  opportunity  to  engage  in  governmental  service.  The 
existence  of  the  P entacosiomedimni,  Hippeis , and  Zeugitae  at 
this  time  is  indicated  by  the  specification  as  to  the  fines  of 
absent  senators.  Three  of  the  terms  found  in  the  so-called 
Solonian  property  classification,  viz.,  Hippeis , Zeugitae , and 
Thetes , undoubtedly  existed  from  the*earliest  times,  and  came 
into  being  as  the  names  of  purely  organic  groups.  Penta- 

1 The  evidence  for  this  is,  indeed,  slight.  I offer  it,  therefore,  as  a possible  solu- 
tion of  an  exceedingly  difficult  question,  and  not  as  well  authenticated  history.  If 
true,  it  is  a remarkable  illustration  of  the  principle  that  institutions  are  not  made 
but  grow.  See  Plut.,  Solon,  12;  Herod.,  V.  72  ; Abbott’s  History  of  Greece,  I, 
p.  306  ; cf.  Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  348. 


154 


TIIE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


cosiomedimnus  alone  wears  an  aspect  of  artificiality,  and  was 
probably  invented  by  some  legislator  before  Solon,  to  desig- 
nate an  arbitrarily  created  rank  or  class.  If  we  are  to  rely 
upon  the  fourth  chapter  of  Aristotle’s  Athenian  Politeia , Draco 
did  not  employ  this  classification  as  a basis  for  the  distribution 
of  political  honors.  Accordingly,  we  may  regard  it  as  serving 
only  financial  purposes  at  this  time.  The  three  lower  classes 
may  not  yet  have  assumed  those  definite  limits  which  we  find 
them  possessing  from  the  time  of  Solon  onward. 

The  Areopagus  suffered,  according  to  the  letter  of  the 
Draconian  legislation,  no  diminution  of  power.  It  was  still 
guardian  of  the  laws  and  supervised  the  magistrates  in  the 
discharge  of  their  official  duties.  The  Ecclesia,  composed 
of  those  able  to  furnish  full  armor,  began  from  this  time  to 
exercise  more  and  more  the  sovereignty.  In  it  the  elections 
were  held,  and  possibly  matters  of  greater  importance  were 
discussed  and  decided.  Yet  it  had,  before  Cleisthenes,  no 
legislative  power,  this  function  belonging  only  to  the  Thes- 
mothetae , and  to  individuals,  as  Draco  and  Solon,  selected 
expressly  for  the  purpose.  Moreover,  it  was  subject  to  the  con- 
trol of  the  Areopagus,  since  the  latter  body  could  inhibit  any 
measure  which  met  its  disapproval.  The  great  point  gained  in 
the  revival  of  the  Ecclesia  was  for  the  time  being  of  little 
apparent  significance.  Potentially,  it  was  the  shifting  of  the 
KpaTos  from  the  Areopagus  to  the  Ecclesia,  from  Eupatridism  to 
property  of  a specified  amount.  No  measures,  however,  were 
taken  for  the  relief  of  the  economic  distress. 

This  was  the  third  stage  in  the  development  of  the  Athenian 
constitution.1  A political  organ  had  been  conceded  to  the  heavy- 
armed in  the  revived  Etclesia,  the  basis  of  political  privilege 
shifting  thus  from  Eupatridism  to  wealth.  Within  this  widened 
governing  circle,  every  care  was  taken  to  provide  for  a perfect 
political  equality  with  respect  to  rank,  while  superior  property 
qualifications  were  essential  to  the  filling  of  higher  magistracies. 


1 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  41. 


THE  DRACONIAN  TIMOCRACY. 


155 


This  latter  restriction  was  no  innovation,  since  formerly  only 
men  of  wealth  were  eligible  to  the  archonship.1  The  chief 
provisions  for  obliterating  distinctions  of  rank  in  the  filling  of 
senatorships  and  inferior  offices,  were  the  introduction  of  the 
lot  and  the  arrangement  by  which  none  could  be  re-appointed 
to  office  till  all  the  rest  of  the  qualified  had  served  their  turn. 
Thus  the  Eupatrids  were  prevented  from  monopolizing  the 
government,  while  pretending  to  give  rights  to  the  inferiors. 
The  object  of  the  new  constitution  is  apparent.  It  was  in  itself 
no  makeshift  to  avoid  a difficulty  for  the  moment,  but  was,  so 
far  as  it  went,  a wise,  substantial  modification  of  the  old  gentile 
system,  and  formed  henceforth  the  basis  of  the  Athenian  con- 
stitution. But  it  was  far  from  striking  at  the  main  root  of  the 
evil.  There  had  been  two  branches  of  the  opposition  party, 
the  very  poor,  with  the  Diacrians  as  a nucleus,  forming  the 
extreme  wing  and  demanding  economic  remedies  ; and  those  of 
moderate  property,  clustering  about  the  Paralian  capitalists, 
occupying  an  intermediate  position  between  the  blooded  nobility 
and  the  Thetes , and  demanding  the  politeia.  The  Eupatrids 
chose  to  favor  the  moderates  by  restoring  the  Ecclesia.2  Their 
measures  failed  to  give  relief,  not  because  they  refused  to  admit 
the  Thetes  to  citizenship ; but  rather  because  no  attempt  was 


1 A timocracy,  in  a certain  sense,  existed  before  Draco.  Accordingly,  he  did 
not  introduce  the  timocracy  ; Thumser,  Zeitschrift  fiir  die  osterreichischen  Gym- 
nasien,  1891,  pp.  978-9. 

2 That  the  Homeric  agora  was  composed  of  all  liable  to  military  service  has 
been  shown  above,  p.  121.  In  like  manner  the  Roman  Comitia  Curiata  of  the 
kingly  period  contained  Plebeians  and  Clients  as  well  as  Patricians  ; Schiller,  in 
Muller’s  Hdb.,  HV.  p.  628,  with  references  in  n.  1.  That  the  Athenian  assembly 
had  suffered  no  change  in  its  composition  before  the  Cylonian  insurrection 
appears  from  Thuc.  I.  126:  “The  Athenians  perceiving  it,  came  in  a body 
(7ra vd-rj/jid)  from  the  fields.”  It  would  be  straining  the  situation  to  the  utmost 
to  make  this  refer  only  to  the  Eupatrids,  as  Gilbert  does,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staats- 
alter.,  I.  p.  123,  n.  2.  After  a time  the  most  of  the  besiegers  grew  weary  of 
the  siege  and  departed,  having  commissioned  the  archons  with  power  to  manage 
the  affair  as  they  saw  fit.  The  commissioning  must  have  taken  place  through 
an  Ecclesia.  This  is,  so  far  as  I know,  the  only  reference  to  an  assembly  at 
Athens  before  Draco,  and  certainly  in  this  assembly  the  non-Eupatrids  took 
part;  see  also  Schneider,  in  Wochenschr.  fiir  kl.  Phil.,  1891,  p.  499. 


156 


TI1E  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


made  to  remove  the  economic  distress.  The  old  nobility  sacri- 
ficed its  exclusive  privileges  of  blood  only  that  it  might  with 
greater  safety  continue  to  oppress  the  multitude.  Even  the 
right  to  bring  complaints  for  injury  before  the  Areopagus,  — a 
right  now  open  to  all,  could  not  have  availed  the  client  against 
his  master.  To  the  Thete,  therefore,  the  Draconian  measures 
meant,  for  the  time  being,  simply  this,  that  one  of  his  oppressors 
had  taken  the  other  into  partnership.1 


1 The  authorities  on  Draco  which  I have  examined  are : Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol., 
especially  ch.  4 ; Politics,  II.  12.  13  (p.  1274b);  Plutarch,  Solon,  17;  Grote, 

History  of  Greece,  ch.  X.;  Busolt,  in  Midler’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  pp.  1 35-1 44;  Gilbert, 
op.  cit.,  I.  123  ff.;  Cox,  Greek  Statesmen,  I.  1 1 ff . ; Encyclopedia  Britannica,  sub 
voce;  Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  pp.  342  ff.,  365  ff.;  Busolt,  Griech. 
Geschichte,  I.  pp.  510-2;  F.  Cauer,  Aristoteles  als  Historiker,  in  Deutsche  Zeit- 
schrift  fur  Geschichtswissenschaft,  1892,  VIII.  p.  3 ff. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 

A new  nobility  of  wealth  had  taken  the  place  of  the  old 
nobility  of  blood  ; and  though  the  Eupatrids  still  enjoyed  the 
exclusive  privileges  of  hierosyne , — religious  rites  and  offices,  — 
in  other  respects  the  two  branches  of  the  nobility  were  on  a 
level.  But  the  servitude  of  the  masses  continued,  until  finally 
the  populace  arose  against  its  oppressors.  After  the  sedition 
had  lasted  long  and  had  assumed  a formidable  aspect,  the  two 
parties  came  to  terms,  appointing  Solon  to  the  archonship  for 
the  purpose  of  reconciling  the  contestants  and  restoring  order.1 
Although  of  moderate  property  and  holding,  therefore,  a mid- 
dle station  in  the  timocratic  scheme  of  government  and  society, 
Solon  was  an  Eupatrid  of  the  highest  rank,  being  descended,  it 
is  said,  from  Codrus,  the  ancient  king.2  He  had  a reputation 
also  for  military  ability  and  statesmanship  which  placed  him 
above  all  his  contemporaries  ; while  his  moderation  made  him 
the  very  man  to  reconcile  conflicting  parties.  Moreover,  he 
was  an  elegiac  poet  of  high  order,  and  employed  his  talent  in 
the  dissemination  of  sound  political  and  moral  doctrine.  As 
prose  literature  had  not  yet  come  into  being,  Solon  adopted 
the  only  means  at  hand,  and  cast  his  political  pamphlets  in  the 
form  of  elegy.  Some  fragments  of  his  poetry  show  us  the 
stirring  energy  of  the  man,  yet  it  is  in  general  the  plain  expres- 
sion of  sober-minded  truth.  One  of  these  pamphlets  revealing 
his  grief  at  the  sight  of  the  “most  venerable  land  of  Ionia”3 
involved  in  such  misery  and  sickness,  called  the  attention  of 
the  public  to  his  patriotic  spirit  and  moderation,  and  was  the 
immediate  cause  of  the  nation’s  choice.  He  battled,  says 


1Arist.  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  5.  2 Plutarch,  Solon,  1. 

3Cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  19,  n.  on’Iaovi'as. 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


I58 

Aristotle,  as  the  champion  of  each  party  against  the  other, 
then  pleaded  with  both  in  common  to  put  a stop  to  the  existing 
discord.  It  is  easy  to  see  from  his  poems  on  which  side  his 
sympathies  lay.  The  whole  blame  of  this  sedition  rested,  in 
his  opinion,  upon  the  wealthy.1  Their  avarice  and  arrogance 
stood  in  the  way  of  his  country’s  prosperity.2 

His  reforms  may  be  classed  under  three  categories  : (1) 

Measures  of  relief  for  the  multitude.  (2)  Re-organization  of 
the  state.  (3)  Laws  of  various  kinds.  His  relief  measures 
were  as  follows  : 

1.  He  abolished  all  debts  both  private  and  public.  This 
alone  is  the  Seisachtheia , or  “shaking  off  of  burdens.”3  The 
term  has  been  improperly  applied  to  the  entire  group  of  relief 
measures.  We  learn  now  also  that  the  measure  extended  to 
debts  of  every  description,  not  being  confined  to  those  con- 
tracted on  security  of  person  or  property.  The  occasion 
offered  no  opportunity  for  discriminations  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  debt  or  the  manner  in  which  it  was  contracted  ; but 
called  rather  for  heroic  treatment  in  the  sacrifice  of  individual 
interests  for  the  safety  of  the  whole.  A special  application  of 
the  Seisachtheia  was  the  annulment  of  mortgages  on  lands  and 
the  removal  of  mortgage  pillars.4  This  affected  only  the 
class  of  free-holders  and  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  clients. 
Another  application  of  the  Seisachtheia  was  the  abolition  of 
debts  contracted  on  security  of  person.  This  in  the  main 
affected  the  clients,  as  appears  from  the  second  chapter  of 


1 Neither  Solon  nor  Plutarch  says  anything  about  a political  distinction  between 
Eupatrids  and  Plebeians,  this  distinction  having  been  removed  before  Solon. 

2 The  influence  of  family  tradition  was  all  powerful  in  ancient  times.  Thus  at 
Rome,  Julius  Caesar  inherited  his  popular  tendencies  from  his  ancestors.  So,  did 
not  the  Codrids,  who  loved  the  Demus,  bequeath  to  their  illustrious  representa- 
tive some  share  of  their  political  sentiments  ? It  is  not,  however,  as  the  adherent 
of  family  or  party,  but  of  pure  statesmanlike  principle  that  he  stands  forth  as  the 
greatest,  wisest,  and  most  unselfish  reformer  of  society  and  government  known  to 
all  antiquity. 

3 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  6;  Plutarch,  Solon,  15. 

4 Solon  in  Bergk,  Anthol.  Lyr.  Frag.,  32  (25).  1-5. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 


159 


Aristotle’s  Athenian  Politeia.  Yet  some  free-holders  may 
have  lost  personal  liberty  in  addition  to  property,  and  may 
thus  have  come  also  to  require  emancipation. 

Another  important  result  was  achieved  through  a natural 
extension  of  the  principle  contained  in  the  Seisachtheia , — 
whether  directly  through  this  measure  or  requiring  a separate 
law.  It  was  too  closely  connected  with  the  abolition  of  debts 
to  be  mentioned  as  an  altogether  independent  measure.  This 
was  the  emancipation  of  all  persons  serving  for  debt  in  Attica.1 
Many  had  also  been  sold  in  a foreign  land  ;2  and  it  has 
usually  been  supposed  that  money  was  in  some  way  provided 
for  ransoming  these.  Aristotle  says  nothing  of  such  provision 
and,  indeed,  it  has  no  basis  of  support  other  than  mere  conjec- 
ture. It  would  be  difficult  to  raise  the  necessary  funds  at  a 
time  when  public  debts  were  abolished.  Nor  can  we  suppose 
that  Eupatrid  and  capitalist  would,  under  the  circumstances, 
have  consented  to  so  generous  a measure,  having  already  lost 
privilege  and  property  beyond  their  endurance.  Again,  it 
would  be  difficult  for  the  government  to  search  out  all  those 
who  were  scattered  over  the  face  of  the  earth  and  lost  in  the 
obscurity  of  servitude.  It  is  better  to  interpret  avyyayov 3 as 
“ opened  the  way  to  return.”  He  restored  the  poor  of  Attica 
to  their  freedom  and  property,  and  thus  made  it  possible  for 
them  to  ransom  their  relatives.  He  permitted,  also,  the  return 
of  such  as  could  escape  from  their  masters.  The  other  class 
of  persons,  mentioned  in  the  same  poem,  composed  of  those 
who  had  fled  from  Attica,  might  now  return  with  impunity. 
This  would  be,  of  course,  a direct  consequence  of  the  Seisach- 
theia, requiring  no  further  legislation.  Although  the  Seisach- 
theia applied  only  to  the  abolition  of  debts,  we  see  that  it 
was  far  reaching  in  its  results.  Aristotle  speaks  of  it  in  the 
briefest  terms  ; but  ascribes  to  it  properly  a great  importance, 
since  without  this  measure  nothing  else  could  be  done.  “ He 


Solon  in  Bergk,  Anthol.  Lyr.  Frag.  36.  n ff. 

3 Id.  1.  7. 


1 


2 Id.  1.  6-10. 


6o 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


freed  the  Demus  for  the  present This  describes  exactly  the 
abolition  of  debts  and  could  have  no  other  application.  It  was 
intended  only  as  a temporary  measure  and  required  a supple- 
mentary law,  if  any  permanent  good  was  to  be  effected. 

2.  He  forbade  lending  money  on  security  of  person,  thus 
freeing  the  Demus  for  the  future.  This  is  the  most  impor- 
tant of  all  the  measures  of  Solon  and  gives  him  the  foremost 
place  among  the  statesmen  of  antiquity.  The  Athenians  could 
hardly  have  endured  the  centuries  of  bitter  feeling,  of  civil 
strife  and  war,  to  which  the  Romans  were  subjected  through 
the  operation  of  the  law  of  debt  and  the  institution  of  clientage. 
This  law  saved  the  state  from  such  peril.  Two  other  measures 
will  be  mentioned  under  this  head,  although  they  may  have 
required  further  legislation  for  their  existence.  The  first  of 
these,  possibly  nothing  more  than  an  especial  provision  of  the 
main  law,  forbade  to  imprison  or  extort  work  in  any  way 
from  the  debtor  ; and  the  second,  a more  independent  law, 
forbade  to  sell  a son  or  a daughter  or  sister  except  when  the 
latter  were  detected  in  unchastity.  The  selling  of  children 
was  a natural  consequence  of  clientage  and  the  primitive  law 
of  debt.  This  law  was,  accordingly,  one  of  the  subordinate 
measures  by  which  he  freed  the  Demus} 

The  Seisachtheia  and  prohibition  of  lending  on  security  of 
person  reached  the  very  heart  of  Athenian  society,  abolishing 
clientage,  weakening  thereby  the  Aryan  gentile  system,  and 
preparing  the  way  for  government  on  a wider  basis. 

3.  His  third  measure  of  relief  is  that  which  is  known  as 
the  Amnesty-decree,  the  words  of  which  were  as  follows  : 
“ Let  those  who  were  affected  with  atimy  before  Solon’s 
archonship,  be  restored  to  honor,  except  such  as  having 
been  condemned  in  the  Areopagus,  or  by  the  Ephetae,  or 
by  the  kings  in  the  Prytaneum,  for  murder  or  robbery,  or 


1 Our  chief  sources  of  information  for  the  relief  measures  of  Solon  are  Aris- 
totle’s Politeia  of  the  Athenians,  especially  ch.  6,  Plutarch’s  Solon,  and  Solon’s 
own  poems,  many  of  which  are  quoted  by  Aristotle. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 


1 6 1 


attempting  to  usurp  the  government,  had  fled  from  the  country 
before  this  law  was  passed.”  1 Solon  recognized  the  harshness 
of  the  previous  rulings  of  the  courts,  and  passed  this  decree 
as  a preliminary  step  to  the  repeal  of  the  Draconian  code,  and 
to  a more  just  and  humane  legislation.  While  this  measure 
affected  a limited  group  of  individuals,  it  is  of  no  small  value 
as  an  index  to  the  nature  of  Solon’s  work  in  the  amelioration 
and  improvement  of  government  and  society. 

Next  after  the  Seisachtheia , according  to  Plutarch,  came 
the  repeal  of  all  the  laws  of  Draco,  except  those  concerning 
homicide,  because  they  were  too  severe  and  the  punishments 
too  great.  Along  with  this  came  the  Amnesty-decree,  quoted 
above.  From  the  laws  of  homicide  he  refrained  his  hand, 
because  of  their  religious  associations,  as  well  as  from  a con- 
sciousness of  their  justice.  I do  not  understand  that  the 
repeal  of  Draco’s  laws  extended  to  his  constitution.  Some 
parts  of  this  fell  into  disuse;  but  the  main  parts  were  con- 
tinued with  more  or  less  modification.2 

Solon  allowed  the  four  Ionic  tribes,  with  their  tribe-kings 
to  remain  as  before.3  Undoubtedly  the  tribes  continued  to  be 
the  basis  of  organization  of  army  and  Ecclesia.  The  Solonian 
Dicasteria  must  have  been  organized  in  like  manner.  The 
Thetesy  lately  admitted  to  the  citizenship,  as  well  as  those 
Agroeci  and  Demiurgi  who  before  Solon  enjoyed  citizenship 
and  performed  military  service,  must  have  been  attached  in 
some  way  to  the  four  tribes.  The  truth  seems  to  be  that  non- 
citizens were  attached  as  clients  to  the  Eupatrid  gentes,  and 
shared  to  some  extent  in  the  gentile  worship.  When,  how- 
ever, such  non-citizens  were  given  the  politeiay  they  organized 
themselves  into  religious  societies,  which  from  the  term  orge- 
ones  applied  to  its  members  we  may  name  “orgeonic  colleges.” 
These  possessed  a certain  independence  of  worship,  and  were 
assigned  to  the  existing  phratries.  Like  the  Eupatrid  gentes, 


2 Aristotle,  Politics,  II.  12.  3 £f.  (p.  1274). 

3 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  8. 


1 Plutarch,  Solon,  19. 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


162 

they  worshiped  Zeus  Herceius  and  Apollo  Patrons } They 
seem  to  have  been  patterned  after  the  noble  gentes,  and 
might  be  spoken  of  as  fictitious  or  non-genealogic  clans.  The 
orgeones  could,  under  the  ancient  gentile^  constitution,  fill  no 
priesthood  or  important  office  in  the  state.  They  were  made 
eligible  to  the  archonship  by  Draco  and  Solon.  The  orgeonic 
colleges  must  have  been  regarded  by  the  ancient  historians 
either  as  plebeian  gentes  or  as  parts  of  the  noble  gentes;  for 
it  is  stated  that  the  Eupatridae , Georgi  ( Agrocci ),  and  Demiurgi 
all  belonged  to  the  four  tribes  and  their  12  phratries  and  360 
gentes  down  to  the  time  of  Cleisthenes.1 2  Some  of  these  asso- 
ciations may  have  come  into  existence  before  Solon;  others, 
containing  the  Thetes , may  have  been  organized  in  his  time. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  place  assigned  to  these  in 
the  gentile  system.  In  later  time  the  oigeones  are  known 
to  have  belonged  to  the  phratry.3  Accordingly  they  must 
at  this  time  have  been  assigned  to  that  body.  The  state  was 
now  divided  into  four  tribes  as  formerly;  and  each  tribe  into 
three  phratries.  But  each  phratry  was  henceforth  composed 
not  only  of  gentes,  but  of  gentes  and  orgeonic  associations. 
These  two  smallest  units  were  on  a perfect  level  de  jure  with 
respect  to  political  privileges;  but  the  gentes  exercised  a pre- 
ponderating influence  in  the  state  through  their  superior  posi- 
tion in  religious  matters  and  their  knowledge  of  the  machinery 
of  government. 

1 Philippi,  Att.  Biirg.,  pp.  205-7, 

2 Fragment  3 of  Aristotle’s  Ath.  Pol.;  p.  88  of  Kaibel  and  Wilamowitz-Mollen- 
dorff’s  2d.  ed.  This  subject  is  exceedingly  obscure. 

3 Philippi,  Att.  Biirg.,  pp.  205-7.  Throughout  this  discussion  the  word  orgeones 
is  used  in  its  special  signification.  In  a more  general  sense  it  designated  wor- 
shippers of  any  sort,  and  might  thus  be  applied  also  to  the  clansmen  of  pure 
descent.  That  Solon  had  something  to  do  with  the  organization  of  the  orgeonic 
associations  appears  from  Photius,  dpyeuves  2.  Art.  = Suid.,  quoted  by  Gilbert,  Hdb. 
d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  p.  132,  n.  1.  Thumser,  Griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  320, 
thinks,  that  the  term  dpyeuves  in  this  connection  has  something  to  do  with  the 
Eleusinian  worship.  His  view  is  not  well  supported.  According  to  Busolt, 
Muller’s  Ildb.,  2 IV.  p.  207,  the  orgeonic  associations  were  called  dla<roL\  but  these 
were  probably  of  later  formation,  and  appear  to  have  been  small  groups  within  the 
phratry  ; Thumser,  op.  cit.,  p.  321  f. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 


63 


The  weakening  of  the  gentile  ties  was  promoted  by  certain 
modifications  of  the  old  Aryan  customs  relating  to  inheritance 
and  satisfaction  for  injury.  During  the  period  of  village  life, 
landed  property,  as  has  been  said,1  belonged  to  the  gens  as  a 
whole,  and  could  not  be  alienated.  This  seems  to  have  been 
the  condition  of  things  even  in  the  time  of  Homer.  Later  on, 
it  became  possible  in  Attica  to  alienate  land  by  sale,  but  not, 
before  Solon,  by  bequest.  At  the  death  of  the  individual,  his 
property,  in  failure  of  children,  went  to  his  near  kin  in  the 
order  of  their  propinquity;  failing  these,  to  the  gennetae. 
Solon  enacted  a law  permitting  the  individual,  in  failure  of 
children,  to  bequeath  his  estate  to  whomsoever  he  wished.  If 
daughters  existed,  these  must  go  in  marriage  to  those  receiv- 
ing the  property.  As  Solon  had  freed  the  individual  from  the 
control  of  the  gens,  so  now  he  freed  property  from  its  control. 
Not  till  now  did  the  xPWaTa  of  the  individual  become  his 
KTrjjxaTa,  i.  e.,  he  entered  into  absolute  possession  of  his  estate.2 
If  a man  without  children  died  intestate,  the  property  still 
went  to  the  anchisteis , or  near  kin,  but  the  gennetae  as  such 
could  no  longer  offer  a claim.  Yet  while  the  individual  was 
thus  emancipated  de  jure  from  gens  and  kin,  the  feeling  still 
continued  that  the  property  belonged  by  moral  right  to  the 
anchisteis  ; and  he,  indeed,  was  a bold  and  stubborn  man  who, 
even  in  the  time  of  Demosthenes,  dared  to  maintain  his  indi- 
vidual right  in  violation  of  this  primitive  Aryan  sentiment. 
But  so  far  as  the  gens  was  concerned,  this  feeling  had  prob- 
ably long  been  dead,  and  we  never  hear  of  gennetae  putting 
forth  even  a moral  claim  to  property.  The  law  did  its  work 
effectually,  therefore,  in  depriving  the  gens  of  this  once 
important  power. 

Another  law  took  from  the  anchisteis  and  gennetae  the  sole 
right  of  prosecution  for  the  injury  of  a kinsman.  Plutarch3 
says:  “Desirous  yet  further  to  strengthen  the  common  people, 
he  empowered  any  man  whatever  to  enter  an  action  for  one 


1 P-  59  *• 


2 Plut.,  Solon,  21;  Demosthenes,  XX.  102. 


3 Solon,  18. 


6 4 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


that  was  injured.  If  a person  was  assaulted  or  suffered  dam- 
age or  violence,  another  that  was  able  and  willing  to  do  it, 
might  prosecute  the  offender.”  Aristotle1  says:  “He  per- 
mitted any  one,  who  wished,  to  go  to  law  in  defense  of  injured 
parties,”  and  regards  this  as  one  of  the  three  most  important 
measures  of  Solon.  Its  object  was  to  place  fellow-feeling  and 
beneficent  action  upon  a wider  basis  than  that  of  kin,  to  give 
the  state  control  over  those  cases  which  most  nearly  concerned 
it,  — but  which,  up  to  this  time,  had  been  managed  by  the 
gentes  in  accordance  with  their  religious  usages,  — thus  bring- 
ing about  a dependence  of  the  individual  upon  the  government 
rather  than  upon  the  gens. 

Most  nearly  connected  with  the  gentile  organization  of  the 
state,  was  the  territorial  subdivision  of  Attica  into  trittyes  and 
naucrariae , already  shown  to  have  existed  before  Solon.  The 
original  functions  of  the  naucrars  continued  without  change 
till  the  erection  of  demes  by  Cleisthenes.  They  collected  the 
taxes,  now  levied  according  to  the  property  scale,  and  dis- 
bursed them  as  ordered  by  the  higher  authorities. 

Having  considered  the  Aryan  gentile  system  of  state  organ- 
ization as  widened  by  Draco  and  Solon,  — though  still  pre- 
served in  its  main  features,  — together  with  the  territorial 
subdivisions  of  the  tribes  developed  from  that  system,  we  come 
now  to  the  timocratic  classification  of  the  citizens.2  Plutarch 
mentions  this  as  the  first  of  his  political  measures.  The  aboli- 
tion of  debts  must  have  brought  great  confusion  into  the  exist- 
ing classification.  Many  whose  estates  had  been  loaded  with 
mortgages  now  possessed  unincumbered  farms.  Others  who 
had  loaned  money  extensively  on  security  of  person  or  prop- 
erty had  probably  been  compelled  to  sell  much  of  their  land. 
A redistribution  of  the  citizens  in  the  property  classes  was 


1 Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  9. 

2 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  7;  Plut.,  Solon,  18.  It  is  unnecessary  to  suppose,  as 
Kenyon  does,  that  Solon  abolished  the  Draconian  timocratic  classes.  Plutarch 
regards  Solon  merely  as  taking  a new  census.  Kenyon’s  explanation  is  too  in- 
genious; cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  25,  n.  on  ri/i^aTa. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 


165 


therefore  an  imperative  necessity.  Accordingly,  “ Solon  being 
willing,”  as  Plutarch  tells  us,  “ to  continue  the  magistracies  in 
the  hands  of  the  rich  men  and  yet  receive  the  people  into  the 
other  part  of  the  goverment,  made  a (new)  census  of  the  citi- 
zens’ estates.”  We  learn  here  (1)  that  two  classes  of  people 
only  were  considered,  viz.,  the  rich  and  the  poor,  no  reference 
being  made  to  Eupatrids  and  non-Eupatrids  ; (2)  that  the  rich 
alone  had  enjoyed  office  before  Solon  ; (3)  that  none  were 
admitted  to  office  by  Solon  who  before  were  ineligible,  unless 
perchance  a Thete  might  become  a Zeugite  by  the  show  of  a 
sufficient  landed  estate.  Thus  the  testimony  of  Plutarch  con- 
firms the  statement  of  Aristotle  in  the  'AOrjvaCwv  UoXurda,  that 
the  distinction  between  Eupatrid  and  well-to-do  non-Eupatrid 
had  vanished  and  the  timocracy  had  been  introduced  before 
Solon.  As  a result  of  this  census,  all  citizens,  including  those 
lately  admitted,  were  divided  into  four  classes  according  to 
annual  income  derived  from  their  own  estates.  The  first  class, 
called  P entacosiomedimni,  was  composed  of  those  who ‘enjoyed 
an  annual  income  from  their  own  estates  of  at  least  500  /uA-pa 
(measures),  wet  and  dry.  The  second  class,  Hippeis , included 
all  with  an  income  ranging  from  300  to  500  p-eVpa,  wet  and  dry. 
This  class  probably  received  its  name  from  the  fact  that  its 
members  served  in  the  cavalry,  equo  privato } though,  from  the 
time  of  Solon,  the  division  was  made  with  reference  to  income, 
just  as  was  the  case  with  the  P entacosiomedimni?  The  third 
class,  comprising  the  Zeugitae , contained  those  who  received  an 


1 Schol.  on  Arist Equites,  627;  Pollux,  VIII.  130.  This  class  must  have  existed 
before  Solon  and  before  Draco.  Solon  merely  fixed  its  limits  definitely. 

2 Aristotle  does  not  take  these  two  facts  in  their  historical  relation,  and  wrongly 
supposes,  therefore,  a discrepancy  between  his  own  view  and  that  of  certain  other 
historians;  cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  27,  notes  on  lirxada , et  seq.  In 
Aristotle’s  time,  the  Hippeis  no  longer  performed  the  function  of  serving  in  the 
cavalry,  and  it  could  only  be  inferred  that  this  was  their  original  duty  from  the 
name  itself,  and  from  the  fact  that  the  statue  of  a horse  stood  on  the  Acropolis, 
dedicated  by  a certain  Anthemion,  on  exchanging  his  Thetic  for  the  Hippie  class; 
cf.  Keil,  Verfassungsgeschichte  Athens,  p.  66  ff ; Sandys,  loc.  cif.,  and  p.  28,  n.  on 
Ai<f>l\ov. 


1 66  THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

income  of  from  200 1 2 to  300  perpa  per  annum.  This  class  was 
evidently  made  up  of  those  who  cultivated  with  their  own  yoke 
of  oxen,  as  distinguished  from  the  Hectcmori , who  used  the 
oxen  of  their  lords.  It  may  have  contained  Eupatrids  of  mod- 
erate property,  but  received  its  character  and  name  probably 
from  the  greater  number  of  Plebeians  (once  clients  of  the  bet- 
ter order)  who  for  the  most  part  composed  it.  The  Thetes, 
who  formed  the  fourth  class,  received  in  like  manner  from 
their  estates  an  income  of  less  than  200  pirpa.  If  any 
were  mere  tenants  and  possessed  no  property  from  which  to 
receive  an  income,  they  of  course  were  still  classed  among  the 
Thetes ? 

It  seems  to  be  a well  established  fact  that  this  classification 
was  based  upon  landed  property  alone.  Under  Draco  the 
qualification  for  office  was  a certain  estate  free  from  encum- 
brance ; under  Solon  it  was  a certain  number  of  measures,  wet 
and  dry,  of  produce  derived  from  one’s  own  estate.3  Reference 
is  doubtless  made  in  both  instances  to  land  and  its  produce.4 
We  are  told  also  that  the  best  form  of  government  is  that 
based  upon  agriculture.  For  those  engaged  in  this  occupation 
are  healthy  in  body  and  soul  ; they  are  attached,  moreover, 
through  their  land,  to  the  state,  and  are  ready  to  sacrifice  them- 
selves for  its  peace  and  safety;  their  property  being  small,  they 


1 The  number  200,  as  the  lower  property  limit  of  the  Zeugite  class,  is  now  con- 
firmed by  the  authority  of  Aristotle.  Bockh,  Staatshaushaltung  d.  Athener,  3 1. 
p.  581,  relying  upon  Pseud.  Dem.  XLIII.  54,  assumed  150  drachmae  as  the  lower 
limit  of  income. 

2 There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Zeugitae  and  Thetes  existed  from  the  earliest 
times,  and  that  Solon  did  nothing  more  than  to  give  them  definite  limits  as  to 
property.  Again,  the  term  Pentacosiomedimnus , when  first  invented,  applied 
to  a man  whose  income  was  500  medimni  (dry  measure  alone).  This  could 
have  been  only  under  a government  far  more  oligarchic  than  that  which  Solon 
favored,  since  Solon  greatly  lowered  the  property  qualification  of  this  highest 
class  in  allowing  account  to  be  taken  of  property  in  both  wet  and  dry 
measures. 

8 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  chs.  4 and  7. 

4 Bekker,  Anecd.  I.  p.  298.  20,  TrevTaKo<riofAt8ifAvoi  = oi  iK  rrjs  olrdas  7 77s  iroiovinres, 

K.T.X. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 


167 


have  no  leisure  to  interfere  in  all  the  little  details  of  government.1 
This  is  the  government  by  the  heavy-armed  and  is  midway 
between  the  absolute  oligarchy,  depending  upon  the  knights, 
and  the  democracy,  based  upon  the  sailors  and  light-armed.2 3 
It  is,  accordingly,  the  best  possible  form  of  government  by  the 
people.  Those  whose  wealth  consisted  of  hoarded  money  or 
merchandise  were  ranked  with  the  Thetes  and  had,  therefore, 
little  part  in  the  government.  They  were  encouraged  by  the 
provisions  of  the  constitution  to  invest  in  land  and  thus  to 
identify  their  interests  permanently  with  those  of  the  state, 
while  the  wise  restriction  as  to  the  size  of  estates  prevented 
the  wealthy  few  from  monopolizing  the  privileges  of  govern- 
ment through  the  excessive  acquisition  of  landed  property. 
This  distinction  between  real  estate  and  movable  property  was 
preserved  till  after  the  battle  of  Plataea. 

The  object  of  the  classification  was,  on  the  one  hand,  taxa- 
tion and  military  service  ; and  on  the  other,  the  distribution  of 
offices.  Only  members  of  the  three  upper  classes  were  eligible 
to  office,  while  within  these  classes  all  distinctions  of  rank  were 
de  jure  obliterated.  The  offices  of  archon,  treasurer,  Poletae 
(who  farmed  out  the  taxes,  sold  confiscated  property,  etc.),  the 
Eleven  (executioners),  the  Colacretae  (treasurers  apparently  of 
the  Naucraric  Fund)  were  open  to  the  three  wealthier  classes 
not  indiscriminately,  but  with  eligibility  fixed  according  to 
importance  of  office  and  amount  of  income.  The  archons 
were  probably  chosen  from  the  P entacosiomedimni?  afterwards 


1 Aristotle,  Politics,  VI.  4.  1 (p.  1318  b,  9 ff.)  ; Curtius,  History  of  Greece,  I.  pp. 
354-5  ; Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  pp.  132-3. 

2 Aristotle,  Politics,  VI.  7.  1 (p.  1321  a,  1 ff.). 

3 Aristotle  does  not  speak  in  more  definite  terms,  and  our  only  authority  for  the 
statement  that  the  Pentacosiomedimni  alone  were  eligible  to  the  archonship,  is 
Demetrius  of  Phalerum,  — quoted  in  Plutarch’s  Aristeides,  — an  untrustworthy 
author,  indeed,  notwithstanding  Schomann’s  great  respect  for  him.  It  is  probable, 
however,  that  he  has  stumbled  upon  the  truth  and  that  the  archonship  was 
restricted  to  the  Pentacosiomedimni , though  there  is  nothing  in  the  Politeia 
against  supposing  that  the  Hippeis  were  also  eligible ; cf.  Landwehr,  Philol., 
Suppl.  V.  p.  1 18  ff. 


1 68  THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

from  the  Hippeis , while  the  Zeugitac  were  not  admitted  till 
45 7.1  The  treasurers  belonged  to  the  highest  property  class, 
just  as  in  later  times.  Nothing  is  said  of  the  Strategi  and 
Hipparchs,  under  the  Solonian  constitution  ; but  if  these 
existed,  they  must  in  like  manner  have  required  the  highest 
qualification  of  property.  Grote2  held  the  view  that  Pentaco- 
siomedimni  alone  were  eligible  to  all  commands,  and  this  is 
probably  correct.  The  Hippeis , as  has  been  said,  constituted 
the  cavalry,  while  the  Zeugitae  made  up  the  body  of  hoplites. 
These  three  classes  were  alone  subject  to  direct  taxes  (eio-^o/W) 
and  to  the  performance  of  liturgies,  or  unpaid  services  to  the 
state.  The  Thetes  served  only  as  light-armed  or  with  panoply 
furnished  by  the  state.  They  held  no  offices  and  were  not 
subject  to  direct  taxation.3  They  were  allowed,  however,  to 
sit  with  the  other  classes  in  the  Ecclesia  for  the  election  of 
magistrates  and  the  management  of  such  other  business  as 
now  came  before  that  body.  They  were  admitted  also  to  the 
courts  ( Dicasteria ) which  exercised  the  euthyna  of  magistrates 
and  entertained  appeals  from  judicial  authorities.4  The  rights 
of  electing  and  judging  magistrates  composed  the  Kpdros  which 
Solon  himself  says  in  his  poems  that  he  bestowed  upon  the 
Dennis.  It  was  just  that  amount  of  power  which  the  people 
needed  for  the  preservation  of  life,  liberty,  and  happiness. 
“Without  these,”  says  Aristotle,  “the  people  must  have  been 
slaves  and  enemies  of  the  rest.” 

We  are  now  enabled  to  trace  the  history  of  the  manner  of 
election  to  the  archonship  with  minute  accuracy  from  the 
earliest  times  to  Aristotle’s  own  day.  Before  Draco,  as  has 
been  noticed,  the  archonship  was  filled  through  appointment 
by  the  Areopagus;  from  Draco  to  Solon  election  to  that  office 


1 Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  29,  n.  on  did  /cat  vvv;  Arist.,  Ath.  Pol., 
ch.  26. 

2 Ch.  XI.,  (small  edition)  I.  p.  590. 

3 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  7 ; Sandys,  op.  cit .,  p.  29,  Testimonia ; Busolt  in  Muller’s 
Ildb.,  2 IV.  p.  148. 

4 Plut.,  Solon,  18  ; Arist.,  Politics,  III.  ij.  8 (p.  1281  B), 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 


69 


was  exercised  by  the  Ecclesia.  Under  Solon,  a new  system 
was  introduced.  Each  tribe  chose  by  vote  ten  candidates  from 
its  qualified  members,  and  from  these  forty  men  the  nine 
archons  were  chosen  by  lot.1  This  combined  process  of 
selection  and  sortition  was  not  without  meaning.  Through 
the  free  election  of  candidates,  the  power  of  the  Thetes  came 
into  play,  and  men  could  be  selected  favorable  to  their  inter- 
ests. Although  they  had  been  given  a share  in  the  election 
of  magistrates,  if  these  were  now  to  be  taken  by  lot,  the 
Thetes  would  have  had  no  representation  in  the  govern- 
ment. The  reasoning  of  Grote  defended  in  a masterly  treatise 
by  Lugebil2  against  Schomann  is  now  demonstrated  beyond 
a doubt.  According  to  this  reasoning,  (1)  all  offices  of  the 
first  importance  were  at  Athens  filled  by  election;  (2)  the 
archonship  was  from  the  beginning  to  a time  succeeding  the 
Persian  wars  an  office  of  the  highest  importance,  but  thereafter 
declined  with  the  gradual  rise  of  democracy,  therefore  (3)  the 
lot  was  introduced  for  the  filling  of  this  office  sometime  after 
the  Persian  wars,  and  its  introduction  signalizes  an  advanced 
stage  in  the  evolution  of  democratic  institutions.3  Apart  from 
the  benefit  accruing  to  the  Thetes  by  the  element  of  election 
in  the  filling  of  magistracies,  the  whole  nation  was  thereby 
enabled  to  call  to  its  service  the  ablest  and  most  honorable 
men  of  the  country.  The  principle  of  sortition,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  introduced  to  prevent  jealousy  and  intrigue.  Most 
important  of  all,  sortition,  if  adhered  to,  would  have  rendered  it 
impossible  for  two  great  rivals  to  contend  for  the  archonship 
(eponymous),  and  involve  their  country  in  danger  through  the 
bitterness  of  their  strife.  But  I believe  that  this  part  of  the 
process  was  often  set  aside  in  the  turmoil  of  the  years  between 


1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  8. 

2 Zur  Geschichte  der  Staatsverfassung  von  Athen,  p.  564  ff. 

3 Much  praise  is  due  to  Grote  for  his  statesmanlike  views  of  Grecian  history  ; 
but  the  greatest  tribute  to  his  memory  will  be  paid  by  the  acknowledgment  that 
the  discovery  of  Aristotle’s  treatise  has  enhanced  his  value  as  an  historian  of  the 
Athenian  democracy. 


170  THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

Solon  and  Peisistratus.  The  functions  of  the  archons  under- 
went through  Solon’s  legislation  no  material  change.  But  their 
judicial  powers  were  now  limited  by  the  right  of  appeal  to  a 
popular  court.  It  was  not  sufficient  merely  to  give  the  Demits 
its  freedom,  — some  means  must  be  discovered  of  securing  it 
against  the  unjust  rulings  of  the  courts.  The  needful  safe- 
guard was  found  in  the  right  of  appeal.  Justly  then  may  we 
regard  this  as  a wise  and  salutary  measure,  as  it  checked  malversa- 
tion on  the  bench  and  led  the  people  gradually,  through  the 
courts,  to  the  supervision  and  management  of  the  government. 

The  Boule 1 was  now  composed  of  400, — 100  from  each 
Phyle.  Its  functions  are  not  stated  ; but  it  probably  arranged 
beforehand  the  business  of  the  Ecclesia,  as  in  later  times. 
Whether  it  had  any  administrative  duties  before  Cleisthenes  is 
unknown.  The  manner  of  choosing  senators  has  not  been 
given  for  this  period  ; but  they  were  probably  taken  by  lot 
from  members  of  the  three  upper  classes  who  were  above 
thirty  years  of  age,  as  under  the  Draconian  constitution.2 

The  Ecclesia  was  composed  of  all  the  citizens,  including 
Thetes , and  met  probably  for  the  election  of  magistrates.  We 
know  not  what  other  business  it  managed,  but  at  this  time  it 
could  have  exercised  no  important  powers.  Its  deliberations 
were  undoubtedly  controlled  by  the  Areopagus,  which  checked 
democratic  tendencies  in  the  popular  assembly  by  its  power  of 
inhibiting  measures  brought  before  that  body.  Solon  did  not 
intend  to  entrust  the  work  of  legislation  to  the  people,  as  is 
evident  from  the  fact  that  he  made  his  laws  binding  for  a hun- 
dred years.  With  the  Areopagus  as  an  all-controlling  body, 
and  with  a set  of  magistrates  enjoying  large  competence  in  the 
military,  financial,  and  judicial  departments  of  government, 
little  room  was  left  for  the  activity  of  a popular  assembly.  Its 
real  power  in  the  state  did  not  begin  before  Cleisthenes. 


1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  8. 

2 It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  three  upper  property  classes  of  Solon  corre- 
sponded, for  all  practical  purposes,  with  the  class  of  “men  capable  of  bearing 
arms  ” in  the  Draconian  scheme. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION.  1 7 1 

Little  is  said  of  the  Dicasteria 1 under  Solon,  but  enough 
to  show  their  relation  to  the  general  plan  of  government. 
Neither  the  number  nor  qualification  of  dicasts  is  given  ; but 
this  is  certain,  that  members  of  all  classes,  including  the 
Thetes , were  eligible.  Probably  an  age  of  thirty  years  or 
over  was  required.  While  the  Thetes  were  theoretically 
eligible,  they  were  practically  excluded  by  the  absence  of 
pay.  None  but  well-to-do  citizens  could  have  devoted  their 
time  to  court  business,  nor  can  we  think  that  even  these 
would  have  consented  to  meet  often  or  in  great  numbers. 
Since  the  business  consisted,  so  far  as  we  know,  only  in 
hearing  and  deciding  appeals  from  the  judgment  of  magi- 
strates, no  great  number  of  sessions  per  annum  was  required. 
In  a word,  the  Dicasteria  were  practically  controlled  by 
the  more  wealthy  class  of  citizens,  and  met  at  comparatively 
rare  intervals  for  the  purpose  of  checking  magistrates  in  the 
performance  of  their  judicial  duties.  It  is  interesting  to  ob- 
serve the  insight  of  Aristotle  into  the  true  spirit  of  the  Athe- 
nian policy.  It  was  through  the  law-courts  that  the  Demus 
became  master  of  the  government.  The  growth  of  its  power 
was  hastened  by  the  fact  that  the  laws  had  not  been  composed 
with  simplicity  and  perspicuity,  but  many  doubts  and  disputa- 
tions arose  as  to  their  meaning,  in  the  settlement  of  which  the 
courts  were  called  to  the  arbitration  of  all  matters  both  public 
and  private.  Some  were  even  of  the  opinion  that  Solon  made 
the  laws  obscure  on  purpose,  that  so  the  Demus  might  become 
master  of  the  decision.  This  is,  of  course,  an  absurd  suppo- 
sition, and  the  true  reason  for  their  obscurity  is  given  by 
Aristotle  in  correction  of  the  false  view.  An  idea  which  is 
altogether  wrong  may  be  of  great  value.  So,  this  false  notion 
calls  attention  to  the  law-courts  as  both  the  instrument  by 
which  the  Athenian  democracy  was  built  up  and  the  foundation 


1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  9.  Busolt,f  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  p.  152,  regards  it  as 
almost  certain  that  there  was  at  first  but  one  popular  court  and  that  this  was  called 

the  Heliaea  ; cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  pp.  34-5,  notes. 


72 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


of  the  people’s  sovereignty.  At  this  epoch,  however,  their 
influence  upon  the  government  was  barely  felt. 

The  power  of  the  Areopagus  was  by  no  means  diminished. 
Although  certain  strong  democratic  tendencies  are  observable 
in  the  constitution,  this  aristocratic  body  was  even  strengthened 
in  its  hold  upon  the  government.  As  guardian  of  the  laws,  it 
exercised  an  unlimited  supervision  over  government  and  people 
in  all  matters,  including  the  superintendence  of  magistrates,1 
and  a protecting  care  and  censorship  over  the  lives  and  con- 
duct of  the  citizens.2  It  could  chastise  offenders,  having  power 
to  punish  and  fine  ; and  in  handing  over  to  the  treasury  the 
moneys  accruing  from  fines,  it  was  under  no  obligation  to  state 
the  ground  on  which  it  had  inflicted  the  penalty.  Solon  added 
the  power  to  try  those  who  conspired  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
Demus .3  The  Areopagus  was  now  at  its  height.  Recruited 
from  ex-archons,  who  had  been  chosen  to  office  for  their  wisdom 
and  integrity,  and  whose  interests  through  their  superior 
wealth  were  closely  intertwined  with  the  peace  and  prosperity 
of  the  country,  it  constantly  gathered  to  itself  the  conservative 
statesmanship,  the  practical  ability  and  experience  of  the 
nation.  Through  its  censorship  of  morals  and  influence  upon 
the  euthyna , it  enjoyed  practically  the  right  of  selection  of  its 
own  members,  by  the  exercise  of  which  its  conservatism  was 
preserved  and  fostered.  The  very  fact  that  its  members  held 
office  for  life,  while  other  public  functionaries  exercised  power 
for  the  brief  period  of  a year,  contributed  enormously  to  its 
powers  of  superintendence  and  administration.  Thus  was  the 
Areopagus  an  irresponsible  power,  directing  the  manifold 
activities  of  government  and  people  within  the  lines  marked 
out  for  it  by  the  constitution.  Solon  was  by  no  means  in 
favor  of  popular  government  ; but  aimed  rather  at  securing 


1 The  duty  relating  to  magistrates  is  not  mentioned  in  this  connection  by 
Aristotle,  but  it  evidently  belonged  to  the  Areopagus  as  under  Draco,  the  right 
of  appeal  to  the  Dicasteria  interfering  but  little  with  its  authority  for  a time. 

2 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  3. 

This  duty  was  performed  heretofore  by  the  court  sitting  in  the  Prytaneum. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 


173 


the  people  in  their  right  to  peace  and  happiness.  With  this 
in  view,  he  had  re-constituted  the  Ecclesia  and  probouleutic 
Senate  and  had  added  the  popular  courts,  — all  needful  as 
safe-guards  against  magisterial  oppression.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  strengthened  the  new  nobility  of  wealth  in  their 
hold  upon  the  government  by  re-assuring  to  their  represent- 
ative body  its  ancient,  far-reaching  prerogatives.  “ He  was 
himself,  as  past  archon,  a member  of  this  ancient  senate,  and 
is  said  to  have  contemplated  that  by  means  of  the  two  sen- 
ates, the  state  would  be  held  fast,  as  it  were,  with  the  double 
anchor,  against  all  shocks  and  storms.”1 

A further  safe-guard  to  the  constitution  was  provided  in  the 
Sedition  Law,  which  is,  indeed,  a peculiar  measure,  and  has 
justly  excited  the  surprise  of  later  thinkers.  We  must  endeavor 
to  view  it  in  relation  to  the  political  conditions  from  which  it 
sprang,  and  in  the  light  of  these,  we  can  understand  that  it  was 
intended,  paradoxical  though  it  may  seem,  to  act  as  a preventa- 
tive of  sedition,  and  to  maintain  in  a degree  the  security  and 
peace  of  the  community.  In  the  Homeric  period,  the  people, 
while  showing  an  independent  spirit,  betray  a total  ignorance 
of  political  organization.  They  owed  submission  only  to 
persons,  — to  the  gods,  and  kings,  as  representatives  of  the 
gods  on  earth.  The  very  idea  of  a constitution  or  system  of 
laws  commanding  their  respect  and  obedience  had  not  yet 
dawned  upon  them.  Through  the  decline  of  kingship  and 
the  rise  of  the  Boule , the  constitution  gained  in  definiteness, 
yet  the  sentiment  of  the  people  did  not  undergo  a corresponding 
change.  Under  the  fully  developed  oligarchy,  they  thought 
that  they  owed  respect  not  to  constitutional  forms,  but  to  their 
great  faction  leaders.  How,  then,  could  they  be  commanded 
to  support  the  government  against  insurrection  when,  in  case 
of  strife  between  two  parties,  they  knew  not  which  represented 

1 Grote,  (small  edition)  I.  p.  593,  quoted  from  Plut.,  Solon,  19.  This  probably 
came  ultimately  from  one  of  his  poems.  The  Senate  of  400  was  but  one  of  the 
three  institutions  supporting  the  people’s  interests,  but  is  here  made  to  represent 
all. 


174 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


the  one,  and  which  the  other  ? Such  a command  may  be  given 
only  when  the  government  is  settled,  its  modes  of  activity 
known,  and  the  state  organization  respected  apart  from  persons 
in  office.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance, 
that  the  people  be  made  to  take  an  interest  in  the  govern- 
ment and  to  lend  their  services  to  its  defense,  even  though 
their  conceptions  as  to  what  the  government  really  is,  be  more 
or  less  imperfect.  For  only  through  interesting  the  people  in 
the  government,  can  a statesman  look  for  improvement  either 
in  government  or  people.  Accordingly,  since  seditions  were 
frequent  in  Attica,  and  since  the  continued  political  apathy  of 
the  people  was  ruinous  to  all  hopes  of  development,  Solon 
ordered  the  people  in  case  of  sedition  to  join  whichever  side 
they  deemed  most  just.  Any  one  who  held  aloof  from  the 
strife  was  dishonored  and  deprived  of  the  citizenship.  The 
ultimate  effect  of  the  measure  was  the  political  education  of 
the  people.  For  the  time  being,  it  was  hoped  that  the  great 
oligarchs  would  be  less  likely  to  engage  in  factional  strife  if  they 
knew  beforehand  that  the  citizens  in  a body  were  to  take  an 
active  interest  in  the  affair  and  to  decide  it  by  force  of  arms  in 
the  way  they  should  see  fit.  Thus  we  can  readily  understand 
how  it  was  intended  primarily  as  a check  to  the  feuds  between 
powerful  nobles,  and  how  its  continuance  in  force  would  lead 
the  masses  to  a participation  in  the  government.  It  is  doubtful, 
however,  whether  the  law  was  ever  enforced.  For  it  is  impos- 
sible to  conceive  how  any  party  or  individual  in  the  state  could 
be  interested  in  the  prosecution  of  offenders,  or  could  hope  to 
receive  more  benefit  than  injury  therefrom.  The  law  was 
intended,  therefore,  to  have  chiefly  a moral  effect,  — and  is  of 
interest  to  us  in  showing  the  relation  of  people  to  government 
in  those  times,  and  the  attempt  of  a great  statesman  to  remedy 
a defect  in  that  relation. 

Aristotle  mentions  three  measures  of  Solon  as  especially 
favorable  to  the  Demus}  The  first,  and  most  important  of 


1 Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  9. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 


75 


these,  was  the  prohibition  of  lending  on  security  of  person. 
Its  practical  effect  was  the  abolition  of  clientage,  as  has  been 
stated  above.  In  the  second  place,  he  permitted  any  one  who 
wished,  to  go  to  law  in  defense  of  an  injured  party,  a measure 
tending  to  weaken  the  gens.  And  in  the  third  place,  he 
granted  an  appeal  to  the  popular  courts.  The  effect  of  this 
was  hardly  felt  in  the  beginning,  but  it  proved  ultimately  to  be 
the  very  stronghold  of  the  people’s  sovereignty.1  We  may 
mention  here  as  a fourth  measure,  equally  indispensable,  the 
admission  of  the  Thetes  to  partial  citizenship.2  We  have  seen 
how,  under  the  gentile  system  of  the  Aryans,  continued  in 
ancient  Greece,  the  inferiors  were,  for  religious  causes,  farthest 
removed  from  social  freedom,  from  political  life.  We  have 
seen  how  the  growth  of  the  kingship  tended  to  mitigate  their 
condition,  and  how  again,  under  the  oligarchy,  they  relapsed 
into  servitude  more  wretched  than  before.  Only  a compara- 
tively small  number  of  these  had,  by  enterprise  and  good 
fortune,  succeeded  in  raising  themselves  above  their  fellows  to 
a position  on  a level,  in  wealth  at  least,  with  their  Eupatrid 
rulers.  We  next  observed  how,  through  the  Draconian  con- 
stitution, the  Eupatrids  took  these  fortunates  into  political 
partnership,  that  they  might  more  securely  and  effectually 
rivet  the  chains  upon  the  miserable  poor.  Even  Solon’s  gov- 
ernment was  still  a timocracy  with  a strong  conservative 
element  in  the  Areopagus,  but  there  had  been  planted  in  it, 
through  the  four  measures  above  enumerated,  a little  demo- 
cratic leaven,  which  in  time  leavened  the  whole  lump.  Solon 
is  to  be  Vegarded  as  the  founder  of  the  Athenian  democracy 
only  in  this,  that  his  measures  rendered  the  later  establishment 


1 Kenyon  (Aristotle’s  Ath.  Pol.,  p.  25,  n.,  2d  ed.)  terms  it  the  one  decisive  fact 
in  the  Athenian  constitution,  the  lever  by  which  the  Demus  brought  all  govern- 
mental powers  and  functionaries  into  direct  subordination  to  itself,  like 
the  tribunate  at  Rome  in  the  hands  of  the  Gracchi  and  their  successors, 
like  the  control  which  the  English  Commons  exercised  over  the  financial 
supplies. 

2 Aristotle,  Politics,  II.  12  (p.  1274  a). 


176 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


of  a democracy  both  possible,  and,  in  accordance  with  a 
natural  law  of  growth,  even  necessary. 

It  would  be  interesting  to  know  Solon’s  idea  in  making  all 
his  ordinances  binding  for  one  hundred  years.  Did  he  suppose 
that  he  had  devised  so  perfect  a scheme  of  government  as  to 
require  no  modification  in  that  long  period?  Certainly  not; 
for  he  himself  said  that  his  laws  were  not  absolutely  the  best, 
but  merely  the  best  under  the  circumstances.  He  desired  to 
impress  upon  the  whole  people  the  idea  of  a permanent,  steady 
government,  and  he  hoped  that  when  better  laws  should  from 
time  to  time  be  required,  they  might  be  developed  from  his 
own  by  imperceptible  changes  rather  than  by  the  sweeping 
innovations  of  another  dictator,  or  through  the  wholesale  and 
unprincipled  legislation  of  a capricious  assembly.  At  any 
rate,  he  could  not,  in  the  face  of  this  ordinance,  have  granted 
legislative  power  to  the  Ecclesia,  or  to  any  other  body  in  the 
state;1  for  thereby  he  would  have  introduced  the  strongest 
temptation  to  break  the  ordinance  on  which  his  hopes  were 
founded,  and  to  undo,  perchance,  in  a single  day,  the  solid 
benefits  conferred  by  his  politeia.  The  most  glaring  defect 
in  the  public  character  of  the  Greeks  was  their  want  of  love 
for  principle,  their  lack  of  adherence  to  constitutional  forms. 
Solon  endeavored,  though  in  vain,  to  supply  this  defect  both 
by  the  sedition  law  and  by  the  ordinance  in  question.  We 
observe  that  these  two  laws  bear  a certain  relation  to  the  work  of 
the  Areopagus,  their  object  being,  so  far  as  they  could  be  carried 
out,  to  re-enforce  that  body  in  its  maintenance  of  conservatism. 

We  come  finally  to  the  laws  of  Solon  on  various  subjects. 

He  reformed  the  currency,  making  70  drachmae  of  the  old 
weight  worth  100  of  the  new.2  This  has  been  connected  by 


1 Of  course  the  Ecclesia  was  at  liberty  to  pass  measures  which  did  not  conflict 
with  the  existing  laws.  But  since  these  were  made  to  cover  all  the  cases  that  the 
legislator  regarded  as  likely  to  occur,  little  room,  indeed,  remained  for  the  legis- 
lative activity  of  the  popular  assembly. 

2 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  10;  Plut.,  Solon,  15. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 


77 


some  with  the  Seisachtheia  ; but  erroneously,  since  a depreci- 
ation of  the  currency  was  needless  as  a relief  measure  after 
the  entire  abolition  of  debts.  His  object  rather  was  to  substi- 
tute the  Euboic  standard  for  the  Aeginetan,  and  thus  to  bring 
Athens  into  commercial  relations  with  Euboea  and  Asia  Minor, 
where  the  newly  adopted  standard  was  in  use.1 

Another  law  was  made  by  Solon  prohibiting  an  individual 
from  possessing  as  much  land  as  he  pleased.2  This  was  in  the 
interest  of  the  small  proprietors.  Had  such  a law  been  in 
force  from  primitive  times,  there  would  have  been  far  less 
need  of  Solon’s  sweeping  reforms. 

He  defined  by  law  the  conditions  on  which  an  alien  might 
receive  the  citizenship.  “He  permitted  only  those  to  be  made 
free  of  Athens  who  were  in  perpetual  exile  from  their  own 
country,  or  came  with  their  whole  family  to  trade  there  ; this 
he  did,  not  to  discourage  strangers,  but  rather  to  invite  them 
to  a permanent  participation  in  the  privileges  of  government  ; 
and,  besides,  he  thought  those  would  prove  the  more  faithful 
citizens  who  had  been  forced  from  their  own  country,  or  volun- 
tarily forsook  it.”  3 These  conditions  were  easier  than  those 
of  a later  date,  and  brought  into  the  state  many  new  citizens. 
A great  number  of  these  became  partizans  of  Peisistratus, 
fearing  an  oligarchic  reaction,  which  would  endanger  their 
civil  status.4 

He  forbade  the  exportation  of  all  produce  of  the  soil  except 
olive  oil.  His  object  in  this  was  to  promote  the  manufactur- 
ing industries.  The  soil  of  Attica  was  unproductive,  and  the 
country  people  found  it  difficult  to  maintain  themselves  by 
agriculture.5  It  was  for  the  promotion  of  this  same  end  that 

1 Kenyon,  Trans,  of  the  Ath.  Pol.  of  Aristotle,  p.  1 6,  n.  i ; Riihl,  Rhein.  Mus., 
XLVI.  p.  450,  makes  a mistake  in  supposing  that  the  reform  in  currency  is  set 
down  as  demotic ; see  Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ed.  Herw.  et  Leeuw.,  chapter  10. 

2 Aristotle,  Politics,  II.  7.  6 (1266  b,  17). 

3 Plutarch,  Solon,  24. 

4 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  13. 

5 Grote,  History  of  Greece,  (small  edition)  Vol.  I.  p.  599,  ch.  XI,  following 
Plutarch. 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


178 

he  encouraged  immigration,1  regulated  the  currency,  and 
directed  the  Areopagus  to  chastise  those  who  did  not  live 
by  their  own  labor.  Plutarch  says  that  in  this  way  he 
“ brought  trades  into  credit .” 

Several  laws  of  Solon  have  reference  to  the  family  and  gens. 
Some  of  these  have  already  been  sufficiently  considered.  That 
one  which  relieved  a son  of  the  duty  of  supporting  the  father 
who  had  failed  to  teach  him  a trade,  is  Aryan  in  spirit,2  but 
may  have  received  its  peculiar  form  from  Solon.  Akin  to  this 
law,  is  the  one  which  declares  that  the  illegitimate  son  is  free 
from  the  burden  of  gerotrophy.  Solon  “regulated  also  the 
walks,  feasts,  and  mourning  of  women,  and  took  away  every- 
thing that  was  either  unbecoming  or  immodest  ; when  they 
walked  abroad,  no  more  than  three  articles  of  dress  were 
allowed  them  ; an  obol’s  worth  of  meat  and  drink  ; and  no 
basket  above  a cubit  high  ; and  at  night  they  were  not  to  go 
about  unless  in  a chariot  with  a torch  before  them.”3  This 
law  marks  an  epoch  in  the  history  of  the  Athenian  family. 
Heretofore  the  wife  enjoyed  great  freedom,  went  abroad  at 
pleasure,  and  indulged  her  tastes  apparently  without  hindrance. 
Now  the  old  freedom  of  Homeric  days  began  to  be  restricted. 
The  wife  came  to  be  confined  more  and  more  to  the  house, 
and  her  influence  on  the  public  life  of  Athens  waned  through 
the  succeeding  years.4  Solon  forbade  the  giving  of  large 
dowries,  permitting  the  wife  to  take  with  her  only  three  suits 
of  clothes  and  an  inconsiderable  amount  of  household  stuff. 
His  idea  in  acting  thus  was  that  “marriages  should  not  be  con- 
tracted for  gain  of  an  estate,  but  for  pure  love,  kind  affection, 


1 Plutarch,  Solon,  24  ; cf.  Aristotle,  Politics,  III.  5.  3 (p.  1278  A). 

2 Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte,  pp.  13-14.  See  Plut.,  Solon,  22. 
The  gerotrophy  was  regarded  by  the  Aryans  as  a return  for  rearing. 

3 Plutarch,  Solon,  20. 

4 In  the  time  of  Aeschylus,  her  position  was  still  comparatively  high  ; in  the 
Peloponnesian  war  it  sank  to  its  lowest  point.  Compare  in  illustration  the 
position  of  women  in  the  tragedies  of  Aeschylus  and  Sophocles.  The  humanism 
of  Euripides  was  the  prophecy  of  better  things. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 


179 


and  the  birth  of  children.”  1 The  legislator  saw  that  where 
marriage  was  a matter  solely  of  business  traffic,  society  must 
suffer  greatly  in  consequence.  Yet  the  law  in  time  became  ob- 
solete, and  the  abuse  of  marriage  for  pecuniary  objects  went 
like  a poison  to  the  very  heart  of  Athenian  society.2  Another 
law  ascribed  to  Solon  declares  that  the  illegitimate  son  or 
daughter  is  to  be  debarred  from  inheritance  and  from  partici- 
pation in  the  sacred  rites.3  This  law  seems  to  have  been 
designed  primarily  as  a protection  against  the  foreign  element 
now  pouring  into  Attica.  Lawful  marriage  could  be  con- 
tracted only  with  those  of  civic  birth  or  of  legal  adoption 
into  the  state  family.  Those  who  had  no  religious  or  family 
rights  could  of  course  take  no  part  in  the  government. 

Solon  made  all  his  laws  binding  for  one  hundred  years,4  wrote 
them  on  wooden  tablets,  called  Cyrbeis  by  Aristotle,  and  placed 
them  in  the  King’s  Porch.  The  nine  archons  on  entering 
office  took  an  oath  on  the  stone  where  pieces  of  the  sacrificial 
victim  lay,  that  they  would  dedicate  a golden  statue,  if  they 
should  transgress  any  of  these  laws.5  By  Ephialtes  they  were 
brought  down  to  the  market-place.6 

After  the  completion  of  his  work,  Solon  was  constantly 
annoyed  by  the  visits  of  persons  of  every  description,  some  of 
them  finding  fault  with  the  laws  ; others  asking  questions  as  to 
their  meaning  and  application.7  It  was  his  desire  that  their 


1 Plutarch,  Solon,  20. 

2 To  the  reader  of  Isaeus  and  Demosthenes  (Private  Orations)  this  statement 
will  not  appear  exaggerated.  If  there  was  one  spot  of  madness  (or,  perhaps,  of 
religious  fanaticism)  in  the  Athenian  mind,  it  is  the  desire  to  keep  the  property 
within  the  circle  of  anchisteis.  This  brought  marriage  into  complete  subordination 
to  considerations  of  property. 

3 Pseud.  Dem.  XLIII.  51,  supposed  to  go  back  to  Solon  ; Thalheim,  Die  griech. 
Rechtsalterthiimer,  p.  7 with  note  1. 

4 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  7;  Plut.,  Solon,  25. 

5 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  chs.  7,  55  ; Plut.,  Solon,  25.  Cf.  Plato,  Phaedr.,  235  D ; 
Pollux,  VIII.  86;  Bergk,  Rhein.  Mus.,  XIII.  p.448;  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of 
Athens,  pp.  23-24. 

6 Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  p.  140. 

7 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  11;  Plut.,  Solon,  25. 


8o 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


letter  should  be  obeyed  ; and  since  he  could  not,  as  their  inter- 
preter, enjoin  this  strict  obedience  without  incurring  the  enmity 
of  all  parties,  he  resolved  to  absent  himself  for  the  space  of  ten 
years,  making  a journey  to  Egypt  for  the  purposes  of  trade  and 
observation. 

We  have  noticed  that  before  Solon  there  were  two  factions  ; — 
on  the  one  hand,  the  citizens  under  the  Draconian  constitution, 
on  the  other,  the  mass  of  the  population  still  excluded  from 
everything.  The  first  is  termed  by  Aristotle,  the  Gnorimi , or 
nobles ; the  second,  the  Demus,  or  commons.1  This  application  of 
Gnorimi  is  demonstrated  by  the  statement  of  Aristotle2  that  the 
Gnorimi  and  Eupori  included  the  three  upper  Solonian  classes. 
Aristotle  in  the  Athenian  Politeia , ch.  11,  mentions  these  two 
factions  as  constituting  each  a separate  class  of  malcontents. 
Solon’s  measures  had  given  satisfaction  to  neither.  The  Demus 
had  hoped  for  a re-distribution  of  land  ; the  nobles  desired  a 
restitution  of  the  former  politeia.  Many  also  of  the  nobles 
found  a special  ground  for  complaint  in  the  abolition  of  debts. 
Had  we  nothing  more  than  this  statement  to  depend  upon,  the 
situation  would  be  exceedingly  obscure.  It  would  be  impossible 
to  make  out  who  were  affected  thus  by  the  Seisachtheia  and  who 
were  most  desirous  of  a political  reaction.  But  in  chapter  13, 
Aristotle  mentions  three  classes  of  malcontents,  subdividing 
one  of  the  factions  already  mentioned.  The  first  class  consisted 
of  those  who  were  disappointed  by  the  abolition  of  debts  ; for 
they  had  thereby  been  reduced  to  poverty.  These  were,  most 
certainly,  capitalists  who  had  invested  their  money  on  security 
of  person  and  property,  and  had  accordingly  through  the 
Seisachtheia  lost  their  all.  The  landlords  could  not  have  been 
affected  thus  ; for  they  still  possessed  their  land.  All  the 
Eupatrids  must  have  been  landowners,  and  are  consequently 
excluded  from  this  category  of  sufferers.  The  force  of  this 
reasoning  becomes  more  apparent  when  we  read  the  statement 


Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  n. 


2 Politics,  II.  12  (1274  a,  18  ff.). 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION.  I 8 I 

made  later  on  in  the  same  chapter  that  among  the  partisans  of 
Peisistratus  were  those  who,  made  poor  by  the  abolition  of 
debts,  had  been  induced  by  their  desperate  financial  condition 
to  cast  their  lot  with  a champion  of  the  poor.  It  would  be 
absurd  to  place  these  among  the  Eupatrids.  The  second  class 
of  malcontents  mentioned  in  the  13th  chapter  included  those 
who  were  dissatisfied  with  the  great  change  in  the  constitution. 
And  what  great  change  introduced  by  Solon  is  here  referred  to  ? 
The  abolition  of  clientage  and  the  admission  of  the  Thetes  to 
partial  citizenship  ; for  the  effect  of  the  Seisachtheia  is  stated 
separately.  None  accordingly  but  the  Eupatrids  could  be  dis- 
appointed with  this  change,  robbing  them,  as  it  did,  of  the 
exclusive  privileges  still  remaining  to  them.  The  third  party 
was  made  up  of  chronic  contentionists,  the  poor  of  Attica,  who 
having  nothing  to  lose,  were  ever  ready  for  strife  and  sedition. 
In  the  next  sentence,  Aristotle  identifies  these  three  classes 
with  the  three  local  factions.  The  capitalists  inhabited  the 
Coast  and  were  necessarily  timocrats  >;  the  Eupatrids  dwelt  in 
the  Plain  and  favored  an  oligarchy  ; while  the  poor  occupied 
chiefly  the  Hills  and  entertained  socialistic  and  democratic 
sentiments.  Aristotle’s  explanation  of  the  two  factions  in 
chapter  1 1 . is  now  clear.  The  faction  of  nobles  contained  the 
capitalists,  who  had  suffered  by  the  abolition  of  debts  ; and  the 
Eupatrids  who  had  hoped  for  a restoration  of  the  pre-Draconian 
oligarchy.  It  was  not  the  whole  party  of  nobles  who  enter- 
tained such  hopes  but  only  the  Eupatrids,  who  may  be  con- 
sidered as  giving  character  to  the  faction  of  which  they  formed 
so  important  a part.  Before  the  Solonian  reforms,  the  two 
classes  of  nobles  were  united  by  common  interests  against  the 
Demits.  Nothing  could  have  been  easier  for  Solon  than  to 
usurp  the  throne  by  siding  wholly  with  one  of  these  contending 
parties  against  the  other.  His  friends  among  the  Eupatrids 
urged  him  especially  to  this  course  of  action.  His  indignant 
refusal  shows  a noble,  unselfish  character  ; yet  it  is  questionable 
whether  his  course  was  the  wisest.  The  government  became 
settled  only  under  an  absolute  ruler  ; and  we  are  not  certain 


1 82 


TIIE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


that  Peisistratus,  though  a good  master,  was  better  than  Solon 
might  have  been. 

After  the  departure  of  Solon,  the  government  continued  for 
four  years  in  peaceful  operation.1  But  in  590  a sedition  arising 
prevented  election  to  the  archonship.  Nothing  is  here  known 
of  the  combination  of  parties,  though  we  may  be  certain  that 
oligarchs  were  arrayed  against  democrats  with  the  middle  party 
of  timocrats  taking  one  side  or  the  other.  Again  in  the  year 
586,  the  same  thing  appears  to  have  happened.  In  582 
Damasias  was  elected  to  the  archonship;  and,  in  violation  of 
the  constitution,  continued  in  office  two  years  and  two  months, 
at  the  end  of  which  period  he  was  driven  out  by  force.  A 
board  of  ten  was  then  appointed  for  the  management  of  the 
government  during  the  remainder  of  the  year,  consisting  of 
five  Eupatrids,  three  Agroeci 2 and  two  Demiurgi.  The  inter- 
pretation of  these  facts  can  only  be  conjectural.  Damasias 
could  not  have  continued  so  long  in  office  without  the  support 
of  a powerful  faction.  We  may  suppose  that  this  faction  was 
oligarchic  and  that  his  expulsion  from  office  was  wrought  by  a 
combination  of  the  Demiurgi  and  Agroeci.  We  may  suppose 
also  that  the  Eupatrids  still  monopolized  the  chief  magistracy 
in  spite  of  the  de  jure  eligibility  of  rich  Plebeians.  These 
conjectures  explain  the  composition  of  the  board  of  administra- 
tion, by  which  the  three  ranks  were  represented  in  the  govern- 
ment. If  it  was  intended  as  a permanent  arrangement,  which 
is  indeed  quite  probable,  its  significance  is  greatly  increased. 
If  distinctions  of  rank  had  been  obliterated  by  the  adoption  of 
the  Solonian  timocratic  classification  of  citizens,  the  inferior 
ranks  were  the  gainers;  and  must,  therefore,  have  been  most 
strenuous  in  opposing  a re-acknowledgement  of  such  distinc- 
tions. But  we  find  them  consenting  to  a representation  by 
rank  and  probably  even  clamoring  for  it.  This  cannot  mean 

1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  13. 

2 Called  dwoiKoi,  or  (typoiKoi,  by  Aristotle.  For  the  dates  given  above,  see  Busolt, 
Muller’s  Ildb.,  2 IV.  p.  155;  Bauer,  Literarische  und  historische  Forschungen  zu 
Arist.  ’A 0.  IIoX.,  p.  47  ft.;  cf.,  also,  Swoboda,  Neue  philologische  Rundschau, 
1892,  p.  51. 


THE  SOLONIAN  REVOLUTION. 


183 


that  they  favored  a return  to  the  old  order  of  things,  but  rather 
that  distinctions  of  rank  had  not  been  effaced  de  facto ; and 
that  the  lower  ranks  had  never  been  represented,  fairly  at  least, 
in  the  government.  Political  equality  was  not  attained  at  Rome 
till  the  adoption  of  the  Licinian  Rogations,  a clause  of  which 
provided  that  one  of  the  consuls  must  be  a Plebeian.  So  at 
Athens,  the  institution  of  this  board,  composed  of  Eupatrids 
and  commoners  in  "equal  proportion,  was  a concession  to  the 
latter,  securing  to  them  for  the  first  time  an  adequate  share  in 
the  administration.1  This  form  of  government  continued  only 
through  the  rest  of  the  year,  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  next 
the  ordinary  arrangement  was  resumed.  In  all  the  elections 
of  this  period  the  strife  concerned  chiefly  the  office  of  Archon 
(Eponymous)  thus  showing,  as  Aristotle  says,  that  it  was  the 
chief  magistracy.  But  another  fact  clearly  implied  in  this 
statement,  is  that  the  Solonian  form  of  election  was,  at  least  in 
the  case  of  this  office,  not  adhered  to.  For  how  could  the  strife 
center  about  an  office  filled  by  lot  from  forty  candidates  ? 
Surely  the  people  must  have  had  some  direct  way  of  making  their 
choice  of  Archon  felt,  and  that  could  be  only  by  direct  election. 

1 Kenyon,  Aristotle’s  Ath.  Pol.,  p.  34,  n.,  supposes  that  the  Eupatrids  were 
authors  of  this  scheme,  being  dissatisfied  with  the  Solonian  constitution  in  that  it 
admitted  the  wealthy  commoners  to  a share  in  the  government.  But  this  view 
does  not  go  a step  toward  explaining  the  situation.  We  are  rather  to  regard  the 
Eupatrids  as  still  monopolizing  political  privileges,  now  granted  legally  to  others. 
It  was  only  by  a coalition  of  capitalists  and  laborers  that  these  exclusive  privileges 
could  be  wrested  from  the  Eupatrids  ; and  when  the  coalition  ceased,  the  Eupatrids 
would  again  recover  their  former  position.  On  the  Solonian  Constitution  : Aris- 
totle, Ath.  Pol.,  chs.  5-13;  Plutarch,  Solon;  Grote,  History  of  Greece,  ch- 
XI.,  (small  edition)  I.  pp.  576-612,  (large  edition)  II.  pp.  460-524;  Curtius, 
History  of  Greece,  I.  pp.  339-377  ; Oman,  History  of  Greece,  pp.  106-113  ; Cox, 
Greek  Statesmen,  I.  pp.  1-32;  Busolt,  Griechische  Geschichte,  I.  p.  524  ft.; 
Busolt,  in  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  pp.  144-154  ; Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I. 
p.  129  ft.;  Landwehr,  Philologus,  Supplbd.  V.  (1884)  p.  130  ft.;  Holm,  Griechische 
Geschichte,  I.  p.  466  ft.;  Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthlimer,  p.  371  ft.; 
Philippi,  Beitrage  zu  einer  Geschichte  des  attischen  Burgerrechts,  p.  185  ft.; 
Lehmann,  Zur  ' Ad-qvaLwv  IloXn-ei'a,  in  Hermes,  1892,  XXVII.  pp.  530-560 ; Leyds, 
Zur  altern  attischen  Geschichte,  in  Neue  Jahrbiicher  fur  Philol.  und  Paed.,  1892, 
p.  88  (on  the  archonship  of  Damasias)  ; Bauer,  Literarische  und  historische  For- 
schungen  zu  Aristoteles  ’A drjvalwv  IloXtreta  ; Keil,  Solonische  Verfassungin  Aris- 

toteles  Verfassungsgeschichte  Athens. 


CHAPTER  X. 


THE  TYRANNY. 

Sedition  continued.  Megacles  was  leader  of  the  moderate 
party;  Miltiades,  and  afterwards  Lycurgus,  of  the  oligarchs; 
Peisistratus,  of  the  democrats.  These  three  parties  were 
located  in  the  Shore,  Plain,  and  Hills  respectively.  The 
Diacrians,  or  Hillmen,  were  joined  by  the  Tlietes  throughout 
Attica,  and  by  those  who  had  been  reduced  to  poverty 
through  the  abolition  of  debts,  in  the  hope  that  the  next 
political  game  might  reverse  their  former  ill-luck.  Many 
aliens  also,  who,  under  the  Solonian  government,  had  by  means 
of  their  wealth,  gained  the  politeia>  now  began  to  fear  a reaction 
in  favor  of  oligarchy  and,  with  its  establishment,  a purification 
of  the  list  of  citizens.  Such  persons  joined  the  democratic 
party  expecting  that  their  services  to  Peisistratus  in  his  political 
schemes  would  win  for  themselves  under  his  patronage  security 
in  their  usurped  rights.  Their  offers  of  assistance  were  readily 
accepted. 

Peisistratus  had  acquired  a brilliant  reputation  as  leader  in 
a war  with  Megara,1  probably  about  the  year  565  b.c.2  He 


1 Herodotus,  I.  59. 

2 Holm,  Griechische  Geschichte,  I.  p.  481  ; Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens, 
p.  54.  Plutarch  (Solon,  8)  regards  this  war  as  the  one  preceding  the  archonship 
of  Solon,  and  resulting  in  the  capture  of  Salamis  ; but  this  is  improbable,  and  is 
rejected  by  Aristotle  (Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  17)  on  the  ground  that  Peisistratus  could  not 
have  been  old  enough  at  that  date  (about  600  B.C.)  for  participation  in  military 
service.  Besides,  a reputation  gained  in  600  b.c.  would  have  availed  him  but 
little  in  his  political  manoeuvres  in  the  year  560,  when  the  glory  of  his  achieve- 
ments would  have  grown  dim  in  the  interval  of  forty  years.  But  we  know 
from  Plutarch  (Solon,  12)  that  the  Megarians  again  encroached  upon  Attica,  and 
took  advantage  of  the  civil  confusion  for  the  occupation  of  Salamis  and  Nisaea. 
It  is  quite  likely  that  a third  war  took  place  some  time  after,  in  which  the 
Athenians  under  Peisistratus  regained  Nisaea,  and  won  great  glory  for  their 


THE  TYRANNY. 


I85 

now  presented  himself  as  champion  of  the  poor.  While  acting 
as  their  liberal  benefactor,  he  succeeded  in  winning  the  friend- 
ship of  many  others  through  his  admirable  personal  qualities. 
He  was  candid  and  generous  to  enemies,  forgiving  of  injury, 
and  highly  cultivated  in  manners.* 1  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  his  patronage  of  the  poor  called  forth  bitter  opposition 
from  his  political  opponents,  and  it  is  not  hard  to  believe  that 
his  life  was  actually  in  peril.  One  day  he  came  before  the 
people  in  the  market-place  and  declared  that  his  enemies  had 
been  making  attempts  upon  his  life,  showing,  as  proof,  the 
wounds  which,  he  affirmed,  they  had  inflicted  upon  himself  and 
his  mules.2  His  ruse  was  successful, — the  people,  on  the 
motion  of  Ariston,  voted  him  a body-guard  of  fifty  club-men  3 
in  spite  of  Solon’s  earnest  warnings.  This  took  place  without 
opposition  on  the  part  of  the  nobles.  They  were  probably  not 
expecting  such  an  event,  and  the  few  who  were  present  lacked 
the  boldness  to  prevent  it,  while  the  poor,  it  is  said,  were 
too  ignorant  to  perceive  the  trick.  This  is  the  meaning  of 
Solon’s  statement  that  he  was  wiser  than  one  party  and  bolder 
than  the  other  ; for  he  both  foresaw  the  danger  and  bravely 
strove  to  avert  it.4  The  people  cared  but  little  how  many 
guards  their  patron  chose  to  keep  ; and  in  a brief  season  they 
had  grown  into  a formidable  band.  With  this  he  seized 


leader.  If  we  assume  the  approximate  date  of  this  war  to  be  565,  we  may  readily 
understand  “ how  the  reputation  won  by  his  successful  conduct  of  it  would  help 
him  powerfully  in  his  bid  for  the  tyranny,  which  would  hardly  be  the  case  if  his 
victory  were  some  forty  years  old  Kenyon,  Arist.  on  the  Const,  of  Athens,2 
p.  38,  n. 

1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  16. 

2 Hdt.  I.  59  ; Arist.,  op.  cit .,  ch.  14  ; Plut.,  Solon,  30.  Plutarch  regards  his 
whole  character  as  insincere,  while  no  historian  seems  inclined  to  believe  the  story 
which  he  tells  of  his  enemies’  attempt  upon  his  life.  Plutarch’s  censure  is  too 
severe  ; yet,  on  the  other  hand,  we  may  accept  the  account  of  his  wounding  him- 
self as  well  attested,  and  in  keeping  with  his  other  devices  for  the  attainment  of 
political  objects.  Further  references  to  authorities  are  givenj>y  Sandys,  Arist. 
Const,  of  Athens,  p.  54. 

3 Cf.  Plato,  Rep.  566  B;  Arist.,  Rhet.,  I.  2.  19. 

4 Plut.,  Solon,  30. 


/ 


1 86  THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

the  Acropolis,  and  took  control  of  the  government,  in  the 
archonship  of  Corneas,  560  b.c.1  Megacles  and  the  other 
Alcmaeonidae  went  immediately  into  exile,  and  Peisistratus 
governed  quietly  for  five  full  years.2  He  administered  affairs 
wisely  and  moderately,  adhered  to  the  laws  and  constitutional 
forms,  and  avoided  acting  arbitrarily.  Solon  himself  appears 
to  have  been  happily  deceived  in  the  administrative  character 
of  Peisistratus,  and  to  have  aided  him  with  his  advice  and 
support.3  But  before  his  power  was  well  established,  a coalition 
between  the  oligarchs  and  timocrats  forced  him  into  exile,  in 
555  b.c.  The  length  of  his  first  period  of  exile  has  not  been 
satisfactorily  determined.4  Megacles,  representative  of  the 
capitalists,  naturally  concluded  that  nothing  was  to  be  gained 
by  civil  strife,  and  made  overtures  of  friendship  and  political 
alliance  to  Peisistratus,  offering  his  daughter  in  marriage  to 
the  latter.  The  terms  were  accepted,  and  Peisistratus  returned 
to  Athens  through  an  “old-fashioned  and  exceedingly  simple 
stratagem.”  Having  caused  a report  to  be  circulated  that 
Athena  was  conducting  Peisistratus  back  to  Athens  he  placed 
by  his  side  on  his  chariot  a tall,  beautiful  woman  to  represent 
the  goddess,  and  thus  rode  into  the  city,  the  people  receiving 
the  pair  with  awe  and  reverence.5  He  came,  indeed,  as  a 
beneficent  deity  to  the  people,  delivering  them  from  oppression 
and  the  whole  country  from  civil  strife.  But  his  alliance  with 
Megacles  was  short-lived.  Fearing  the  curse  attaching  to 
the  family  of  the  Alcmaeonidae,  he  failed  to  consummate 
his  marriage  with  the  daughter  of  Megacles,  thus  incurring 
the  enmity  of  the  father.  To  escape  a second  coalition  of 
Eupatrids  and  capitalists,  he  withdrew  in  secret  from  Athens,6 

1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  14  ; Plut.,  Solon,  32  ; cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens, 
p.  55,  n.  on  £ttI  K u/j.£ov. 

2 As  reckoned  by  most  historians,  cf.  Sandys,  op.  cit.,  p.  56. 

3 Plut.,  Solon,  31. 

4 Eleven  years,  according  to  Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  14  ; but  this  is  evidently  too 
great.  The  estimates  of  the  modern  historians  range  from  three  to  six  years. 

3 Cf.  Hdt.  I.  60. 

6 545  B.C.,  according  to  Kenyon,  Arist.  on  the  Const,  of  Athens,2  pp.  39,  40. 


THE  TYRANNY. 


and  settled  in  the  district  about  the  range  of  Pangaeus  in 
Macedonia,  and  spent  many  years  in  working  the  rich  mines  of 
that  section,  using  some  of  the  wealth  thus  acquired  in  hiring 
mercenaries.  Then  coming  to  Eretria,  he  brought  into  his 
alliance  the  knights  of  that  city,  the  Thebans,  Lygdamis  of 
Naxos,  and  many  others.  With  these  forces,  in  addition  to  the 
mercenaries,  he  returned  to  Attica,1  defeated  the  Athenians 
at  Pallenis,  and  once  more  took  control  of  the  government. 
By  one  of  his  clever  stratagems  he  deprived  the  people  of  their 
arms,  then  telling  them  in  the  Ecclesia  what  he  had  done,  bade 
them  not  to  be  surprised  or  dejected,  but  to  go  about  their 
own  duties,  saying  that  he  would  henceforth  attend  to  all 
governmental  affairs.2  No  doubt  he  was  driven  to  the  employ- 
ment of  mercenaries  and  the  disarming  of  citizens  not  by  the 
discontent  of  the  people,  but  by  the  opposition  of  his  political 
adversaries,  Megacles  and  Lycurgus.  He  is  to  be  regarded  as 
a father  to  the  people,  like  the  gentle  Codrus,  whose  successor 
Peisistratus  endeavored  to  be  in  the  strict  sense  of  that 
relation.  Accordingly,  he  took  up  his  abode  on  the  Acropolis, 
on  the  spot  where  the  family  hearth  of  the  ancient  kings  still 
stood,  dedicated  to  Zeus  Herceius , — desiring  that  his  usurped 
power  might  thus  receive  the  strong  sanction  of  religion,  that 
the  pikes  of  mercenaries  might  in  time  be  replaced  by  the 
more  potent  spiritual  force  of  the  commonwealth’s  sacred 
hearth.  He  endeavored,  in  a word,  by  means  of  this  and  other 
acts,  to  convert  the  tyrannis  to  a basileia .3  The  policy  of  his 
former  rule  was  repeated  on  a more  liberal  scale.  He  was 
humane  in  his  ordinances,  ready  to  pardon  offenders,  mild  and 
gentle  in  demeanor,  and  generous  to  the  needy.  While 
pursuing  a foreign  policy  vigorous  for  the  time  and  country, 
his  main  energies  were  directed  to  domestic  improvements. 


1 535  B-c->  according  to  Kenyon,  loc.  cit.  ; 541,  according  to  Gilbert,  Hdb.  d. 
griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  p.  140  ; cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  56.  For  his 
alliances,  see  Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  15  ; Hdt.  I.  61. 

2 Cf.  Polyaenus,  I.  21.  2. 

3 Cf.  Curtius,  History  of  Greece,  p.  389  f. 


i 88 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


The  city  was  renovated,  public  works  erected,  religion,  art, 
architecture,  literature,  and  all  the  known  forms  of  culture 
promoted.1  The  laws  of  Solon  were  enforced  so  far  as  they 
did  not  conflict  with  his  supremacy,  and  the  people  were 
trained  to  peaceful,  quiet  life,  obedience  to  law  and  constitu- 
tional forms.2  The  populace  loved  and  adored  him  as  a 
benefactor,  and  many  of  the  nobles  were  pleased  with  his 
reign,  because  of  the  vast  social  and  intellectual  advantages 
which  their  relation  with  his  court  conferred.  Peace  reigned 
and  the  golden  age  of  Attic  history  had  come.  It  seems  to 
have  been  his  chief  object  to  promote  the  interests  of  agricul- 
ture and  country  life.  With  this  end  in  view,  he  forbade,  on 
the  one  hand,  loitering  in  the  market  place,  and  limited  the 
right  of  residence  in  the  city  ; on  the  other  hand,  he  loaned 
sums  of  money  to  the  peasants  and  bought  them  small  farms  ; 
so  that  these  entered  upon  a remarkable  stage  of  prosperity, 
strongly  contrasted  with  their  wretched,  grovelling  condition 
under  the  oligarchy.3  Nor  did  he  permit  them  to  come  to 
Athens  even  for  the  purpose  of  litigation ; but  appointed 
itinerant  judges  to  pass  through  the  country  settling  disputes. 
Often  he  himself  visited  the  country  with  the  same  object.4 
By  encouraging  the  people  to  attend  to  their  own  interests  and 
by  engaging  the  services  of  many  in  the  construction  of  public 
works,  he  greatly  promoted  their  welfare  and  the  common 
peace  and  quiet  of  the  whole  country.  Faction  ceased.  Those 
nobles  who  were  too  proud  to  submit  retired  into  the  country 
or  went  abroad,5  and  those  who  remained  were  taught  that  the 
laws  of  the  nation  were  more  powerful  than  they.  His  pro- 
motion of  industry  was  partially  an  economic  policy  in  his  own 
interest,  since  he  levied  an  income  tax  of  one-tenth  ; and 
partially  political,  inasmuch  as  his  measures  drew  the  people 


1 Holm,  Griechische  Geschichte,  I.  p.  488  ff. 

2 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  chs.  14,  16  ; Hdt.  I.  59;  Thuc.  VI.  54. 

8 Arist.,  op.  cit.,  ch.  16;  cf.  Politics,  VIII.  (V.)  10  (p.  1311  a,  14). 

4 Cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  63,  notes  on  §§  5-6. 

6 Holm,  op.  cit.,  p.  485  f. 


THE  TYRANNY. 


89 


away  from  the  center  of  political  life  and  fastened  their 
attention  upon  other  things.  It  would  be  absurd  to  suppose 
that  in  all  this,  Peisistratus  was  actuated  by  purely  selfish 
motives  or  the  love  of  present  enjoyment.  His  motives  were 
those  of  a far-seeing  statesman  with  the  permanent  good  of  his 
country  at  heart.  In  such  a spirit,  he  passed  the  ordinance 
providing  for  the  wounded  in  war  and  for  the  families  of  those 
fallen  in  battle.  In  the  same  spirit,  he  himself  conformed  to 
the  laws  of  the  land,  obeying  a citation  before  the  court  of  the 
Areopagus,  and  would  have  submitted  to  his  trial,  had  not  the 
accuser  failed  to  appear.  A selfish  potentate  of  that  age  and 
nationality  must  have  delighted  in  asserting  his  superiority  to 
law  ; but  Peisistratus  never  assumed  an  advantage  over  his 
fellow  citizens.  He  ruled  without  title  or  office,  allowing  the 
machinery  of  government  to  run  as  the  constitution  prescribed, 
but  keeping  some  member  of  his  family  in  one  of  the  higher 
magistracies. 

Peisistratus  had  now  reached  an  advanced  age,  and  died  of 
sickness  in  the  archonship  of  Philoneos,1  527  b.c.,  having  ruled 
nineteen  years.  The  rest  of  the  time  from  his  first  usurpation 
had  been  spent  in  exile.  He  left  four  sons  ; — two,  Hippias 
and  Hipparchus,  of  a woman  of  civic  birth  whom  he  had 
married'  according  to  Athenian  usage  ; and  two,  Iophon  and 
Hegesistratus,  surnamed  Thettalus,  of  an  Argive  woman,  with 
whom  a marriage  could  probably  not  at  this  time  be  legally 
contracted.  For  this  reason,  her  two  sons  are  called  voQoi  as 
the  off-spring  of  a marriage  with  a foreign  woman.2  Hippias 
was  the  eldest  and  best  adapted  by  nature  to  public  life.  He 
accordingly  succeeded  to  his  father’s  power  and  policy,  though 
Hipparchus  was  closely  associated  with  him  as  patron  and 
minister,  so  to  speak,  of  art,  literature,  religion,  and  general 
culture.  It  was  the  latter  who  invited  to  the  court  of  the 


1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  17;  Thuc.  VI.  59  ; Sandys,  op.  cit.,  p.  65  ff. 

2 This  I regard  as  the  best  explanation  of  the  passages  in  Hdt.  V.  94  and  Arist., 
Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  17;  cf.  Sandys,  op.  cit.,  p.  66. 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


I90 

Peisistratidae  the  great  poets,  — Anacreon  and  Simonides, 
among  others  of  less  distinction.1 

The  rule  of  the  sons,  was  wise  and  moderate,  like  that  of  the 
father  ; “ and,  for  tyrants,  these  men  in  the  greatest  degree 
studied  virtue  and  intelligence.  And  though . they  exacted 
from  the  Athenians  only  one-twentieth  of  their  income,  they 
adorned  their  city  in  a beautiful  manner,  and  carried  on  their 
wars  and  provided  sacrifices  for  the  temples.  The  state  enjoyed, 
too,  the  laws  which  had  been  previously  enacted,  in  all  other 
respects,  except  that  they  always  took  care  that  one  of  their 
own  family  should  hold  the  offices.” 2 But  a great  change 
came  with  the  assassination  of  Hipparchus.  Hippias  at  once 
became  suspicious  and  cruel,  killing  and  banishing  many  nobles 
whom  Aristogeiton  had  been  prevailed  upon  by  torture  to 
denounce.  He  did  not  spare  his  own  friends,  but  was  distrustful 
of  all  alike.  His  subjects  felt  keenly  this  change  of  policy  and 
were  now  ready  for  outbreak,  provided  the  slightest  hope  of 
success  should  be  offered.  After  about  three  years  of  harsh 
tyranny,  Hippias,  perceiving  the  menacing  disposition  of  the 
citizens,  began  to  fortify  Munychia  with  the  intention  of 
changing  his  quarters  from  the  Acropolis  to  that  position.  For 
in  case  of  rebellion  or  interference  of  foreign  powers,  he  would 
be  able  to  hold  out  longer  from  the  latter  stronghold,  receiving 
supplies  by  sea  ; and,  if  finally  beaten,  he  could  more  easily 
effect  his  escape  from  Attica  to  a place  of  retreat  which  he  had 
already  prepared  in  Sigeium.  In  the  meantime,  the  Alcmae- 
onidae,  who  had  long  been  in  exile,  were  attempting  to  return 
by  force.  After  several  fruitless  efforts,  they  succeeded, 
through  their  influence  on  the  oracle  at  Delphi,  in  inducing  the 
Lacedaemonians  to  put  down  the  tyranny,  although  the 
Peisistratidae  were  on  terms  of  intimate  friendship  with  the 
Spartan  authorities.  Perhaps  the  alliance  between  Athens  and 
Argos  added  no  little  weight  to  the  injunction  of  the  oracle 
that  “ Athens  must  be  free .” 3 The  Lacedaemonians  under 


Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  18. 


2 Time.  VI.  54. 


8 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  19. 


THE  TYRANNY. 


I9I 

Cleomeries,  their  king,  invaded  Attica,  and  with  the  help  of  the 
Athenians  besieged  Hippias  in  the  Acropolis.  The  children 
of  the  Peisistratidae  while  being  conveyed  through  the 
besieging  lines  fell  into  the  enemies’  hands.  To  secure  their 
safety,  Hippias  agreed  to  surrender  the  Acropolis  and  withdraw 
from  Attica  within  five  days,  taking  his  friends,  mercenaries, 
and  property  with  him.  This  occurred  in  the  archonship  of 
Harpactides,  51 1 b.c.  He  went  first  to  Sigeium,  then  to  his 
son-in-law  Aeantides  at  Lampsacus,  and  finally  to  the  court  of 
King  Darius.1 

The  tyranny  was,  in  a certain  sense,  an  advance  beyond  pre- 
existing forms  of  government.  The  rule  of  the  ancient 
Basileus  had  been  personal,  irresponsible.  The  oligarchy 
introduced  a definite,  preconceived  system  of  government  — a 
constitution,  and  thus  made  a great  improvement  upon  the 
basileia . But  to  the  common  people,  it  was,  for  the  time 
being,  a retrogression,  — the  substitution  of  many  rulers  in 
place  of  one,  of  a soulless  corporation  in  place  of  an  individual 
whose  sympathies  could  be  touched.  The  Draconian  constitu- 
tion widened  the  oligarchy,2  but  increased  the  misery  of  the 
poor.  Solon’s  laws  were  favorable  to  the  commons,  yet  were 
of  little  effect  owing  to  sedition.  The  Peisistratidae  enforced 
the  measures  of  Solon  and  passed  still  further  ordinances  in 
the  interest  of  the  poor.  They  crushed  the  oppressive  power 
of  the  great  nobles,  compelled  them  to  obey  the  laws,  and 
elevated  the  inferior  ranks,  thus  bringing  about  a political  and 
social  equality.  Political  equality  under  their  rule,  meant, 
indeed,  a political  nullity  ; yet  this  leveling  process  affected 
powerfully  the  public  life  of  the  Athenians,  when  once  they 
were  set  free  from  their  political  fetters.  The  Peisistratidae 


1 Thuc.  VI.  59.  I have  not  attempted  a detailed  history  of  the  period  of  tyranny 
at  Athens.  Before  the  discovery  of  Aristotle’s  Politeia  the  main  facts  were  known 
and  the  relation  of  the  tyranny  to  the  development  of  the  constitution  was 
thoroughly  appreciated  by  Curtius  and  others.  Some  interesting  matter  has  been 
added,  but  nothing  to  alter  our  impression  of  the  period  as  a whole. 

2 By  transferring  the  sovereignty  from  the  Areopagus  to  the  Ecclesia. 


192 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


forced  the  whole  nation  into  constitutional  grooves,  compelling 
the  people  to  follow  these  till  it  became  with  them  a second 
nature.  They  also  promoted  morality,  religion,  intelligence, 
and  culture  in  general,  all  of  which  are  essential  to  an  individual 
or  a nation  that  would  prosper  in  self-government.  They 
pursued  a policy  of  internal  improvement  which  greatly 
heightened  the  material  welfare  of  the  people,  and  especially  of 
the  peasant  class.  On  the  other  hand,  certain  disadvantages 
are  inherent  in  the  nature  of  tyranny.  One  of  these  is  the 
political  stagnation  of  the  people.  A slave  can  hardly  be  a 
perfect  man,  though  he  abound  in  all  other  blessings  of  life  ; 
and  the  uncertainties  connected  with  his  existence  rob  him  of 
happiness.  So  the  Athenians  could  not  at  any  time  have  been 
perfectly  satisfied  with  the  rule  of  the  Peisistratidae  ; and  the 
harsh  and  bitter  policy  of  Hippias  in  the  last  three  years  of  his 
reign  justified  them  in  their  fears,  and  in  after  ages  filled  their 
memories  of  the  tyranny  to  the  utter  oblivion  of  all  the 
advantages  which  it  had  conferred.1 


1 Details  of  this  period  may  be  found  in  Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  chs.  14-19;  Plutarch, 
Solon,  30  ff. ; Herodotus,  I.  59  ff. ; Grote,  ch.  XXX.,  (small  edition)  II.  pp.  58-70, 
(large  ed.)  III.  pp.  324-345  ; Cox,  Greek  Statesmen,  I.  pp.  33-58  ; Curtius, 
History  of  Greece,  I.  pp.  371-400  ; Plass,  Die  Tyrannis,  I.  pp.  186-211  ; Landwehr, 
Philol.,  Supplb.  V.  p.  102  n. ; Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece,  pp.  82,  87,  137-8, 
144  ; Busolt,  Griechische  Geschichte,  I.  pp.  540-623 ; Holm,  Griechische  Ge- 
schichte,  I.  pp.  484-502  (see  especially  list  of  authorities,  p.  501)  ; Thumser,  Die 
griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  pp.  391—5  ; Sandys,  Aristotle’s  Constitution  of  Athens, 
notes  on  chs.  14-19. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


THE  CLEISTHENEAN  CONSTITUTION  AND  ITS  DEVELOPMENT  TO 
THE  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS. 

The  fall  of  the  tyranny  was  followed  by  a renewal  of  the 
party  strife.  Cleisthenes,  leader  of  the  Paralians  and  champion 
of  the  Demits , was  opposed  to  Isagoras,  leader  of  the  Pedi- 
aeans  and  friend  of  the  Peisistratidae,  in  a contest  for  the 
archonship  for  the  year  508. 1 From  this  it  appears  that  the 
Solonian  mode  of  filling  the  archonship  was  still  in  abeyance. 
Isagoras,  with  the  assistance  of  political  clubs,  gained  the  day. 
Cleisthenes  then  appealed  to  the  people,  promising  them  the 
politeia  in  return  for  their  support.  His  immediate  object 
seems  to  have  been  to  keep  Isagoras  from  occupying  the  office 
to  which  he  had  been  elected.  In  this  he  might  have  suc- 
ceeded, had  not  Isagoras,  being  inferior  in  power,  called  for 
help  on  his  friend,  Cleomenes,  king  of  Sparta,  and  induced  the 
latter  to  force  the  expulsion  of  the  Alcmaeonidae  on  the  osten- 
sible ground  of  the  curse  attaching  to  their  gens.  As  Cleo- 
menes entered  Attica,  Cleisthenes  fled  with  a few  friends  and 
relatives.  The  Spartan  king  then  expelled  700  families  of  the 
Athenians  designated  by  Isagoras  as  supporters  of  Cleisthenes. 
After  this  he  attempted  to  destroy  the  Boule  of  400, 2 to  over- 
throw the  Solonian  constitution  and  to  establish  an  oligarchy  of 
300  with  Isagoras  at  the  head.3  But  the  government  was,  for 
the  first  time  in  Athenian  history,  able  to  take  care*  of  itself 
without  the  aid  of  nobles.  The  Boule  of  400  opposed  the 


1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  20  ; Sandys,  op.  cit .,  p.  77,  n.  on  XXI.  § 1. 

2 Herodotus  and  Aristotle  mention  the  Boule  without  further  definition.  It 
could  hardly  have  been  the  Areopagus  since  the  latter  was  now  filled  with  friends 
of  the  tyrant. 

3 Hdt.  V.  72. 


94 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


oligarchic  movement,  collected  the  people  and  forced  Cleo- 
menes  and  Isagoras  to  take  refuge  in  the  Acropolis.  It  then 
laid  siege  to  the  citadel  and  on  the  third  day  Cleomenes  and 
Isagoras  agreed  to  withdraw  from  Attica.  The  adherents  of 
the  latter  were  abandoned  to  their  fate,  and  the  exasperated 
Athenians  put  them  all  to  death.  Cleisthenes  and  the  exiled 
families  were  recalled.  He  had  gained  great  popularity  as 
champion  of  the  people’s  rights,  and  was  chosen  forthwith  as 
their  leader  and  legislator.  All  this  happened  in  the  year  508. 
Rpforp  its  rlfvqp  he  had  given  to  the  country  a constitution  far 
more  democratic  in  its  tbRri  that  0f  Solo n . 

^ He  first  instituted  ten  new  phylae  in  place  of  the  four  old 
ones,1  which  were  permitted  to  remain  merely  as  religious  or- 
ganizations. He  allowed  also  the  gennetae  to  continue  in  their 
own  gentes  and  phratries,  and  to  retain  their  sacred  rites 
according  to  ancient  usage  ; 2 but  seems  to  have  created  new 
phratries  for  those  who  were  not  members  of  any  gens.3  For 
the  institution  of  new  tribes,  he  first  divided  Attica  into  demes, 
probably  more  than  one  hundred  in  number.4  Some  of  these 
he  found  already  existing  as  component  parts  of  the  naucrary, 
or  old  Attic  town,  while  some  he  may  have  erected  by  the 
union  or  subdivision  of  other  localities.  Those  not  already 
furnished  with  a name,  he  designated  by  the  name  of  the  place 
or  of  the  most  important  gens  inhabiting  it.5  Of  these  demes 
were  formed  thirty  trittyes , ten  to  each  of  the  three  local  dis- 
tricts of  Attica.  The  trittyes  were  then  assigned  by  lot  to 
the  tribes,  in  such  a manner  that  every  tribe  contained  three 


1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  21  ; Hdt.  V.  66, 69  ; cf.  Arist.,  Politics,  III.  2 (p.  1275  b,  37). 

2 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  21. 

3 Arist.,  Politics,  VII.  4 (p.  1319b,  20  ff.);  cf.  Buermann,  Die  attischen  Neubiirger 
und  die  Kleisthenischen  Phratrien,  Jahrbiicher  fur  classische  Philologie,  Supplb. 
IX.  p.  610  ff.;  Busolt  in  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  pp.  160-1,  207  ff.;  Sandys,  Arist. 
Const,  of  Athens,  p.  83,  n.  onro  5£  7 tvrj — Trarpia. 

4 Hdt.  V.  69  (the  interpretation  is  uncertain) ; Busolt,  op.  cit.,  p.  1 58,  holds  the 
view  that  there  were  100;  cf.,  however,  Grote,  ch.  XXXI.,  (small  edition)  II.  pp. 
73-4,  and  Sandys,  op.  cit.,  pp.  79-80,  n.  on  § 4. 

0 Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  403. 


THE  CLEISTHENEAN  CONSTITUTION. 


95 


trittyes , one  from  each  local  division.  His  object  in  the  insti- 
tution of  new  tribes  was  to  obliterate  distinction  of  rank.  In 
the  old  gentile  organization,  the  Eupatrids  counted  for  every- 
thing ; and  the  new  citizens  appeared  as  intruders,  contami- 
nating by  their  presence  the  sacra  of  the  religious  tribes.  The 
sentiment  continually  found  expression  that  only  members  of 
the  gentes  should  share  in  the  privileges  of  tribal  membership, 
and  thus  in  the  general  government.  In  the  new  tribes,  there 
lingered  no  such  associations  of  caste  and  religion  ; but  all 
were  to  stand  on  the  same  footing  so  far  as  property  qualifica- 
tions allowed.  Equality  was  promoted  by  adding  the  name  of 
the  deme  to  that  of  the  individual,  in  place  of  his  father’s  name 
as  formerly.  In  this  way  the  new  citizens  could  not  be  distin- 
guished from  the  noblest  Eupatrids.  All  free  inhabitants  of  a 
deme  at  the  time  of  its  erection  were  enrolled  in  its  register 
and  became  thereby  members  of  the  deme  and  citizens  of 
Athens.  There  were  enrolled  also  many  aliens  and  slaves 
lately  enfranchised,  as  it  would  seem.  Aristotle 1 tells  us  that 
Cleisthenes  admitted  these  to  the  tribes.  Their  admission  to 
the  phratry  and  thus  to  the  lepa  koI  oo-io,  was  probably  subject  to 
conditions  unknown  to  us.  Certain  decrees  conferring  the  citi- 
zenship granted  admission  to  any  phratry  which  the  individual 
might  choose  except  those  especially  reserved  by  law.  Later 
decrees  allowed  free  choice  of  phratry,  as  well  as  of  deme  and 
tribe.  The  purpose  of  the  phratry  was  to  watch  over  the 
purity  of  citizenship  and  to  maintain  the  civic  rights  of  Athe- 
nian youths  till  their  enrollment  in  the  deme-book.  It  also 
maintained  the  sacra  of  Apollo  Patroiis  and  Zeus  Herceius , a 
participation  in  which  was  an  essential  qualification  to  office.2 


1 Politics,  III.  2 (p.  1275  b,  37). 

2 On  the  phratry  since  Cleisthenes  : Philippi,  Beitrage  zu  einer  Geschichte  des 
attischen  Biirgerrechts,  p.  172  ff. ; Buermann,  op.  cit.,  pp.  597-619;  Szanto,  Unter- 
suchungen  iiber  das  attische  Burgerrecht ; Zur  attischen  Phratrien  und  Geschlechts- 
verfassung,  Rhein.  Mus.,  XL.  p.  506  ff.;  Sauppe,  De  phratriis  atticis  commentatio; 
Tarbell,  A Study  of  the  Attic  Phratry,  American  Journal  of  Archaeology,  Vol.  V. 
No.  2,  pp.  1 35— 1 53  ; Paton,  The  Deceleian  Inscription  and  the  Attic  Phratries, 


96 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


The  demes  were  erected  for  religious,  military,  financial,  and 
general  administrative  purposes,  and  took  * the  place  of  the 
former  naucraries.* 1  It  is  distinctly  implied  in  the  statement 
of  Aristotle  and  others  that  the  naucraries  were  altogether 
abolished  by  Cleisthenes  or  set  apart  from  all  connection  with 
the  government.  Besides,  the  number  of  naucraries  to  the 
tribe  is  absolutely  irreconcilable  with  the  number  of  trittyes  to 
the  tribe.  Still  further,  the  naucrary,  in  order  to  be  a “dis- 
trict ” at  all,  must  have  its  two  demes  adjacent.  We  know 
that  a systematic  arrangement  of  the  demes  in  pairs  must  have 
conflicted  with  the  arrangement  of  demes  in  trittyes , as  stated 
by  Aristotle.  We  have  no  ground  for  supposing  that  the 
naucrary  was  ever  a “marine  district.”  It  was  rather  an  ad- 
ministrative district  and  was  superseded  in  this  capacity  by  the 
Cleisthenean  deme. 

The  distribution  of  demes  among  the  tribes  has  been  ex- 
plained above.  The  object  of  this  systematic  promiscuity  of 
arrangement  was  twofold.  First,  every  tribe  had  one  trittys  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  capital,  that  it  might  the  more  conveniently 
secure  a representation  in  the  Ecclesia.  Had  the  tribes  em- 
braced each  a continuous  territory,  some  of  them  must  have 
been  remote  from  Athens.  It  would  be  difficult  for  these  to 
send  even  a small  delegation  to  the  national  assembly,  or  to 
hear  of  an  extra  session  called  in  haste.  Solon  found  it  diffi- 


Classical  Review,  V.  pp.  221-3;  Busolt  in  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  pp.  160-1,  205- 
21 1 ; Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthumer,  p.  397  ff.;  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of 
Athens,  p.  83. 

1 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  21,  says  “he  instituted  demarchs  exercising  the  same 
functions  as  the  former  naucrars,  and  he  created  demes  in  place  of  the  naucraries.” 
The  testimony  of  later  writers,  with  one  exception,  confirms  the  statement  of  Aris- 
totle, if,  indeed,  there  is  need  of  confirmation.  Pollux,  VIII.  103,  says, 
“ Demarchs  are  rulers  of  demes.  They  were  formerly  called  naucrars,  while  the 
demes  were  also  called  naucraries.”  Hesychius,  s.  v.,  says  the  demarchs  are 
“ those  who  were  formerly  called  naucrars  ” ; cf.  Photius,  s.  vatKpapoi.  Only 

Cleidemus  states  that  each  of  the  new  tribes  contained  five  naucraries,  and  each 
naucrary  two  demes.  Busolt,  Muller’s  Hdb.,  *IV.  p.  120,  and  n.  5,  says, 
accordingly,  that  the  naucraries  were  retained  only  as  marine  districts,  endeavor- 
ing tli  us  to  save  the  bad  authority  of  Cleidemus.  But  in  this  he  has  not  succeeded. 


THE  CLEISTHENEAN  CONSTITUTION. 


197 


cult  in  his  time  to  interest  the  common  people  in  governmental 
affairs,  and  now  it  seemed  unlikely  that  men  would  leave  their 
work  and  travel  in  any  great  numbers  from  the  remote  parts 
of  Attica  to  attend  an  assembly,  especially  when  they  received 
no  compensation  for  their  time.  Thus  it  would  happen  that 
the  tribes  occupying  Athens  and  vicinity  would  practically 
control  the  government  in  their  own  interests.  All  this  was 
prevented  by  the  arrangement  whereby  each  tribe  could  be 
represented  by  the  demes  in  and  near  Athens,  whose  %aot<u 
might  attend  the  Ecclesia  without  discomfort  or  self-sacrifice. 
A still  more  important  reason,  and  the  only  one  usually  given, 
is  that  such  a distribution  of  the  component  parts  of  the  sev- 
eral tribes  destroyed  all  possibility  of  local  faction.  Cleis- 
thenes  remembered  the  strife  between  the  men  of  the  Hills, 
Shore,  and  Plain,  with  its  resulting  evils,  and  resolved  once 
for  all  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  its  recurrence.  His  far- 
sighted statesmanship  in  this  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  no 
local  disturbance  ever  arose  in  Attica  from  that  day  forth. 
The  synoecism  of  Attica  was  now  completed  beyond  every 
fear  of  a relapse.  The  tribes  were  created  for  the  same  pur- 
poses as  the  demes.  Accordingly,  they  served  as  a foundation 
for  the  military,  financial,  and  general  administrative  organ- 
ization of  the  state.  Like  the  deme  also,  they  possessed  a 
religious  character  and  celebrated  sacred  rites  and  festivals. 
Cleisthenes  desiring  the  sanction  of  a higher  authority  than 
man  in  naming  the  new  tribes,  consulted  the  oracle  at  Delphi. 
Apollo  answered  by  selecting  ten  eponymous  heroes  for  the 
tribes  from  a list  of  one  hundred  archegetae , or  “founders,” 
sent  to  him  by  the  Athenians.1 


1 Authorities  on  the  Cleisthenean  demes,  trittyes  and  phylae : Hermann,  Polit- 
ical Antiquities  of  Greece,  p.  217  ff.;  Schomann,  Assemblies  of  the  Athenians, 
pp.  353-361;  Athenian  Constitutional  History,  p.  64  ff.;  Grote,  History  of  Greece, 
ch.  XXXI.,  (small  edition)  II.  p.  71  ff.,  (large  edition)  III.  p.  347  ff.;  Cox,  Greek 
Statesmen,  I.  pp.  61-5;  Holm,  Griechische  Geschichte,  I.  pp.  504-6;  Landwehr, 
Philologus,  Supplb.  V.  p.  161  ff.;  Philippi,  Beitrage  zu  einer  Geschichte  des 
attischen  Biirgerrechts,  pp.  147,  155  ff.,  239  f. ; Szanto,  Untersuchungen  iiber  das 


198 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


It  has  been  generally  supposed  that  Cleisthcnes  through 
these  measures  effected  a complete  transformation  in  the 
character  of  the  state,  that  he,  in  a word,  converted  the  clan 
state  into  a political  state.  I wish  to  show  that  this  view 
is  erroneous. 

1 . The  new  tribes  and  demes  were  patterned  after  the  old 
tribes  and  gentes.  As  the  old  tribes  and  gentes  were  origi- 
nally local  as  well  as  religious,  so  were  the  new  tribes  and 
demes  originally  local  as  well  as  religious.  As  the  former 
ceased  in  time  to  be  purely  local,  so  did  the  latter.  With 
the  old  organization,  the  local  idea  was  obliterated  more  than 
with  the  new;  but  this  is  due  to  greater  age  and  to  outside 
influences.  The  local  character  of  the  deme  was  also  in  time 
weakened  by  the  fact  that  membership  in  a deme  did  not 
change  with  change  of  residence.  Thus  it  had  in  this  respect 
the  purely  family  and  not  territorial  character. 

2.  In  the  manner  of  admission  to  citizenship  the  two  organ- 
izations were  alike.  There  remained,  as  before,  but  two  sources 
of  citizenship,  viz.,  birth  and  adoption.  The  phratry  had  in 
its  keeping  the  lepa  7rarpwa,  without  which  no  man  could  enter 
the  offices  of  state.  And  whether  the  phratry  exercised  the 
right  to  select  its  members,  as  Philippi  supposes,  or  whether  a 
new  citizen  secured  admission  to  the  phratry  of  his  choice 
through  a decree  of  the  people,  as  Buermann  maintains,  it  all 
amounts  to  the  same  thing  so  far  as  the  present  question  is 
concerned.  In  any  case,  the  phratry  adopted  the  new  citizen 
into  itself, — one  of  the  sub-families  of  the  state,  — and  into 
its  religious  worship  ; and  as  participants  in  a common  worship, 
the  phrateres  regarded  one  another  as  kinsmen.  All  this  is 


attische  BUrgerrecht,  p.  32  ff . ; Die  Kleisthenischen  Trittyen,  Hermes,  XXVII. 
pp.  312-5;  Dittenberger,  Die  Kleisthenischen  Phylen,  Hermes,  IX.  p.  385  ff.; 
Leake,  On  the  Demi  of  Attica,  in  Transactions  of  the  Royal  Society  of  Litera- 
ture, 2 1.  11.  p.  1 1 4 ff . ; M.  H.  E.  Meier’s  Ross,  Die  Demen  in  Attika  und  ihre 
Vertheilung  unter  die  Phylen  ; Sauppe,  De  demis  urbanis ; Gilbert,  Hdb.,  I.  p. 
189  ff.;  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  p.  2 t t ff . ; Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer, 
p.  400  ff.;  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  pp.  78-82,  notes. 


THE  CLEISTHENEAN  CONSTITUTION. 


199 


easily  understood  of  the  phratry,  when  we  reflect  that  it 
consisted  originally  of  kindred  alone,  and  that  the  principle  of 
fictitious  adoption  was  most  potent  in  ancient  times.  There 
seems  at  first  sight  some  objection  to  calling  the  deme  a 
fictitious  gens  ; yet  it  was  by  no  means  absolutely  fictitious. 
Many  a deme  was  inhabited  by  a Eupatrid  gens  with  those  who 
were  its  former  dependents  and  sharers  in  its  worship.  With 
the  tribe,  fiction  played  a still  greater  part,  yet  even  the 
tribesmen  felt  a certain  kinship  for  one  another  as  participants 
in  the  tribal  worship,1  and  they  must  certainly  have  cherished 
as  warm  a faith  in  their  heroes  as  the  Eupatrids  in  those  of  a 
more  ancient  adoption. 

3.  No  provision  was  made  whereby  an  alien  might  in  future 
acquire  citizenship  by  residence  in  a deme.  The  Athenians 
were  as  exclusive  as  ever.  Nay,  they  grew  more  and  more 
exclusive  as  time  went  on.  The  Eupatrid  of  old  believed  that 
his  religion  was  desecrated  by  the  presence  of  a stranger,  and 
therefore  aliens  must  be  forever  shut  out  from  participation  in 
the  government.  The  Athenian  in  the  time  of  Demosthenes 
excluded  strangers  from  the  citizenship  for  the  protection  of 
his  tepa  Kat  6W.2  What  was  the  difference  then  between  the 
oligarchic  and  the  democratic  state  in  regard  to  the  family 
character  and  in  regard  to  its  relations  with  aliens  in  blood  and 
religion?  None,  whatever.  There  had  been  an  adoption  of 
many  new  citizens  into  the  state  family.  There  had  been  a 
reconstruction  of  the  state  to  bring  about  the  equalization  of 
ranks.  In  all  this  there  had  been  an  extensive  application  oT 
the  “legal  fiction,”  but  the  character  of  the  state  remained 
the  same. 

In  immediate  connection  with  the  new  tribal  arrangement, 
is  mentioned  the  re-organization  of  the  probouleutic  Senate, 
whereby  it  was  to  consist  of  500  in  place  of  400,  fifty  from 


1 See  above  p.  1,  n.  1. 

2 (Demosthenes)  LIX.  92  and  106  ; cf.  Dem.  LVII.  3. 


200 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


each  phyle.  The  manner  of  appointment  is  not  mentioned 
and  must  therefore  have  been  by  lot,  as  formerly,  since  any 
peculiarity  in  the  mode  of  election  would  have  been  noticed  by 
Aristotle.1  It  certainly  performed  probouleutic  functions  at 
this  time  ; and  began  naturally,  in  the  absence  of  frequent 
sessions  of  the  Ecclesia,  to  assume  large  administrative  power. 
It  may  be  stated  with  confidence  that  the  senate  of  500  exer- 
cised some  judicial  functions,  just  as  every  other  administrative 
power  in  the  state.  At  one  time  in  its  history,  we  know  not 
when,  it  possessed  authority  to  punish  by  fine,  imprisonment, 
and  even  death,  which  authority  was  afterwards  taken  from  it 
and  given  to  the  popular  courts.2  It  is  possible  or  even  likely 
that  this  power  dates ’from  the  time  of  Cleisthenes  and  that  it 
was  his  intention  to  transfer  the  whole  judicial  authority  of  the 
Areopagus  to  the  new  senate.  Such  a supposition  is  in  har- 
mony with  his  democratic  policy  and  with  his  well-known 
hostility  to  the  Areopagus.  While  therefore  the  senate  of 
500  may  have  started  with  extraordinary  judicial  competence 
which  was  afterwards  transferred  to  the  popular  courts,  its 
recognized  executive  and  supervisory  powers  were  gradually 
limited  by  the  rise  of  the  popular  assembly.  Several  years 
after  the  reforms  of  Cleisthenes,  in  the  archonship  of  Hermou- 
creon,  probably  501  b.c.,3  the  oath  which  the  Boule  was 
required  to  take  assumed  that  form  which  continued  through 
all  the  remaining  time  of  the  democracy.  Its  chief  provisions 
seem  to  have  been,  to  perform  the  senatorial  functions  according 
to  the  law,  to  maintain  the  Solonian  constitution,  to  work  for 
the  highest  good  of  the  people,  to  reject,  in  the  docimasy  of  the 
succeeding  Boule>  any  unworthy  candidate.4 


1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  21. 

2 Id.  ch.  45. 

3 Kenyon,  Arist.  on  the  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  57,  n. 

4 Gilbert,  Handbuch  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  p.  252.  Gilbert  adds  the  clause 
prohibiting  the  imprisonment  of  citizens  except  under  specified  circumstances  ; yet 
this  probably  did  not  belong  originally  to  the  oath. 

Authorities  on  the  Boule  of  500  : Hermann,  Political  Antiquities  of  Greece, 
pp.  244-252  ; Grote,  History  of  Greece,  ch.  XXXI.,  (small  edition)  II.  p.  78,  (large 


THE  CLEISTHENEAN  CONSTITUTION. 


201 


The  Boule  of  the  Areopagus  had,  under  the  tyranny,  become 
filled  with  friends  of  the  Peisistratidae,  and  must  therefore  have 
now  appeared  as  an  enemy  to  the  new  government.  Probably 
no  measures  were  passed  in  relation  to  it  ; but  its  authority 
was  silently  disregarded.  Feeling  that  any  self-assertion  at 
this  time  would  be  suicidal,  that  body  cautiously  held  itself  in 
the  background,  while  it  gradually  changed  in  character  and 
political  sentiment  by  the  reception  of  ex-archons  who  had  filled 
office  under  a more  popular  constitution. 

The  Ecclesia,  meeting  probably  once  in  each  prytany,  or 
tenth  of  a year,  was  composed,  theoretically,  of  all  the  citizens, 
including  those  newly  admitted.  It  now  enjoyed  far  greater 
freedom  of  action  than  formerly,  owing,  first,  to  the  equaliza- 
tion of  ranks  within  the  citizen  body,  secondly,  to  the  abeyance 
of  the  inhibitory  power  of  the  Areopagus,  and  thirdly,  to  the 
practical  annulment  of  the  Solonian  law,  forbidding  legislation 
for  a hundred  years.  Although  no  constitutional  restriction  of 
membership  existed,  it  was  virtually  composed,  in  the  main,  of 
well-to-do  citizens  dwelling  in  Athens  and  vicinity.  From  the 
earliest  times  the  people  of  Attica  had  lived  in  villages,  the 
synoecism  gathering  into  the  capital  the  noble  and  wealthy, 
leaving  the  peasant  and  artisan  class,  for  the  most  part, 
untouched.  In  the  factional  times,  beginning  in  the  pre- 
Draconian  period  and  lasting  till  the  usurpation  of  Peisistratus, 
there  must  have  been  a gathering  of  the  poor  into  the  city,  so 
far  as  these  enjoyed  liberty  of  movement.  The  emancipation 
of  clients,  without  any  provision  for  their  comfort,  fostered  this 
tendency,  to  the  personal  advantage  of  any  demagogue  who 
might  bid  for  their  support.  But  Peisistratus,  statesman,  as 
well  as  demagogue,  checked  this  ochlocratic  tendency  by  salu- 
tary laws,  and  especially  by  his  rural  policy;  and  thus  restored 


edition)  III.  pp.  357-358  ; Cox,  Greek  Statesmen,  I.  pp.  65-66  ; Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I. 
pp.  144,  251  ff.  and  in  Philologus,  XXXIX.  p.  131  ff.  ; Meier  und  Schomann, 
Attische  Process  (Lipsius),  pp.  1 33-142  ; Busolt  in  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  pp.  159, 
248  ff.  ; Griechische  Geschichte,  I.  p.  617  ff. ; Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalter- 
thiimer,  p.  478  ff.  ; Headlam,  Election  by  Lot  at  Athens,  p.  41  ff. 


202 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


country  life  to  more  than  its  former  vigor  and  prosperity. 
Hence  on  the  restoration  of  the  constitution,  Attica  was 
divided,  for  the  most  part,  into  small  estates  tilled  by  their 
proprietors,  who  loved  the  country,  and  held  aloof  from  city 
noise  and  city  politics.  There  was  no  pauper  class  living  on 
the  government  purse,  or  on  the  price  of  their  votes.  Thus, 
only  men  of  wealth  and  leisure,  men  interested,  therefore,  in 
the  stability  of  the  government,  took  part  regularly  in  the 
Ecclesia  and  courts.  This  is  the  kind  of  democracy  which 
Aristotle  pronounces  first  and  best.  “A  democracy  (of  this 
sort)  may  be  framed  where  the  majority  live  by  tillage  or 
pasturage;  for,  as  their  property  is  but  small,  they  have  no 
leisure  perpetually  to  hold  public  assemblies,  but  are  con- 
tinually employed  in  following  their  own  business,  not  having 
otherwise  the  means  of  living;  nor  are  they  desirous  of  what 
another  enjoys,  but  prefer  to  follow  their  own  business  rather 
than  meddle  with  state  affairs,  and  accept  offices  which  will  be 
attended  with  no  great  profit.  For  the  greater  part  of  man- 
kind are  desirous  of  riches  rather  than  honor.  . . . Besides, 
their  right  of  electing  magistrates,  and  calling  them  to  account, 
will  satisfy  them,  if  they  feel  any  desire  of  honors.”  1 The 
work  of  the  Ecclesia  was  mainly  legislative.  Business  of  ordi- 
nary importance  was  generally  dispatched  by  the  senate  in  the 
name  of  the  popular  assembly,  while  the  latter  body  had  not 
yet  a thought  of  intruding  in  the  province  of  archon  or  other 
magistrate,  but  kept,  itself  modestly  within  that  sphere  of 
activity  belonging  by  nature  to  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people.2 


1 Arist.,  Politics,  VI.  4 (p.  1318  b,  10  ff.). 

2 Authorities  on  the  Ecclesia:  Schomann,  Assemblies  of  the  Athenians,  I.  chs. 
I.— III.,  VI.;  Griechische  Alterthiimer,  3 1.,  pp.  402-425;  Grote,  History  of  Greece, 
ch.  XXXI.,  (small  edition)  II.  pp.  78-9,  (large  edition)  III.  pp.  358-360  ; Her- 
mann, Political  Antiquities  of  Greece,  pp.  252-264;  Freeman,  Historical  Essays, 
second  series,  p.  128;  Ilartel,  Studien  iiber  attisches  Staatrecht  und  Urkundwesen; 
Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I.  p.  268 ff.;  W.  Vischer,  Kleine  Schriften,  I.  p.  402ft.;  O.  Miller, 

De  decretis  atticis  quaestiones  epigraphicae  ; Busolt  in  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  p. 
257  ft.;  Thumser,  Die  griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  504^. 


e year  501  b.c.*  They  were  then 
Kara  <f>v\ as  — one  from  each  tribe  and 


V[  / 

THE  CLEISTHENEAN  CONSTITUTION.  203 

The  Dicasteria  continued  Ifo  exercise  the  euthyna  of  magis- 
trates, and  to  receive  appeals  from  their  judicial  decisions.1 

The  nine  archons  continued  as  the  chief  executive  magis- 
trates of  the  nation.  Theyjfwere  now  chosen  by  election  and 
seem  to  have  possessed  rhe  same  powers  and  functions  as 
under  the  Solonian  constitution,  subject  to  the  Senate  of 
500  instead  of  the  Areopagus.  The  ten  generals  were  not 
instituted  till  the  archopship  of  Hermoucreon,  supposed  by 
Kenyon  to  belong  to  ,m'ir  15  r* 2 
elected  by  tribes 
were  subordinate  to  thd  Polemarch,  who  remained  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  army  till  after  the  battle  of  Marathon.  As  the 
Zeugitae  were  still  excluded  from  the  archonship,  so  the  office 
of  general  must  have  been  filled  only  by  men  of  wealth. 

The  remaining  subject  of  interest  connected  with  the 
Cleisthenean  system  is  ostracism.  It  was  devised  for  the 
protection  of  the  constitution  against  the  friends  of  the 
tyrants,  who  must  have  formed  a numerous  and  powerful 
party.  Their  leader  was  Hipparchus,  son  of  Charmus,  a 
kinsman  of  the  Peisistratidae.  Cleisthenes’  immediate  object 
in  introducing  ostracism  was  to  expel  this  man  because  of  his 
dangerous  enmity  to  the  government.  But  no  open  act  of 
hostility  on  his  part  occurred  which  would  warrant  the  appli- 
cation of  the  measure  ; and  the  demits  with  its  accustomed 
leniency  allowed  all  those  partisans  of  the  tyrants  who  were 
disposed  to  keep  the  peace  to  remain  quietly  in  the  city.  The 
return  of  Hippias  with  a Persian  army  must  have  awakened 
them  to  a sense  of  danger,  especially  when  they  discovered 
that  there  were  men  within  Athens  ready  to  betray  their 


1 Authorities  on  the  Dicasteria  : Grote,  History  of  Greece,  chs.  XXXI.,  XLVI., 
(small  edition)  II.  pp.  79  ff.,  440  ff.,  (large  edition)  III.  pp.  359  ft.,  IV.  pp.  456-486; 
Meier  und  Schomann,  Der  attische  Process  (ed.  Lipsius);  M.  Frankel,  Die 
attischen  Geschworengerichte  ; Cox,  Greek  Statesmen,  I.  p.  66  ; Gilbert,  op.  cit., 
I.  p.  357  ff.;  Busolt  in  Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  p.  267  ff.;  Thumser,  op.  cit., 
p.  538  ff. 

2 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  22. 


204 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


country  to  the  barbarians,  if  oftly  the  tyrant  might  regain 
his  power.  Even  then  no  immediate  steps  were  taken  to 
punish  the  traitors,  probably  because  the  Athenians  were 
satisfied  with  their  unexpected  success  and  anticipated  no 
further  danger  from  Hippias  or  the  Persians.  But  when  they 
learned  two  years  later  that  another,  more  formidable  invasion 
of  the  barbarians  was  impending,  they  proceeded  to  secure 
themselves  against  domestic  foes  by  the  ostracism  of  Hippar- 
chus.1 Other  friends  of  Hippias  shared  the  same  fate,  among 
whom  was  Megacles,  son  of  Hippocrates  and  nephew  of  Cleis- 
thenes.  Megacles’  political  conduct  may  have  been  the  result 
of  private  or  family  differences  ; since'  we  should  expect  the 
Alcmaeonidae  to  adhere  on  principle  to  the  government  founded 
by  their  great  kinsman.  Something  unaccountable  must,  at 
any  rate,  have  happened  to  effect  a reconciliation  and  alliance 
between  these  hereditary  foes.  A hint  has  been  thrown  out 
elsewhere  of  an  understanding  between  Hippias  and  certain 
Alcmaeonidae  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Marathon  whereby 
the  latter  were  to  betray  the  city  to  him.  The  ostracism  of 
Hipparchus— took  place  icL-4£g  ; of  Megacles  in  487,  in  the 
archonship  of  Telesines.  In  the  following  year,  the  measure 
was  diverted  from  its  original  purpose  and  applied  to  purely 
political  objects.  Xanthippus,  father  of  Pericles,  was  the  first 
to  suffer  under  the  new  departure.  Other  instances  of  its 
application  will  be  mentioned  as  they  occur.  For  the  present, 
we  have  followed  the  history  of  ostracism  far  enough  for  the 
understanding  of  its  character.  Stated  abstractly,  the  purpose 
of  ostracism  is  to  supply  the  lafck  of  a constitutional  morality , 
i.e.y  respect  for  constitutional  forms.  It  is  similar  then  in  its 
design,  to  the  sedition  law  of  Solon  ; but  far  more  potent  in 
its  effect.  The  man  who  is  too  great  to  obey  the  laws  is  sent 
into  honorable  exile ; and  the  constitution  saved  thus  from 
overthrow.  When  respect  for  the  government  as  such  was 
lacking,  when  no  standing  army  or  well-regulated  police  existed, 


1 Kenyon,  Aristotle  on  the  Constitution  of  Athens,  p.  58,  n. 


THE  CLEISTHENkAN  CONSTITUTION. 


205 


when  the  constitution,  still'  untried,  had  so  many  powerful 
enemies  at  home  and  abroad,  at  that  time  ostracism  was  cer- 
tainly a wise  and  wholesome  institution.  ButL  ijUmay  be  urged, 
we  have  the  evidence  of  Aristotle  for  the'fectihat  it  was  soon 
diverted  to  merely  political  objects.  This  is  true  in  a certain 
sense,  but  it  is  going  too  far  to  assume  that  its  employment 
thereby  became  unwholesome.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  this 
very  use  of  the  measure  which  has  been  successfully  vindicated 
by  Grote,  who  shows  that  it  continued  to  be  employed  against 
men  who  threatened  the  government  by  their  power  and  influ- 
ence, and  who,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  were  moving  thus 
in  the  direction  of  tyranny.  Its  principle  had  not  changed, 
though  it  wasr  Ao  longer  employed  against  the  avowed  or  sus- 
pected friends  of  a particular  tyrant,  e.g.>  Hippias.  Lugebil 
has  added  to  Grote’s  theory  the  statement  that  there  is  some- 
thing analogous  in  the  application  of  ostracism  to  the  modern 
change  of  ministry,  as  in  England.  He  has  noticed  that 
ostracophory  (vote  of  ostracism)  never  took  place  — after  the 
change  in  its  employment  — except  when  two  political  antago- 
nists at  the  head  of  their  respective  parties  were  engaged  in 
keenest  strife  for  the  mastery.  The  ostracophory  decided 
which  was  the  stronger  party  and  compelled  the  head  of  the 
weaker  to  go  into  exile.  But  Lugebil  supposes,  in  opposition 
to  Grote,  that  the  victor,  being  really  the  more  influential  man 
stood  nearer  to  the  tyranny  than  the  vanquished,  and  much 
nearer  after  he  had  gotten  rid  of  his  opponent  than  before, 
that,  in  a word,  ostracism  paved  the  way  to  tyranny.  Accord- 
ing to  this  reasoning,  the  original  object  of  ostracism  was 
exactly  reversed  when  it  came  to  be  used  as  a political  instru- 
ment. But  he  is  wrong.  The  essential  feature  of  ostracism  is 
of  course  not  the  voting  but  the  retirement  from  the  country. 
Let  us  suppose  then  that  it  has  been  ascertained  which  is  the 
more  and  which  the  less  influential  man  in  the  state,  and  that 
it  is  nevertheless  unnecessary  for  the  weaker  antagonist  to  go 
into  exile.  Which  in  that  case  is  the  more  dangerous  man  ? 
Not  the  more  influential  ; for  he  is  already  at  the  head  of  the 


206 


TIIE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


government,  having  received  a vote  of  confidence  from  the 
people.  There  is  no  danger  that  he  will  violate  the  constitu- 
tion and  aim  at  the  tyranny  so  long  as  he  is  undisturbed  by 
his  defeated  opponent.  But  the  latter,  having  no  respect  for 
constitutional  forms,  will  concentrate  his  resources,  make  secret 
preparations,  and  at  an  unexpected  moment  drive  his  more 
popular  antagonist  from  the  government,  and  himself  seize 
the  power.  Thus  Grote  is  right.  Ostracism  existed  from 
the  first  almost  to  the  last  for  the  security  of  the  constitution 
against  tyranny.  Its  object,  stated  in  more  definite  language 
than  that  of  Grote  was  to  enforce  submission  to  the  rule  of  the 
majority,  such, . extraorxli  n ary  , .moans being  rcqaiked  in-. The 


absence  of 


'his  defect  in  the  public 


character  of  the  Greeks  has  been  discussed  in  its  relation  to 
the  sedition  law.  Cleisthenes,  improving  upon  that  strange 
device  of  Solon,  recommended  ostracism  as  a preventive  of 
civil  war.  The  great  reforms  which  he  introduced  inspired 
the  mass  of  people  with  love  for  the  government,  and  led 
them  gradually  to  a comparatively  high  degree  of  constitu- 
tional morality.  But  while  the  work  of  education  was  going 
on,  the  young  constitution  must  be  protected  against  the 
assaults  of  oligarchic  chiefs,  who  were  opposed  to  the  new 
state  of  things,  and  against  the  more  dangerous  attacks  of 
demagogues,  who  by  holding  forth  to  the  people  hopes  of 
further  innovation  sought  thus  to  win  popularity  with  a view 
to  making  themselves  despots.  Connections  of  the  Peisis- 
tratidae,  as  Lugebil  observes,  must  have  been  in  the  main 
of  the  latter  class.  Ostracism  substituted  voting  for  civil 

strife_nnd--lhiis. ..freed .The  . state- of 4angerous-jQen.  It  would 

be  a mistake,  however,  to  suppose  that  this  institution  actually 
compelled  adherence  to  conservative  political  principles.  For 
it  often  happened  that  the  upholder  of  existing  political  insti- 
tutions, i.  e.,  the  conservative,  proved  the  weaker  party  and 
was  forced  into  banishment,  thus  leaving  the  innovator  to 
pursue  his  course  unchecked.  Certainly,  Cimon,  and  Thucy- 
dides, son  of  Melesias,  were  defenders  of  existing  constitu- 


THE  CLEISTHENEAN  CONSTITUTION. 


20  7 


tional  forms,  against  the  innovations  of  Pericles.  But  in  the 
absence  of  respect  for  forms,  ostracism  prevented  civil  strife 
by  enforcing  obedience  to  the  decision  of  the  majority,  as 
has  been  said  above.  The  cause  of  its  disuse  after  about 
ninety  years  of  operation,  has  not  been  discussed  by  Grote 
with  equal  success.  An  institution  is  not  abandoned  simply 
because  it  has  once  been  abused,  as  in  the  ostracism  of  Hyper- 
bolus. On  the  contrary,  one  case  of  abuse  acts  as  a prece- 
dent for  further  cases,  and  the  evil  spreads  rather  than  ceases 
of  its  own  accord.  The  Ecclesia  could  pass  a vote  of  ostracism 
only  when  6,000  (or  more)  members  were  present.1  In  the 
course  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  it  came  about  that  the  attend- 
ance could  no  longer  be  made  to  reach  this  number  ; and  from 
that  moment  ostracism  became  impossible.  It  appears  to  have 
ceased  at  a time  when  there  was  no  longer  any  use  for  it. 
Henceforth  we  find  no  individuals  raised  so  far  above  their 
fellows  as  to  be  a menace  to  the  state.2 

Cleisthenes  introduced  into  the  constitution  no  new  princi- 
ple,  but  brought  into  far  greater  prominence  the  democratic 
elements  already  existing  in  it.  This  he  did  chiefly  by  equal- 
izing the  ranks,  as  above  described,  and  by  slighting  the  power 
of  the  Areopagus.  The  government  was  democratic,  strictly 
speaking,  only  in  potentiality.  In  its  practical  working  it  was 
a timocracy  of  the  milder  class,  while  the  state  was  still  a clan- 
state,  and  remain^TucITTTrbugE  the  whole  period  of  its  free- 
dom. Yet  the  adoption  of  the  Cleisthenean  constitution, 
exhibiting  greatly  strengthened  democratic  tendencies,  may  be 


1 Plutarch,  Aristeides,  7 ; Lugebil,  Jahrb.  f.  class.  Philol.,  Supplb.  IV.  p.  146. 

2 Authorities  on  ostracism:  Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  22  ; Grote,  (small  edition)  I. 
p.  605  ; II.  pp.  84-92  ; Schomann,  Assemblies  of  the  Athenians,  pp.  234-9 ; An- 
tiquities of  Greece,  pp.  181-3,  33%>  385,  395—7  ; Athenian  Constitutional  History, 
pp.  85-6  ; Gilbertf  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  pp.  144-6,  294-5  ; Muller’s 
Handbuch,  2 IV.  pp.  161-2,  261  ; Hermann,  Political  Antiquities  of  Greece,  pp. 
125  n.  13,  218,  219  n.  17,  257  ; Cox,  Greek  Statesmen,  I.  pp.  68-70  ; Lugebil, 
Ueber  das  Wesen  und  die  historische  Bedeutung  des  Ostrakismos  in  Athen, 
Jahrb.  f.  die  class.  Philol.,  Supplb.  IV.  pp.  1 19-175  ; Curtius,  History  of  Greece, 
I.  p.  420. 


208 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


justly  regarded  as  the  beginning  of  a new  period,  — the  fifth 
in  the  history  of  the  government.  The  yoke  of  the  tyranny 
was  broken,  and  the  Solonian  constitution,  as  lately  modified 
and  improved,  became,  for  the  first  time,  a living,  political 
organism.  This  constitution,  by  conferring  large  benefits  upon 
the  people,  and  by  opening  to  them  new  and  attractive  spheres 
of  activity,  inspired  them  with  a patriotism  hitherto  unknown. 
A great  tide  of  public  enthusiasm  and  public  energy,  arising  at 
this  point,  surged  onward  through  the  Persian  wars,  carrying 
the  Athenians  victoriously  through  those  crises  in  the  history 
of  their  country  and  the  world,  liberating  the  Ionic  Greeks, 
founding  a great  maritime  empire,  gaining  in  height  and 
strength,  with  each  political  advance,  till  it  reached  its  climax 
in  the  marvelous  activity  of  the  Periclean  age.1 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  the  archons  were  now 
elected,  not  taken  by  lot,  and  that  the  Polemarch  was  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  army  till  after  the  battle  of  Marathon. 
The  question  as  to  who  commanded  the  Athenians  in  this  bat- 
tle was  of  great  interest  before  the  discovery  of  Aristotle’s 
Politeia  of  the  Athenians.  Lugebil 2 treated  the  question 
exhaustively,  and  arrived  at  the  truth  in  confirmation  of  Grote’s 
theory,  and  in  opposition  to  Schomann.  The  archons  were 
the  chief  magistrates  of  the  nation  till  sometime  after  the 
Persian  wars,  though  the  efficiency  of  the  office  must  have 
suffered  a certain  deterioration  with  the  change  in  the  mode  of 
election.  In  487  a return  was  made  to  the  Solonian  method 


1 Authorities  on  Cleisthenes  : Grote,  cli.  XXXI.,  (small  edition)  II.  p.  70  ff.,  (large 
edition)  III.  pp.  346-398  ; Curtius,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  397-431  ; Cox,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  59- 
71  ; Landwehr,  Zur  altern  attischen  Geschichte,  Philol.,  Supplb.  V.  pp.  158-169  ; 
Schomann,  Assemblies  of  the  Athenians,  pp.  14-5,  234-9,  342-361  ; Antiquities 
of  Greece,  pp.  335-8 ; Ath.  Const.  Hist.,  pp.  64-88  ; Hermann,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
215-221  ; Gilbert,  op.  cit.,  I.  pp.  141-6  ; Muller’s  Handbuch,  2 IV.  pp.  158-162  ; 
Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Ancient  City,  pp.  423-9 ; Philippi,  Beitrage  zu  einer 
Geschichte  des  att.  Biirgerrechts,  pp.  147-181  ; Leist,  Graeco-italische  Rechts- 
geschichte,  p.  162  ; Lugebil,  Zur  Geschichte  der  Staatsverfassung  von  Athen, 
Jahrbiicher  fur  classische  Philologie,  Supplb.  V.  p.  680  ff. ; Droysen,  Die  Strategen, 
Hermes,  IX.  p.  1 ff.;  Holm,  Griechische  Geschichte,  I.  p.  503  ff ; Thumser,  Die 
griech.  Staatsalterthiimer,  p.  395  ff. 

2 Op.  cit.,  p.  564  ff. 


THE  CLEISTHENEAN  CONSTITUTION. 


209 


of  filling  this  office,  — the  nine  archons  from  that  date  were 
taken  by  lot  from  100  (possibly  500)  candidates  elected  by  the 
tribes  (or  demes).1  In  closest  dependence  upon  this  change 
came  the  elevation  of  the  ten  generals  in  military  authority, 
the  chief  command  in  war  being  about  this  time  transferred  to 
them  from  the  Polemarcli^^" 

We  come  now  to  an  event  of  vast  significance  in  the  history 
of  the  Athenian  government.  In  the  archonship  of  Nicode- 
mus,2  it  was  proposed  to  distribute  among  the  citizens  the 
revenues  accruing  to  the  state  from  silver  mines  in  Maroneia.3 
Themistocles  opposed  this  proposition  and  moved  that  the  sum 
on  hand,  100  talents,  be  loaned  to  the  100  wealthiest  men  of 
Athens,  a talent  to  each.  The  use  to  which  the  money  was 
to  be  put  is  not  mentioned  in  the  proposition  as  given  by 
Aristotle  or  Polyaenus,4  and  yet  the  people  would  hardly  have 
acceded  to  the  measure,  had  they  no  idea  of  its  object.  How- 
ever that  may  be,  it  is  simply  stated  that  if  the  money  should 
be  employed  in  a manner  acceptable  to  the  people,  the  amount 
should  be  debited  to  the  state.  Otherwise,  the  fund  should  be 
repaid  by  its  holders  to  the  treasury.  With  this  money,  there 
were  built  100  triremes  at  the  cost  of  a talent  each.  The  work 
was  rapidly  accomplished  and  in  so  excellent  a manner  as  to 
satisfy  a majority  in  the  Ecclesia.  But  it  did  not  pass  without 
opposition  on  the  part  of  conservative  statesmen.  Aristeides 
insisted  upon  laying  the  foundation  of  Athenian  military  power 
in  the  heavy-armed  as  most  conducive  to  the  stability  of 

1 The  number  of  candidates  (ru v irpoKpidivrwv)  as  well  as  the  persons,  or  bodies, 
by  whom  the  nominations  are  made  is  uncertain.  Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  8, 
speaking  of  the  usage  of  his  own  times,  mentions  ioo  candidates  nominated  by 
the  tribes.  In  ch.  22  he  mentions,  on  the  contrary,  500  candidates  nominated  by 
the  demes.  Possibly,  as  Kenyon  (2d  ed.,  pp.  59-60)  suggests,  we  should  read 
100  in  place  of  500  ; possibly  Aristotle  is  confusing  the  election  of  archons  with 
that  of  the  Boule  of  500,  whose  members  were,  indeed,  elected  by  the  demes  ; 
Arist.,  op.  cit.,  ch.  62  ; cf.  Sandys’  edition,  p.  87. 

2 Probably  in  the  year  483 ; Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  88,  n.  on 
e r 17  Tpla\  cf.  Dionysius  Hal.  VIII.  83,  p.  17 11  (Reiske). 

3 A new  mine  may  have  lately  been  discovered  there ; cf.  Sandys,  op.  cit., 
p.  89,  n. 

4 Strateg.  I.  30.  6. 


210 


TIIE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


private  and  public  character,  while  he  “ regarded  the  navy  as 
the  seed-bed  of  novelty  and  change.”  1 Athens,  engaged  at 
this  time  in  a war  with  Aegina,  was  meeting  with  ill-success 
owing  to  her  weakness  by  sea.  But  Themistocles  must  have 
looked  beyond  the  present,  to  the  defense  of  his  country 
against  a more  formidable  enemy,  already  far  advanced  in  its 
preparations  for  overwhelming  Europe  with  a flood  of  barba- 
rians. Nor  was  his  view  most  probably  confined  to  this  horizon, 
but  included  all  the  future  greatness  of  Athens,  her  walls  and 
Peiraeus,  her  hegemony  and  empire.  For  these  were  the 
results  of  his  decree.  Aristeides  was  ostracised  and  an 
obstacle  to  the  furtherance  of  the  Themistoclean  naval  policy 
thus  removed.2  It  was  probably  in  the  following  year  that 
Themistocles  held  the  office  of  archon,3  and  began  his  great 


1 Cox,  Greeks  and  Persians,  pp.  153-4. 

2 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  22,  seems  to  accord  with  Plutarch  in  placing  the 
ostracism  of  Aristeides  soon  after  the  passage  of  Themistocles’  naval  decree. 
Aristeides  opposed  the  measure,  and,  after  its  passage,  hindered  its  execution. 
This  appears  to  be  the  reason  for  his  ostracism  ; cf.  Plutarch,  Themistocles,  4 ff. ; 
Aristeides,  7. 

3 An  interesting  article  by  J.  A.  R.  Munro  on  the  “ Chronology  of  Themistocles’ 
career”  has  just  appeared  in  the  Classical  Review,  VI.  pp.  333-4.  Below  are  the 
main  results  of  Munro’s  investigation. 

There  are  two  distinct  systems  of  chronology  for  the  career  of  Themistocles, 
according  to  which  the  same  events  are  separated  by  an  interval  of  ten  years.  In 


the  following  table  a and  b represent  the 

two  systems  respectively  : 

— 

(1)  Themistocles’  Archonship,  . 

• 493 

483 

(2)  his  ostracism, 

. 471 

461 

(3)  his  flight  from  Argos,  . 

. 467 

(457  ?) 

(4)  his  death,  . . . . 

• 459 

449. 

The  conflicting  dates  are  in  every  case  based  upon  the  authority  of  ancient 
writers.  This  conflict  probably  arose  from  the  fact  that  the  Persian  Wars  were 
ten  years  apart,  as  were  also  the  two  expeditions  to  Egypt  (459  and  449),  in  con- 
nection with  the  fact  that  Themistocles  was  65  at  his  death,  which  was  supposed 
to  have  occurred  at  the  time  of  one  or  the  other  of  these  expeditions  to  Egypt. 
Munro  makes  another  hardly  less  interesting  discovery  : Thucydides,  I.  137, 
says  that  Themistocles  found  Artaxerxes  petoorl  fiaaikevoPTi.  In  IV.  50,  the 
Athenian  envoys  found  him  pcojotI  TedvqKbra.  “ The  interval  cannot  be  more 
than  four  months  ” ; op.  cit .,  p.  334.  This  proves  that  Thucydides  is  not  always 
reliable  in  matters  of  chronology. 


THE  CLEISTHENEAN  CONSTITUTION. 


2 


work  of  fortifying  the  Peiraeus.  Strict  adherence  to  forms 
was  never  a marked  quality  of  the  Athenians  ; and  I cannot 
help  believing  that  they  on  this  occasion  recurred  to  the  ballot 
for  the  purpose  of  placing  in  office  the  man  most  competent  to 
execute  the  newly  adopted  measure.  Thus  the  fortification  of 
the  Peiraeus  was  but  a natural  continuation  of  his  naval  policy. 
The  building  of  triremes  went  on.  Probably  the  first  ioo 
were  completed  in  the  year  after  the  adoption  of  the  measure, 
i.  e.,  in  482,  and  the  revenues  from  the  mines  for  the  years  482 
and  481,  amounting  to  50  talents  per  year,  applied  to  the  same 
object.  Thus  the  Athenians  fought  at  Artemisium  with  127 
ships,1  and  soon  after  were  reinforced  by  53  additional  ships,2 
which  seem  not  to  have  been  ready  to  sail  with  the  main 
armament.  These  180  ships  of  the  Athenians  were  employed 
in  the  battle  of  Salamis,  and  twenty  ships  besides  were  lent  to 
the  Chalcidians.  Thus  the  number  of  Athenian  ships  amounted 
at  that  date  to  200. 3 The  fear  of  the  Persian  invaders  brought 
about  a reconciliation  of  political  opponents,  the  ostracised 
were  recalled,4  and  all  united  in  loyal  service  to  their  country 
in  its  supreme  peril.  At  the  same  time,  a regulation  was 
adopted,  fixing  as  a limit  to  the  free  movement  of  persons 
while  in  exile  under  ostracism,  the  points  of  Geraestus  and 
Scyllaeum,  i.  e.}  the  southeast  point  of  Euboea  and  the  eastern- 
most point  of  Argolis  respectively.5  Any  infringement  of 
this  regulation  was  punishable  with  atimy. 


1 Hdt.  VIII.  1. 

2 Id.  VIII.  14. 

3 Id.  VIII.  44;  cf.  Landwehr,  Philol.,  Supplb.  V.  p.  181. 

4 In  the  archonship  of  Hypsichides,  480  B.C. 

5 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  22,  1.  34  (Herwerden  et  Leeuwen),  gives  ivrbs,  making  the 
limit  mentioned  the  eastern.  Wyse  has  corrected  this  to  e/crds,  thus  defining  the 
western  rather  than  the  eastern  limit.  The  latter  reading  agrees  with  Philochorus 
in  Lex.  Rhet.  Cantab.,  6(rTpcu<urp.ov  rpbiros  • p.rj  eiri^aLvovra  evrbs  Yepaicrrov.  It 
agrees  also  with  the  fact  that  before  the  fixing  of  this  limit,  Aristeides  while  in 
exile  lived  in  Aegina,  inside  the  limit,  while  afterwards  men  under  ostracism 
dwelt  only  outside  the  limit ; cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  91,  n.  on 
£kt6s. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


FROM  THE  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE 
PELOPONNESIAN  WAR. 

The  sixth  period  of  Athenian  constitutional  history  begins 
with  the  restoration  of  the  Areopagus  to  its  former  position 
of  authority  and  influence  in  the  state.  This  took  place  not 
through  any  public  measure  but  in  an  altogether  informal  way, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  it  was  the  cause  of  the  battle  of  Salamis 
being  fought.  For  the  ten  generals  who  were  beginning  to 
supersede  the  archons  in  the  administration,  losing  all  hope  of 
saving  the  state  and  people  by  any  regular  means,  issued  a 
proclamation  bidding  everyone  rescue  himself  as  best  he  could. 
At  this  crisis,  the  Boule  of  the  Areopagus  came  forward  and 
furnished  each  man  with  eight  drachmas  in  money,  conveying 
all  with  their  families  and  movable  property  by  ship  to  places 
of  safety.1  Thus  the  Areopagus,  through  its  energy  and 
practical  wisdom  exhibited  at  this  crisis,  regained  its  former 
dignity  and  authority;  and  for  seventeen  years  managed  the 
government  in  a wise  and  efficient  manner.2 

Immediately  after  the  departure  of  the  Persians  the  Athenians 
returned  to  Athens  with  their  wives,  children,  and  property,  and 
set  to  work  rebuilding  the  city  and  the  walls.  Of  the  old  line 
of  wall  only  a small  part  was  left  standing.  Most  of  the  houses 


1 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  23,  quoted  also  in  Plutarch’s  Themistocles. 

2 “ A government  may  be  changed  either  into  an  oligarchy,  a democracy,  or  a 
constitutional  government,  when  the  magistrates,  or  any  one  part  of  the  city, 
acquire  great  credit,  or  increase  in  power  ; as  the  senate  of  the  Areopagus  at 
Athens,  which,  having  procured  great  credit  during  the  Persian  war,  added  firm- 
ness to  the  administration  ; and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  maritime  force,  having 
gained  the  victory  at  Salamis,  by  their  power  at  sea,  got  the  lead  of  the  state,  and 
strengthened  the  popular  party”;  Aristotle,  Politics,  VIII.  (V.)  4 (p.  1304  a,  17  ff.) ; 
cf.  Isocrates,  VII.  5T. 


FROM  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  21 3 


were  in  ruins,  a few  only  remaining  in  which  the  chief  men  of 
the  Persians  had  lodged.1  The  Spartans  opposed  the  rebuilding 
of  the  walls,  but  were  outwitted  by  Themistocles  aided  by 
Aristeides.2  The  former  had,  while  archon,  begun  the  work 
of  fortifying  the  Peiraeus  3 in  accordance  with  his  vigorous  naval 
policy,  and  it  must  have  been  with  feelings  of  the  greatest 
pleasure  and  satisfaction  that  he  could  at  last  look  upon  his 
finished  work.  He  it  was  who  had  made  Athens  great.  The 
independence  of  the  Athenians,  their  “weight  and  worth”  in 
the  common  council  of  the  Greeks  were  secure  behind  the 
Themistoclean  bulwarks.  His  masterpiece  of  skill  brought 
upon  him  the  enmity  of  his  former  friends  and  admirers,  the 
Spartans,4  together  with  their  oligarchic  sympathizers  at  Athens. 
Although  Aristotle  mentions  him  as  the  Athenian  counsellor 
in  war  during  these  times,  we  know  of  but  one  or  two  special 
cases  where  his  advice  was  offered.  All  our  other  information 
would  lead  us  to  believe  that  his  influence  henceforth  declined. 
The  fortification  of  Athens  and  Peiraeus ‘was  brought  about  in 
479-478  b.c.  Themistocles  was  ostracised,  according  to  the 
generally  accepted  chronology  based  upon  Thucydides,  in  47 1 .5 
With  the  decline  of  Themistocles,  Aristeides  came  into  greater 
prominence.  He  had  been  a friend  of  Cleisthenes  and  a sup- 
porter of  his  constitution.6  Accordingly,  we  found  him,  before 
Xerxes’  invasion,  the  advocate  of  conservative  principles,  in 
active  rivalry  with  Themistocles,  his  younger  contemporary  ; 7 
and  it  was  probably  his  opposition  to  the  Themistoclean  naval 
policy  which  brought  about  his  ostracism.8  After  his  restora- 
tion, his  rivalry  with  Themistocles  continued  ; but  it  was  now  a 


1 Thucydides,  I.  89. 

2 Id.  I.  90-92. 

3 Id.  I.  93. 

4 Id.  I.  74,  91,  135. 

5 See  Morris,  Thucydides,  p.  331.  For  the  foreign  policy  of  Themistocles, 
cf.  Holm,  Griech.  Gesch.,  II.  pp.  m-112,  138-139,  notes  n and  12. 

6 Plutarch,  Aristeides,  2. 

7 Morris  in  American  Journal  of  Philology,  VII.  p.  329. 

8 Cox,  Greek  Statesmen,  I.  p.  1 18  f. 


214  THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

rivalry  for  the  leadership  of  the  popular  party.1  He  had  been 
converted  by  the  lessons  of  war  to  a strong  democratic  policy. 
Plutarch  says  that  on  his  return  from  the  battle  of  Plataea, 
Aristeides,  considering  that  the  people  deserved  some  attention 
and  respect  because  of  their  gallant  behavior  in  battle,  and  that 
it  would  be  difficult  to  keep  men  elated  with  victory  from  an 
equal  participation  in  the  government,  carried  a decree  admitting 
all  to  a share  in  the  government,  and  opening  the  archonship 
to  the  whole  body  of  Athenians.2  According  to  Aristotle, 
however,  the  Zeugitae  were  not  admitted  to  the  archonship  till 
457,  and  the  Thetes  were  never  legally  eligible.3  Plutarch  has, 
therefore,  failed  to  understand  the  true  nature  of  the  decree. 
Gilbert,4  following  Schomann,  observed  that  the  poorest  citizens 
could  not  have  actually  occupied  the  archonship  at  this  time, 
because  it  was  an  unpaid  office  and  one  which  involved  consider- 
able expenditure.  He  conjectured,  therefore,  that  the  principal 
change  wrought  by  Aristeides  in  this  decree  was  the  obliteration 
of  the  distinction  between  real  estate  and  moveable  property. 
Henceforth  all  Athenians  were  eligible  who  could  bear  the 
expense.  Under  the  new  light  from  Aristotle,  we  are  obliged 
to  accept  this  view.  No  discrimination  as  to  kind  of  property 
could  have  obtained  in  the  military  sphere  during  the  Persian 
Wars  ; consequently,  no  such  discrimination  could  be  main- 
tained henceforth  in  the  political  sphere.  We  have,  on  the 
other  hand,  sufficient  evidence  that  the  battle  of  Salamis  marks 
the  beginning  of  a new  epoch  in  the  history  of  the  Thetes. 


1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  23. 

2 Plutarch,  Aristeides,  22.  Demetrius  Phal.  informs  us  (Plut.,  op.  cit.,  1)  that 
Aristeides  was  chosen  archon  from  the  highest  property  class,  and  places  his 
archonship  after  the  battle  of  Plataea,  i.  e.,  in  478;  cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of 
Athens,  p.  87.  But  (1)  it  is  doubtful  whether  Aristeides  was  wealthy  enough  to 
belong  to  the  Pentacosiomedimni , and  (2)  it  is  known  that  he  was  archon  in  489 
instead  of  478.  It  is  impossible,  therefore,  from  the  data  furnished  by  Demetrius, 
to  determine  with  any  degree  of  certainty  the  time  when  the  Hippeis  became 
eligible  to  the  archonship.  Demetrius  would  place  the  event  in  or  after  478. 

8 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  26. 

4 Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  p.  146  and  n.  1. 


FROM  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  215 

The  oligarchy  had  in  many  states  of  Greece,  also  most  likely 
in  Athens,  depended  mainly  upon  the  Hippeis  for  support. 
From  these,  therefore,  the  rulers  of  the  city  were  chosen.  By 
reviving  the  Ecclesia,  Draco  restored  the  politeia  to  the  heavy- 
armed. Now  that  the  Thetes  had  gained  the  victory  at  Salamis 
and  had  served  well  as  light-armed  troops  on  land,  they  began 
to  take  a bolder  stand  in  politics,  and  to  exercise  a greater  and 
greater  influence  upon  the  administration.1  For  the  present, 
however,  the  government  remained  timocratic.  Plutarch  places 
Aristeides’  constitutional  measure  after  the  return  of  the 
Athenians  from  Plataea,  i.e.  in  479  b.c.  In  the  same  year,  he 
abetted  the  trick  of  Themistocles  for  the  building  of  the  walls 
in  defiance  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  and  soon  after,  with  Cimon 
as  colleague,  took  command  of  the  thirty  Athenian  ships  sent 
out  with  the  fleet  of  Pausanias  to  the  seat  of  war.  The  dis- 
graceful conduct  of  the  Spartan  commander  at  Byzantium  gave 
the  Athenians  the  opportunity  of  taking  under  their  protection 
the  liberated  Ionians.2  They  now  possessed  the  most  powerful 
fleet  of  all  the  Hellenic  cities.  They  had  gained  experience 
in  war ; their  fame  filled  Greece  ; they  were  enterprising, 
energetic,  ready  to  take  advantage  of  circumstances.  The 
allies  offered  them  the  hegemony  ; and  Aristeides  accepted  it 
in  the  name  of  the  Athenians,  the  Lacedaemonians  voluntarily 
yielding  it  to  them.3  This  success  was  largely  due  to  the 
excellent  personal  qualities  of  Aristeides.  “ He  insensibly 
drew  the  chief  command  from  the  Lacedaemonians,  not  by 
force  of  arms,  horse,  or  ship,  but  by  his  gentle,  obliging  deport- 


1 Aristotle,  Politics,  VIII.  (V.)  4 (p.  1304  a,  22  ff.). 

2 Thucydides,  I.  95-6  ; Plutarch,  Aristeides,  23. 

3 This  seems  to  be  the  proper  reading  of  Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  23,  1.  40,  (ed.  H. 
et  L.),  i.e.,  eUbvrwv  t&v  Acucedcufj.oviwi',  and  is  re-inforced  by  Plut.,  loc.  cit .:  “And 
here  the  magnanimity  of  the  Lacedaemonians  was  wonderful.  For  when  they  per- 
ceived that  their  generals  were  becoming  corrupted  by  the  greatness  of  their 
authority,  they  voluntarily  laid  down  the  chief  command,  and  left  off  sending  any 
more  of  them  to  the  wars,  choosing  rather  to  have  citizens  of  moderation  and 
consistent  in  the  observance  of  their  customs,  than  to  possess  the  dominion  of  all 
Greece.”  Sandy’s  reasoning  ( op . cit.,  p.  93)  appears  weak. 


21 6 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


ment.”  1 In  478,  he  fixed  the  annual  contributions  of  the  allied 
cities  and,  in  the  name  of  Athens  exchanged  with  them  the 
oath  of  agressive  and  defensive  alliance,  at  the  same  time  sinking 
red-hot  pieces  of  iron  into  the  sea  and  uttering  execrations  on 
those  who  should  break  the  articles  of  treaty.2  The  object  of 
the  league  was  defence  against  the  Persians  and  compensation 
for  previous  losses  by  ravaging  the  king’s  country.3  For  the 
support  of  the  league  it  was  necessary  for  the  larger  cities  of 
the  allies  to  furnish  ships  with  their  crews  ; from  the  smaller, 
a certain  money  contribution  was  required.  The  allies  were 
perfectly  satisfied  with  the  assessment  of  Aristeides,  and 
because  of  the  lightness  of  their  burden  imagined  that  the 
golden  age  had  come.4  The  sum  of  the  annual  contributions 
was  460  talents,  reached  probably  after  the  battle  of  Eury- 
medon,  at  which  time  several  cities  had  been  added  to  the 
league.  Deputies  from  all  the  cities  met  periodically  in  a 
synod  in  the  temple  of  the  Delian  Apollo,  under  the  presidency 
of  Athens.5  Here  the  common  interests  of  the  confederacy 
were  considered.  Athens  had  also  from  the  beginning  control 
of  the  finances,  the  treasury  being  managed  by  magistrates 
called  Hellenotamiae  (Hellenic  Treasurers),  — an  office  now 
instituted  and  filled  only  by  Athenians,6  though  the  treasury 
remained  for  some  time  in  Delos.  It  is  not  intended  here  to 
present  in  detail  the  constitution  of  the  Delian  Confederacy. 
Enough  merely  is  given  for  understanding  the  purposes  of  the 
league  and  the  relations  of  Athens  to  it.  A new  phase  of  Greek 
politics  now  appeared.  An  attempt  was  made  to  widen  the 
narrow  circle  of  city  politics  and  city  prejudices,  and  to  establish 
a federal  union,  or,  if  that  were  impossible,  an  empire.  The 


1 Plutarch,  Aristeides,  23. 

2 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  23. 

8 Thucydides,  I.  96. 

4 Plutarch,  Aristeides,  24. 

6 Thucydides,  I.  97. 

6 Id.  T.  96.  See  on  the  constitution  and  object  of  the  confederacy,  Holm, 
Griech.  Geschichte,  II.  pp.  115,  157,  268,  n.  15. 


FROM  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  217 

influence  of  these  new  conditions  upon  Athens  will  be  noticed 
as  occasion  requires. 

During  this  period  there  was  a steady  development  of 
democratic  principles.  The  history  of  the  period  centers  about 
the  Areopagus,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Senate  of  500,  the 
Ecclesia,  and  the  popular  courts  on  the  other.  These  democratic 
institutions  rose  with  the  decline  of  the  aristocratic  Bonle.  It 
was  Aristeides  who  counselled  the  Athenians  to  gather  from 
their  fields  into  the  city,  that  they  might  secure  to  themselves 
the  rule  of  the  sea  and  the  more  complete  control  over  their 
allies.1  He  told  them  that  they  could  support  themselves  by 
public  service,  military  and  administrative.  They  obeyed  ac- 
cordingly, flocked  to  the  city  in  great  numbers,  began  to  live 
more  and  more  upon  the  public  purse,  and,  in  a brief  time,  con- 
verted the  hegemony  into  an  empire.  Only  the  Chians,  Les- 
bians, and  Samians  were  allowed  to  retain  their  constitutions, 
that  they  might,  in  return  for  assured  freedom,  aid  in  maintain- 
ing the  empire.  Undoubtedly  Athens  was  forced  to  this  policy 
by  the  character  of  the  Ionians,  their  indisposition  to  long- 
continued  personal  military  service,  and  their  desire  to  shake 
off  the  burden  of  taxation,  when  once  the  danger  from  the 
Persians  had  been  removed  from  their  doors.2  In  466  Naxos 
revolted,  but  was  reduced  by  siege  and  deprived  of  its  auto- 
nomy by  the  Athenians.  Soon  after,  the  example  set  by  Naxos 
was  followed  by  Thasos.  The  Thasians  were  encouraged  in 
their  revolt  by  the  Spartans,  who,  however,  failed  to  give  the 
promised  aid  because  of  troubles  at  home.  Thasos  fell,  appar- 
ently in  463,  after  a siege  of  two  years.  The  triumph  of  Athens 
over  her  revolted  allies  gave  power  to  the  democracy.  The 
people  became  bolder  in  politics  every  day.  Cimon,  who  in 
opposition  to  Themistocles,  had  sought  with  some  success  to 
restrain  them,  found  them  now,  on  his  return  from  Thasos, 


1 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  24. 

2 Thuc.  I.  99  ; Cox,  Athenian  Empire,  pp.  3-7,  28-9  ; Holm,  Griech.  Geschichte, 
II.  p.  115. 


21 8 THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 

beyond  his  control,  and,  under  the  leadership  of  Ephialtcs, 
seeking  to  remove  from  the  constitution  all  its  aristocratic  ele- 
ments. In  his  euthyna  as  general,  he  was  accused  of  miscon- 
duct in  the  war  by  Pericles  and  others  ; but  was,  according  to 
Plutarch,1  acquitted,  and  regained  for  a season  his  influence  in 
the  state.  In  462  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  were  besieging 
without  effect  the  revolted  Helots  in  Ithome,  requested  aid 
of  the  Athenians.  Ephialtes,  leader  of  the  popular  party,  op- 
posed the  resolution  to  send  help,  advising  the  Athenians  to 
“let  the  pride  and  arrogance  of  Sparta  be  trodden  under.” 
But  the  influence  of  Cimon  prevailed,  and  he  led  a consider- 
able force  to  Ithome.  It  now  seems  most  probable  that  the 
overthrow  of  the  Areopagus  occurred  during  the  absence  of 
Cimon  on  this  expedition.2  The  leader  in  the  attack,  as  all 


1 Cimon,  14.  But  Demosthenes,  XXIII.  205,  says  that  he  narrowly  escaped 
death,  and  incurred  a fine  of  50  talents. 

2 The  date  for  the  fall  of  the  Areopagus  has  generally  been  assigned  approxi- 
mately to  the  year  460,  i.  e.,  two  years  later  than  that  given  by  Aristotle,  Ath. 
Pol.,  ch.  25.  The  expedition  of  Cimon  to  Ithome  has  been  placed  earlier  than 
this  event  by  some  historians,  as  Curtius,  History  of  Greece,  II.  p.  417  ff.;  later, 
by  Lloyd,  Age  of  Pericles,  I.  p.  382  ff.;  coincident,  by  Wachsmuth,  The  Historical 
Antiquities  of  Greece,  II.  p.  72  ff.  Now  that  the  date  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
Areopagus  (462)  has  been  ascertained,  it  has  become  possible  to  fix  with  greater 
precision  the  expedition  of  Cimon.  He  was  prosecuted  in  463.  He  was  on 
some  expedition  when  the  Areopagus  fell.  He  could  not  have  had  time  between 
463  and  462  to  have  returned  from  this  expedition  in  season  to  take  part  in  the 
debate  on  the  resolution  to  send  help  to  Sparta,  and  to  lead  the  Athenian  force, 
still  in  462,  to  the  siege  of  Ithome.  On  the  other  hand,  he  must  have  led  this 
force  in  462,  for  Ephialtes  was  assassinated  in  that  year  (Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  chs. 
25-6,  Kenyon),  and  Plutarch  says  that  Ephialtes  opposed  the  resolution.  Yet 
it  may  be  urged  that  though  the  resolution  was  taken  in  462,  the  aid  might 
have  been  delayed  till  the  next  year,  and  thus  the  sending  of  aid  might  have 
followed  the  fall  of  the  Areopagus.  This  objection  is  to  be  met  as  follows  : 
Plutarch  tells  us  that  Cimon,  returning  from  a certain  military  expedition  and 
finding  the  Areopagus  fallen,  endeavored  to  restore  it  and  to  re-establish  the  aris- 
tocracy of  the  time  of  Cleisthenes  ; but  his  efforts  were  fruitless.  His  opponents 
raised  against  him  a storm  of  indignation,  and  he  was  met  with  taunts  of  laxity 
in  private  life  and  over-fondness  for  Sparta.  Under  such  conditions,  it  was 
impossible  that  he  should  immediately  prevail  upon  the  Athenians  to  put  him  in 
command  of  a powerful  force  to  be  led  even  the  next  year  to  the  relief  of  Sparta. 
Plutarch’s  description  of  Cimon’s  reception  can  refer  only  to  his  return  from 


FROM  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  219 


authorities  agree,  was  Ephialtes,  who  had  opposed  sending 
aid  to  Sparta,  — a man  reputed  for  justice  and  incorrupti- 
bility in  public  life,  the  peer  of  Aristeides  and  Cimon,  poor 
but  generous,  a good  citizen  and  an  upright  statesman.* 1  He 
had  once  served  as  a general,2  but  was  now  devoting  his 
whole  energy  to  the  work  of  political  reform.  Full  of  the 
spirit  of  Themistocles,  he  was  seeking  to  obliterate,  in  gov- 
ernment and  society,  all  distinction  between  Eupatrid  and 
Plebeian,  between  rich  and  poor,  — to  assure  to  every  free  • 
Athenian,  however  humble  in  means,  the  largest  life  and  the 
utmost  liberty  of  action  commensurate  with  the  security  of  the 
republic.  This  brought  him  into  collision  with  the  Spartan 
policy  of  cramping  the  faculties  of  the  individual,  — a policy 
represented  in  Athens  by  the  Areopagus.3  His  opposition 
to  Sparta  was  not  grounded  upon  the  base  desire  to  make 
Athens  great  at  the  expense  of  her  sister  states.  Rather 
it  was  the  feeling  that  the  oligarchs,  wherever  found,  were 
alike  hostile  to  his  larger  plans  for  the  education  and  elevation 
of  the  Athenian  masses.  Although  the  complicity  of  the 
Spartans  in  the  revolt  of  Thasos  was  not  yet  known,  the  keen- 
sighted  democratic  leader  must  have  observed  that  the  oli- 
garchs in  Sparta  were  of  one  stamp  with  the  oligarchs  in 
Thasos,  and  that  everywhere  their  party  was  the  most  formid- 
able obstacle  to  Athenian  naval  supremacy.  If  then  Sparta, 
the  stronghold  of  oligarchy,  should  be  weakened,  would  it  not 
weaken  correspondingly  the  forces  of  treason  and  rebellion 
within  the  empire  ? Ephialtes  was  justified  by  the  divulgence 
of  Sparta’s  treasonable  agreement  with  the  Thasians  and  still 


Ithome  after  the  contemptuous  dismissal  of  the  Athenians  and  the  divulgence  of 
Sparta’s  treachery  to  Athens  in  the  case  of  the  Thasians.  The  result  of  this 
whole  argument  is  that  Cimon  made  but  one  expedition  to  aid  the  Spartans,  and 
while  on  that  expedition  the  Areopagus  fell.  On  his  return  he  attempted  to 
restore  it,  but  was  ostracised  as  a favorer  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  had 
proved  themselves  false  friends  to  Athens. 

1 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  25  ; Aelian,  V.  H.,  II.  43  ; Heracl.  Pont.,  I. 

2 Plutarch,  Cimon,  13. 

3 Cox,  Greek  Statesmen,  II.  pp.  4-5. 


220 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


more  by  the  events  of  the  next  half-century.  The  Areopagus, 
in  pursuing  a conservative  policy,  had  favored  alliance  with 
Sparta  and  had  thus  made  itself  obnoxious  to  the  democrats. 
Furthermore,  it  no  longer  enjoyed  its  ancient  reputation  for 
honor  and  wisdom.  Ephialtes  began  his  attack  on  that  body 
by  procuring  the  condemnation  of  several  of  its  members  on 
the  charge  of  mal-administration  ; and  finally  carried  a decree 
transferring  all  its  powers  of  governmental  supervision,  and 
most  of  its  judicial  functions,  to  the  senate  of  500,  the  Ecclesia, 
and  the  courts.1  Ephialtes  was  supported  by  Pericles,  who  was 
already  known  to  entertain  democratic  sentiments,  but  who 
had  not  yet  appeared  openly  as  leader  of  the  people.2  The 
oligarchs,  enraged  at  Ephialtes  for  what  he  had  done  and 
unable  to  impeach  his  character,  caused  him  to  be  assassinated, 
according  to  Aristotle,  in  the  year  462. 1 Cimon,  on  his  return, 


1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  25  ; Plutarch,  Cimon,  15.  Plutarch  tells  us  that  on  this 
occasion  “the  multitude  broke  loose  and  overthrew  all  the  ancient  laws  and 
customs  they  had  hitherto  observed.” 

2 That  Pericles  had  a hand  in  robbing  the  Areopagus  of  its  important  functions 
is  shown  by  Aristotle,  Politics,  II.  12  (p.  1274  a,  7 f.);  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  27  ; Plutarch, 
Cimon,  15.  Plutarch  says  that  Pericles  was  already  powerful  ; yet,  according  to 
Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  27,  he  did  not  appear  as  leader  of  the  demus  till  a later  date. 
The  story  of  Themistocles’  part  in  the  overthrow  of  the  Areopagus  is  probably 
false,  since  he  was  ostracised  before  the  siege  of  Naxos  in  465  (a  date  on  which  we 
may  confidently  rely)  and  no  hint  is  given  of  his  ever  returning  from  exile.  It  is 
thought  best  to  give  the  story  as  told  by  Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  25.  A 
party  to  this  plot  was  Themistocles,  who  was  a member  of  the  Areopagus  and 
was  expecting  trial  before  its  court  on  a charge  of  Medism.  Wishing  to  avoid 
this  danger  by  the  destruction  of  that  body,  he  one  day  told  Ephialtes  that  the 
Areopagus  was  about  to  arrest  the  latter  ; then,  on  the  other  hand,  promised  the 
Areopagus  to  point  out  to  them  certain  persons  who  were  conspiring  for  the 
overthrow  of  the  constitution.  Messengers  were  accordingly  dispatched  by  the 
Areopagus,  and  were  conducted  by  Themistocles  to  the  place  where  he  knew  he 
should  find  Ephialtes.  While  approaching  the  spot,  Themistocles  conversed 
loudly  with  the  deputies,  that  Ephialtes  might  overhear  and  learn  the  purport  of 
the  visit.  The  latter  in  alarm  escaped  to  a sanctuary.  This  event  created  the 
greatest  excitement.  The  Boule  of  500  assembled,  and  Ephialtes  and  Themis- 
tocles appearing  before  it,  inveighed  against  the  Areopagus,  repeating  their  charges 
before  the  Ecclesia  with  such  force  and  persistence  that  they  finally  gained  their 
object.  Thus  the  Boule  of  the  Areopagus  was  shorn  of  all  its  power  of  govern- 
mental supervision.  Cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  pp.  101-3,  n.  on  § 3. 


FROM  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  22  1 


endeavored  to  roll  back  the  rising  tide  of  democracy  and  to 
restore  the  Areopagus  to  its  former  dignity  and  authority. 
But  the  insult  Athens  had  received  from  Sparta,  the  treacher- 
ous connections  of  Sparta  with  the  rebellious  allies  of  Athens, 
now  came  to  light,  and  the  murder  of  the  people’s  champion 
made  the  multitude  furious.  The  weak  points  in  Cimon’s 
private  life  were  discovered  and  exaggerated,  his  fondness  for 
Sparta  was  turned  to  his  disadvantage,  and  he  was  exiled  by  a 
vote  of  ostracism  probably  in  461.1  2 The  leader  of  the  popular 
party  in  this  movement  was  Pericles.3  It  was  probably  under 
his  guidance  also  that  the  Athenians  threw  off  the  hegemony 
of  Sparta  and  forthwith  entered  into  alliance  with  the  Argives, 
Thessalians,  and  soon  after  with  the  Megarians.  It  now  ap- 
peared that  Athens  was  to  become  the  head  of  as  great  a con- 
federacy as  that  of  Sparta.  This  seemed  to  affect  her  attitude 
toward  the  maritime  allies. 

The  change  from  hegemony  to  empire  was  completed  in 
460-5  8, 4 with  the  transfer  of  the  confederate  treasury,  amount- 
ing to  1,800  talents,  from  Delos  to  Athens,  where  it  was 
deposited  in  the  temple  of  Athena.  These  funds  were  to  be 
used  in  the  construction  and  manning  of  triremes  for  the 
defense  of  the  allies  and  the  prosecution  of  war  with  the 
Medes,  and  in  the  erection  of  public  buildings  at  Athens 


1 Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  26  (Kenyon).  Cf.  Plutarch,  Pericles,  10 ; Diod.  XI.  77.  6 ; 
Antiph.  V.  68.  The  fact  that  the  oligarchs  vented  their  rage  upon  Ephialtes 
confirms  the  view  that  he,  not  Pericles,  was  the  leader  in  the  attack.  Again,  on 
the  return  of  Cimon,  Ephialtes’  name  had  disappeared,  — the  contest  was  between 
Pericles  and  Cimon.  It  was  Pericles,  not  Ephialtes,  who  sent  Cimon  into  exile. 
All  these  facts  tend  to  corroborate  the  testimony  of  Aristotle  as  to  the  date  of 
Ephialtes’  assassination. 

2 That  Cimon  was  banished  while  the  people  were  still  excited  over  the 
dismissal  of  the  Athenians  from  Ithome  appears  from  Plutarch,  Cimon,  17  ; cf.  15. 

3 Plutarch,  Cimon,  17  ; Pericles,  9. 

4 This  event  has  been  placed  as  late  as  454  ; Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter., 
I.  p.  391  and  n.  3 with  references.  The  evidence  offered  for  this,  however,  is 
insufficient.  On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  likely  that  the  removal  of  the  treasury 
should  precede  the  construction  of  the  long  walls,  the  improvements  within  the 
city,  and  the  introduction  of  the  dicastic  stipend. 


222 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


designed  for  the  use  of  the  confederacy.  Undoubtedly  they 
were  soon  diverted  from  their  original  object,  and  employed  by 
Athens  for  private  purposes  without  discrimination.1  By  the 
fall  of  the  Areopagus,  the  Ecclesia  was  left  with  hardly  a check 
upon  its  action.  Although  it  must  adhere  in  its  deliberations 
to  the  program  presented  by  the  Boule  of  500,  it  could  practi- 
cally compel  the  Boule  to  subserve  its  pleasure  in  the  selection 
of  subjects  for  debate.  Now  that  the  inhibitory  power  of  the 
Areopagus  was  removed,  there  was  great  danger  that  the 
Ecclesia  would  drift  into  anarchy.  But  Pericles  found  a 
sufficient  safe-guard  in  two  institutions  which  he  introduced 
about  this  time.2  The  first  of  these  was  the  ypa^  vapavofuov  or 
writ  against  an  unconstitutional  measure.  According  to  this, 
any  member  of  the  Ecclesia  could  stop  deliberation  on  any 
subject  by  declaring  under  oath  that  he  wished  to  try  the 
constitutionality  of  the  proposed  law  or  decree  before  a Heli- 
astic  court.  The  unconstitutionality  might  lie  in  either  form 
or  matter,  and  the  charge  could  be  brought  within  the  limit  of 
a year  after  the  adoption  of  the  measure.  Beyond  this  time  the 
measure  might  be  impugned,  but  not  the  proposer.  When 
the  measure  alone  was  assailed,  it  was  defended  by  five 
advocates  chosen  to  represent  the  people.3  The  proposer,  if 
convicted,  must  pay  a heavy  fine,  or  even  lose  his  franchise,  or, 
in  some  cases,  his  life.  On  the  other  hand,  the  prosecutor 
who  failed  to  obtain  a sixth  part  of  the  votes  was  fined  a 
thousand  drachmas  and  disqualified  from  bringing  further 
accusations.4  The  original  object  of  the  ypa<j>r)  irapavopuav  was 


1 Athens  was  fulfilling  her  duties  toward  the  allies  in  defending  them  from  the 
Persians.  Her  citizens  were  obliged  to  neglect  private  interests  and  the  occupa- 
tions of  peace  for  the  sake  of  securing  the  allies  against  danger.  Some 
compensation  seemed  due  her  for  such  service. 

2 These  measures  were  unnecessary  before  the  fall  of  the  Areopagus.  On  the 
other  hand,  they  could  not  have  operated  efficiently  before  the  introduction  of  the 
dicastic  stipend.  They  belong,  therefore,  to  the  years  immediately  following  the 
overthrow  of  the  Areopagus. 

Hermann,  Political  Antiquities  of  Greece,  p.  261. 

4 Schumann,  Assemblies  of  the  Athenians,  p.  1 63. 


FROM  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  223 


the  protection  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  constitution 
against  innovation.  It  promoted  consistency  also  in  the  code, 
since  a new  law  would  rarely  be  proposed,  through  fear  of  the 
writ,  without  the  repeal  of  the  old  law  which  the  new  was  to 
supplant.  Of  like  nature  was  the  institution  of  the  Nomothetae , 
dating  from  about  this  time.  The  Nomothetae  were  a body  of 
sworn  jurors  chosen  from  the  Heliasts  and  varying  in  number 
according  to  the  importance  of  their  duties.1  Once  a year  the 
laws  (vo/i,ot)  were  revised  in  the  Ecclesia,  at  which  time  any 
citizen  could,  with  the  consent  of  the  Boule , propose  the 
adoption  of  a new  law  and  the  repeal  of  the  corresponding  old 
law.  After  due  public  notice,  this  proposition  came  before  the 
Nomothetae  in  their  annual  session.  Although  the  Nomothetae 
had  the  organization  of  a parliament,  the  procedure  was  that 
of  a trial.  Public  advocates,  with  the  help  of  volunteers, 
defended  the  old  law,  while  the  proposer  of  the  new  measure, 
also  aided  by  volunteers,  undertook  the  task  of  prosecution. 
A majority  vote  decided  ; and  the  measure  if  adopted  became 
a law,  no  report  being  made  to  the  Ecclesia.2  It  is  to  be 
noticed  that  proposals  for  change  of  vofxoi  could  be  made  but 
once  a year,  and  that  the  procedure  was  slow  and  well  guarded. 
The  chief  law-making  power,  thus  lay  in  the  hands,  not  of  the 
assembly,  but  of  the  law  courts,  — the  Heliasts  had  taken  the 
place  of  the  Areopagus  in  the  control  of  the  legislation. 

Several  years  may  have  passed  after  the  fall  of  the  Areopa- 
gus before  these  two  institutions  came  into  efficient  operation. 
They  involved  the  regular  and  frequent  sessions  of  large 
bodies  of  men  on  business,  which  had  no  direct  interest  for 
themselves,  and  which  they  would  be  unwilling,  therefore,  to 
perform  gratuitously.  The  full  development  of  the  Athenian 


1 The  numbers  500  and  1001  are  authenticated  ; Andoc.  de  Myst.,  84  ; Dem. 
XXIV.  27. 

2 On  the  Nomothetae , see  Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  p.  285  ff.; 
Muller’s  Hdb.,  2 IV.  pp.  264-6;  Schomann,  Animadversiones  de  Nomothetis; 
Assemblies  of  the  Athenians,  pp.  239-268.  For  further  references,  see  Thumser, 
Die  griech.  Staatsalterthlimer,  p.  525. 


224 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


law  courts  was  reached  when  Pericles  introduced  the  dicastic 
stipend,  probably  between  the  years  457  and  45 1.1  Before 
considering  this  innovation  in  detail,  it  is  thought  best  to 
record  the  events  that  had  happened  in  the  meantime.  The 
acquisition  of  the  Delian  fund  enabled  the  Athenians  not  only 
to  undertake  several  important  military  enterprises  abroad,  but 
also  to  plan,  under  the  guidance  of  Pericles,2  extensive  improve- 
ments within  the  city,  and  to  begin  the  construction,  in  458, 
of  the  long  walls  from  Athens  to  the  Peiraeus  and  Phalerum. 
This  was  the  legitimate  consequence  of  the  Themistoclean 
naval  policy.  Themistocles  proposed  to  establish  the  Athenian 
naval  supremacy  by  bringing  Athens  to  the  sea; 3 but  since 
the  Athenians  could  not  be  persuaded  to  leave  the  city,  whose 
ground  was  sacred  because  of  religious  associations,  Pericles,  by 
the  erection  of  these  walls,  brought  the  sea  to  the  gates  of 
Athens.4  Henceforth,  the  city  could  not  be  blockaded  so  long 
as  her  fleet  held  the  sea.  That  this  movement  was  democratic 
is  shown  by  the  treasonable  attempt  of  the  oligarchs  to  prevent 
it.  At  this  time  there  was  a large  army  of  Lacedaemonians  in 
Boeotia.  “To  them  certain  Athenians  were  privately  making 
overtures,  in  a hope  that  they  would  put  an  end  to  the  democ- 
racy and  the  building  of  the  long  walls.”5  The  Athenians, 
suspecting  their  designs,  marched  out  to  meet  them  with  their 
whole  force  and  their  allies  from  Argos  and  Thessaly,  but 
were  defeated  at  Tanagra  in  457,  after  great  slaughter  on  both 
sides.6  Pericles  was  one  of  the  Athenian  commanders  in  this 


1 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  27,  states  that  Pericles  introduced  the  dicastic  stipend  as 

an  off-set  to  the  private  liberality  of  Cimon.  This  must  have  been  after  the  return 
of  Cimon  from  exile,  i.  e.,  after  457  and  before  his  departure  on  his  last  expedition, 
i.  e.,  in  451.  . 

2 Cimon  could  not  have  been  the  builder  of  the  long  walls,  since  he  was  in  exile 
while  their  construction  was  under  way  ; Thucydides,  I.  107-8  ; Plut.,  Cimon,  17. 

3 Thucydides,  I.  93. 

4 This  can  be  better  said  of  Pericles  than  of  Themistocles  ; see  Plut.,  Themist., 

*9- 

6 Thucydides,  I.  107  ; Plutarch,  Themist.,  19,  also  calls  it  a democratic  measure. 

6 Thucydides,  I.  107-8. 


FROM  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  225 


battle,  and  distinguished  himself  for  great  personal  bravery. 
Cimon,  who  was  in  exile,  offered  himself  and  his  comrades  to 
the  service  of  the  Athenians.  Although  he  was  himself 
rejected,  the  heroic  self-sacrifice  of  his  companions  in  the 
battle  won  for  him  a speedy  recall  from  exile,  45 7-6. 1 About 
two  months  after  the  battle,  the  Athenians  more  than  retrieved 
their  loss  by  their  victory  over  the  Boeotians  at  Oenophyta.2 
In  the  treasonable  design  of  the  oligarchs,  displaying  itself 
on  the  eve  of  the  battle  of  Tanagra,  was  openly  manifested 
for  the  first  time  a danger  which  had  long  been  discerni- 
ble, but  which  had  now  begun  to  assume  threatening  pro- 
portions. This  danger  lay  in  the  substitution  of  party 
spirit  for  patriotism,  in  devotion  to  oligarchy  or  democ- 
racy, rather  than  to  country  and  its  freedom.  Thus  two 
political  centers  were  formed  in  Sparta  and  Athens,  to  which 
the  sentiments  of  oligarchs  and  democrats  respectively  moved 
in  rapid  gravitation.  While  the  great  mass  of  people  through- 
out the  Athenian  empire  remained  loyal  to  Athens,  there  were 
those  in  every  allied  city  and  in  the  capital  itself  — few,  indeed, 
yet  powerful  in  their  wealth,  station,  intelligence,  and  thorough 
organization  — who  sympathized  with  Sparta,  who  prayed  and 
plotted  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Athenian  government.3  Polit- 
ical clubs  had  long  existed,  but  were  now  exercising  a greater 
and  greater  influence  upon  the  course  of  events.  The  oli- 
garchs could  not  plot  openly,  and  the  days  of  sedition  were 
passed.  Accordingly,  they  worked  in  secret  through  these 
clubs,  coming  forth  from  their  retirement  only  at  crises,  which 
they  hoped  to  turn  to  their  advantage  by  a bold  application  of 
their  forces.  What  may  be  said  of  party  morals  applies  with 
greater  propriety  to  the  morals  of  clubs.  These  embodied  the 
base  motives  and  heartless  selfishness  of  the  age.  They  were 
a rank  poison  in  the  political  life  of  Greece.4  Between  demo- 


1 Plutarch,  Cimon,  17. 

2 Thucydides,  I.  108. 

3 Curtius,  History  of  Greece,  II.  p.  239  ff. ; III.  pp.  339-40. 

4 Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece,  pp.  178-180. 


226 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


crats  and  oligarchs,  stood  as  a third  party  the  moderates  — 
€7rteiKcts — who,  indeed,  concealed  the  oligarchs  within  their 
own  number,  and  who  now  constituted  the  retarding  force  in 
the  development  of  democracy.  To  Aristotle  they  were  the 
soundness  and  virtue  of  the  state,  and  their  rule  was  the  most 
perfect  form  of  democracy.  They  were,  in  general,  men  of 
moderate  wealth,  yet  might  include  such  of  the  demus  whose 
political  tone  transcended  their  material  circumstances.  From 
the  fall  of  the  Areopagus  till  after  the  battle  of  Tanagra,  the 
moderates  had  no  leader  of  distinction,  since  Cimon,  their 
natural  champion,  was  in  exile.1  The  termination  of  the  bit- 
ter contest,  as  to  whether  the  Areopagus  or  the  Heliastic 
courts  should  control  the  government,  was  marked  by  the  pro- 
duction in  458  of  the  Oresteia  of  Aeschylus.2  Aristotle  tells 
us  the  Athenian  state  now  began  to  suffer  a considerable  de- 
terioration. Many  good  men  of  both  parties  had  been  lost  in 
the  war,  which  now,  carried  on  in  a desultory  manner,  served 
only,  in  the  opinion  of  Aristotle,  to  cripple  the  state.  The 
blame  of  this  he  lays  upon  the  government  in  sending  out 
detachments  of  but  2,000  or  3,000  at  a time,  and  upon  the 
generals  in  command,  whose  only  recommendation  to  appoint- 
ment was  the  reputation  of  their  fathers.  It  would  be  more 
just  to  Athens  to  say  that  her  restless  energy  caused  at  times 
a waste  of  power.  When  we  consider  that  in  these  years 
Athens  formed  an  alliance  with  Argos,  Megara,  and  Thessaly, 


1 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  26,  is  certainly  wrong  in  making  Cimon’s  youth  a 
reason  for  his  absence  from  political  life  during  this  period*  He  was  a young 
man,  perhaps  twenty-five  years  of  age  at  the  time  of  Xerxes’  invasion.  This  would 
make  him  forty-two  when  the  Areopagus  fell,  and  a man  of  forty  could  not  have 
been  considered  too  young  for  the  leadership  in  politics  in  those  times.  A more 
cogent  reason  is  the  one  given  above.  Cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens, 
pp.  104-5,  n*  on  vewTepov. 

2 “ Thus  we  may  regard  this  tragedy  as  the  harmonizing  termination  of  one  of 
the  sorest  constitutional  struggles  through  which  Athens  had  to  pass”;  Curtius, 
op.  cit .,  II.  p.  426;  cf.  Bernhardy,  Geschichte  der  griechischen  Literatur,  III. 
p.  287  ff. ; Mahaffy,  History  of  Greek  Literature,  I.  p.  272,  is  wrong  in  placing 
the  fall  of  the  Areopagus  so  late.  The  Oresteia  did  not  appear  at  the  time  of  the 
conflict,  as  Curtius  has  observed. 


FROM  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  227 


defeated  the  Corinthians  and  Aeginetans,  besieged  the  latter 
effectually  in  their  island,  and  built  the  long  walls,  we  cannot 
help  thinking  that  her  foreign  and  home  policy  was  never 
more  vigorous  or  successful.  To  be  sure  she  met  with  re- 
verses, as  in  the  loss  of  the  fleet  dispatched  to  Egypt ; but 
these  did  not  seem  to  diminish  her  energy.  Indeed  it  appeared 
for  a time  that  her  empire  was  not  to  be  confined  to  the  sea, 
for  extending  nothward,  it  came  to  include  Boeotia  and  Phocis, 
and  there  was  no  telling  where  it  would  stop.  But  the  weak- 
ness of  Athens  by  land,  the  absence  of  any  real  need  of  her 
protection  on  the  part  of  her  new  subjects,  and  the  active  op- 
position of  Thebes  and  Sparta  soon  brought  the  land  empire 
to  an  end.1  To  the  student  of  constitutional  history  these 
events  are  of  value,  in  that  they  manifest  the  strength  and 
activity  of  Athens  under  a popular  government.  But  Aristotle 
complains  of  a laxity  in  the  internal  administration  of  Athens, 
and  in  a departure  from  her  old  usage  of  strict  adherence  to 
law.  It  is  indeed  quite  likely  that  the  Ecclesia  began  with  the 
fall  of  the  Areopagus  to  take  the  management  of  affairs  more 
directly  into  its  own  hands,  and  to  control  the  administration 
through  psephismata , or  simple  decrees  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
people.  The  change  would  naturally  take  place  with  the 
liberation  of  the  Ecclesia  from  the  veto  and  inhibitory  power 
of  the  Areopagus.  The  nine  archons  suffered  immediately 
with  that  body  by  the  cutting  down  of  the  life-long  dignity 
and  authority  that  awaited  them  on  the  expiration  of  their  year 
of  office.  In  the  year  457,  Zeugitae  were  admitted  to  the 
archonship,  though  no  change  was  made  in  the  manner  of 
election.  Before  this,  the  Zeugitae  had  constitutionally  filled 
only  the  lesser  magistracies,  but  had  often  been  admitted  by 
a legal  fiction  to  the  archonship  and  other  offices  requiring 
high  property  qualifications.  The  Thetes  were  never  admitted 
except  by  a legal  fiction.2  The  archons  were  being  superseded 


1 Holm,  Griechische  Geschichte,  II.  p.  271. 

2 Cf.  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  p.  106. 


228 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


in  the  administration  by  the  generals,  senate,  ecclesia,  and 
courts;  and  were  now  little  more  than  clerks  with  routine  duties. 
These  measures  were,  no  doubt,  carried  through  with  the 
approval  of  Pericles.  It  was  his  policy  to  remain  in  the  back 
ground,  “ reserving  himself,  like  the  Salaminian  trireme,  for* 
great  occasions,  while  matters  of  lesser  importance  were  de- 
spatched by  friends  or  other  speakers  under  his  direction.”  1 
In  this  way  he  maintained  his  influence  unbroken  through  so 
many  years.  While  still  a young  man,  he  had  shown  his  polit- 
ical bearing  by  the  accusation  (in  463)  of  Cimon  in  the  euthyna  of 
his  generalship.  He  was  undoubtedly  connected  with  Ephialtes 
in  his  attack  upon  the  Areopagus,  and  seems  to  have  followed 
up  that  victory  by  robbing  it  of  some  other  powers.2  Cimon, 
his  political  antagonist,  was  converted  to  a friendly  yoke-fellow 
by  the  application  of  ostracism  in  461. 3 From  the  time  of  his 
return,  in  457-6,  a mild  rivalry  existed  between  the  two  leaders, 
though  in  the  main  their  fields  of  action  were,  apparently  by 
mutual  agreement,  separated.4  The  story  is  told  that  Cimon 
gained  great  influence  in  the  state  by  the  magnificence  of  his 
liturgies  and  by  the  beneficent  liberality  of  private  expenditures. 
Pericles,  on  the  other  hand,  having  comparatively  little  wealth, 
sought  to  counterbalance  this  influence  by  the  introduction  of 
a dicastic  stipend.  This  was  not  a selfish  expedient  however 
to  secure  his  personal  ascendency.  His  object  was  rather  to 
ground  the  democratic  state  upon  the  Heliastic  courts,  as  the 
aristocratic  state  had  been  grounded  upon  the  Areopagus. 
The  regular  and  frequent  sessions  of  numerous  Dicasteria  was 
essential  to  this  object  and  could  be  effected  only  by  the  intro- 
duction of  pay.  Moreover,  most  of  the  allies  had  by  this  time 
granted  to  Athens  by  treaty  the  power  to  settle  all  the  more 


1 Plutarch,  Pericles,  7 

2 This  seems  to  be  the  idea  of  Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  27.  Ephialtes  may  have 
contented  himself  with  robbing  it  of  its  political  powers,  and  Pericles  have 
followed  this  up  by  depriving  it  also  of  its  most  important  judicial  duties. 

3 See  p.  22i. 

4 Plut.,  Cimon,  17. 


FROM  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  229 

important  cases  at  law  arising  among  them.1  For  despatching 
the  judicial  business  of  the  allies  and  of  the  Athenians  them- 
selves, now  greatly  increased  through  their  growing  enterprise, 
and  for  enabling  the  courts  to  take  the  place  of  the  Areopagus 
in  the  control  of  the  Ecclesia,  an  exceedingly  complex  and 
extensive  judicial  system  was  evolved.  The  jury  courts  now 
became  the  most  prominent  feature  in  the  public  life  of 
Athens.2  A further  addition  to  the  judiciary  was  made  in  453 
by  the  re-establishment  of  the  thirty  itinerant  judges,  whose 
duty  was  to  visit  all  the  demes  of  Attica,  settling  petty  cases, 
and  bringing  those  of  more  importance  before  the  Heliastic 
courts.  The  office  of  itinerant  judge  had  been  instituted  by 
Peisistratus  as  a part  of  his  rural  policy.  There  were  still 
many  people  in  the  country;  and  it  was  a relief  both  to  them 
and  to  the  government  to  have  their  petty  cases  settled  outside 
of  the  capital. 

In  the  archonship  of  Antidotus,  451  b.c.,  Pericles  carried 
a measure  restricting  the  politeia  to  those  of  civic  birth  on 
the  side  both  of  father  and  mother.3  Under  the  Aryan  gentile 
system,  continuing  down  to  Solon’s  time,  civic  birth  on  the 
side  of  both  parents  was  an  indispensable  requisite  to  citizen- 
ship. This  usage  was  confirmed  by  the  law  of  Solon  that 
“ no  voOos  should  enjoy  the  anchisteia .”  On  the  adoption  of 
the  Cleisthenean  constitution  and  the  admission  of  many  aliens 
to  the  citizenship,  the  sentiment  of  the  Athenians  on  this 
point  was  naturally  weakened,  and  violations  of  the  law  were, 
in  consequence,  overlooked.  But  it  had  now  come  about  that 
citizenship  at  Athens  conferred  unexampled  privileges,  and 
hence  was  more  highly  valued  and  more  zealously  guarded 
than  ever  before.  At  the  same  time,  the  soundness  of  an 
ancient  state  depended  upon  purity  of  citizenship.  Pericles 


1 Gilbert,  Hdb.  d.  griech.  Staatsalter.,  I.  pp.  391,  402  ff. 

2 Aristophanes,  Clouds,  207-8. 

3 Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch  26  ; Plutarch,  Pericles,  37  ; cf.  Arist.,  Politics,  III.  5 
(p.  1278  a,  34);  Isaeus,  VIII.  19;  XII.  9;  Sandys,  Arist.  Const,  of  Athens,  pp. 
106-7. 


230 


TIIE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


was  not  an  unprincipled  politician  who  desired,  by  limiting 
the  franchise,  to  gain  popularity  and  support.  His  object  was 
to  maintain  the  integrity  of  Athenian  citizenship  and  to  keep 
the  citizen  body  within  the  maximum  numerical  limit  fixed 
by  the  conditions  of  ancient  political  society.  In  the  same 
year,  Cimon  brought  about  a five  years’  truce  with  Sparta,  and 
immediately  after  set  sail  with  200  ships  for  Cyprus,  where 
he  died  in  449. 1 The  departure  of  Cimon  in  45  1 left  Pericles 
without  a rival.  From  this  time  forth  he  controlled  the  state 
with  a firm  hand.  In  447-6  the  battle  of  Coronea  was  lost, 
the  land  empire  of  the  Athenians  fell,  and  the  state  was 
saved  only  by  the  ability  and  tact  of  Pericles.  A thirty 
years’  peace  was  made  in  445  between  Athens  and  Sparta. 
Hostilities  with  Persia  had  already  ceased,  and  the  treaty 
of  Callias  was  negotiated  in  the  same  year.  Thus,  Pericles 
was  left  free  to  carry  out  his  home  policy  in  the  adornment 
of  his  city  with  public  works,  in  strengthening  Athens  and 
the  Peiraeus,  in  fostering  the  Themistoclean  naval  policy.  All 
this  required  expense,  and  the  confederate  funds  were  freely 
used.  Thucydides  opposed  the  domestic  policy  of  Pericles, 
declaring  that  the  “ contributions  paid  in  for  conducting  the 
war  against  the  Persians  were  employed  to  deck  out  the 
city  like  a vain  woman,  while  at  Susa  citizens  paid  court  to 
the  Great  King.”2  He  was  rebuked  by  a vote  of  ostracism, 
and  the  autocracy  of  Pericles  established  more  firmly  than 
ever.  There  were  now  more  than  20,000  persons  subsisting 
in  whole  or  part  upon  the  public  purse.3  These  were  the 
6,000  dicasts,  1,600  archers,  1,200  horsemen,  500  senators, 
500  guards  of  the  dock-yards,  50  guards  in  the  city,  about  700 
magistrates  resident  in  Attica,  about  700  abroad  in  the  empire, 
2,500  hoplites  (at  the  beginning  of  the  war),  4,000  men  for  the 
guardships  (allowing  200  to  each  of  the  twenty),  2,000  men 
for  the  ships  which  collected  the  tribute  (probably  ten  in 


1 Thucydides,  I.  1 1 2 ; Wachsmuth,  Historical  Antiquities  of  Greece,  II.  p.  79. 

2 Curtius,  History  of  Greece,  II.  p.  458,  quoted  from  Plutarch, 

3 Arist.,  Ath.  Pol.,  ch.  24. 


FROM  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  23 1 


number,  two  to  each  of  the  five  tribute-districts  of  the  empire). 
Besides  these,  there  were  all  those  who  were  maintained  in  the 
Prytaneum  at  public  cost,  together  with  the  orphans  supported 
by  the  state  and  the  guards  of  the  prisons,  the  number  of 
whom  has  not  been  stated.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the 
contributions  from  the  allies  amounted  to  six  hundred  talents, 
and  this  sum  must  have  been  greatly  increased  by  the  port- 
duties  at  Athens,  tolls  from  the  Bosporus,  and  other  sources  of 
revenue.1  Yet  there  was,  after  all,  no  idle  mob  in  the  city 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  war.2  The  hoplites  were  all  landed 
proprietors  ; guards,  senators,  and  magistrates  were  in  constant 
service  on  every  day  of  the  year.  The  small  dicastic  fee  of 
two  obols  did  not  suffice  for  daily  subsistence  ; yet  it  was 
indispensable  to  the  service  now  required  of  these  courts,  since 
they  must  sit  240  to  300  days  in  the  year.  The  dicasts  were 
in  general  old  men,  whose  years  of  manual  labor  were  past. 
They  must,  however,  have  been  men  of  some  property  ; and 
indeed  no  pauper  class  existed  in  Athens.  At  the  close  of  the 
war,  when  the  economic  condition  of  the  country  was  at  its 
worst,  there  were  only  5,000  Athenians  who  owned  no  land.3 
These  facts  go  far  toward  determining  the  character  of  the 
Periclean  democracy.  The  Athenians  were  now  a very 
busy  people,  and  most  enthusiastic  and  energetic  in 
their  performance  of  the  state  services.  Private  interests 
and  the  trivial  self-seekings  of  daily  life  were  lost  in  the 
grander  duties  of  ruling  a magnificent  empire  and  maintaining 
the  glory  and  worth  of  a free  government.4  The  whole  organ- 
ism of  state  and  empire  was  pervaded  and  controlled  by  the 
mighty  spirit  of  Pericles.  Though  a citizen  without  title, 


1 Whibley,  Political  Parties  in  Athens,  makes  the  total  income  amount  to  1,000 
talents. 

2 Id.  p.  42  ff. 

3 Id.  p.  40. 

4 This  does  not  mean  that  selfishness  gave  way  to  self-sacrificing  patriotism,  but 
rather  that  they  exchanged  “ a paltry  ambition  after  private  wealth  and  comfort 
for  a higher,  though  still  selfish  ambition  after  public  fame  and  the  glory  of  leading 
the  course  of  public  affairs”;  Mahaffy,  Social  Life  in  Greece,  p.  135. 


232 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION. 


holding  merely  the  office  of  general  by  annual  election,  his 
wisdom,  virtue,  and  genuine  patriotism  made  his  authority  more 
absolute  than  that  of  kings  and  tyrants.  His  spotless  char- 
acter, calm  temper,  and  generous  devotion  to  the  best  interests 
of  his  countrymen  commanded  their  love  and  confidence,  while 
his  peerless  intellect,  his  mighty  eloquence,  his  restless  energy 
moved  ceaselessly  the  gigantic  machinery  of  his  state  and  impe- 
rial government.  There  was  no  weak  yielding  to  the  popular 
will,  — with  the  sternness  and  austerity  of  aristocratic  or  kingly 
rule,  he  directed  uprightly  and  undeviatingly  to  his  country’s 
good,  the  minds  of  the  citizens,  for  the  most  part  by  persuad- 
ing them  and  showing  them  what  was  to  be  done  ; but  some- 
times by  urging  and  pressing  them  forward  against  their  will. 
In  his  foreign  policy  he  curbed  their  passion  for  conquest, 
and  directed  their  power  to  the  consolidation  of  their  present 
empire  and  to  its  maintenance  against  the  Lacedaemonians. 
At  home,  he  made  Athens  the  school  of  Hellas,  first  city  of 
all  time  in  literature,  science,  art,  and  general  culture.  His 
was  the  policy  of  Ephialtes, — to  break  from  the  minds  and 
souls  of  the  poor  their  fetters,  to  give  to  the  humblest 
Athenian  citizen  comfort  in  life,  education,  happiness,  to  fill 
his  mind  with  the  noblest  sentiments  and  loftiest  aspira- 
tions, to  open  to  him  the  widest  possible  field  for  the  exer- 
cise of  all  his  faculties.1  Such  was  the  fruit  which  time 
bore  to  the  Solonian  constitution.  In  431,  on  the  invasion 
of  Attica  by  the  Spartans,  he  took  the  demes  wholly  into  the 
city,  thus  completing  the  movement  begun  by  Aristeides.2 
Although  intended  as  a war-measure,  and  indispensable,  con- 
sidering the  unprotected  condition  of  Attica  and  the  weakness 
of  her  land  forces,  it  was  of  vast  political  significance,  as  the 
last  step  in  the  growth  of  democracy.  The  demns , shut  up  in 
Athens,  ruled  in  law  courts  and  Ecclesia.  Oligarchs  and 
moderates  were  silenced  for  a number  of  years.  The  moral 


1 For  the  character  and  aims  of  Pericles,  see  especially  Plutarch,  Pericles,  and 
Thucydides,  II.  35  ff.,  65  ; cf.  Holm,  Griech.  Geschichte,  II.  p.  271  ff. 

2 Thuc.  II.  14. 


FROM  BATTLE  OF  SALAMIS  TO  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR.  233 

deterioration  which  set  in  at  this  time  and  which  affected 
society  and  government  alike,  arose  from  conditions  independent 
of  the  policy  of  Aristeides  and  Pericles,  and  would  have 
influenced  any  government  no  matter  what  its  form.  . A 
besieged  city  with  an  over-crowded  population,  a fearful  and 
long  continued  plague,  twenty-seven  years  of  war,  the  wholesale 
ruin  of  fleets  and  armies,  the  dismemberment  of  the  empire,  — 
all  these  told  powerfully  on  the  character  of  the  Athenian 
state.  Yet  what  other  state  would  not  have  been  completely 
crushed  by  such  reverses  ? The  strength  of  Athens  began 
with  Cleisthenes  ; under  the  Four  Hundred  and  the  Thirty  she 
was  weakest  ; with  the  renewed  democracy  her  strength  was 
renewed,  so  far  as  exhaustion  from  the  war  permitted, — 
sufficient  justification  of  the  principle  that  freedom  is  the 
parent  of  virtue,  strength,  and  courage.1 


1 “ We  alone  do  good  to  our  neighbors  not  upon  a calculation  of  interest,  but  in 
the  confidence  of  freedom  and  in  a frank  and  fearless  spirit”;  Pericles  in  Thucy- 
dides, II.  40. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


Abbot,  E.  Pericles  and  the  Golden  Age  of  Athens.  New  York 
and  London,  1891. 

Bauer,  A.  Literarische  und  historische  Forschungen  zu  Aris- 
toteles’  * AOrjvaLtov  UoXltclol.  Munich,  1891. 

Baunack,  Joh.  und  Theod.  Die  Inschrift  von  Gortyn.  Leipzig, 
1885. 

Bernhardy,  G.  Grundriss  der  griechischen  Literature  Halle, 
1876. 

Bliimner,  H.  Die  griechischen  Privatalterthiimer.3  Tubingen, 
1882. 

Bradley.  Aristotle’s  Conception  of  the  State,  Hellenica,  1881, 
p.  18  iff.  Oxford. 

Brieger,  A.  Die  Verfassungsgeschichte  von  Athen,  nach  Aristo- 
teles’  neu  angefundener  Schrift,  Unsere  Zeit,  1891.  II.  pp.  18-36. 

Browning,  R.  The  Agamemnon  of  H^schylus,  etc.  Boston  and 
New  York,  1888. 

Biicheler  und  Zitelmann.  Das  Recht  von  Gortyn.  Frankfurt, 
1885. 

Buchholz.  Die  homerischen  Realien,  Bde.  I.  and  II.  Leipzig, 
1871-3. 

Buermann,  H.  Drei  Studien  auf  dem  Gebiet  des  attischen 
Rechts  [Abdr.  aus  dem  ix.  Supplb.  der  Jahrbiicher  fur  classische 
Phrlologie].  Leipzig,  1878. 

Busolt,  G.  Griechische  Geschichte,  2 vols.  Gotha,  1888.  Zur 
Gesetzgebung  Drakons,  Philologus,  L.  pp.  393-400.  Die  griechi- 
schen Staats-  und  Rechtsalterthiimer,  in  Muller’s  Handbuch  der 
klassischen  Alterthumswissenschaft,  Bd.  IV.  1st  ed.,  Nordlingen, 
1886  ; 2d  ed.,  Munich,  1892. 

Butcher  and  Lang.  The  Odyssey  of  Homer  (translation).  New 
York,  1888. 


236 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


Cassel,  P.  Vom  neuen  Aristoteles  und  seiner  Tendenz.  Berlin, 
1891. 

Cauer,  F.  Hat  Aristoteles  die  Schrift  vom  Staate  der  Athener 
geschrieben  ? ihre  Ursprung  und  ihr  Wert  fur  die  altere  athenische 
Geschichte.  Stuttgart,  1891.  Aristoteles  als  Historiker,  Deutsche 
Zeitschrift  fiir  Geschichtswissenschaft  (1892),  VIII.  pp.  1-28. 

Cauer,  P.  Aristoteles’  Urteil  iiber  die  Demokratie,  Neue  Jahr- 
biicher  fiir  Philologie  und  Paedagogik,  1892,  pp.  581-593. 

Cox,  G.  W.  The  Greeks  and  the  Persians  ; The  Athenian 
Empire.  New  York,  1887. 

Crusius,  0.  Die  Schrift  vom  Staate  der  Athener  und  Aristoteles 
iiber  die  Demokratie,  Philologus,  L.  pp.  173-8. 

Curtius,  E.  Alterthum  und  Gegenwart.  Berlin,  1875.  The 
History  of  Greece,  translated  by  A.  W.  Ward,  5 vols.  New  York, 
1886. 

Delbriick,  B.  Die  indogermanischen  Verwandtschaftsnamen. 
Abhandlungen  der  philologisch-historischen  Classe  der  koniglich 
sachsischen  Gesellschaft  der  Wissenschaften,  XI.  pp.  381-606. 
Leipzig,  1890. 

Dittenberger.  Die  kleisthenischen  Phylen,  Hermes,  IX.  p.  385  ff. 

Donaldson,  J.  Women  in  Ancient  Greece.  Contemporary  Review 
(1878),  XXXII.  pp.  647-64. 

Droysen,  H.  Vorlaufige  Bemerkungen  zu  Aristoteles’  ’AffyraiW 
UoXireia.  Berlin,  1891. 

Eichhoff.  Ueber  die  Blutrache  bei  den  Griechen.  Daisburg, 
1872. 

Erdmann,  M.  Der  Athenerstaat.  Leipzig,  1892. 

Fanta,  A.  Der  Staat  in  der  Ilias  und  Odyssee.  Innsbruck,  1882. 

Frankel,  M.  Attische  Geschworengerichte.  Berlin,  1877. 

Frazer.  Prytaneum,  Temple  of  Vesta,  etc.,  Journal  of  Philology, 
XIV.  (No.  XXVIII.),  p.  145  ff. 

Freeman,  E.  A.  History  of  Federal  Government,  I.  London 
and  Cambridge,  1863.  Comparative  Politics.  London,  1873.  The 
Historians  of  Athens,  Historical  Essays,  second  series,  pp.  1 10-123. 
London,  1880.  The  Athenian  Democracy,  ib.  pp.  124-181. 

Gilbert,  G.  Die  altattische  Komenverfassung  [Abd.  aus  dem  vii. 
Supplb.  der  Jahrbiicher  fiir  classische  Philologie].  Leipzig,  1874. 
Handbuch  der  griechischen  Staatsalterthiimer,  2 vols.  Leipzig, 
1881. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


237 


Gladstone.  Studies  on  Homer  and  the  Homeric  Age,  3 vols. 
Oxford,  1858. 

Gomperz,  Th.  Aristoteles  und  seine  neuentdeckte  Schrift, 
Deutsche  Rundschau,  XVII.  p.  219;  Die  Schrift  vom  Staatswesen 
der  Athener  und  ihr  neuester  Beurtheiler.  Vienna,  1891. 

Goodwin,  W.  W.  At /cat  a7ro  ctv[a(36\wv  and  SiVat  av(A/36\(U(u,  Amer- 
ican Journal  of  Philology  (1880),  I.  pp.  4-16. 

Gopalacharlu.  Vedic  Women,  The  Theosophist,  XII.  p.  8 ff. 
Grote,  G.  A History  of  Greece,  10  vols.  Murray,  London,  1888 
(referred  to  as  “large  edition”);  the  same,  4 vols.,  Allison  & Co., 
New  York,  1882  (referred  to  as  “small  edition”). 

Grunzel.  Aristoteles  und  die  ’AOtjvollwv  IIoAireta.  Leipzig, 

1891. 

Hammarstrand,  S.  W.  Attikas  Verfassung  zur  Zeit  des  Konig- 
thums  [Abd.  aiis  dem  vi.  Supplb.  der  Jahrbiicher  fur  classische 
Philologie].  Leipzig,  1873. 

Headlam,  J.  W.  Election  by  Lot  at  Athens.  Cambridge,  1891. 
The  Constitution  of  Draco,  Classical  Review,  V.  pp.  166-9.  Notes 
on  Early  Athenian  History  : (I)  The  Council  : e^eVat,  and  vaxxpapoi , 
ib.  VI.  pp.  249-253  ; (II)  The  Council,  ib.  pp.  293-8. 

Hearn.  The  Aryan  Household.  London,  1879. 

Henkel.  Studien  zur  Geschichte  der  griechischen  Lehre  vom 
Staate.  Leipzig,  1872. 

Hermann,  C.  F.  Political  Antiquities  of  Greece,  translated. 
Oxford,  1836. 

Herwerden  et  Leeuwen.  De  Republica  Atheniensium.  Leyden, 
i89i- 

Herzog,  E.  Zur  Literatur  fiber  den  Staat  der  Athener.  Tubingen, 

1892. 

Holm,  A.  Griechische  Geschichte,  3 vols.  ‘Berlin,  1886. 
Howard,  G.  E.  Development  of  the  King’s  Peace  and  the 
English  Local  Peace-Magistracy. 

Hug.  Bezirke,  Gemeinden  und  Biirgerrecht  in  Attika.  Studien 
aus  dem  classischen  Alterthum  (1881),  I.  pp.  1-50.  Freiburg. 

Ihne,  W.  Early  Rome.  New  York,  1890. 

Jebb,  R.  C.  Homer  : an  Introduction  to  the  Iliad  and  Odyssey. 
Boston,  1887. 

Jevons,  F.  B.  The  Development  of  the  Athenian  Democracy. 
London,  1886. 


238 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


Jowett,  B.  Thucydides  (translation).  Boston,  1883.  The  Poli- 
tics of  Aristotle  (translation).  Oxford,  1885. 

Kaibel  und  Kiessling.  Aristoteles’  Schrift  vom  Staatswesen  der 
Athener  (German  translation).  Strassburg,  1891. 

Kaibel  et  Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.  Aristoteles’  IIoAiraa  ’A 6rj- 
miW.2  Berlin,  1891. 

Keil,  B.  Die  Solonische  Verfassung  in  Aristoteles’  Verfassungs- 
geschichte  Athens.  Berlin,  1892. 

Kenyon,  F.  G.  Aristotle  on  the  Constitution  of  Athens.2  Lon- 
don, 1891.  Aristotle  on  the  Athenian  Constitution  (translation). 
London,  1891. 

Kirchhoff.  Der  delische  Bund,  Hermes,  XI.  p.  1 ff. 

Krauss.  Sitte  und  Brauch  der  Siidslaven.  Vienna,  1885. 

Kuhn,  E.  Die  Entstehung  der  Stadte  der  Alten.  Leipzig,  1878. 
Die  griechische  Komenverfassung  als  Moment  der  Entwickelung 
des  Stadtewesens  im  Alterthum.  Rhein.  Mus.  XV.  pp.  1-38. 

Leake,  W.  On  the  Demi  of  Attica,  Transactions  of  the  Royal 
Society  of  Literature,  I.  11.  p.  114#.  London,  1829. 

Lehmann.  Zur  'AOrjvatwv  lloAireia,  Hermes  (1892),  XXVIII. 
pp.  530-60. 

Leist.  Graeco-italische  Rechtsgeschichte.  Jena,  1884.  Alt- 
arisches  Jus  Gentium.  Jena,  1889. 

Leyds,  R.  Zur  altern  attischen  Geschichte,  Neue  Jahrbiicher  fur 
Philologie  und  Paedagogik,  1892,  p.  88. 

Lippert,  J.  Die  Religionen  der  europaischen  Culturvolker  in 
ihrem  geschichtlichen  Ursprunge.  1881. 

Lloyd.  The  Age  of  Pericles.  London,  1875. 

Luber.  Die  ionische  Phyle  der  TeXeovres.  Gorz,  1876. 

Lugebil.  Ueber  das  Wesen  und  die  historische  Bedeutung  des 
Ostrakismos  in  Athen,  Jahrbiicher  fiir  klassische  Philologie,  Supplb. 
IV.  1.  Zur  Geschichte  der  Staatsverfassung  von  Athen  [Sep.  abdr. 
aus  d.  5.  Supplb.  d.  Jahrbiicher  fiir  klassische  Philologie].  Leipzig, 
1871. 

Mahaffy.  Social  Life  in  Greece.  London,  1883. 

Maine,  H.  Ancient  Law.  New  York,  1885. 

McLennan.  The  Patriarchal  Theory.  London,  1885.  Studies 
in  Ancient  History.  London,  1886. 

Meier  und  Schomann.  Der  attische  Process  (J.  H.  Lipsius). 
Berlin,  1883. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


239 


Melber,  J.  Aristoteles’  'AOrjvaiwv  noXtreta  und  die  bisher  dariiber 
erschienene  Litteratur.  Blatter  fiir  das  Bayerische  Gymnasialschul- 
wesen  (1892),  XXVIII.  1. 

Meyer,  E.  Die  Pelasger  in  Attika  und  auf  Lemnos,  Philologus, 
XLVIII.  p.  466  ff. 

Meyer,  G.  Griechische  Grammatik.  Leipzig,  1886. 

Meyer,  P.  Des  Aristoteles  Politik  und  die  ’Afl^vaiW  noAiraa, 
nebst  einer  Litteratur-Uebersicht.  Bonn,  1891. 

Mommsen,  Th.  The  History  of  Rome  (trans.  by  Dickson),  4 vols. 
New  York,  1886. 

Morgan.  Ancient  Society.  New  York,  1887. 

Morris,  C.  D.  Chronology  of  the  nevr^Kovraena,  American  Journal 
of  Philology,  VII.  pp.  325-343.  Thucydides,  bk.  I.  Boston, 
1887. 

Muller,  C.  Fragmenta  historicorum  Graecorum.  Paris,  1848. 
Miiller,  Max.  Editor  of  The  Sacred  Books  of  the  East  (translation). 
Oxford  : Buhler,  G.  ( a ) The  Sacred  Laws  of  the  Aryas,  pt.  I. ; Apa- 
stamba  and  Gautama,  II.  1879  ; pt.  II.  Vasishtha  and  Baudhayana, 
XIV.  1882  ; ( b ) The  Laws  of  Manu,  XXV.  1886.  Eggeling,  J. 
The  Catapatha  Brahmana,  pt.  I.  bks.  I.  and  II.,  XII.  1882.  Jolly,  J. 
The  Institutes  of  Vishnu,  VII.  1880. 

Munro,  J.  A.  R.  The  Chronology  of  Themistocles’  Career. 
Classical  Review  (1892),  VI.  p.  333  f. 

Newman,  W.  L.  Aristotle  on  the  Constitution  of  Athens,  ib. 

v.  pp-  ^s-16^ 

Oman,  C.  W.  C.  A History  of  Greece.2  London  and  New  York, 
1891. 

Packard,  L.  R.  Studies  in  Greek  Thought.  Boston,  1886. 
Paton.  The  Deceleian  Inscription  and  the  Attic  Phratries. 
Classical  Review,  V.  pp.  221-3. 

Pauly.  Realencyklopaedie.  2d  edit.  Stuttgart,  1864. 

Petersen,  C.  Ueber  die  Geburtstagsfeier  bei  den  Griechen  nach 
Alter,  Art,  und  Ursprung  [Abdr.  aus  d.  ii.  Supplb.  d.  Jahrbiicher 
fiir  klassische  Philologie].  Leipzig,  1858. 

Philippi,  A.  Beitrage  zu  einer  Geschichte  des  attischen  Biirger- 
rechts.  Berlin,  1870.  Der  Areopag  und  die  Epheten.  Berlin, 
1874. 

Plass,  H.  G.  Die  Tyrannis  in  ihren  beiden  Perioden  bei  den 
alten  Griechen,  I.  Bremen,  1852. 


240 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


Poste.  Aristotle  on  the  Constitution  of  Athens  (translation). 
London,  1891. 

Ridgeway,  W.  The  Homeric  Landsystem,  Journal  of  Hellenic 
Studies  (1885),  VI.  pp.  319-339.  Homeric  Trial  Scene,  Journal 
of  Philology,  no.  XIX.  p.  30  ff. 

Rohde.  Psyche,  I.  Freiburg,  1890. 

Riihl,  F.  Ueber  die  von  Mr.  Kenyon  veroffentlichte  Schrift  vom 
Staate  der  Athener,  Rhein.  Mus.  1891,  pp.  426-464.  Der  Staat  der 
Athener  und  kein  Ende.  Jahrbiicher  fur  klassische  Philologie  (1892), 
Supplb.  XVIII.  pp.  675-706. 

Sandys.  Aristotle’s  Constitution  of  Athens.  London  and  New 
York,  1893. 

Sauppe,  H.  De  phratriis  Atticis  Commentatio,  I.  Gottingen, 
1886. 

Schenkl.  Zur  Geschichte  des  attischen  Biirgerrechts.  Wiener 
Studien,  V.  (1883),  p.  52  ff. ; VII.  (1885),  p.  337  ff. 

Schomann,  G.  F.  Opuscula  Academici,  I.  Greifswald,  1835. 
Assemblies  of  the  Athenians  (Eng.  trans.).  Cambridge,  1838. 
Athenian  Constitutional  History  (Eng.  trans.).  Oxford  and  London, 
1878.  Antiquities  of  Greece,  1880. 

Schliemann.  Mycenae.  New  York,  1878. 

Schrader.  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte.2  Jena,  1890. 

Schvarcz,  J.  Aristoteles  und  die  ’A^vatW  rtoAtreia.  Leipzig,  1891. 

Smith.  Dictionary  of  Greek  and  Roman  Antiquities.  2 vols. 
London,  1890. 

Spencer.  Principles  of  Sociology.  2 vols.  New  York,  1882. 

Starcke.  Die  primitive  Familie  in  ihrer  Entstehung  und  Ent- 
wickelung.  Leipzig,  1888. 

Sturm.  Der  Ostrakismos  und  seine  Bedeutung  in  Athen.  Vienna, 
1878. 

Szanto,  E.  Die  kleisthenischen  Trittyen,  Hermes,  XXVII.  pp. 
3 1 2-3 1 5.  Zur  attischen  Phratrien-  und  Geschlechtsverfassung, 
Rhein.  Mus.  XL.  p.  506  ff.  Untersuchung  liber  das  attische  Biirger- 
recht.  Vienna,  1881. 

Tarbell,  F.  B.  A Study  of  the  Attic  Phratry,  American  Journal 
of  Archaeology,  V.  no.  2.  pp.  13 5-1 53. 

Thirlwall.  History  of  Greece.  2 vols.  New  York,  1845. 

Thompson.  The  Draconian  Constitution.  Classical  Review  (1891), 
V.  p.  336. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


24 


Thumser,  V.  Die  griechischen  Staatsalterthiimer.6  Freiburg,  1892. 

Tylor.  Primitive  Culture.  2 vols.  New  York,  1888. 

Vischer.  Ueber  die  Bildung  von  Staaten  und  Biinden.  Kleine 
Schriften,  I. 

Wachsmuth,  C.  Die  Akropolis-Gemeinde  und  die  Helikon- 
Gemeinde,  Rhein.  Mus.  XXIII.  p.  170  If.  Die  Stadt  Athen  im 
Alterthum,  I.  Leipzig  1874. 

Wachsmuth,  W.  Historical  Antiquities  of  the  Greeks.  2 vols. 
(translation).  Oxford  and  London,  1837. 

Whibley,  L.  Political  Parties  in  Athens  during  the  Peloponnesian 
War.  Cambridge,  1889. 

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.  Burg  und  Stadt  von  Kekrops  bis 
Perikles,  Philologische  Untersuchungen,  I.  (1880.) 

Wright,  J.  H.  Did  Philochoros  quote  the  ’AOrjvaiwv  HoXireia  as 
Aristotle’s?  Am.  Journ.  of  Philol.  XII.  pp.  310-318.  The  Date  of 
Cylon.  Boston,  1892. 

Zelle.  Beitrage  zur  alteren  Verfassungsgeschichte  Athens.  Dres- 
den, 1850. 

Zimmer.  Altindisches  Leben.  Berlin,  1879. 

Zingerle,  A.  Zur  'AOrjvaiajv  UoXireta  des  Aristoteles,  Zeitschrift 
fiir  die  osterreichischen  Gymnasien,  XLIII.  p.  205  f. 


INDEX. 


Acastus,  123. 

Acropolis,  20,  n.  1,  90,  97. 

Acte  ( Actaea ),  103,  105. 

Adoption,  of  families  into  gens,  5;  cere- 
monies of,  17,  n.  4,  44  ; object  of,  46; 
in  Crete,  75. 

Adultery,  49,  n.  5,  147,  n.  2. 

Aegicoreis,  103,  106. 

Agnation,  influence  on  the  family,  3, 
12  ; in  the  household,  57. 

Agni,  34,  n.  2. 

Agora,  the  Homeric,  88,  116,  121-8. 

Agroeci  ( Apoeci , Geomori , Georgi,  Pela- 
tae , Paroeci),  77,  n.  5,  86,  88,  161-2, 
182. 

Alcmaeon,  125. 

Alcmaeonidae,  135-6,  186,  190,  204. 

Amnesty-decree  of  Solon,  160-1. 

Amphidromia,  43. 

Anacreon,  190. 

Ancestor-worship,  earliest  form,  11,  n. 
4 ; influence  of  on  marriage  cere- 
monies, 15;  on  the  family,  24-5 ; 
evidence  of  among  the  Aryans,  24,  n. 
1;  origin  of,  30,  31,  n.  iff.;  leading 
fact  in,  32  ; causes  of  decline,  70,  n. 
7;  in  early  Attica,  71,  80;  in  Homer, 
68-71;  in  Hesiod,  69-70. 

Anchisteia,  79. 

Anchisteis  ( Sapindas , cognate-family , 
near  kin),  6,  55-8,  163;  defined,  3,  n. 
1,  22,  n.  2 ; and  niyoga  marriage,  42  ; 
assist  at  nomizomena , 46  ; court  of, 
50,  n.  2 ; privileges  and  duties  of,  79. 

Anthropologists,  questionable  method 
of,  4,  n.  4,  80,  n.  3. 

Antidotus,  archonship  of,  229. 

Aphidna,  93-4,  105. 


Apoeci,  see  Agroeci. 

Apollo,  as  law-giver,  147,  n.  1;  Patrdiis , 
82,  162,  195. 

Arbitration,  of  the  state,  3,  118-9;  in 
the^phratry,  67. 

Archegetae,  197. 

Archon,  82,  95;  the  (eponymous),  123, 
126-7,  I29>  131-2,  183;  the  nine 
archons,  124,  i29ff.,  170,  203,  208. 

Archonship,  election  to,  168-9. 

Areopagus,  see  Boule. 

Argadeis,  103-4,  106. 

Aristaechmus,  archonship  of,  143. 

Aristeides,  rival  of  Themistocles,  209  f.; 
aids  in  rebuilding  walls,  213;  ostra- 
cism of  Them.,  213-4;  law  as  to 
archonship,  214;  and  Delian  Con- 
federacy, 215-7. 

Ariston,  185. 

Artemisium,  battle  of,  21 1. 

Aryan,  race,  primitive  home  of,  21,  n.  4 ; 
use  of  term  in  this  treatise,  2,  n.  4. 

Assembly,  of  phratry,  19,  n.  3 ; of 
tribe,  20,  n.  2, 63;  see  Agora , Ecclesia. 

Asylum,  in  Attica,  119. 

Athena,  Pallas , as  law-giver,  147,  n.  1 ; 
Phratria , 96. 

Atthis,  103. 

Autochthon,  103. 

Autochthones,  87,  97. 

Basileia,  111-128,  187;  religious  char- 
acter of,  20,  n.  3 ; origin,  hi;  decline, 
1 22  ff  ; made  elective,  125. 

Basileus,  primitive  duties  of,  20,  n.  3 ; 
resigns  in  old  age,  72  ; clan-chief  so 
termed,  82,  iiij  character  of,  112-4, 
191  ; right  to  rule,  H4ff;  revenues, 


244 


INDEX. 


20,  n.  5 ; ten-year,  125  ; annual,  func- 
tions of,  1 30- 1. 

Basilinna,  basilissa,  49,  n.  1,  130,  n.  2. 

Bate,  95. 

Birth,  ceremonies  of,  43-4. 

Blood-feud,  in  Homeric  Greece,  3,  73, 
n.  3,  1 18  ; in  the  phratry,  19,  n.  2 ; in 
the  gens,  67  ; in  Attica,  79-80,  163-4. 

Boucolium,  129. 

Boule,  the  Homeric,  112,  115,  1 17-120, 
1 21,  145,  n.  3 ; of  the  Areopagus, 
112,  n.  4,  126,  172-3,  132-3,  144-5* 
154,  201,  212,  218,  n.  2;  the  Draco- 
nian, 144ft;  the  Solonian,  170,  193; 
the  Cleisthenean,  199  ft. 

Bouleuterium,  83-4,  96,  112. 

Bratstvenici,  see  Phrateres. 

Bratstvo,  see  Phratry . 

Brauron,  93,  106. 

Burial,  68-9. 

Burning  of  body,  69-70. 

Buselidae,  8-9,  n.  1. 

Cecropia,  93-4,  hi. 

Cecropis,  103. 

Cephisia,  93,  105. 

Children,  in  prim.  Aryan  family,  1 1 ; 
in  house-community,  16-7  ; in  later 
Aryan  family,  53-5  ; in  Athens  before 
Solon,  78-9 ; sale  and  emancipation 
of,  51. 

Cimon,  206,  217;  prosecuted  by  Pericles, 
218;  ostracised,  221;  recalled,  225; 
private  liberality  of,  228  ; death,  230. 

Citizenship,  177,  199,  229. 

City,  Greek  conception  of,  26 ; see 
Polls. 

Clan-chief,  59,  62-3,  82, 112. 

Cleisthenes,  147,  n.  1,  193  ff. 

Cleomenes,  193-4. 

Client,  61;  Greek,  86-9;  Cretan,  77; 
Attic,  77,  83  ; see  Hectemori , Agroeci. 

Codrids,  126,  158,  n.  2. 

Codrus,  123-5,  I&7- 

Cognate-family,  see  Anchistek. 

Colacretae,  107,  167. 

Commandments,  Aryan  gentile,  65-6. 


Confederacy,  Delian,  216  ff.;  change 
to  Empire,  221. 

Coronea,  battle  of,  230. 

Council,  family,  13,  n.  1;  see  Boule. 

Court,  of  village,  60-1 ; of  300, 135,  146, 
n.  r>  J53»  cf.  J93>  °f  the  Areopagus, 
1 50-1,  189;  popular  courts,  see  Di- 
cast eria. 

Craddha,  27,  n.  5;  see  Nomizomena. 

Cropidae,  95. 

Currency,  reformed  by  Solon,  176-7. 

Cyclopes,  3-4,  n.  1,  50,  n.  2. 

Cylon,  134-7. 

Cyrbeis,  179. 

Cytherus,  93,  106. 

Daemons,  69-70, 

Damasias,  137,  152,  182. 

Daughters,  infanticide  of,  12,  16,  n.  8; 
marriage  of,  22;  initiation  of,  44  ; ap- 
pointed, 46,  n.  3. 

Deceleia,  93,  105. 

Delphinium,  119,  149. 

Deme,  83,  85,  96,  n.  1,  hi;  Cleis- 
thenean, 194, 196-7;  a fictitious  gens, 
5,  198. 

Demarch,  196,  n.  1. 

At]p.otcu,  197. 

Demiurgi,  86-8,  140  f.,  146,  161-2,  182. 

Democracy,  best  kind  of,  202 ; growth 
of,  in  Athens,  217. 

Demus,  136,  160,  168,  174-5,  i8of.,  232. 

Aetriroiva,  52. 

Dharma  ( Themis , Fas,  Jus  divinum), 
period  of,  25  ; defined,  29-30;  influ- 
ence of  on  the  hearth,  33 -7;  mar- 
riage, 38  ; patria  potestas , 42-3  ; cere- 
monies of  birth,  44 ; dowry,  54 ; 
private  ownership,  59 ; clan-leader- 
ship, 62  ; kinship  in  gens,  63-4  ; idea 
of  law,  64-5;  instinct  of  sympathy, 
66. 

Diacria,  103,  106. 

Diacrians,  155,  184. 

Diasia,  98. 

AiKtur-iroX.os,  1 16,  n.  1. 

Dicasteria,  168,  17 1,  203. 


INDEX. 


245 


Dicastic  Stipend,  223-4,  228-9. 
Dionysia,  the  Lenaean , 130. 
Dodecapolis,  85,  93  ft.,  99. 

AovXeveiv,  to  (slavery),  138  ft.,  142,  n.  2. 
Dowry,  39,  54-5,  72,  78. 

Draco,  law  of,  as  to  ancestor-worship, 
71;  laws  and  constitution,  147,  n.  1, 
143  ff. 

Ecclesia,  126,  144,  n.  5,  152,  154;  the 
Solonian,  170;  Cleisthenean,  201. 
Eedna,  51,  72,  74. 
iyyvr\<ri<s}  40. 

€hr<|>opa£,  168. 
ckSovvcli,  40,  72. 

Eleusis,  93,  106-7. 

Eleven,  the,  167. 
tvayC^civ,  see  Nomizomenci. 

Epacria,  93-4,  106. 

€<J>€0-T101,  61. 

Ephetae,  133,  148,  n.  2,  160;  were 
Areopagites,  120;  and  the  Draconian 
legislation,  120,  148  ft. 

Ephialtes,  179,  218-220,  232. 
eimiK€i$  (moderates),  226,  232. 
Epimenides  of  Crete,  135. 

Eponymous,  heroes,  1,  n.  3,  18,  n.  4 ; 

see  Archon. 

Erechtheus,  98. 

Erinys,  of  parent,  72. 

Eupatridae,  88,  i25f.,  134,  140,  142. 
Eupori,  180. 

Eupuridae,  95. 

Euthyna,  152-3,  168,  172. 

Exogamy,  5-7,  80. 

Exportation  of  produce,  177-8. 

Factions,  local,  184,  197,  201. 
Factitious  groups,  tendency  to  create, 
26. 

Family,  stages  of  development,  25,  n. 
2 ; mutual  duties  of  members,  23,  n. 
6;  primitive  Aryan,  10-12;  early 
Aryan,  12-18,  22  ; later  Aryan,  25- 
55  ; Homeric,  72-5  ; Spartan,  75  ; 
Cretan,  75-7 ; early  Athenian,  77-80 ; 
and  gens,  Solon’s  laws  as  to,  178-9. 


Fire  of  hearth,  why  eternal,  33,  n.  6. 
Functions,  specialized,  and  temporary 

functionaries , 133. 

Gargettus,  94. 

Geleontes,  103  ft. 

Gennetae,  59  ft.,  82-4,  194;  and  the 
blood-feud,  3 ; and  the  niyoga  mar- 
riage, 42  ; rights  of  inheritance,  163; 
see  Gens. 

Gens  ( Clan , Gotra),  origin  of,  4,  58-9  ; 
composition,  80,  85  ; heterogeneity, 
4-6,  8,  n.  2,  58;  autonomy,  85;  prop- 
erty,  59  ; abode,  60-1  ; leader,  61-2  ; 
court,  61,  67  ; characteristics,  9,  n. 
1,  81-2;  clients,  61  ; object,  63-4; 
Aryan,  58-67  ; Greek,  80-9  ; under 
Cleisthenes,  194. 

Gentile,  commandments,  65-7;  organ- 
ization of  the  Athenian  state,  85. 
Geomori,  Georgi,  see  Agroeci. 

Gerontes,  116,  n.  1,  118,  120. 
Gerotrophy,  50,  n.  1,  52,  56,  58,  n.,  72. 
Gnorimi,  180. 

Gotra,  see  Gens. 

Gortyn,  law-code  of,  75-7. 

Government,  changes  in,  212,  n.  2. 
Grammateion,  84. 

■ypcu})!]  ‘irapavdp.cav,  222-3. 

Guest,  48,  n.  4. 

Hades,  70. 

Harpactides,  archonship  of,  191. 
Hearth,  27,  33-4,  42  ; fire , why  eternal 
33,  n.  6;  purity  of,  34  ; extinction  of, 
35  ; worship  of,  24. 

Hecalesium,  94. 

Hegesistratus,  189. 

Heiress,  17,  n.  5,  76-7. 

Hectemori  ( Shannivartani ),  61,  79,  86- 
9,  138ft.,  158  ; see  Clients , Agroeci. 
Heliaea,  17 1,  n.  1. 

Helicon,  94,  97. 

Hellenotamiae,  216. 

Heracles  Tetrakomos,  94. 

Hermoucreon,  archonship  of,  200. 
Herzog,  see  Polemarch. 


246 


INDEX. 


Hestia,  see  Hearth. 

cT<upoi,  1 13. 

lepd  xal  oo-ia,  195. 

lepa  iraTpwa,  198. 

Hierosyne  ( iepoavvr) ),  157. 

Hindoo  Customs,  genesis  of,  7. 

Hipparchs,  152,  168. 

Hipparchus,  son  of  Charmus,  203;  son 
of  Peisistratus,  189  f. 

Hippeis,  144,  i5r>  T53>  165,  215. 

Hippias,  189-192,  203. 

Hippomenes,  125. 

Homicide,  purification  for,  35,  n.  3 ; 
prosecution  for,  83 ; mitigating  cir- 
cumstances in,  1 19;  actions  for,  131, 

i48ff. 

Homogalaktes,  2,  82. 

Hopletes,  i03ff. 

opoi,  1 40-1,  158. 

House,  a temple,  35-6. 

House-community,  9,  12-18,  23,  27,  n.  4, 
17,  n.  6. 

Household,  established  by  nature,  2 ; 
monarchical  in  government,  2,  12-13, 
48,  54,  73 ; composition  of,  27, 
4 3,  55-6 ; aims  of,  28 ; duties  of 
members,  14,  29;  gods  of,  36,  n. 
3 f- 

Householder,  29,  n.  4,  36,  42-3,  49,  n.  6 ; 
South-Slavonic,  12-14;  Hindoo,  28, 
n.  1 ; Athenian,  28,  n.  5 ; Cretan,  75-6. 

House-mother,  14,  37. 

UTT6V0UVOS,  I 24  f.,  153. 

Hyperbolus,  ostracism  of,  207. 

Hypsichides,  archonship  of,  21 1. 

Inheritance,  28,  47,  n.  4,  57,  n.  4b;  in 
Homeric  Greece,  72;  in  Crete,  76; 
in  Athens,  163. 

Initiation,  into  house-worship,  40,  44  ; 
into  gens  and  phratry,  84. 

Intermarriage  of  kinsmen,  restrictions 
as  to,  6-7,  n.  4,  15,  16,  n.  1,  40-1,  80, 
n.  4. 

Ion,  1 13,  123,  n.  2. 

Iophon,  189. 

Isagoras,  193-4. 


Joint  family,  see  House-Community. 

Judges,  itinerant , 188,  229. 

Jus  divinum,  see  Dharma. 

Kerameis,  104. 

King,  see  Basileus. 

Kingship,  see  Basileia. 

Kinship,  among  the  South-Slavonians, 
6,  n.  1,  9,  12,  15,  n.  5,  40,  n.  2 ; in 
primitive  Aryan  family,  12  ; in  the 
phratry,  18;  in  factitious  groups,  26; 
in  Homeric  Greece,  73 ; cognate,  22, 
n.  2,  57-8. 

Kinsmen,  in  Homeric  Greece,  3 ; in 
early  Attica,  78. 

KXrjpoi,  28-9. 

Kto|iT),  83,  g2ff.,  in. 

Kpdros,  1 1 6,  154,  168. 

KTr||jittTa  and  xpfjfJLaTa>  163. 

Land,  of  gens,  28-9,  59,  60,  82,  n.  1, 
163  ; acquisition  of  limited  by  Solon, 
177- 

Land  empire  of  Athens,  226-230. 

Law,  origin  of,  64  ; monopoly  of  the 
knowledge  of,  143,  148,  151;  code  of 
Draco,  145,  n.  1,  146  ff. ; of  Solon, 
176-9,  191 ; sedition  law  of  Solon, 
173-4,  204. 

60,  63,  83,  96. 

Lot,  election  by,  144,  169, 183,  200,  209. 

Lyceum,  129. 

Lycurgus,  147,  n.  1. 

Manes,  33,  45- 

Marathon,  94  ; battle  of,  204. 

Maroneia,  209. 

Marriage,  by  robbery,  n,  15,  37,  n.  4; 
by  purchase,  11,  37,  78;  object  of, 
41,  78;  ceremonies  of,  15,  n.  3 f.,  39- 
40,  n.  2,  72. 

McLennan’s  theory  of  the  gens,  4-5, 
of  polygamy,  polyandry,  etc.,  7. 

Meal,  Aryan,  42-3. 

Medon,  123,  125. 

Medontidae,  125. 


INDEX. 


247 


Megacles,  leader  of  Paralians,  184, 186 ; 

nephew  of  Cleisthenes,  204. 

Megara,  war  with,  184,  n.  2. 

Melite,  94. 

Menestheus,  98-9. 

Mesogaea,  103,  105. 

Mesogeia,  95. 

Metoecia,  98. 

(ITITpOTToXlS,  75. 

Migrations  to  Attica,  5. 

Minos,  147,  n.  1. 

Monogamy,  7-8,  10,  n.  2,  16. 

Mother,  in  primitive  Aryan  family,  n. 
Museum,  94,  98. 

Mutterrecht,  8,  n.  2. 

Myron,  135. 

Naturalis  ratio,  see  Rta. 

Nature -worship,  higher  development 
of,  63,  n.  5. 

Naucrariae,  103,  107-110,  164,  196. 
Naucrars,  108;  board  of,  127. 

Navy,  early  Attic,  108 ; created  by 
Themistocles,  209-21 1. 

Naxos,  revolt  of,  217. 

Nicodemus,  archonship  of,  209. 

Niyoga  marriage,  42,  n.  1 ff.,  78. 
vo0os,  46,  n.  2,  189,  229. 

Nomizomena  (ivaylfa v,  parentare ),  32, 
n.  1 ff.,  45-7,  50,  52,  n.  7,  56-7,  68,  72. 
Nomothetae,  223. 

Oath,  34,  n.  9,  61 ; of  Boule,  200. 
Obsequium,  50. 

Oenoe,  94. 

Offerings  to  the  dead,  32,  68-70 ; see 
Nomizomena. 

oIkos,  see  House , Household. 

Oligarchy,  129-137,  191;  oligarchs  in 
Athenian  Empire,  219. 

Oresteia  of  Aeschylus,  226. 

Orgeones,  87,  161-2. 

Ostracism,  203-7,  21 T- 

Palladium,  119,  149. 

Pallas,  sons  of,  106. 

Pallene,  94. 

Paralia,  103. 


Paralians,  155. 

Parentare,  see  Nomizomena. 

Parents,  in  primitive  Aryan  family,  1 1 - 
12;  in  Homeric  Greece,  72;  gero- 
trophy  of,  16-17;  duties  of,  50;  re- 
spect to,  66. 

Paroeci,  see  Agroeci. 

Parricide,  66. 

Pater,  of  clan,  82  ; of  state,  116. 

Patni,  51. 

Patria  potestas,  2-4, 12-13,  n.  2;  weak- 
ening of,  23,  n.  4 ; nature  of,  47-8  ; 
limitations  of,  50  ; in  the  clan,  62  ; 
in  early  Attica,  78-9. 

Patriarchal,  family,  3,  n.  3,  4 ; theory, 
1-26. 

Patriotism  of  the  Aryans,  2,  12,  64. 

Peace,  in  family,  13  ; in  gens,  62-3  ; 
thirty  years’,  230. 

Pediaeans,  106. 

Pedion,  103,  106. 

Peiraeus,  94  ; fortifications  of,  210  f. 

Peisistratus,  100,  106,  135-6,  18 1,  184- 
9 ; usurpation,  185  ; character  of  his 
rule,  186  ff.,  201. 

Pelasgians,  97,  n.  4,  104. 

Pelatae,  see  Agroeci,  Clients,  Hectemori. 

Peleces,  95. 

Pentacosiomedimni,  144,  153-4,  165. 

Pericles,  207  ; attack  on  Areopagus, 
220,  n.  2 ; dicastic  stipend,  224  ; law 
as  to  citizenship,  229 ; character  and 
policy,  228,  231-2. 

Perjury,  61. 

Perrhidae,  94. 

Phalerum,  94. 

Phalerus,  93-4,  105. 

Philoneos,  archonship  of,  189. 

Phoenicians,  114,  123. 

Phrateres,  and  the  blood-feud,  3,  83, 
149  ; ties  of  religion  and  blood,  18, 
91,  198  ; mutual  duties  of,  18,  n.  2. 

Phratriarch,  90. 

Phratry,  origin,  9,  18,  90  ff.,  95-6;  size, 
18;  composition,  112  ; Cretan,  75; 
early  Athenian,  90-101 ; Cleisthenean, 
194-5* 


248 


INDEX. 


Phreatto,  150. 

Phylae,  origin,  19-20,  n.  6,  90,  102  ; 
fictitious,  19,  n.  7 ; combination  of, 
21,  114,  1 19  ; Cretan,  75,77;  Ionic, 
90-110;  constitution  of,  92  ; nature 
of,  102,  n.  1;  confusion  of  boundaries, 
107;  under  Solon,  1 61 ; Cleisthenean, 

1,  n.  3,  194  ff. 

Phylobasileis,  21,  91-2,  104,  130,  150, 
152. 

Pitthus,  94. 

Plebeians,  108,  134,  140,  142,  n.  3,  155, 
n.  2. 

Pleme,  see  Phylae. 

irXrieos,  134,  143. 

Plotheia,  94. 

Polemarch,  20,  109,  123,  125,  127,  129, 
203,  208;  functions  of,  131. 

Poletae,  167. 

Polis,  83,  90,  93  ff.,  96  ; origin  of,  122. 
Politeia,  79,  143,  146,  155,  161,  193. 
Polyandry,  among  the  Aryans,  7,  n.  7. 
Polygamy,  among  the  Aryans,  7,  10,  n. 

2,  49,  n.  2. 

Pompe,  40,  72. 

Poseidon,  98. 
irdTvia,  51,  75. 

Prayer  for  offspring,  45,  n.  4f. 
Primogeniture,  54,  62,  72. 
Probalinthus,  94. 

Promiscuity,  7-8. 

Property,  in  primitive  Aryan  family,  1 1 ; 
division  of,  27,  n.  6 ; separate,  of  wife, 
55  ; of  clan,  28-9,  59-60  ; qualifica- 
tion for  office,  154,  167-8. 

Prytanes,  109,  n.  5. 

Prytaneum,  37,  83-4,  129,  150,  160, 
231. 

Psephismata,  227. 

Purification  at  hearth,  34. 

Rajan,  see  Basileus. 

Religion,  higher  development  of,  29, 
n.  6 ; see  Dharma. 

Revenues  of  king,  20,  n.  5,  107,  116-7. 
Rta  (kAotaos,  0u<ris,  naturalis  ratio ),  de- 
fined, 29-30  ; period  of,  25,  53. 


Sagotra,  see  Gennelae. 

Salamis,  battle  of,  212. 

Samachidae,  94. 

Samanodakas,  33,  n.  4. 

Samiti,  see  Assembly. 

Sapindas,  see  Anchisteis. 

Seisachtheia,  158-161,  177,  180. 

Shannivartani,  see  Hectemori. 

Simonides,  190. 

Slaves,  44,  48,  n.  6. 

Solon,  107,  147,  n.  1,  185  ; and  Theseus, 
1 01-2;  family  of,  157;  character, 
157-8;  Seisachtheia , 158-161;  am- 
nesty-decree, 160;  property  classes, 
164-8;  archons,  167-170;  Boule  of 
400,  170;  Ecclesia,  170;  Dicasteria, 
17 1 ; Areopagus,  172  ; visit  to  Egypt, 
180. 

Solonian  Revolution,  The,  157-183. 

Sons,  value  of,  16-7,  72;  at  marriage, 
27  ; bring  fame  to  ancestors,  33,  n.  2, 
4D  n.  5,  45  ; eldest,  17,  n.  3,  53  ; 
continues  worship,  45-6 ; avenges 
father,  53,  n.  2. 

Soul,  belief  in  existence  of,  30-1 ; 
Homeric  conception  of,  32,  n.  4,70-1. 

Spartan  interference  in  Athenian  af- 
fairs, 213,  217. 

Sphettus,  93-4,  106. 

State,  developed  from  family,  1,  n.  2, 
79  ; ancient  theory  of,  1,  n.  3. 

Strategi,  Draconian,  152;  Cleisthenean, 
203. 

Succession,  in  primitive  Aryan  family, 
11 ; in  House-community,  13-14;  in 
leadership  of  clan,  61-2  ; in  basileia , 
1 1 3-4;  see  Inheritance. 

Suppliant,  at  the  hearth,  34-5  ; honor 
due  the,  65. 

<rv<rrf|naTa  Stj^wv,  93. 

Sympathy,  limited  by  kinship,  5. 

Synoecism  of  Athens  and  Attica,  6,  83, 
91,  94,  97-8,  100,  197,  201. 

Tanagra,  battle  of,  224. 

Telos,  40. 

Tetrapolis,  93-4,  106. 


INDEX. 


249 


Thargelia,  131. 

Thasos,  revolt  of,  217. 

Themis,  see  Dharma. 

Ge'fuo’res,  1 1 5. 

Thesmia,  129. 

Themistocles,  naval  policy  of,  209  ft.; 
chronology  of  career,  210,  n.  2 ; re- 
builds walls  of  Athens,  213  ; ostra- 
cism of,  213;  and  Areopagus,  220, 
n.  2. 

Theseus,  93,  98-101,  106,  112. 

0€<T(1OI,  I43,  I48. 

Thesmothetae,  129,  132,  136,  n.  3,  154. 
Thesmotheteum,  130. 

Thetes,  88,  139,  153,  155  ft,  162,  166-7, 

I75»  2I4~5- 
Thoricus,  93,  106. 

Threptra,  72. 

Thucydides,  son  of  Melesias,  206 ; 
ostracism  of,  230. 

Thymoetadae,  94. 

Timocracy,  The  Draconian,  138-156, 

191. 

Titacidae,  94. 

Treasurers,  no,  167. 

Tribe,  see  Phylae. 

Tribe-kings,  see  Phylobasileis. 

Tricorynthus,  94. 

Trikomia,  95. 

Trittyes,  early  Attic,  94,  103,  107-110, 
164  ; Cleisthenean,  194-6. 

Tutelage,  of  women,  23,  n.  3. 


Tyranny,  116,  n.  8,  184-192;  advan- 
tages of,  1 9 1-2. 

Uncles,  maternal  and  paternal,  22,  n.  2. 

Vippati,  19,  n.  8. 

Village,  society  of  households,  2 ; seat 
of  a gens,  19,  n.  6 ; location  of,  60-1 ; 
see  Gens. 

Vojvoda,  see  Polemarch . 

Walls,  the  long,  224. 

Wife,  in  primitive  Aryan  family,  11; 
relatives  of,  12,  n.  2 ; in  later  Aryan 
family,  51—3  ; in  Cretan  family,  76  ; 
mistress  within  the  house,  16 ; im- 
portance of,  41,  n.  7 ; qualifications 
of,.  49,  n.  1 ; second,  49,  n.  2 ; duties 
of,  52-3. 

Women,  free  choice  of  husbands,  51, 
n.  8 ; in  Homeric  Greece,  72-5  ; in 
Athens,  74,  78,  178. 

Xanthippus,  ostracism  of,  204. 

Xypete,  94. 

Zaleucus,  147,  n.  1. 

Zeugitae,  138,  n.  2,  144,  151,  n.  4,  153, 
165-6,  203,  214,  227. 

Zeus,  Herceius , 82,  162,  187,  195 ; 

Geleon , 106;  Phratrius,  96. 

Zupa,  Zupan,  19-20. 


879C8,UNM'ERS,TYOFIUINO,S~ 

M««iuruDiESWC£f»’MlPH|l0lMr 


